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This is the inaugural issue of *Russian Journal of Communication*. Inauguration suggests something formal and extraordinary; yet, starting this journal seems such a natural thing to do. Communication has always been at the heart of Russian ethos. Neither completely European nor completely Asian, Russia has been caught in the middle geographically, historically and culturally. As a result, its connectedness to the world, to the Other, has been complex and contradictory, full of fear and fascination. There are even two words in Russian expressing the idea of connectedness: *obchenie*, understood as personal interaction based on common and shared values, and *kommunikatciya*, understood as transfer of information. Ironically, communism (*kommunizm*, in Russian) became the ideology for building a new social order, and the spirit of the commune (*obschina*, in Russian) suffered in the aftermath of the October Revolution of 1917 and subsequent collectivization of the USSR. Had, perhaps, the idea for a new society been expressed by a different name, capturing the roots of the Russian language and soul and, thus, more native to the Russian ear, the country’s development might have been more evolutionary. But then, Russia historically never had an easy time connecting to the Other (or itself), experiencing major and minor disruptions, of external and internal origin.

Today Russia exhibits a similar — complex and contradictory — attitude to the study of communication, which is often conceptualized in terms of those countries where it has had a longer history. On the one hand, with strong philosophic, linguistic and psychological traditions, there is resistance in Russia to this heterogeneous and seemingly derivative area of study — even in those countries where the study of communication does have a longer history, its disciplinary status is still debated. On the other hand, with those same philosophic, linguistic and psychological traditions, among others, Russia has a lot to contribute to the study of communication as a category of practice. Through publications, conference presentations and organizations, we now begin to hear more and more Russian voices in the conversation of socio-cultural traditions as an important discursive resource in the study of communication.

Perhaps it is not easy for Russians to see the study of communication as a discipline, let alone a science because the analytical tendencies, dominant in the Anglo-American philosophic tradition, had never been widespread in Russia. However, the study of communication is not only about clarifying meaning of existing symbols and explaining how and why rules should be followed. Communication is a constitutive, creative and contingent...
process, and so Russian thought, known for its synthetic traditions and transformative nature, has a lot to contribute to the overall study of communication.

The importance of joining forces in the study of communication is imperative in today’s multicultural world, which like Spencer-Brown’s universe cuts itself in two to observe itself; often this inclusion/exclusion cut can literally be bloody. If we see the violence of distinguishing (and naming) as the basis of the “originary paradox” of communication, only together can we strive toward reconciling its conceptualizations as a passionate quest for a normative universality and as respect to all singularities.

Not only is today’s world one of increasing hybridity, it is also more mediated than ever. If this issue were coming out several decades ago, it would be safe to say (as had been common in those days), “You are now holding in your hands the first issue of RJC.” Today it is more appropriate to say simply, “You are now reading the first issue of RJC,” for many of us now spend more time in front of the computer screen. Russia entered the global village of electronic communications later than many other countries, but embraced this medium with a special enthusiasm.

The study of communication, be it as a discipline or a field, is critical in the world given the role of communication as constitutive of all relations — interpersonal, political, economic, technological, etc. Even a physical description of sound waves or the nature of light is a socio-cultural achievement, a communication. Just like for Russians “Pushkin is our everything,” to use the famous words of another man of letters, it can be said that for all of us, “communication is our everything.” That is why the study of communication, despite its identity issues, has endured through centuries. Nothing is as important as the question, “What is communication?” And, because any system that could find the final answer for the question it poses for itself would cease to exist (as N. Luhmann reminds us), the study of communication certainly has a long, if tormented, future. If, to exist, the study of communication should be able to reproblematize itself in the face of new and newer situations, formulating not so much a task that can be methodologically solved as a problem that must remain a problem, it can certainly use the Russian experience. Russia has overcome many challenges, facing and creating new problems — its spirit never conquered, never satisfied.

Like communication and like Russia itself, may this journal be complex, transformative and fortuitous.
COMMUNICATION IN THE CONVERSATION OF DISCIPLINES

ROBERT T. CRAIG

Communication has acquired many of the institutional-professional trappings of an academic discipline, but as an intellectual tradition it remains radically heterogeneous and largely derivative. What mainly explains the field’s disciplinary emergence is its significant relationship to communication as a category of social practice, and it is, I argue, by reconstructing its intellectual traditions around that category that the field can best hope not only to become more intellectually coherent and productive but more useful to society as well. A theory of disciplinarity is presented in which every discipline derives its identity and coherence from its participation in the conversation of disciplines, for which it draws on a specific mixture of intellectual, institutional, and sociocultural discursive resources. Communication’s specific character as a discipline thus can be understood in terms of its contributions to knowledge in certain intellectual traditions, its evolving institutional forms, and its relevance to “communication” understood as a socioculturally constituted category of problems and practices. The third of these factors — the sociocultural context of disciplinarity — has, I maintain, a primary role. Communication as a practical discipline has been constructed upon (even as it reflexively reconstructs) the foundation of communication as an increasingly central category in modern societies and global culture.

Keywords: disciplines, practical discipline, problematization, social practices

There is, of course, nothing ultimately sacred or immutable about the existing departments of academic study, which have assumed their present, seemingly rather haphazard forms over a relatively brief span of history. Historical and comparative perspectives are required

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in order to avoid falsely naturalizing the present categories of knowledge and systems of academic organization. Most of what we now think of as “traditional” disciplines are scarcely more than a century old as organized professions, and it is recurrently fashionable to predict their imminent demise or transformation within some radically different (interdisciplinary, or postdisciplinary) institutional arrangement. Academic disciplines are sometimes derided as mere appurtenances of academic administration and politics having mostly unfortunate effects on the fragmentation of knowledge and regimentation of intellectual work. The role of traditional disciplines in the larger social process of knowledge production is clearly undergoing some changes (Gibbons et al., 1994). On the other hand, the department-discipline system that emerged in US academic institutions about a century ago has continued to grow in influence, and studies have found no indication that disciplines are generally declining or in danger of dying out (Abbott, 2001; Clark, 1987).

Disciplines are commonly discussed using certain metaphors. Along with arboreal metaphors (each discipline a branch on the tree of knowledge), what we might call real estate metaphors are ubiquitous in the discourse of disciplines. We speak of disciplinary “foundations”, “fields” of knowledge, “turf wars” among disciplines with competing claims to overlapping curricular “territories” and so on. These metaphors are useful in some ways and yet deeply misleading if taken too literally. Disciplines do not in fact occupy clearly bounded, mutually exclusive territories, nor are they built upon rock-solid conceptual foundations. No academic discipline among the humanities or social sciences has the degree of intellectual distinctiveness and coherence that these metaphors imply; all disciplines are heterogeneous, contentious, and shameless borrowers. Equally misleading, however, is the dialectical opposite of the idealized image of disciplinary coherence, the cynical view that academic disciplines, being mere creatures of administrative convenience and petty academic politics, have no intelligible coherence, no intrinsic intellectual value. The idealized and cynical views both reflect a foundationalist Either/Or, the false assumption that every discipline either must have a fully coherent theoretical-epistemological foundation, or it can have no rational basis at all.

This article highlights an alternative cluster of metaphors for discussing disciplines. In this alternative way of speaking, a discipline is “a conversational community with a tradition of argumentation” (Shotter, 1997, p. 42) that participates along with other disciplines in a broader conversational community — the conversation of disciplines — with its own traditions of argumentation. Academic disciplines are not founded upon eternally fixed categories of knowledge; they are discursive formations that emerge, evolve, transform, and dissipate in the ongoing conversation of disciplines. Rhetorical resources for constructing and legitimizing disciplines can be found in contexts of intellectual, institutional, and sociocultural history: intellectual contexts of classic and current texts, theories, problems, methods and modes of analysis; institutional contexts of universities and departments, professional organizations, funding agencies, publishers, libraries, databases, and associated classification schemes; and sociocultural contexts of ordinary concepts and
practices more or less deeply ingrained in the cultural belief systems and habits of the general society. Thus, a disciplinary voice derives its strength — its disciplinary authority — from its resonance with discourses throughout society (its relevance to cultural practices and beliefs) as well as from its intellectual distinctiveness and productivity and its entrenchment in existing institutional schemes of organization. Every discipline draws from a complex mixture of institutional, intellectual, and cultural resources, and negotiates the tensions among these different sources of legitimacy in specific ways. Every discipline participates in the conversation of disciplines in its own evolving ways, using the specific mix of discursive resources available to it at any given time.

Although the conversation of disciplines is concentrated most densely in academic institutions and scholarly professions, it involves participants from throughout society insofar as academic disciplines resonate with a wider culture. All disciplines are reflexively involved with cultural practices of the general society, but some disciplines especially depend on this relationship as a source of legitimacy and authority. The term *practical discipline* refers to a type of discipline that recursively cultivates the very social practices that constitute the discipline’s specific subject matter (Craig, 1989, 2006). Practical disciplines necessarily rely on sociocultural relevance as an especially important source of legitimacy. A practical discipline typically emerges and is considered important not because of some intellectual breakthrough that suddenly reveals a whole new range of research problems (in the way that the discovery of DNA’s molecular structure led to a new discipline of molecular biology or Noam Chomsky’s invention of transformational-generative grammar revolutionized the discipline of linguistics). Rather, a practical discipline grows to prominence because it credibly purports to be useful for addressing some range of practical concerns already acknowledged as such in society.

Communication has acquired many of the institutional-professional trappings of an academic discipline but as an intellectual tradition it remains radically heterogeneous and largely derivative (Craig, 1999). What mainly explains the field’s disciplinary emergence is its significant relationship to communication as a category of social practice, and it is, I argue, by reconstructing its intellectual traditions around that category that the field can best hope not only to become more intellectually coherent and productive but more useful to society as well. Communication’s specific character as a discipline can thus be understood in terms of its contributions to knowledge in certain intellectual traditions, its evolving institutional forms, and its relevance to “communication” understood as a socioculturally constituted category of problems and practices, but the third of these factors — the sociocultural context of disciplinarity — has, I maintain, a primary role. Communication as a practical discipline has been constructed upon (even as it reflexively reconstructs) the foundation of communication as an increasingly central category in modern societies and global culture. If communication is now a discipline, it is because communication scholars have seized a rhetorical opportunity. Leveraging the commonsense relevance of their topic, they have gained access to institutional and intellectual resources that they have adapted and
transformed as means for addressing “problems of communication” in society. In this way they have brought an important new voice to the conversation of disciplines.

The following sections develop this argument in two main parts. The first part examines a variety of ways in which the idea of a discipline has been conceptualized and argues for a new theory according to which complex mixtures of intellectual, institutional, and sociocultural resources enable diverse and evolving forms of disciplinarity. The second part argues that the communication discipline will be sustained as a legitimate academic enterprise insofar as its disciplinary practices engage with, inform, and productively cultivate the social practice of communication.

A THEORY OF DISCIPLINARITY

Derived from the Latin *disciplina*, “discipline” in one of its standard senses has long meant simply any field of knowledge or learning. It can also denote the qualities of self-control and orderliness that are required to master a discipline or the process of training or education in which those qualities are imparted. The scholar who learns a discipline (and thereby acquires discipline) was originally called a “disciple” (*discipulus*), and the disciple’s opposite was the teacher or “doctor.” The doctor’s teaching was based on a “doctrine” (*doctrina*), a set of principles related to the discipline. “[H]ence, in the history of the words, doctrine is more concerned with abstract theory, and discipline with practice or exercise” (*Oxford English Dictionary*, p. 741). This distinction is no longer common. “Discipline” now tends to cover both the theoretical and practical senses, and if anything the theoretical sense probably predominates in academic usage. As Kaplan (1993) noted, “the heritage of the Renaissance has been a consideration of disciplines as fields of knowledge — accumulations of data, facts, or texts that one masters in order to have command of a discipline” (p. 56). In current academic usage, however, fields of knowledge are bound up in complex ways with organized scholarly professions and academic departments.

Disciplines in the Modern University

With the development of modern research universities since the nineteenth century, the practical sense of discipline as practice and exercise has been largely eclipsed by an institutional sense that refers to a certain ill-defined set of academic units and professional groups along with their associated fields of knowledge. The “discipline of anthropology” thus includes the subject matter of anthropology along with university departments of anthropology and the group of scholars who work in those departments. To apply the term discipline to such a conglomeration confers upon it a vague but highly valued aura of academic legitimacy.

The complexity of this current discourse was well captured by Becher (1989). In current usage, he wrote,
The concept of an academic discipline is not altogether straightforward. ... The answer [as to whether a given field of learning is a discipline] will depend on the extent to which leading academic institutions recognize [it] in terms of their organizational structures ... and also on the degree to which a freestanding international community has emerged, with its own professional associations and specialist journals. ... Disciplines are thus in part identified by the existence of relevant departments; but it does not follow that every department represents a discipline. International currency is an important criterion, as is a general though not sharply-defined set of notions of academic credibility, intellectual substance, and appropriateness of subject matter. Despite such apparent complications, however, people with any interest and involvement in academic affairs seem to have little difficulty in understanding what a discipline is, or in taking a confident part in discussions about borderline or dubious cases. (p. 19)

Some definitions of discipline stress the intellectual qualities of disciplines while others emphasize their organizational and professional characteristics, but Becher concluded that the intellectual and institutional aspects “are so inextricably connected that it is unproductive to try to forge any sharp division between them” (1989, p. 20).

Although I agree with Becher that these aspects of disciplinarity interact so closely that they are ultimately inseparable, I believe it is useful to separate them analytically if only to understand more clearly how they interact. In so doing we find, moreover, that a full understanding of the concept of discipline requires that we distinguish not just two but three interacting sources of disciplinarity; that disciplinarity has sociocultural as well as intellectual and professional-institutional components.

**Disciplines and Sociocultural Categories**

Even the most well established academic disciplines might cease to exist were the cultural values and categories that sustain them to dissipate. Bronowski (1972) pointed out that science, for example, expresses values such as the impulse to explore, freedom from tradition and authority, and the testing of truth in experience. The academic practice of science would be difficult to sustain in a sociocultural milieu that did not cultivate such values to some degree.

Historically, according to Toulmin, “the fact that science has developed with such vigor and fertility in Western Europe since A.D. 1600 is a consequence, not least, of an active resonance between scientific specialists and the general public, and of the interaction of ideas between the newly emerging special sciences and the wider culture of the time” (1972, p. 298). In this process, elements of the scientific worldview were gradually incorporated into “common sense” while growing public interest helped to sustain the intellectual and institutional growth of science.

But, if disciplines can be invigorated by their resonance with the wider culture, they can also be enervated by loss of contact with the general public if they become excessively...
specialized, technically sophisticated, and professionally insular. “A science which cuts itself off entirely from the broader intellectual debate will thus retain only localized significance; its professional technicalities will have no power to influence “common sense” or “common knowledge,” and the science itself will be in danger either of expiring, or falling into the hands of second rate men (sic), for lack of good new recruits to cultivate it” (Toulmin, 1972, pp. 296-297). Toulmin cited Babylonian astronomy as a striking example, but his point applies equally well, although perhaps in less drastic ways, to modern disciplines.

Disciplines rise and decline along with the cultural practices and beliefs that sustain them. Thus the 19th and 20th century development of psychology and sociology responded to evolving sociocultural trends. As Osborne & Rose (1997) showed, for example, prior to its formulation as sociological theory in the late 19th century, “the social point of view” (p. 91 and elsewhere) emerged in practical, problem-oriented, often technical discourses about medicine and disease, crime, government, social surveys and statistics, and so on.

A discipline extends beyond professional academia into publisher’s categories, popular media, philanthropic programs, and the like — institutional structures that weave the discipline into the social fabric. A discipline that is culturally meaningful attracts students, public recognition, and funding. The disciplinary professional becomes a recognizable social type such as the scientist, the psychologist, the economist, or the teacher.

Gergen (1995), discussing the early twentieth century efforts to legitimate psychology as a discipline, noted how disciplinary legitimacy relied in part on the support of an educated public. “[T]he central challenge for psychology, then, was to generate forms of self-representation that could simultaneously appeal to audiences both within the academy and among the educated public — in addition to its own membership” (Gergen, 1995, p. 5; see also: Brown, 1992; Leary, 1992).

The relationship between disciplines and sociocultural categories is not unidirectional. The central ideas and values of established disciplines filter into the culture and help to constitute the very categories that sustain the discipline’s meaningfulness. Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration attributes this constitutive role distinctly to social science (the “double hermeneutic” in which sociological interpretations of society inform the self-interpretations of social actors); however, the point applies to all disciplines insofar as all disciplines constitute systems of social action. Natural science, for example, not only is sustained by certain cultural values but also is a powerful social influence sustaining those very same values. Pierce (1991) extended the point to other disciplines:

The reification of a discipline’s subject matter in the academic world comes to dominate its treatment in other contexts. The establishment of such university disciplines as “physics” or “sociology” results in the provision of credentials to persons uniquely qualified to serve as “physicists” or “sociologists” in external applications of the subject, spreading reified definitions of the discipline and its content throughout society as a whole. (Pierce, 1991, p. 25)
If disciplines depend on their sociocultural relevance for legitimacy, can even a well-established academic discipline dissipate along with the cultural categories that formerly sustained it? Consider the case of literature. No discipline, or so it might seem from a narrow historical focus, could be more academically traditional or more deeply entrenched in universities than literary studies, but in *The Death of Literature* (1990) Alvin Kernan argued provocatively, as his title suggests, that academic literary studies are in serious danger of extinction along with “literature” as a cultural category. “[T]he disintegration of romantic-modernist literature in the late twentieth century,” he wrote, has been a part not only of a general cultural revolution but more specifically of a technological revolution that is rapidly transforming a print to an electronic culture. .... [T]he old literature of romanticism and modernism was a printed-book concept from the outset, institutionalizing and idealizing print’s potential to create authors, fix exact texts, hold the smallest detail of style locked permanently in place for leisurely inspection, and assemble and catalog the imaginary library of universal literature. Literature began to lose its authority, and consequently its reality, at the same time that the ability to read the book, literacy, was decreasing, that audiovisual images, film, television, and computer screen, were replacing the printed book as the most efficient and preferred source of entertainment and knowledge. Television, computer database, Xerox, word processor, tape, and VCR are not symbiotic with literature and its values in the way that print was, and new ways of acquiring, storing, and transmitting information are signaling the end of a conception of writing and reading oriented to the printed book and institutionalized as literature. (p. 9)

Kernan concluded:

[L]iterature is disappearing into another category of reality where it is becoming only one technique for written communication, one among many ways, oral, pictorial, schematic, and many modes, print, television, radio, VCR, cassette, record, and CD, by which information can be assembled, organized, and transmitted effectively. (p. 201)

Kernan foresaw emerging from the ashes of literature a new discipline, “communications, a subject with both practical and theoretical dimensions, and considerable usefulness” (1990, p. 202).7

**Disciplines in the Conversation of Disciplines**

Disciplines can be understood with reference to: ways in which philosophical schemes of disciplines interact with the inertial and political forces of academic-professional institutions (Machlup, 1982, pp. 89 & 119); how the inherent characteristics of subject matters shape disciplinary practices (Becher, 1989) and how they *should* do so (Collier,
1992; Toulmin, 1972), or conversely, how forms of disciplinary organization shape intellectual activities (Fuchs, 1992; Pierce, 1991); how a discipline is shaped by its institutional resource base (Turner & Turner, 1990); or how “fractal” patterns are endlessly reproduced in disciplinary cultures and social structures (Abbott, 2001). As the metaphor of the conversation suggests, the approach advanced in this article is hermeneutical (Gadamer, 2006). Absolute disciplinary coherence is neither possible nor desirable. Disciplinary “foundations” are recursive reconstructions of disciplinary practices within a hermeneutic circle of interpretation and action. Disciplinary coherence is a matter of interpreting a tradition of argumentation in which institutional, intellectual, and sociocultural practices interact — a practical, hermeneutical problem that arises within the conversation of disciplines.

“[T]he various disciplinary enterprises rely upon models and paradigms borrowed from each other, and never less so than when they proclaim their independence, so that the mutual relation of the disciplines is never one of autonomy or of heteronomy, but some sort of complicated set of textual relations that needs to be unraveled in each instance” (Godzich, 1986, p. x; see also Abbott, 2001). For example, the “sociological perspective” of sociology can be defined only against a background that includes sociology’s differences from history (Burke, 1992), anthropology (Mills, 2001), economics (Massey, 1999), and other disciplines (Brewer, 2007). Classic writings in sociology assert the uniqueness and importance of a sociological perspective with compelling intellectual force, but sociologists themselves have always disagreed about the meaning and value of such a perspective. The sociological tradition can be read as a series of arguments about how and how much sociology differs from various other disciplines. Approaches within sociology can be described as economic, cultural, historical, political, psychological, and so forth. Thus the conversation within sociology internalizes the conversation between sociology and other disciplines (indeed it constitutes much of that interdisciplinary conversation, for the conversation “among” disciplines occurs within disciplines to a large extent). The intellectual center of sociology moves with the shifting focus of a conversation about the meaning and value of a sociological perspective on society. If it were generally concluded among sociologists that the sociological perspective lacked meaning or value in their work as compared to other, more valid and useful perspectives — if, in effect, the idea of a sociological perspective were no longer felt to be worth discussing — then the conversation would break up or turn to other topics and sociology would cease to exist as an intellectually sensible enterprise. The discipline would then continue only as an increasingly pointless, however deeply entrenched institutional shell housing various unrelated research specialties under the name of an exhausted intellectual tradition. However unlikely this scenario may seem, sociologists have recurrently expressed the fear that something like it may be happening (Halliday & Janowitz, 1992; Osborne & Rose, 1997; Turner & Turner, 1990). These worries about disciplinary status are indeed something of a tradition in sociology. As the last of the major social sciences to be established (1890s), sociology faced problems of field definition and didn’t
coalesce in England (where anthropology had dominated) until after WWII (see Ross, 1991, pp. 131, 255).8

Gergen (1995), writing about the history of psychology, similarly noted that a discipline, in order to legitimize itself must distinguish itself from other disciplines in the academy, yet “its rationale would have to achieve intelligibility in those very disciplines” (p. 5). The identity of each discipline can be established only vis-à-vis its jostling competitors, its dialogical others in the conversation of disciplines.

With this background on the interacting intellectual, institutional and sociocultural contexts of disciplinary identity and authority, we now turn to consider the case of communication as a discipline.

**RECONSTRUCTING COMMUNICATION AS A DISCIPLINE**

Concerning the place of rhetorical studies in US communication departments, Keith, Fuller, Gross, and Leff (1999) wrote:

> The history of Speech Communication, like any other discipline, has been a dialectic between conceptual formations and institutional structures. Sometimes ... institutions were molded in the image of a particular concept ... other times, conceptual accounts chased institutional arrangements ... Neither side of the dialectic is right or wrong; the problem lies in the refusal to engage it, in the pretense that institutions and theories are already aligned according to some master plan. (1999, p. 332)

How shall we engage the dialectic? As we have seen, social and rhetorical analyses of disciplines have shown that their development interacts with cultural as well as institutional and economic forces (see also: Messer-Davidow, Shumway, & Sylvan, 1993). If knowledge is regarded idealistically, then these “external” influences can appear only as sources of corruption (Collier, 1992). But if disciplines are regarded as intellectual-institutional-sociocultural complexes, then the question is not whether extra-intellectual factors will have a role, but what role they will have and how the resulting tensions may be best resolved. When, as in the case of communication, the institutional development of a discipline, driven by cultural and economic forces, has outrun its intellectual development, then social and rhetorical studies of the discipline may have primarily a hermeneutical task, not to show how these cultural and economic factors have contaminated or distorted knowledge, but rather to clarify the intellectual and cultural significance of the evolving institutional formation of the discipline.

**Problematizing Communication**
Institutional changes that have brought diverse areas of communication study together in unified academic-professional structures are driving the search for intellectual coherence (O’Keefe, 1993; see also Pierce, 1991), but I believe it can be shown that those institutional changes themselves have followed a cultural logic that is, potentially, the discipline’s primary source of intellectual coherence. The core subject matter of a practical discipline, as noted earlier, is the very sociocultural practices that sustain the discipline’s commonsense meaningfulness in society. The institutionalized discipline makes use of the resources afforded by its (perhaps mostly borrowed) intellectual traditions to reconstruct and cultivate particular social practices, thus institutionalizing a recursive loop of theory and practice (Carey, 1989; Craig, 1989, 1999, 2006). Although the institutional, intellectual, and cultural-practical aspects are all necessary to the formation of a practical discipline, the sociocultural practices that sustain the discipline and constitute its focal subject matter have, as I have argued, a primary role.

In order for a practical discipline to flourish, three factors must be present. First, the discipline must address social problems and practices that are regarded as important by the general public. In other words, it must be socially relevant. Second, it must have something interesting and useful to say about those problems and practices. It must have cognitive content. It must offer access to productive intellectual resources, rooted in rich and lively traditions of academic thought, which can be applied to understand and reconstruct those important and problematic social practices. Third, it must find a secure home and resource base in academic institutions. Thus, communication is warranted as a practical discipline insofar as it effectively marshals its available institutional and intellectual resources to address “problems of communication” in society, thereby growing in all three dimensions of disciplinary authority (intellectual, institutional, and sociocultural).

The field of communication is not yet well entrenched institutionally and its intellectual contributions, while hardly negligible, are not yet of such weight as to explain its apparent emergence toward disciplinary status. An academic discipline has coalesced like a mass of iron filings around a powerful sociocultural magnet, “communication.” The communication discipline cannot but locate its own central problematic in the “problem of communication” so increasingly familiar in modern societies and global culture, where communication has become not just a problem but rather a characteristic way of posing all problems (McKeon, 1957; see also: Craig, 2006; Deetz, 1994; Peters, 1999).

Commonsense ideas and practices of communication have evolved in historically specific circumstances (Cameron, 2000; Carey, 1989; Deetz, 1994; Mattelart, 1996; Peters, 1999, in press; Schiller, 1996). This has been intensely the case in the USA, where the communication discipline first took root. Fears, hopes, and practical opportunities arising from the ongoing development of mass media and communication technology certainly have had a large role in this process. The idea of communication also resonates strongly with themes in American culture such as individualism and the drive toward self-improvement, faith in technology and progress, and the chronically expressed need for stronger bonds of
social community under conditions of sociocultural diversity and rapid change. The eruption of the communication idea around the world in globalized forms and in culturally adapted localized forms needs to be understood within the general process of economic and cultural globalization with all its attendant puzzles and controversies. The rapid international growth of the academic communication field is bound up in ways we have yet to understand with the emergence of “communication” as a keyword in global culture (Craig, in press). Understanding this relationship is an urgent research problem at the discipline’s foundation. The recent formation of the Russian Communication Association and the appearance of publications such as *Russian Journal of Communication* signify Russia’s participation in this global process of discipline formation and call upon scholars to interpret “communication” and address “problems of communication” specifically in terms of Russian culture, thus also enriching the global conversation.

As Deetz (1994) pointed out, the fundamental social problems that both explain and call for the emergence of a communication discipline are not simply found in the world but are constituted by particular ways of engaging with the world:

> In looking at the formation of a discipline, [a distinct mode of explanation], co-extensive with the formulation of a way of attending to the world is the constitution of a social problematic. As I have suggested, this is neither a causal relation going from a way of attending to problem conception nor one from problem situation to a way of attending. They historically arise together as a problematization in a competitive environment of alternative attentions and problems. And, as the pragmatists argued, the basic question is not which one is right or most critical but rather what kind of people do we want to become and what kind of world do we wish to live in. (p. 584, bracketed words added)

Disciplinary coherence will be found only in our engagement with this problematization of communication both globally and locally.

**Joining the Conversation of Disciplines**

Communication, like sociology, suffers from disciplinary incoherence, but of a different origin. Sociology has an acknowledged central tradition of classic, seminal works but seems in danger of breaking up as its various specialties turn away from that disciplinary core and migrate toward other disciplines (Scott, 2005). Communication still lacks an established disciplinary core of classic theories and research exemplars. The field comprises diverse academic traditions, each having produced or appropriated its own, more or less coherent intellectual resources, which have converged institutionally under the culturally resonant symbolic banner of “communication” and are only now just beginning to overcome their mutual ignorance. Journalism and media scholars have their reasons for migrating to that banner, as do scholars in cultural studies, conversation analysis, and rhetoric, but they
are not the same reasons, and the differences among them and the implications they hold for one another have not yet been much explored.

The diversity of the field has been acknowledged as a problem or celebrated as a strength, but has not yet been exploited for the generation of fresh insights and the construction of a richer, more encompassing disciplinary perspective on communication. Thus, the problem of a disciplinary core in communication studies is, in more than one sense, a communication problem, now complicated, as noted earlier, by the growing cultural complexity and variability of the communication idea as it spreads globally. The question in communication studies is not whether the disciplinary conversation will break up but how to get it actually started (Craig, 1999, 2007). The communication problem in the discipline must be addressed in order to generate the intellectual resources needed to address the communication problem in society. Communication can become a discipline only by being practical — by marshalling its resources to address the communication problems that are its raison d’être. But it can become practical in this way only by finding its voice in the conversation of disciplines.

In the formation of a communication discipline, “the problem of communication in society” must be reconstructed within the intellectual traditions drawn to or appropriated by the discipline of communication as it works through its disciplinary affinities and tensions both internal and external. The conversation between communication and other disciplines will appear internally as a debate among proponents of sociological, psychological, linguistic/semiotic, and other ways of theorizing communication (Craig, 1999). Disciplinary coherence is thus a hermeneutical problem faced by a heterogeneous set of evolving traditions that find themselves institutionally linked and without any well-articulated pattern connecting them to each other, to other disciplines, and to their common, practical task vis-à-vis the cultural discourse of “communication.”

The rapid institutionalization of communication as an academic discipline so far owes less to the importance of its intellectual contributions than to the economic importance of communication skills and occupations, supported by the widespread cultural belief that interpersonal and social problems are caused by bad communication and can be alleviated by good communication (Cameron, 2000; Peters, 1999). The authority of the new discipline derives mainly from the power of “communication” as a symbol that evokes the most characteristic problems and opportunities of an increasingly diverse yet interdependent world. The field has attracted students and institutional resources not primarily because its scientific fruitfulness has been proven beyond question but because its topic is considered important, meaningful, and especially, useful. Communication, if a discipline at all, is thus unavoidably a practical discipline. But a practical discipline must be more than just practical, it must also be a discipline; its particular way of being useful is that it approaches practical problems as a discipline. It theorizes practice from a disciplinary point of view. It participates simultaneously in several worlds — several conversations: the conversation of ideas, the conversation of institutionalized academic disciplines, and the conversation of
society — and its distinctive contribution to each of these conversations depends on what it is able to learn within the others. That is its special task as a discipline.

NOTES

1. The debate on disciplines is as old as the disciplines themselves and involves a wide range of disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and antidisciplinary views on academic work. For reasons of space, neither the widely dispersed general literature on disciplines nor the long-running debates about the disciplinary status of communication and its predecessor fields (speech, etc.) can be fully reviewed in this article. On disciplines in general, see: Abbott (2001); Becher (1989); Campbell (1969); Clark (1987); Foucault (1970); Fuchs (1992); Fuller (1991); Gibbons, et al. (1994); Gross & Keith (1996); Kline (1996); Lee & Wallerstein (2005); Machlup (1982); Messer-Davidow, Shumway, & Sylvan (1993); Ross (1991); Stichweh (1992); Toulmin (1972); Turner (2006); Wernick (2006). See Craig (in press) for a brief history of the debate on communication as a discipline; see also: Anderson, et al. (1988); Angus & Lannamann (1988); Benson (1992); Berger & Chaffee (1987); Craig (1989); Craig & Carlone (1998); Deetz (1994); Donsbach (2006); Levy & Gurevitch (1993); Paisley (1984); Peters (1986); Putnam (2001). Benson (1985) remains the best general source on speech or speech communication as a discipline; see also: Benson (1992); Craig (1991); Keith (in press).

2. Clyde Kluckholm famously described anthropology as “an intellectual poaching license” (Geertz, 1980, p. 167). In communication we poach even more, and without a license.


5. Levine, for example, defined discipline as a “discrete body of knowledge with a characteristic regimen for investigation and analysis” (cited in Nothstine, Blair, & Copeland, 1994, p. 57).


8. On the history and disciplinary identity of sociology, see also: Collins (1985); How (1998); Lepenies (1986); Levine (1995); Mazlish (1989); Scott (2005); Turner (2006).

9. Swanson (1993) argued that this is happening in communication as well, which may be true; however, convergent processes also seem to be at work in this field. Deetz (1994) would correlate the fragmentation of sociology with the breakup of its underlying problematic of social order.

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SEMIURGY: FROM LANGUAGE ANALYSIS TO LANGUAGE SYNTHESIS

Mikhail N. Epstein

The article focuses on the transition from language analysis to language synthesis as a new strategy in the performative humanities of the early 21st century. In addition to semiotics, the practical discipline of semiurgy (sign-formation) is described in the context of growing creative potential of electronic communications. For philosophy, it means the turn to linguistic vitalism as an attempt to synthesize the legacies of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein.

Keywords: neologisms, memetics, semiotics, terminology, sign-formation, creative philology, predictionary

“Speech that we hear, living and full of images, sparkles our imagination with the fire of new creations, i.e., new word formations ... The only life responsibility of ours is word creation ... Poetry aims at language creativity, while the language is the creation of life relations, as such. ... The first experience, summoned by the word, is evocation, incantation by the word of a never-existing-before phenomenon; the word gives birth to action.” —Andrei Belyi

1. NEOLOGY AND SEMIURGY. SIGN GENERATION AND THE INTERNET

There are three types of sign activity: combinative, descriptive and formative. Most written or oral texts fall under the first type. Whether it be Pushkin, Lenin, a brilliant scientist, or an illiterate person, they all combine words in their own way, although the

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number of words and ways of their combination in literature, politics, science, or colloquial speech are very different.

Books of grammar, dictionaries, linguistic studies and manuals where words and the rules of their combination are described, fall under the second type of sign activity. Such descriptive mode goes beyond the first, practical level of language, and so functions as the language of the second order (or “meta-language”).

The third type of sign activity is the rarest of all three: it does not deal with the use or description of signs that already exist in language, but introduces new signs in it; its focus is neology, or sign creation, i.e., Semiurgy (from Greek semeion, sign, and Greek — ourgia, work; cf. dramaturgy, liturgy, metallurgy).

The examples of Semiurgy can be found in the famous dictionary compiled by Vladimir Dal’ (out of 200 thousand words about 14 thousand were coined by him), in the poetry and fiction of A. Belyi, V. Khlebnikov and V. Mayakovskу. At the same time, this type of sign activity is still in the initial stages of its development.

It is assumed that the creation of words and language elements as new signs is a collective, communal and anonymous process, and that word formation can only be the result of activity of a nation as a whole. This assumption is only partially true. For millenia individuals’ input into language development could not be registered, leaving it only with the products of the verbal “natural selection” by many generations. Such an era of “folk” language formation is coming to an end. There were times when literature as a field of individual creativity did not exist either. Songs and fairy-tales were passed down by generations via word of mouth. With the creation of writing, individual authorship of literary works came into being. Now with the transition to electronic networks, the folk epoch of language is ending — and more and more individual authors of words will be appearing as their individual coinages can be searched on the web.

Admittedly in the past, word formation by individuals also acted as an important factor in the growth of language. M. V. Lomonosov, for example, introduced such words as маятник, насос, притяжение, созвездие, рудник, чертеж [balance wheel, pump, gravitation, constellation, ore mine, blueprint]; N.M. Karamzin was the author of such words as промышленность, влюбленность, рассеянность, трогательный, будущность, общественность, человечность, обще полезный, достижимый, усовершенствовать [industry, amorousness, absent-mindness, touching, futurity, community, humaneness, common use, attainable, to perfect]; A. Shishkov’s input included баснословие и лицедей [fabulosity and dissembler]; F. Dostoyevsky enriched the Russian language with вселенский и стушевствовать [panhuman and to efface oneself], K. Brulloв, with отсебятина, [one’s own concoction]; V. Khlebnikov, with ладомир и творяник, [world harmony and a noble creator]; I. Severyanin with бездарь, [dull commonplace]; and A. Solzhenitsyn, with образовашница [smatters].

However, in the past only writers and scientists had a chance to immortalize their word coinages. Before the Internet, it was difficult to trace new words back to their individual
source and determine the initial meaning of that word and the intention of its author. With
the Internet, it is simply a matter of pushing the “search” button. The Internet also makes it
possible, in an instant, to send a new word out to numerous users. New formations catch on
instantaneously, their growing usage testifying to their success. It is such characteristics as
its reading transparency and writing permeability that make the Internet an ideal medium for
registering and dissemination of new signs (verbal as well as graphic or visual). *The Internet
does to language what writing at one point did to literature, i.e., it undermines language’s
folklore foundations, moving it to the area of individual creativity.* Indeed, systemic sign
formation, which checks its coinages against the vocabulary that already exists, becomes
possible only through the electronic network.

Today every writer or thinker must have the entire World Wide Web at hu’s
fingertips.¹ This is not only for searching information sources, which can be found at the
library (albeit, with more time spent on the search), but also for having an access to
everything that has been uttered and registered. This allows us to check the novelty of our
own sign-creations. A sign maker (or *wordsmith*) is interested not in what exists on the Net,
but what it does not yet contain. Today’s main work tool is the Net as a whole, with its gaps
and edges browsed in a moment. Only the Net, as a most comprehensive resource of all
existing signs, is commensurable with the task of sign creation. For a “paradigm maker,” the
one who creates new signs and concepts, new genres and disciplines that lead to paradigm
shifts in thinking, the measure of novelty is obtained through the comparison with the
existing sign systems as they are packed on the web.

One can anticipate that in the future, the formation of new signs will become a more
prominent creative activity than the combination of already existing signs which was the
focus of verbal art in the past and still is in the present. With new and faster electronic ways
of information processing, what at one time was an important activity of combining language
signs will gradually be automatized, its value as a unique human activity reduced not only
in the technological, but also aesthetic and intellectual fields. It will lose its power of
estrangement and effect of surprise (once a prerogative of literature and philosophy). Estrangement, or deautomatization of language will more often take the form, not of a
combination of old signs, but generation of new ones. Sign-givers and sign-makers
(*знакодатели*) will soon play as important a role in society as lawmakers (*законодатели*).
Signmaking and lawmaking are two complementary types of activity in that the law makes
everyone subject to self-restriction while the new sign creates for everyone a new
opportunity for self-expression.

Thus, we need a new discipline that would study the methods of creation of new signs.
Within semiotics, three branches are usually identified: semantics as the study of
relationships between a sign and its meaning, or between the signifier and the signified;
syntactics as the study of relationships between signs; and pragmatics as the study of
relationships between signs and their users. However, no branch exists specifically devoted
to the creation of new signs, i.e., the study of relationships between signs and their absence
as the semiotic zero, or sign vacuum. Such a branch could be called semionics, cf. such disciplines as bionics, electronics, avionics, and culturonics.

Semiurgy\(^2\) is the activity of generating new signs and their introduction into language. Semionics as the fourth branch of semiotics along with semantics, syntactics and pragmatics, is the discipline that studies the activity of generating new signs.

Different areas of science, art, mass communications, and information technologies, dealing with the creation of new signs, could be coordinated by Semiurgy as practice and Semionics as theory of sign formation. The branch of linguistics that studies the formation of the existing words (derivatology) could then incorporate the study of the techniques of creating new words and become a subdivision of Semionics. In marketing, a special area of Semiurgy exists in the form of branding, i.e., creation of new language, visual, or sound signs for companies to advertise and promote their products.

2. **LINGUISTRY, CREATIVE PHILOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF CULTURE: MEMETICS**

Sign creation and word creation as activities do not simply represent the generation of new signs or words, but function as an act of meaning formation, or concept construction. Every new word brings about a new meaning, and with it, a possibility of new understanding and new action. People feel and act guided by the meaning of words. We ask ourselves, “Is it love or not?” Or, perhaps, the feeling that we experience is more accurately called compassion, or friendship, or lust, or respect, or gratitude? And so, having decided on the exact word for our feelings, we act in accordance with its meaning, e.g., we get married or divorced, meet or leave, confess our love or not love. The Greek language had a number of words denoting different types and shades of love, and we still use some of them today, e.g. eros, mania, philia, agape and storge. However, in the Russian language, as in many European languages, there is only one word, “love,” indiscriminately applied to Motherland, ice-cream, or a woman. With new formations, derived from the same root and refracted through the prism of suffixes, cf. любь and любя, равнолюбие and недолюбок, слюбка and залюбь [lovedom, lovehood, eqiphilia, underloved, translove, etc.] not only a new layer of meanings appears in the language, but also new shades in the range of feelings, actions and intentions.

We can recall the huge impact that the language of ideology had on Soviet society and the world, in general. The empty words that were nothing but air vibrations, were taken as the blueprints for the industrial giants of socialism, collective farms and communal apartments, systems of surveillance and punishment, five-year plans, and holidays and work days. The power of words at that time was overwhelming. And yet, the significance of words during that time was not so much overemphasized as underplayed; words were brought down to the level of incantation of ideologemes, their stems killed and the meanings subject not
to interpretation or discussion, but only to execution. In the post-Soviet society such ideologemes must be replaced by the free and creative use of stems, providing space for meaning formation and action. To understand itself, and at the same time become more complex and refined in its meanings, culture is in dire need of words with clear stems and numerous derivatives. The 21st century with its need for word creation, is consonant with the avant-garde of the 20th century, the ideas of A.Belyi and V.Khlebnikov:

Word creation does not break the rules of language…. Just like the waters of shallow rivers are populated with fish by the modern man, so linguistry (языковедство; cf. forestry, лесоводство) makes it possible to populate with new life, with extinct or non-existent words, the impoverished language waves. We believe they will sparkle with life again as they were in the first days of creation. (Khlebnikov, 1986, p. 627).

While theoretical linguistics might be compared to botany as the study of plants, practical linguistics, or linguistry, can be compared to forestry or gardening, horticulture, soil cultivation, or arboreal practices. In fact, linguo-creativity (or creative philology) is the only ideology of our time that provides a nation with the sense of existence, and links past and future. Only language can nourish our consciousness with common meanings, making it possible for people to understand each other. That is, not speech, not what is said in the language, but the language as such, in the form of words and morphemes, and not texts or sentences. Take such eternal and unavoidable morphemes as мир, дар, кровь, люб-, ход-, на-, по-, и, -ств, -овь, -ение [peace, gift, blood, love, in, to, re-, un-, -ful, -ous, -ify, -ness, etc.]. The level of sentence brings differences, while the level of texts leads to misunderstanding, suspicion, and public battles.

Hardly any political, philosophical or religious ideology can unify today’s society. A nation’s disintegration begins precisely at the point where a certain unifying “national” idea, as an evaluative assumption with the claim for universality, is put forth. It is not in the idea, but in the language that a unifying national sense is found (only on the condition of the language unfettered development, its stems strong and its crown thick). Lexicology is not only the study and description of the language vocabulary, but also the scientific foundation of its enrichment through creative word formation which expands the original sphere of meanings available to all members of a certain culture. Ludwig Wittgenstein famously pronounced: “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.” (The Tractatus, 5.6). Philology is the discipline that not only loves and studies words, but also draws on them for new thought and action. Creative philology expands the world of a certain nation by expanding the limits of its language. As the language resources of a culture expand, philology impacts its gene pool, its mental patterns and modes of activity.

Roman Jakobson noted a remarkable similarity between the genetic program of an organism and the language program of the development of a culture or a society:

Today’s agenda has the study of the temporal programming role of language as a bridge from past to future. It is worth mentioning that in 1966, N.A.Bernshtein, a well-known Russian specialist in biomechanics, in the conclusion to his book had an appropriate
comparison between “the DNK and RNK molecules”, which contain the codes that reflect “the anticipated processes of growth and development”, and “the psychobiological or psychosocial structure of speech as the anticipated model of future”. ( Jakobson, 1985, p. 334)

The future can be described in different genres: fortune-telling, a prophecy, apocalypse, an Utopia, or an anti-Utopia, a political or an aesthetic manifesto, a scientific hypothesis, a science fiction book or a movie. But the most economic and compact genre of future description is a new word, a neologism. A new word does not simply describe something that is possible in the future, but also creates this very possibility, by expanding the sphere of meanings enacted in the language. By coining a certain word, I make thinkable and therefore possible its signified. What is in the language is on the mind; and what is on the mind is in the action. According to Velimir Khlebnikov, “the word governs the brain, the brain governs the hands, and the hands govern the kingdoms”. One simple word can be the embryo of new theories and practices, just like one seed contains millions of future plants.

The idea about the programming role of language is especially relevant in view of the new discipline, formed on the basis of genetics and called “memetics,” which can be defined as the genetics of culture. “Memes” are units of meaning or information, transferable from one mind to another through words, images, catch-phrases, and quotes. Memes, as genes or viruses of meaning, are transmitters of cultural rather than biological information. Examples of memes include slogans, musical tunes, fashions, cook recipes, mathematical formulas, and computer algorithms. In fact, the entire history of the humankind can be seen as the evolution of memes, their struggle for survival, dissemination, conquest of minds, incorporation into material and spiritual culture. Memetics treats religions, ideologies, political systems, philosophical and art trends, ideological disputes and day-to-day talks as forms of acts where myriads of memes struggle to master the sign universe. From this standpoint, “the function of the language is memes propagation” ( Blackmore, 2000, p. 99).

Clearly, different levels of language have the capability of different degrees of “replicability.” The word as a separate unit is the undisputed “champion” among language memes. In fact, the word is the main meme, i.e., the most contagious of all “infoviruses”, or, to put it better, the most productive of all “infogenes.” Travelling from one mind to another, the word leaves there seeds of future thought and action. The word propagates much faster than the sentence or text. Not even idioms, or aphorisms, or catch-phrases propagate as often and everywhere as lexical units of language. The most popular text with millions of copies in print still can not compare, as far as frequency, with words which are repeated in all texts in a given language.

A new word is like a mini-meme; it contains the strongest power of propagation as the maximum meaning is generated with the minimum sign. Cultures that worship Logos (i.e., the word that was before everything) must also pay attention to the Neologism, or anticipation of the new word, still silent in the depths of language, until it comes to life. In this respect, I wish to make a plea for all writers, lecturers, orators, philologists, and
journalists. We are all users of the language treasures, drawing from it words and phrases and turning them into the means to our very existence; thus, language value turns into monetary value. We all are language’s dependents for life; yet, we can (at least partially) repay our debt, enriching language with new words. Language has no Internal Revenue Service agency, to which each of us would have to pay back with at least one new word per a thousand or tens of thousands words we used. Let paying back that way be a matter of our professional honor.

3. PHILOSOPHY AND LANGUAGE SYNTHESIS

Every new discipline or method of thinking, whether it is the quantum physics or Hegel’s philosophy, develops its own vocabulary. One cannot imagine the quantum mechanics without such neologisms (words or word combinations) as quantum, photon, quark, spin, superconductivity, uncertainty principle, matter-wave dualism and so on. From the linguistics standpoint, the development of every discipline equals the continuous growth of its vocabulary as the system of signs that not only describe the laws of the universe, but also pave the way for new ways of thinking.

Sign creation is especially important in philosophy, which searches for such terms, concepts, and categories that could free our thinking from the prison of everyday language and common sense prejudices. To think means to create a new language of intellectual wonderment and estrangement, that is orthogonal to common sense and is critically cleaned from all automatic clichés and meanings soiled by everyday use. A philosopher quite often fails to find necessary words in the existing language and coins new words or assigns new meanings to old ones, e.g. idea (Plato), thing-in-itself (Kant), Aufhebung (Hegel), Ubermensch (Nietzsche), Zeitigung (Heidegger). The language of Plato, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, or Heidegger is rich in neologisms expressing the most fundamental categories of their thought that did not fit into the existing vocabulary. Philosophy creates new terms and significations, similar to how economics creates new goods and values.

In the 20th century Anglo-American philosophy, the linguo-analytical approach is predominant. Philosophy’s main task is proclaimed to be the analysis of everyday, scientific, and philosophical language with its grammar and logical structures. At the same time, the synthetic aspect of utterances and the task of production of more substantive and informative judgments are practically ignored.

Philosophy of language synthesis, or constructive nominalism may be seen as the 21st century alternative to the tradition of language analysis. Insofar as the subject of philosophy - universals, ideas, or generalizations - is present in language, the task of philosophy is to expand our mental vocabulary and grammar, to synthesize new words and concepts, lexical fields and syntactical rules. Thus philosophy helps the society to increase the volume of speakable, conceivable and thinkable, and, therefore, doable and accomplishable. From language analysis, which was its focus in the 20th century, philosophy moves to language
synthesis — the program that was boldly unveiled in G. Deleuze and F.Guattari’s books A Thousand Plateaus (1987) and What is Philosophy? (1996).

Language synthesis is the philosophical trend aimed at the synthesis of new terms, concepts, and judgments on the basis of their language analysis. Every act of analysis contains the possibility and condition of a new synthesis. Where there is a possibility of breaking a judgment into elements, there also exists a possibility of new judgments, or a new combination of elements, therefore, a new domain of thought and speech.

For instance, the judgment “stupidity is a vice” can be treated analytically, in the spirit of G.Moore, as equivalent to such judgments as “I have a negative attitude towards stupidity”, or “Stupidity creates negative emotions in me.” The synthetic approach to this judgment, however, positions it as a potential foundation for other, alternative and more informative, “wonderous” judgments (cf. Aristotle’s idea in Metaphysics about philosophy born out of wonderment). Analysis, as such, is intellectually trite and empty unless it provokes attempts at a new synthesis.

Let us create a possible sequence of synthesizing questions and alternative judgments regarding the statement stupidity is a vice. Is stupidity always a vice, or can it be considered a virtue in certain cases? If intelligence can be exercised for a sophisticated justification of a vice, then can stupidity serve as manifestation of innocence? If stupidity is sometimes used as a means to a virtuous goal, can it then be considered a virtue itself? M. Saltykov-Shchedrin, a prominent Russian satiric writer of the 19th century, has coined a remarkable moral term that has come into common usage: благоглупость, which can be conveyed by the English neologism virtupidity. Virtupidity is a well-intentioned stupidity, a high-sounding nonsense, or pompous triviality.

Let us extend this line of thought to the next level. If stupidity, if only in an ironic sense, can be a virtue, can baseness or meanness be virtuous as well? Or rather can virtuousness be mean and base? Can we speak not only of virtupidity [благоглупость] but also benemalence [благоподлость; cf. benevolence] as well-intentioned meanness. Benemalence appears to be a dubious oxymoron. Lack of intelligence can go hand in hand with good intentions, but what about maliciousness and perversity of intentions? Can one betray, rape, and blaspheme while having good intentions? The answer is yes, with the examples ranging from The Great Inquisitor in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov to the Soviet official hero, the exemplary pioneer Pavlik Morozov who denounced and betrayed his father.

Thus, as a trivial subject of analysis, the judgment stupidity is a vice can set up grounds for a synthesis of non-trivial, thought-provoking judgments and new word formations such as virtupidity and benemalence. Language synthesis can be formally operationalized by the symbol ÷ as the sign of logical bifurcation (i.e., an alternative emerging from the analysis of the above mentioned judgment). The elements of the judgment which precede the sign ÷ are viewed as variables, whereas their alternatives or variations that follow are new judgments:
Stupidity is a vice.
Stupidity can be a vice (but may not be).
Stupidity can be a virtue (under certain circumstances).
One of the conditions of virtue is a good intention.
Stupidity can be the product of good intentions (Virtupidity).
Meanness can be the product of good intentions (Benemalence).

Whatever judgment we might take, its every element can be questioned and substituted, generating a new judgment. If the elements $a$, $b$ and $c$ can be isolated in a judgment as a result of analysis, their synthesis generates such combinations as $bcd$, or $cba$, or $abd$ (i.e., a new thought, a mental object yet to be cognized, requiring interpretation, and a new act of analysis, and a new synthesis that follows it). G.V. Leibniz (1984) considered the art of synthesis to be more important than that of analysis. For him, synthesis is defined as algebra of qualities, or combinatorics “which deals with forms of objects or formulas of the Universe, i.e., the quality in general, or the similar and dissimilar, for formulas are the result of the combination of the initial elements $a$, $b$, $c$, etc., and this science is different from algebra, which manipulates formulas as they apply to the quantity, or the equal and non-equal” (p. 122).

In principle, analytical and synthetical procedures are reversible. Every analysis that isolates certain elements of a judgement can be transformed into synthesis, i.e., recombination of these elements and formation of alternative judgments, and also new terms, concepts, sentences, disciplines, methods, and worldviews. Thus, the level of synthesis correlates with the level of analysis that precedes it and makes it possible. Accordingly, all analytical philosophy can be interpreted and revised in the language of synthesis. Wherever separate elements of a judgment can be isolated, their new combinations are possible as well. They describe the state of affairs not existing, but possible as part of various discourses, worldviews, futures, virtual worlds, and alternative fields of knowledge. Every language synthesis introduces a new mental state, which searches its further implementation in new theoretical, political, scientific and technical practices.

Synthesism must not be seen as a departure from analytical and critical functions of philosophy; on the contrary, synthesism is their legitimate extension and transformation.

In the analysis-synthesis procedure the following stages can be singled out:

1. The structure of the text or discourse, its elements (analysis).
2. Conceptual and verbal constraints and biases, ideological construction of the text (criticism).
3. Various alternative recombinations of elements; gaps and lacunae that are not realized in, yet can be inferred from this text or discourse (synthetic stage 1: combinatorial).
4. Semantic interpretation of new sign combinations, search for their referents, denotative and connotative components; mental states and transformation of meanings,
which can find their place in complementary/alternative discourses (synthetic stage 2: interpretative).

5. Constructive and experimental work on implementing such alternatives, formation of new terms, discourses, disciplines, cultural styles and practices, etc. (synthetic stage 3: constructive).

Synthetic transformation and deepening of analysis might draw closer the Anglo-American philosophy, where analytical tendencies dominate, with the Continental and especially Russian philosophy known for their synthetic traditions.

Philosophy of synthesis combines the two traditions deemed incompatible: Nietzsche’s philosophy of life and Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, i.e., the most ambitious and radical versions of vitalism and linguism. Synthesis then is a form of linguo-vitalism - the increase in vitality of language itself, the expansion of the discursive frontiers of the humanities to embrace the maximum of what can be thought and said. The “will for power” specific to language is the multiplication of speakables and thinkables.

According to the analytical tradition, based on the late Wittgenstein, philosophy is the “critique of language”; it is aimed at the study of language games, clarifying word meanings, concepts and rules used in speech practices of everyday life, science, arts, or professional areas. But following this assumption, philosophy itself is a linguistic game, one among others. Then it has still another goal, which is conducting its own language game with utmost vigor and breadth, constantly revising and updating its rules, its thought-images, its conceptual foundation containing units of vocabulary and grammar. According to the late Wittgenstein, language does not tell the “truth” about the world, does not really reflect facts or “atoms” of the universe, but instead plays by its own rules that are different for different discourses, types of consciousness and behavior: “The term “language game” is meant to emphasize that speaking a language is a component of activity, or a form of life” (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 90). According to Wittgenstein, language is not only a reflexive instrument, but the play of life as such, its expansion into the sphere of signs. “Play” and “life” are the key concepts that connect Wittgenstein and Nietzsche; life should play in language as it does in nature or history.

Philosophy then as a meta-language that describes and refines the “natural” language(s) is aimed not at the “truthful” analysis of language, but playing its own language game with an increasing intensity. Language as a game (which is the main assumption of analytical philosophy) contains in itself the refutation of pure analytism—presenting philosophy with a new task of a synthesizing and constructive order. It does not tell the truth about language, since language does not tell the truth about the world. Instead, it strengthens and renews the life of language itself, extending the boundaries of what can be thought and said. Thus Nietzsche’s vitalism rescues Wittgenstein’s (subtle yet constructively poor) analytism, endowing it with the power, valor and courage that Nietzsche assigns for life. To paraphrase Nietzsche, philosophy is striving for power, not of a superman over the world, but a superlanguage over meaning.
NOTES

1. *hu pron* (a clipping of “human”) — a 3rd person gender-neutral pronoun referring both to a man and a woman. For more information see the entry in the PreDicitionary at the end of the article (under Grammatical Words).

2. The word “semiurgy” can be found in J. Buadrillard, cf. his “Systems of objects” (1968), and also in the postmodern theory of communication where it means “sign activity in general,” “production and propagation of signs,” including combinative and descriptive activity, i.e., any sign activity. I attach to this term a much more specific meaning — the art and practice of creating new signs.

3. The term “meme” was introduced by the British biologist Richard Dawkins in 1976 in his book *The Selfish Gene*. Dawkins argued that, alongside genes as transmitters of biological information, there exist transmitters of cultural information, which are also predisposed to self-engendered propagation and comply with the laws of Darwin’s evolution. Similar to genes, Dawkins gave the names of “memes” to such units of cultural memory; memes then strive toward constant self-replication and use for that purpose books, songs, plays, TV programs, and mass communications.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX : PREDictIONARY AND LEXICOPOEIA
As a practical extension of semiurgy, I would like to present here some fragments of my coinages, a collection of new words and terms that I have been trying to introduce to Russian and English audiences. For seven years (since April, 2000) I have been developing the web project, entitled Дар слова. Проективный словарь русского языка [The Gift of a Word: A Projective Dictionary of the Russian language]. Every Sunday I forward the new issue of the Dictionary by e-mail to the subscribers (there are about three thousand of them by now). Every issue contains several new words with their definitions, samples of usage and the reasons for their introduction into the language. These neologisms may eventually be accepted into the language and start circulating as the signs of new concepts, ideas, theories, styles and trends. Or, they may not. It is the readers’ decision whether the words happen to be well-adaptive and whether the images and ideas that the new words present are true to the readers’ expectations. You cannot impose anything upon the language, but you can offer something in hopes that a bit of it will not be rejected. Or, as Fyodor Tyutchev, the 19th century Russian poet, put it:

It is beyond our power to fathom
Which way the word we utter resonates,
Thus, like a sudden grace that comes upon us,
A gift of empathetic understanding emanates.

The Gift of a Word is a dictionary of lexical and conceptual possibilities of the Russian language, and the prospects of its development in the 21st century. The title page of the dictionary contains the contents of the previous issues (there were 250 of them as by June 2007):

http://old.russ.ru/antolog/intelnet/dar0.html

Of course, neologisms with Russian stems are difficult to translate into English. But I am also preoccupied with the work on linguistry in English, and the results of this work will be presented in the dictionary of my English coinages, entitled Predictionary. This word has already been included in a dictionary of English neologisms (WordSpy).

Predictionary

Predictionary is a projective dictionary that does not register words already in use but predicts new words and introduces them for the first time. The first Russian installment of the projective dictionary, as a separate edition, came out in 2003 (Проективный философский словарь. Новые термины и понятия). The dictionary contained 165 articles by 11 authors, including 90 articles of my own.

The term predictionary can be read in two ways:

(1) pre-dictionary, a draft, a beginning of a dictionary;
(2) prediction-ary, a collection of predictions, a list of predicted words.

Almost all dictionaries, even those that contain neologisms, are reactive in that they lag behind the evolution of the living language and reflect its foregone stages. A Predictionary, on the contrary,
is a proactive dictionary: it contributes new words that might make their way into texts, speeches and dictionaries of the future.

This Predictionary is a collection of words that I have coined since the early 1980s. The project has a three-fold agenda — analytic, aesthetic, and pragmatic.

1. Analytically, PreDictionary searches for blank spaces and semantic voids in the lexical-conceptual systems of languages in order to fill them with new words designating would-be phenomena and nascent ideas for which no semantic markers currently exist.

2. Aesthetically, PreDictionary aims to create new words as miniature works of verbal art, (micropoems, lexipoems), filled with lyrical or dramatic intrigue; such newly minted linguistic coins can open fresh venues for expressiveness by provocatively juxtaposing the formative lexical elements of existing words.

3. Pragmatically, PreDictionary seeks to introduce new words into the language by providing examples of their usage in various styles of oral and written speech. Each word is defined and illustrated in such a way as to demonstrate its communicative value and the range of its possible applications in typical situations and discourses.

It is my hope that most words in this experimental lexicon will achieve the first task, and that at least some will approach the second goal. The third goal may be unattainable. Still, with hope once again triumphing over experience, I set out to achieve the unachievable.

**Lexicopoeia as a Literary Genre**

What is the minimal unit of verbal creativity? Obviously, a neologism, i.e., a single word as a quantum of creative energy. A new word exposes — in the most concentrated form — the same qualities of invention and fantasy that are manifest in longer literary texts, such as poems or novels.

There are many varieties of neologisms according to their discursive and social functions: scientific and technical terms, commercial trademarks and brand names, political slogans, and expressive coinages in literature and journalism. Many authors, such as Lewis Carroll or James Joyce, weave neologisms into the fabric of their poetry or fiction. However, there should be recognition for a neologism as a self-sufficient literary text that is not intended for any pragmatic use and is not a part of any larger literary genre. I call this genre of a single word creation *lexicopoeia*. For more information on word creativity and the genre of lexicopoeia see Epstein, 2004, pp. 254-320.

The word *lexicopoeia* is formed from the Greek roots *lexis*, meaning word, expression (from *legein*, meaning say) and *poiein*, meaning to make or compose. Lexicopoeia literally means word-composition, word-formation.

As the epigraph to this project, I have chosen Ralph Emerson’s saying “Every word was once a poem.” Actually, lexicopoeia is nothing but an abbreviation of this aphorism: the whole sentence is condensed into a single word: lexico-poieia.

“Every word [lexis] was once a poem [poiema].”
… and still IS at the moment of its coinage.

Lexicopoeia is the most concise genre of literature. Even an aphorism seems obese and verbose as compared with a neologism. If an aphorism as a literary genre corresponds to the sentence as a
linguistic unit, then a lexicopoem corresponds to the word as a minimal element of speech having meaning as such.

The material for lexicopoeia is provided by formative units of words — roots, prefixes, suffixes and other morphemes. Not any arbitrary combination of morphemes can be regarded as a new word, just as not any arbitrary combination of words can claim to be a poem or a story. A lexicopoem is a minimal literary text that has its own idea, image, composition, plot, authorial intention and intertextual connections with other words. This distinguishes lexicopoeia as a genre of verbal art from random combinations of morphemes. The meaning of a lexicopoem can not be mechanically derived from separate meanings of its morphological components.

The word lexicopoeia is an example of the literary genre that it designates. This word itself is a fresh coinage: it has never been used before in English or any other language. It is absent not only from all dictionaries, but also from 3 billion pages of the World Wide Web.

In the process of assembling this lexicopoetic collection, all coinages were checked on the web (via Google) to make sure none had been used before, at least in the sense deployed in this Predictionary. The Predictionary has the following 15 thematic rubrics.

- General
- Everyday Life
- People. Characters
- Relationships. Communication
- Psychology. Emotions
- Life. Health. Death
- Love. Sex
- Mind. Knowledge
- Philosophy
- Religion. Beliefs
- Society
- Time
- Internet. Informational Technology
- Language. Textuality
- Grammatical Words (pronouns, conjunctions, etc.)

The new words are arranged alphabetically within them. Below I reproduce only fragments of my PreDictionary that in its full version includes more than 120 words.

**Everyday Life**

Dunch *n* (a word-portmanteau, blend of *lunch* and *dinner*; cf. *brunch*) — a small meal between lunch and dinner in the late afternoon or early evening (about 3-5 pm.). Dunch usually includes tea or coffee with cookies, sometimes fruits or a light salad.

This is a more appropriate word for an intermediate meal than the once suggested *linner*. *Dunch* is a lighter meal, more similar to lunch than to dinner. Accordingly, the word is more brief (one syllable) and follows the pattern of another recently coined meal - brunch. The need for such a term reflects the proliferation of social occasions in contemporary urban life, as well as the ubiquity of food and opportunities to partake of it.

E.g. For tomorrow, I have already scheduled lunch and dinner with my colleagues. Let’s have a *dunch* together.

**Psychology/ Emotions**

Happicle *n* (happy + diminutive suffix — icle, like in *particle, icicle*) — a particle of happiness, the smallest unit of happiness; a single happy occurrence or a momentary feeling of happiness.

Happicles make life worth living, even in the absence of one big happiness.

E.g. There is no happiness in this world, but there are happicles. Sometimes we can catch them, fleeting and unpredictable as they are.
Love/Sex
Dislove v trans (prefix dis + love; cf. dislike, disapprove) — to have a deep negative feeling, attraction through aversion to someone.
Dislove is a deeper feeling than dislike; it is not just a matter of taste, but of personal relationship. It is addressed to individuals rather than to inanimate entities. Dislove implies a strong negative emotional connection to its human object.
E.g. I don’t dislike Andy, I dislove him. I would never divorce a person whom I merely dislike.

Mind/Knowledge
Cerebrity n (Lat cerebrum, brain; cf. celebrity) — a famous, well-publicized intellectual; a brainy, cerebral person who is emotionally dry or egocentric.
E.g. I try to avoid meetings with such cerebrities. Everything they have to say is already in their books.

Philosophy
Reity n (Lat res, matter or thing) — all that is real in opposition to the virtual.
Reity is a more narrow realm than the one called reality. Virtual worlds are parts of reality, which embraces emotions, numbers, computer games, abstract concepts etc. Reity is what we find around us when we turn off our computers, e.g., the aroma of coffee, the sound of a living voice, a view from the window.
E.g. The switch to reity from a video or a computer is a gratifying experience. You sense afresh the charm of things as they smell and taste and touch you.

Society
Dreadvertise v (dread + advertise) — to advertise by dread, to engage in military propaganda.
E.g. There are skilled dreadvertisers in our government.

Time
Chronomaniac n (Gr khronos, time + Gr mania, obsession, madness; cf. nymphomaniac) — a person obsessed with time and speed; one who attempts to live faster and to control time up to the smallest units. A synonym: timenik n (time + suffix — nik; cf. peacenik)
E.g. All my colleagues are crazy timeniks. No one has a minute for a human conversation.

Internet/Informational Technology
Egonetics n (ego + net + ics) — weaving a network of self-references, increasing one’s presence on the internet.
Egonetics is different from “ego surfing” — a search of one’s own name on the internet (using search engines). Egonetics is an active electronic dispersal of one’s name, making links to one’s homepage, entering various interactive sites and open forums. Such an ego-expansion can be done for the sake of an idea or a commercial promotion, but in the absence of ideological or professional motifs, this is a narcissistic case of egonetics.
E.g. One of my colleagues uses his office hours for egonetics.
Jim is caring and responsive, he is not an egoist in the traditional sense, he is simply an egonetic. He loves his name more than himself.
Jim is caring and responsive, he is not an egoist in the traditional sense; he is simply an egonetic. He is more attached to his virtual persona than to his physical existence.

Language/Textuality
Silentese noun or adjective (silent + suffix — ese, like in Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese) — the language of silence; it may use paralinguistic signs, gestures, mimicry and facial expressions.
E.g. He didn’t say anything. — Why, he spoke eloquently, but it was Silenese, the most difficult language to study and understand.

**Grammatical Words**

Hü pron (a clipping of “human”) — a 3rd person gender-neutral pronoun referring both to a man and a woman.

Hü belongs to the category of back-clippings, in which an element or elements are removed from the end of a word to create a shortened form: flu (influenza) lab(oratory), math(ematics), ad(vertisement), piano(forte), and condo(minium).

Hü is pronounced (hju:), like “hu” in “human.” As a sound pattern, “hu” is closest to the two other genderless, singular, person-related English pronouns: “you” and the interrogative “who.” “Who” and “hu” are naturally drawn to each other by rhyming and communication contexts, as a question and the answer: (hu:)? — (hju:). “Hu” designates precisely that generic, un-gendered HUman to whom the question “who?” refers. Thus the answer is prompted by the question itself. “Who buys this stuff? Who would want a car like that?” — “Anyone who believes that hu can afford it.”

The five forms of the 3rd person pronouns make up the table:

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All derivative forms are pronounced similarly: hus (hu:z), huself (hu:sel). E.g. Anyone who admits that hu has a conflict of interests should not serve as an investigator.

For some speakers, preferable technique in avoiding gender-biased pronouns is to change the noun into plural. However, such a solution is problematic and even detrimental to the language’s ethical and conceptual capacity to deal with individuals. Compare:

A hero is one who places huself at risk for another.

Heroes are those who place themselves at risk for others.

To convey this idea I would like to imagine A HERO, a heroic human being, rather than a group of heroes, a mass of heroes. Resorting to “they” successfully eliminates not only gender, but individuality as well. Should we speak and think about people only in terms of multitudes? I think it’s important to talk about a student, an employee, an author, a doctor, a physicist, or a person, rather than to refer to faceless students, authors, doctors, persons, etc. We need to accommodate grammar to ethical and conceptual concerns, not the other way around. Gaining gender-neutral grammar at the expense of an individual reference is a dubious achievement.

There are several advantages of “hu” over other contenders for the vacancy:

1. “Hu” is fully motivated, semantically and etymologically justified, as a shortened form of “HUman.” Whenever the pronoun is used, you have the idea of the noun behind it making it memorable, inherently meaningful and suggestive (unlike purely conditional, artificial pronouns earlier suggested such as “e, et, mon, na, ne, po, se, tey”).

2. “Hu” is a short, one syllable word. The use of “hu” (2 keystrokes) cuts effectively the time needed to type “he or she” (9 keystrokes); cf. “huself” (6) and “himself or herself,” (18) etc. This is a substantial economy of time, space, and effort in our frequent daily use of gender-neutral pronouns, especially in e-mails.
3. “Hu” fits the pattern of existing 3rd person pronouns (“he” and “she”), first, by including the consonant “h” common to all of them; second, by containing only one vowel, like all of them. “Hu - he - she” — these words, all open syllables, one consonant plus one vowel, are good partners in distributing the gender roles within one lexical family.

4. The spelling of “hu” coincides with its pronunciation; there are no irregularities of the kind that damages, for example, the “s/he” pronoun, making it good in writing but unpronounceable.

5. “Hu” is used in a regular grammatical manner, in contrast to “they” (as a singular pronoun). “Hu” can be used routinely and automatically, without twisting the sentence to put all nouns in plural or exploiting “they” in a disagreeable manner to refer to a singular person.

6. It is easy to form derivatives from “hu” following the existing patterns: “hus” and “huself.”

7. If we decide to borrow a gender-neutral pronoun from another language, we’ll have to consider the Persian “u,” Arabic “hu” and Old English “ou.” All of them could be easily incorporated in contemporary English with the addition or preservation of “h,” as a shortened form of the genderless “human.”

So far, I do not see any strong logical or historical arguments against hu-language. It is the language of undivided HUmaness. In the near future, this HUmaness will need even better articulation to distinguish our species from artificial “it” forms of intelligence that are rising to a more active role in civilization and language. Soon we’ll have to answer such questions as “Who is reading, writing, calculating, speaking, and even thinking?” The answer may be “hu” (human) or “it” (machine). We need “hu” not only to speak equally about men and women, but in order to speak differently about humans and non-humans who share with us many similar qualities and predicates and fulfill many comparable tasks. We increasingly need “hu” as a sign of a humanly specific actor or agent in the language of mental actions and symbolic interactions.

In the famous episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation, the crew of the Enterprise manages to liberate an individual from the hive-like structure of the maleficent Borg Collective. They name hum, of course, Hu(gh)!

The full version of PreDictionary is on my web site:
http://www.emory.edu/INTELNET/predictionary.html

All are invited to participate in this project. Free Internet subscription to “The Gift of the World. Proactive Dictionary of the Russian Language” is at http://subscribe.ru/catalog/linguistics.lexicon
This article examines how television in the United Kingdom, France and Russia has managed shifts in consensus resulting from the recent rise of “Islamic extremism.” The research is based on recordings from news bulletins on “Establishment” channels (BBC1, France 2, 1st Channel). We conclude that hybridity in multiculturalist discourse is highest within the BBC, where a robust “hegemonic chain” has facilitated representation of the widest range of voices in the most complex combinations, but where the disruption to the consensus is most vividly expressed. In France, consensus around integrationist values holds good for the state and the media, but the relative weakness of the hegemonic chain beyond the official sphere results in reduced hybridity and significant discursive contradiction. In Russia, precisely because of the state-media symbiosis, television fails to internalise multicultural values, alternative voices are represented only when reaccented from an official viewpoint, and discursive tension is correspondingly higher.

Keywords: extremism, hegemony, Islam, multiculturalism, television

On December 6, 2006, Vladimir Putin called a meeting of party leaders to discuss extremism in Russian society. In his address, he referred to international terrorism, internal...
ethnictensions and Russia’s multicultural, multi-faith status. Two days later, Britain’s Tony Blair gave a speech on multiculturalism, singling out Muslim fundamentalism as the most dangerous form of extremism threatening British society, claiming: “The reason we are having this debate is not generalised extremism. It is a new and virulent form of ideology associated with a minority of our Muslim community.” Both speeches provided the headlines for the evening news bulletins of BBC 1 and Russia’s Channel 1 respectively.

The broader context behind a coincidence which passed largely unnoticed is the rise of Islamic radicalism and the reinforcement of a “War on Terror” discourse in the wake of terrorist atrocities in the USA (9/11), the UK (7/7), Russian (Beslan), and elsewhere. There is an emergent body of academic work treating the “War on Terror’s” implications for inter-ethnic cohesion, security and multicultural policy, and its representation in the media. Anglophone research is oriented towards identifying the impact of Western media bias against Islamic cultures. For example, Said’s (1997) seminal study demonstrates how Islamic groups are induced first to assimilate then perpetuate western media images of Muslim hostility. Poole (2002) details British media stereotyping of Muslims in the context of the new global order. Qureshi and Sells (2003) analyse post-9/11 constructions of the Muslim as enemy. Sanadjian (2002) and Lyon (2005) examine the retrograde influence of the anti-terror campaign on Western multiculturalism. There is less scholarship on French or Russian media representations. In France and Russia attention has focused on Islam itself; Sifaoui’s (2002) monograph on the Islamic threat to French integrity builds on Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis; a parallel Russian body of work (e.g. Brass & Shumilin, 2004) promotes the Establishment line on Chechnya and global terror. A British counterweight is Russell’s (2005) exposé of Russian demonisations of Chechen Muslims after 9/11.

Whilst much one-nation scholarship references the US approach to Islamic radicalism, few genuinely comparative analyses have been undertaken. This article addresses the lacuna by considering television news mediations of the impact of Islamic extremism on inter-ethnic cohesion policy in three European nations which share similarities in their postcolonial relations with Islamic states, substantial Muslim contingents within multicultural populations, and varying degrees of involvement in the “War on Terror.” They also exhibit differences of media and political cultures and policy towards Muslim minorities. We based our research on recordings from the main evening bulletins on channels considered close to the Establishment viewpoint in each country (BBC1, France 2, 1st Channel).

Our article focuses on television news across the three nations, asking: How have European news outlets reflected shifts in consensus views resulting from the three-way intersection of Islam, extremism and multiculturalism/intégration/mnogonarodnost’ (henceforth abbreviated as MIM)?

We first provide some brief background information in order to (i) differentiate in summary form the value systems within which the consensus shifts are occurring in our three countries, and (ii) to present empirical data derived from our corpus of recordings as a means of setting the context for the theoretically informed case studies around which we base our
main argument. We then outline a framework within which to treat the question we pose, basing our approach to mainstream media representations around the notion of hegemony as articulated by Ernst Laclau (1985), modified for text analysis purposes via the insights of Mikhail Bakhtin (1981).

**BACKGROUND: MULTICULTURALISM, MNOGONOARODNOST’ AND INTÉGRATION**

Official cultures in France, the UK and Russia have developed extensive (albeit divergent) theoretical positions on inter-ethnic relations. In Russia, *mnogonarodnost’* is constitutionally enshrined, just as *intégration* is in France; in the UK, *multiculturalism* gained broad Establishment support which, as the Blair speech indicated, is now ebbing fast. In all three countries, the War on Terror, along with the rise of nationalism, concern over migration, and hostility to US-derived “political correctness” have prompted a shift of values. In each case, (re)definitions of extremism as a marker of what lies beyond the socially acceptable have been key to the dynamics of the shift. And in each case, media systems play a crucial role in driving the process.

This is not the place to explore the complexities of concepts relating to the status and interrelations of ethnic groups within Britain, France and Russia. For present purposes, we employ three concepts with the following meanings:

*Multiculturalism* is a fluid concept. Originally the umbrella term for anti-discrimination policies implemented following ethnic tensions in the late 1950s in response to immigration from the Commonwealth countries, it was based on “the concept of equality as difference, the right to have one’s differences recognised … in the public sphere” (Modood, 2005, p.153-154). At its fringes, the multiculturalist consensus which emerged in the 1960s developed in the early 1980s into a radical minority politics grounded in a concept of political blackness, but “from the late 1980s onwards … most Asians were emphasising a more particular ethnic and religious identity” (Modood, 2005, p.156). The alliance came under different pressure under the Conservatives, following concerns over the non-integration of immigrants, a tabloid-led anti-political correctness campaign, and the emergence of Islamic radicalism, a trend hastened under New Labour. Now, as a recent Guardian article (13/6/07) argues: “[Multiculturalism] is being shelved in preference for community cohesion. But the difference seems one of semantics rather than substance. The argument about multiculturalism has spread misunderstandings and anxieties about an assimilation agenda.”

*Intégration* is a prescriptive, Republican ideal. To paraphrase the official definition offered by the Haut Conseil à l’intégration (2007), *Intégration* is a long term process of active social participation based on shared values, expressed in terms of the equal rights and obligations of all people living in France. This entails, among others, equality
between the sexes, respecting freedom of thought, and freedom of religion. The latter is most commonly encapsulated in the concept of laïcité, which possesses three main dimensions: neutrality, autonomy and community (McGoldrick, 2006, p. 38). It defines the function of religion within the state and can be understood as the separation of religion from "public space." However, as its proponents stress, it should not be treated as a rejection of religion. On the contrary, laïcité represents a system of public order (l’ordre public) which permits religious freedom to flourish, as it provides protection against religious group pressure on individuals (McGoldrick, 2006, p. 39).

Mnogonarodnost’— The Russian approach to inter-ethnic relations is terminologically and conceptually confusing and reflects an uneasy synthesis of Great Russian imperialism, the spurious Soviet-Marxist brotherhood of nationalities dispersed across a 15-republic Federation (the original context in which mnogonarodnost’ — “multi-peopled-ness” — was formalised as state policy) and the influence of US-inspired civic citizenship. As Valerii Tishkov (2006) argues, in Russia the concept of one nation is technically absent, since the notion of “national interests” is used to define the demands of citizens of various ethnic origins. Moreover, the terms “nationality” (natsional’nost’), “people” (narod), “national group” (narodnost’), “nation” (natsiia), and “ethnic group” (etnos) have, since Soviet times, been used inconsistently (Sokolovskiy, http://www.indepsocres.spb.ru/library/racism_soder.html); for example, in his public pronouncements Putin refers to Russia alternatively as many-peopled (mnogonarodnyi) and multinational (mnogonatsional’nyi).

BACKGROUND: THE EMPIRICAL DATA

The trajectory of our preliminary data analysis is from the general to the specific. First, we identified the overall prominence of Islam-related news stories in daily news bulletins monitored over six months (01/11/2006 to 30/04/2007). “Islam-related” stories are identified as those containing specific reference to Islam, or connoting, verbally or visually, the involvement of Islamic factors (e.g. references to guerrilla fighters presumed Islamic, or stories on migrants in which background images of veiled women are displayed). During this period Islam was of differing importance to the BBC and to the French and Russian channels: the BBC’s Ten o’clock News, Channel 1’s Vremia and Journal de 20 Heures devoted 26.9%, 12.1% and 6.8% respectively of their news time to the topic. For this and other statistical indicators see Appendix (Table B1).

Next, we conducted a concordance analysis based on transcribed bulletins from the first trimester (01/11/2006 to 31/01/2007) in order to concentrate specifically on multiculturalism’s interrelationship with a) extremism, b) Islam and c) ethnic difference/tension, on how the boundaries of normative are defined, and on the extent to which extremism is linked with terrorism, and with Islam. To provide a direct link to the issues treated in our case studies, we then focused on identifying the represented actors and the quotation patterns (direct/indirect) in a selected corpus of stories highlighting ethnic
difference and featured in bulletins recorded in the first trimester. Taking into account that this analysis is based on just 14 British, 12 French and 15 Russian news stories about inter-ethnic cohesion featured between 01/11/2006 and 31/01/2007 our conclusions about the identified quotation patterns (direct/indirect) are potentially prone to statistical distortions. They are, therefore, provisional and indicative. Thus, we were able to assess the relative importance accorded to the voices in basic, numerical terms as a precursor to the critical interpretation of the disposition of those voices and its bearing on consensus issues undertaken in the case studies. The tables of stories selected for quotation pattern analysis are given in the Appendix (Table A1, A2 and A3), with those selected for our detailed, case-study analysis highlighted.

INTERSECTION OF ISLAM WITH MIM AND EXTREMISM

MIM was referenced with identically low frequency in Russia, Britain and France. However, in Russia, the use of affiliated notions (“respect” [n=2], “dialogue” [n=1] and “interpenetration of cultures” [vzaimopronikvenie kultur] [n = 1]), generate the sense of a need for intercultural bridges. British discourse is less loaded and featured only one comment involving “diversity” (n = 1) and two direct links to Britain, though it can be inferred that the value is more fully embedded in the Establishment culture and does not require foregrounding. In France, the integrationist value of Laïcité, occurred only 6 times. In none of the bulletins was there an overt linking of multiculturalism to terrorism (with the exception of Tony Blair’s speech), although the single French reference to “communautarisme” (a term with negative connotations sometimes used to refer to separatism between communities) occurred in conjunction with sectarian violence in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon.

In France and Britain, the idea of extremism is virtually one-dimensional. In the UK, it is linked almost exclusively to Islamic radicalism, which endangers democracy (n = 1) and requires moderation (n = 1). It is sometimes contrasted with “moderate Islam” (n = 2). Islam reoccurs in conjunction with extremism under several headings: Islam (n = 7), Sunni (n = 1), preacher (n = 1), Muslim (n = 7). Under its umbrella, extremism embraces terrorism (n = 2), bombing (n = 3) and violence (n = 2). Links to migrants are absent, and extremism is only once associated with crime.

In France, the conflation of extremism and Islam is more complete. The term “extremism” itself occurs only once (in a story commemorating the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish extremist), though a related notion, “Intégrisme,” features twice, each time in the context of Islamic violence. The term “Islamiste” (in which the conflation acquires lexical embodiment) is used frequently (n=35). The adjective “radical” is used in conjunction with Islam 5 times.

Russia presents a contrast. Extremism is linked specifically to Islam twice only, though there are associations with Wahabhism (n = 2) and guerrilla fighters (boeviki) (presumably
Islamic, though this is rarely specified). It is usually tied to broader political radicalism expressed as politics (n = 5), political parties (n = 4) slogans and protests (3). Radical extremism is associated with national hatred (n = 3), and fascism (n = 1). References with a covert Islamic dimension to tensions with immigrant communities are also to be noted (n = 4). Much discourse centres on attempts to negotiate the boundaries of extremism and it is sometimes discussed in the context of legitimate civic protests (n = 3). It betrays traces of a criminalisation discourse, with the following occurrences noted: trial (n = 2), punishment (n = 2), criminal (n = 2), crime (n = 7). As in the UK, the susceptibility of young people to extremism is acknowledged.

QUOTATION PATTERNS

Our analysis of quotation patterns (see Appendix, Table B2) revealed that the prevalence of *vox populi* representatives in *Vremia* cannot disguise a clear predilection for people allied to the Putin agenda (demonstrators on a Unity Day march, children talking to the President, etc.). The political representatives all belong to parties useful to Putin’s cause and the other voices represented are overwhelmingly those of the state authorities. The low Muslim presence can be explained by the already-noted strategy of downplaying the Islamic dimension to domestic news.

The same prevalence of direct over indirect quotation can be found in French news stories. The identity of the Muslims quoted indicates a selection policy oriented, like Russia’s, towards those sympathetic to the official agenda (12 republican Muslims, two representatives of the moderate Muslim community, one respected mosque leader). Similarly, *vox populi* quotes were from staff in the public services.

On the BBC stories *vox populi* representatives were relatively diverse and included passers-by from several ethnic/religious groups. Moreover, apart from the greater frequency and range of Muslims voices cited (these included Muslim radicals, preachers, and representatives of Muslim organisations) the proportion of indirect quotes is far higher than in either Russia or France.

Within our central argument we will contextualise this discrepancy in terms of a greater willingness on the BBC’s part to engage with, and dialogise, the voice of the Muslim Other, attributable in turn to the broader and more robust consensual scope it embraces. We must first prepare the theoretical ground for the case studies in which that argument will be articulated.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Our argument, is doubly bound up with the Establishment which we will need to define; first, we are treating MIM as the, albeit unstable, consensual norms by which
societies deal with their postcolonial legacies; second, we are concentrating on the treatment of these norms within channels considered close to the Establishment position. We are interested in the extent to which they have internalised official articulations of inter-ethnic cohesion policy, and the ways in which disruptions to those articulations attributable to Islamic radicalism have impacted upon their news discourse strategies.

In theorising the Establishment and its relationship with television, we abandon empiricist notions of the phenomenon as consisting of elite institutions (inclusive of the government) wielding political power from an identifiable point of privilege. Such a conception is inadequate both to the BBC’s subtle consensualism (whose reach extends well beyond those institutions), and Russia’s Channel 1 (which, though heavily state-controlled, fails to function as a repository for those broadly accepted “commonsense” values associated with the Establishment). We have substituted for it the Laclauan model of hegemony according to which the power capable of generating such “commonsense” values does not reside in discrete social formations, but consists of “nodal points” or “chains of equivalence” which partially (and provisionally) fix dominant meanings within a complex system of differences and antagonisms (Laclau,1985, p. 135).

For Laclau, hegemony “cannot be conceived as an irradiation of effects from a privileged point” (1985, p. 141), since “the problem of power cannot be posed in terms of the … dominant sector which constitutes the centre of a hegemonic formation … such a centre will always elude us”. Nor can we posit “the total diffusion of power in the social, as this would blind the analysis to the presence of chains of equivalence and to partial concentrations of power” (p. 142). Hegemonic power is inhabited by difference: “[T]he two conditions of a hegemonic articulation are the presence of antagonistic forces and the instability of the frontiers which separate them” (p. 136). This instability facilitates the emergence of “overdetermined” chains of equivalence. Thus, ethnic minority interests, capitalist entrepreneurialism and middle class liberalism might represent the multiculturalist consensus chain. At every point, the chains threaten to dissolve into mutual antagonisms before a new chain emerges. Hegemony thrives on such tension, for “a situation in which a system of differences had been … welded together would imply the end of hegemonic politics” (p.138).

We therefore replace instrumentalist views of mainstream television news as an agent of central power with an understanding of television as the site in which the chains constituting hegemonic meaning are articulated. However much pressure they place on media outlets, ruling elites will, unless they establish themselves within such chains, never control hegemony. But we should emphasise that the framework applies differently to different media systems. For example, it best captures the Russian situation “in the negative,” by pointing up the (near) absence of chains of equivalence and thus demonstrating the failure of the regime to benefit from hegemonic power (a failure reflected in Channel 1’s paranoid fear of alternative opinion, Pavlovian obedience and crude polemicising). Moreover, it does not preclude differential influence amongst the various interests forming
chains and is thus no more “optimistically democratic” than other theories of power (when one group masks its superior influence through hegemonic allegiances with others, its ability to shape hegemony to its advantage increases).

Hegemony can be approached at the textual level through the Bakhtinian notion of monologism or “unitary language.” Here, power is associated with the attempt to minimise the centrifugal heteroglossia (mnogolosie) of discourse and orient it towards the centripetal force of the unitary language. However, inflected with Laclaua’s concepts of overdetermination and equivalence chains, the unitary language is not the property of a single, discrete group. Indeed, Bakhtin himself characterises it as an abstraction never realised within any specific utterance. Rather it emerges from a process in which certain contingent voices (e.g. journalists) weave between and “reaccent” other voices - government, business, official Muslim opinion, radical Islam - without “mastering” them, but “aggregating” them out at a particular point in the ideological spectrum. The (never complete) weakening of the barriers dividing the hybrid, antagonistic voices corresponds on the textual level to the density of the chains identified by Laclau on the societal level. The unitary language is the discursive effect of this process and is articulated from the elusive Establishment position. The instability besetting the process from which that position emerges accounts for its ever-shifting nature of that position. To return to Bakhtin:

The centripetal forces of the life of language, embodied in a “unitary language,” operate in the midst of heteroglossia … Every concrete utterance … serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. (Bakhtin 1981, p. 272)

For this reason, MIM values may at times appear to be spoken from within the Establishment position and at others from beyond it.

It is important for the purposes of evaluating the ideological orientation of news to note Bakhtin’s rejection of the notion of a “neutral, authoritative word”:

There are no “neutral” words and forms — words and forms that can belong to noone; language has been completely shot through with intentions and accents. Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life. (Bakhtin 1981, p. 293)

Likewise, at the macro-level, the purported neutrality of the hegemonic consensus masks the chains of ideological interests that it serves.

Language’s accentual hybridity is most evident in the dialogistic phenomena of indirect speech, and the looser, hybrid form of Quasi-Direct speech (Nesobstvenno priamaia rech’), where the words of another are rendered without quotation marks and bear traces of the intentions of the quoting consciousness in what Bakhtin terms a form of “ventriloquation.” In each case, a third-person presence evaluates and re-articulates the word of another. One of our tasks will be identifying the component voices in this process.
Dialogism is, however, not restricted to hybridity within speech; even apparently single-voiced utterances are oriented implicitly towards an external collocutor as hidden polemic. Equally, a high level of discursive hybridity may indicate the presence of a relatively robust hegemonic chain (capable of appropriating difference), rather than its opposite.

Mediating between the Bakhtinian and Laclauian idioms, we identify three interlinked strategies, of which representation as the drive to give voice to the flow of hybrid discourses (antagonisms), yet reorient it towards unitariness (equivalence) is the first. The second is the attempt by a participant in the dialogic encounter, once discursive hybridity has stabilised as a unitary sign (hegemonic chain), to internalise it in order to perform its meanings. Thus, the BBC “internalises” consensus multiculturalism and performs it in its codes of practice, selection of interviewees, etc. The third we call the metadiscursive strategy by which distance from Establishment positions (e.g. multiculturalism) is re-established in order to “authenticate” them from without, but also, potentially, to undermine them. We will refer to visual aspects of the reports where necessary, but make no attempt at a systematic image analysis which exceeds our scope.

CASE STUDIES

We will examine the disposition of voices, levels of discursive hybridity and modes of reaccentuation in three reports per country, referring our Bakhtinian methodology back to our overarching Laclauan model via the distinction between representation, performance and metadiscourse. As a complete set, the stories chosen (see tables A1 to A3 in the Appendix) thematise (i) state interventions into the debate around multicultural/integrationist values (ii) formal attempts to foster national and inter-ethnic cohesion, and (iii) the clash of cultures. Such themes were thought likely to feature relatively high levels of the metadiscursivity and performativity with which we particularly associate the hegemonic process in its mature phase. However, we divide the analyses by country rather than theme because (a) it is the inter-country comparative dimension which is of key importance to us, (b) there is excessive overlap between the theme categories (particularly between state interventions and cultural clashes), and (c) these categories are unevenly distributed across the three countries. As will become apparent, for Britain (8/12/06; 24/1/07) and Russia (6/12/06; 10/12/06), pairs of closely related stories were collapsed for case study purposes in order to achieve a balance of 3 per nation. Because we are interpreting texts steeped in human intentionalities, we will not apply our critical apparatus as a rigid, positivistic template. Our points of entry into, and exit from, texts will be intuitive, and ad hoc. Moreover, in Russia’s case, the extreme rapidity with which the ideological sands are shifting necessitates sporadic references to broadcasts outside our monitoring period.

Britain: Case 1 (BBC 1 News, 8/12/06)
Let us begin with Tony Blair’s multiculturalism speech. The report’s representational strategy includes multiple instances of terminological slippage reflecting a mutual contamination of voices. Whilst the presenter’s headline invokes “ethnic minorities,” the opening sentence of the item proper speaks of a “message to Britain’s Muslim communities,” citing Blair’s reference to “immigrants.” Blair himself speaks of “religious groups” and this statement is quoted as Quasi-Direct Discourse, in which the other’s exact words are given in a third-person rendition, but without quotation marks: “All of us have a duty, he said, to integrate … religious groups have the right to their identity.” This device recurs, sometimes with third person grammatical markers which, however, do not diminish the other’s presence in the reported speech: “He didn’t mind differences in culture but he was deeply worried by those who rejected … tolerance.” The effect is that of a ventriloquation of Blair’s position from within the presenter’s discourse.

This alignment of voices elides the stark contradiction in Blair’s rhetoric. His injunction “Conform to tolerance or don’t come” is itself intemperate. But, by re-expressing the paradox as merely “an uncompromising message,” whilst retaining Blair’s terminological conflation and dual assumption that minorities are both un-integrated, and in need of integration, the news discourse reaccents the other’s word, mollifying its harsher edges.

Muslim voices are framed by a statement which reproduces the governmental association of integration with Britishness and separatism with extremist Muslims: “But what about the idea of the British duty to integrate taking precedence over religious practice?” Nonetheless, the voices themselves are permitted to challenge the construct of Britishness and, at the same time offer an alternative form of integration based on shared commitment to multicultural difference. Whilst an official Muslim spokesman appears to reinforce the Blairite view of Muslim intransigence, the assertion of an Asian-looking female that it is “not essential” to be British these days, supported by a white male’s belief that a single version of Britishness cannot be universally imposed, connotes a vision of a multicultural Britain in which communities agree not to impose norms upon each other. Through the selection of such vox populi opinions, the BBC engages in a performance of multiculturalism at odds with its representational strategy.

In the concluding sentences, multiculturalism is thematised when the reporter wonders “whether we’ve got multiculturalism right.” The effect of ending with speculation about “segregated communities and parallel lives” is to predetermine a negative answer to the question, indicating that it has been posed on the government’s terms. Thus the supposedly metadiscursive naming of multiculturalism is posited intradiscursively from within the position of one of those contesting its meaning. In this case, performance undercuts representation but is itself thwarted by metadiscursivity, as hegemonic equivalence (re)fragments into competing antagonisms.

The BBC’s performance of multicultural values is evident in a special report from a later bulletin dedicated to Britishness (BBC 1, 24/1/07). Answers to the questions of Mark Easton, the Home Affairs Editor, as to what it means to be British are provided by
representatives of our multicultural society: a white female, a black male and an oriental female.

Cardiff, [white female]: “I think more Welsh these days, especially the Welsh government and more sort of autonomy given to the country....”

Birmingham, [black male]: “I can see myself to be more English than British because England is more associated with the Queen.”

Edinburgh, [Oriental female]: “I am Scottish more than British. I do not really talk about me being British anyway.”

The interviewees proclaim allegiance to the home nations to which they belong, rather than to Britain. As previously, they have been chosen to particular ideological effect, enabling the report to achieve a (re)integration of ethnic minorities around a shared commitment to difference of a “safer” kind: not that of separatist Muslim communities, but that of the home nations. Multiculturalism is performed, and simultaneously sanitised, in the context of the assault to which it is now subjected.

Britain: Case 2 (BBC 1, 24/11/06)

In our second case study, the metadiscursive naming of multiculturalism is linked not to discussion of an ideal, but to a specific story behind which the “clash of cultures” discourse lurks. It covers the November 2006 controversy over British Airways (BA) suspending an air hostess for wearing a Christian cross.

In the report, Mark Easton acknowledges that “people want to proclaim their religious and cultural identity,” cuing him meta-discursively to interpret the cross incident and an earlier story about a Muslim teacher sacked for wearing a veil as inevitable consequences of our multicultural society, seemingly from within the consensus position of a hegemonic chain.

Easton’s initial response to the presenter’s question about why BA has backed down is couched in hybridised discourse in which the reporter’s third-person account of BA’s motives is represented from BA’s ideological viewpoint. Easton’s references to “running a global company” and “dress and safety rules,” phrases drawn from the business lexicon, co-articulate the hegemonic, multiculturalist contract between business and ethnic minorities according to which the “Christianity vs. Hinduism” conflict Easton cites should be discarded in the interests of “the bottom line.” The lexicon of the other is augmented with that other’s spatio-temporal viewpoint (“when you’ve got goodness knows how many Bishops pressuring you”). But later, Easton’s hybridised discourse acquires a double-accented quality: in adopting BA’s position, the journalist reveals its absurdity through a sarcastic over-identification with the blinkered BA policy: “suddenly a review seems like a good idea.”
The fact that it is “goodness knows how many Bishops” calling for a climb-down is significant in a way that Easton will not acknowledge. For the outrage that the incident provoked stemmed not from a critique of the logic of BA’s dress code, but from the company’s refusal to recognise Christianity’s status as a “British” value around which those outraged were calling for BA, and those “politically correct” minorities supporting the stewardess’s suspension, to coalesce.

Easton recasts the newsreader’s observation about the two parallel stories in the form of another question: “Is there one law for Christians and another for Muslims?” This phrasing is that of the Muslim objectors to the BA decision who perceive hypocrisy in mainstream British resentment towards both the “stubborn” Muslim teaching assistant and “politically correct” BA for not allowing the stewardess to wear her cross. Easton answers his own question with a resounding “I don’t think so,” resolving the dialogue between Muslim minority and mainstream, Christian Britain in the latter’s favour.

However, he goes on to offer a meta-discursive, moderately separatist definition of multiculturalism in terms of “competing identities,” reassuring us that all we will see in the future is innocuous little “rows” over “veils and crosses.” The equivalence between the two stories that the multiculturalist narrative imposes on them is misleading. The overwhelming tenor of opinion about the Muslim assistant was hostile to her claims, whilst views expressed on the stewardess were predominantly favourable; in each case the arguments were made from a position requiring adherence to mainstream Christian values. Here, in embracing multiculturalist difference, metadiscursivity is out of step with a representational strategy whose ultimate effect is to endorse assimilationism.

Britain: Case 3 (BBC1, 10/11/06)

False parallelism is at work in an earlier story of the failure to convict the Nick Griffin, leader of the British National Party (BNP), for describing Islam as a “wicked, vicious faith.”

Here, four different news stories and four different voices are represented directly within Easton’s discourse: a Muslim extremist protesting against caricatures of the Prophet with his provocative banner (‘Behead those who insult Islam’), Nick Griffin’s insult to Islam, the Pope’s recent ill-advised reference to Islam’s historical association with evil violence, and Trevor Phillips, former (black) chairman of the Commission on Racial Equality (CRE), who warned of the dangers of multiculturalism. There is an overlap between the piece’s metadiscursive function (it foregrounds tensions between multiculturalist theory and practice), and its performative dimension (the invocation of multiple voices to challenge Griffin’s extremism in the name of “commonsense” consensus).

But the orientations and sequencing of the voices directly cited changes the picture. The extremist message on the Muslim protestor’s banner is followed by Griffin’s offending
statement. These two form a pair to be juxtaposed with the “moderate” opinions of the Pope and the CRE Chairman. However, the words of the second pair, far from countering Griffin’s outburst, offer a toned down, temperate version of his message in a second set of pairings: Griffin (“wicked, vicious faith”) + Pope (“evil and inhuman”), and Griffin (“multiracial hell-hole”) + Griffins (“dangerous form of exclusion”).

The voice of the Muslim community does not go un-represented. But it is both anonymised and “hystericalised.” Easton’s phrases “caused huge offence,” “created a storm,” “offensive to many” “hugely offensive to many people” all refer implicitly to the Muslim communities at which Griffin’s remarks were directed. But their voice is not directly heard. And the emotive tenor of the phrases is in sharp contrast with the “sensible” rationalism of the actors in favour of “debate” and “free speech.”

Easton’s assertion that he “thinks there is a fear that today’s acquittal might be portrayed as evidence that Britain is “almost institutionally anti-Islamic” bears careful scrutiny in the context of the tension between the metadiscursive message (in which viewers are reassured that reason will prevail in the form of a new law to protect multiculturalist consensus) and the performative strategy (whose confused parallelism fails to prevent the BNP from disrupting that consensus). The impersonal “there is a fear” masks the subjectivity of the government calling for the new law. But the passive impersonal construction “might be portrayed” hides the agency of the Islamic communities who indeed claimed that their treatment evidences judicial bias. The words “institutionally anti-Islamic” represent the presence of the “alien voice” of the radical critics of British Islamophobia. However, the framing expression “might be portrayed” modalises that claim, casting doubt on its validity. Equally, the Muslims’ perception that their community is “under attack” is qualified with the alternative formulation “or feel alienated” (feeling alienated may reflect a failure to integrate, rather than the justified reaction to attack).

Here, the ideological effect of the dialogical representation process is to bolster that of the flawed performative strategy in undercutting the restatement of commitment to multicultural “equidistance.”

France: Case 1 (France 2, 7/12/06)

French news reports extensively perform normative consensus values through the selection of actors, the words they speak and, through their narrative structures. Our monitoring period featured several stories depicting well-assimilated Arab-Muslim families willing to subordinate their faith to, or integrate it with, laïcité.

One is the narrative of a successful French Arab self-made businessman (Mourad Boudjedal), now the rich benefactor of a Toulon rugby club. In the tale of the 2nd-generation Arab immigrant made good, we have an alignment of ethnic minority, business and state interests whose trajectory is first reflected by the reporter within an official lexicon; he charts progress from “le chomage” (unemployment) to “l’impot sur les grandes fortunes” (income
tax on large earnings), then internalised in the hero’s vernacular reaccentuation: he advances from “bouffer le pain des Français” (scoffing French people’s bread) to “donner du pain aux Français” (giving bread to French people). The alignment is best rendered in the term “beurgeois” (a pun combining “bourgeois” and “beur” — the term used to describe the mixed identity of second generation French-Arabs). The fact that the term is quoted sympathetically within the comments of the reporter - “le beurgeois, comme on l’appelle ici” (the bourgeois as they call him here) - authenticates the integrationist principle through the received opinions of ordinary French citizens; the businessman himself rejects religious separatism as the basis for his identity: “Je suis d’origine Arabe, mais je ne suis pas musulman” (I’m of Arab origin but I’m not Muslim).

The tale is further authenticated through the dialogic citing, and implicit rebuttal, within Boudjelal’s own words, of the racists responsible for the immigrant stereotype: “Euh, sale Arabe ... retourne dans son pays” (Hey, dirty Arab, go back to your own country!). Again, the terms of the rebuttal and the positive trajectory it embodies are re-expressed in the reporter’s official lexicon which refers to: “une ville que le Front Nationale dirigeait encore il y a quelques années” (a town which the National Front ran a few years ago). The report is characterised by a weaving between official and vernacular discourses which, unlike Easton’s tension-laden narratives, mutually bind one another. Thus, following Boudjedal’s account of how he overcame prejudice in order to integrate, the reporter reminds us that an immigrant from the Maghreb now runs the town’s symbolically important rugby club, a fact re-confirmed in Boudjedal’s sentiment: “il y a eu un changement d’attitudes qui est clair” (there’s been a clear change of attitudes). The report incarnates laïcité in a positive example of an integrated French-Arab citizen, and also performs the victory over racist barriers to integration in its narrative trajectory.

France: Case 2 (France 2, 2/1/07)

A complementary report tells of a well-integrated French Muslim family which continues to practice its faith, but within official republican parameters. One difference from the previous report is in the presenter’s metadiscursive introduction characterising the story in official, integrationist terms: “une famille musulmane pratiquante française et fière de l’être. Une famille tout à la fois très pieuse et très attachée à la République” (a practising Muslim family, French and proud of it, at once very devout and very attached to the Republic). However, whilst the report tells of a law-abiding but devout Muslim family, nowhere do the interviewees refer to the Republic, or to pride in being French (although they do say it possible to be both French and Muslim). Metadiscursive naming and representation here coexist in mild tension. Moreover, one must assume that the “vous” in the presenter’s invitation to the viewer - “Vous allez rentrer dans le quotidien d’une famille musulmane ...” (You’re going to be introduced to the everyday life of a Muslim family) is the average, non-Muslim/laïc Frenchman and that, in bringing this “ideal viewer” into the pious Muslim’s
home, the report enacts the integration which is currently absent, even whilst the presenter claims it to be already achieved.

In other respects, too, the report performs integrationism. Thus, Moustapha Moussali, head of the family, stresses the status of his religious devotion as “pratique privée” (private practice) and the avoidance of “prosélytisme.” Moreover, his wife’s rejection of the idea of insisting on her daughters wearing the Islamic headscarf at school can be construed as being implicitly aimed at opponents of the controversial French law on religious clothing.

The Muslim voice in this report recapitulates the hegemonic consensus and responds dialogically to peripheral Islamic objectors. At a second level, the report is itself outwardly dialogised in its orientation towards critics of Islamic separatism, setting out to prove that, contrary to right-wing fears, devout Muslims can reconcile faith with their French citizenship. The report concludes with the reporter importing the value of “l’indifférence,” a term he cites directly from Moussali’s words, into his own, metadiscursive summary: “Un droit à l’indifférence, et l’espérance que les relations avec le reste de la société française soient, un jour, apaisées” (“a right to indifference and the hope that relations with the rest of society will one day be appeased”).

France: Case 3 (France 2, 28/1/07)

It is in an item in which laïcité itself is the story that the levels of discursive tension observed in the BBC reports is attained. The story concerns a charter on laïcité produced by the French Council on Integration. The presenter notes that it relates primarily to maternity hospitals which have recently been subject to violent conduct from religious extremists.

Superficially, the report finds evidence to support the need for a renewed commitment to laïcité. But let us examine the sequencing of the examples. The first is that of a Madame Zenzelaoui who, in answering a question about whether she has to be attended by a female gynaecologist, responds in moderate terms that, whilst Islam requires this, it provides for the possibility of male doctors in emergencies. The reporter identifies a parallel flexibility on the part of the hospital authorities: “alors, on s’adapte dans la mesure possible aux convictions religieuses” (we adapt as far as possible to religious convictions). His words, however, adopt the inner perspective of the hospital management and there is no attempt to distance himself from the assertion. This false parallelism cues the next example in which a Muslim woman is prevented by her husband from accepting the services of a male doctor. Here, the reporter’s comment that the hospital would not budge (“ne transige pas”) is vindicated in the words of the hospital manager who confirms that the intervention was successful. Monologic harmony is misleadingly presented as dialogic alternation.

The third example is that of a doctor attacked by the husband of a Muslim patient on the grounds that Islam forbids a wife to be touched by males other than her husband. The sequence thus leads ever further towards Muslim extremism and violence. The fourth example develops this trajectory to its conclusion. It is one in which gender is almost
overshadowed by religion/race as a female medical worker is attacked by radicals angry that a non-Muslim of either sex should dare to touch “their” women. The doctor-interviewee dialogises the words of the extremists within his own speech, re-accenting them to underscore their shocking aggression: “Tenez, ça va vous apprendre à vous occuper de nos femmes!” (There, that will teach you to take care of our women!).

In the penultimate sentence the reporter switches to metadiscursive mode as he recasts the examples within the thematic context which spawned them and characterises the guiding principle by which the hospital chief operates: “il ne s’agit pas que d’une question de laïcité” (it is not just a question of laïcité). The term is not used by the chief himself, but the argument he makes falls within its normative framework, suggesting that the violence against which laïcité protects women indicates a predilection for violence in general. But in none of the examples cited in support of the argument does the violence of (Muslim) husbands against wives, or indeed, a generalised violence, feature; it is rather the specific violence of Muslims against non-Muslims. This double elision discloses a mismatch between the principles whose credibility the individual stories are intended to support and the message that the stories actually enunciate: that of an irrational hatred having little to do with religious piety and everything to with a cultural clash in the face of which laïcité is an irrelevance. The mismatch mirrors the wider disjunction between an outmoded French assimilationism and the tensions which it is intended to eradicate. Here, it is not a case of a hegemonic consensus in transition from one configuration to another, but rather of one which, because it fails to embrace the interests of the ethnic-religious other, is barely hegemonic at all.

Russia: Case 1 (Channel 1, 6/12/06)

We commence our analysis of Russia’s Channel 1 with two reports on the extremism meeting. The first is heavily contaminated by the voice of Putin whose “authoritative word” organises the reporting discourse; the presenter ventriloquates Putin’s position, adopting the same phrases as those used by the President: “не встречает адекватного отпора” … “четко различать ту грань” (doesn’t meet with adequate resistance … clearly distinguish the boundary). That all is not so straightforward is, however, evident from the fact that, whilst for the presenter extremism “is not meeting with adequate resistance,” Putin assures us that those “propagating national, religious and race hatred will meet with adequate resistance” (будет дан адекватный отпор).

The awkward fit between the source of authority and its media interpreter is partly attributable to extremism’s over-broad definition: it is treated “во всех его проявлениях” (in all its manifestations). But it also reflects the presenter’s failure to internalise Putin’s discourse in an act of “responsive understanding” (Bakhtin), a failure responsible for the manner in which Putin’s speech is reconstituted within the presenter’s narrative. Following Putin’s initial declaration on the need to fight extremism, examples of court leniency towards
racists are cited. With no explanation, this is succeeded by the President’s calls for stricter migration controls in the interests of ordinary Russians: “Мы должны дать ясный сигнал обществу, что государство думает о гражданах России, о коренном населении страны” (“We must send society a clear signal that the state is thinking of Russian citizens, of the country’s established population”). The confusion is exacerbated by the succeeding segment quoting another politician’s call for the substitution of mere tolerance (терпимость) of other cultures by a true multiculturalist interpenetration (взаимопроникновение) of cultures.

A later report (Channel 1, 10/12/06) focuses on the contributions to the “debate” of Vladimir Zhirinovskii and Gennadii Ziuganov, themselves hardly strangers to xenophobia. They concentrate on youth involvement in right-wing violence, and the need not to over-interpret extremism to include legitimate protest. The achievement of coherence is hampered by the lack of a metadiscursive overview reconciling the struggle with racism, immigration and youth policies, and the needs of the “Russian” population on the one hand, and the avoidance of free speech restrictions on the other. As part of Putin’s new, authoritarian-nationalist power axis, these formerly extreme politicians have now been “mainstreamed.” The contradiction is not lost on the reporter who dialogistically frames Zhirinovskii’s words about ways of dealing with youth susceptibility to extremism with a cutting commentary: “Жириновский оказался озадачен, ведь самым экстремальным политиком в стране до сих пор считался он… Владимир Вольфович подумал и решил, что экстремизм—это все-таки не про него” (“Zhirinovskii was astonished, for, until now, he had been considered the country’s most extreme position. Vladimir Volfovich thought a little and decided that extremism was nothing to do with him.”). The audacious journalistic sarcasm is articulated from a position at odds with a President calling for the very restrictions on migration recently demanded more colourfully by Zhirinovskii himself. Instability in Russian media discourse intersects with ideological and terminological incoherence.

Russia: Case 2 (Channel 1, 25/11/06)

One exception to the discursive incoherence occurs in a report relating to the recently proposed banning of the burqa in the Netherlands. Unusually, it features vox populi snippets in which ordinary Dutch people vent their sarcastic rejection, or puzzled incomprehension, of the new law. The presenter’s discourse orients itself to the mocking tone of the Muslim husband who, in response to the suggestion that he beats his wife, jokes: “Конечно бью, каждый день. Что поверили? Все эти разговоры о парандже уже надоели” (“Of course, every day. What, you believed me? I’m sick of all these conversations about the parandja!”). Like the words of the Muslim interviewee, the presenter appropriates, then ridicules, the voice of his opponent, the conservative Christian party proposing the ban. When he reminds us that Holland is called “the most liberal country in Europe,” then refers to it as “Самый терпимый к иммигрантам народ…” (the most immigrant-tolerant people), he, too, implicitly dialogises the self-identification of the Dutch right, subjecting it to mocking
rebuttal: “теперь смотрит на них с подозрением” (now regards [immigrants] with suspicion). This is in sharp contrast with earlier commentaries on Channel 1’s Odnako programme targeting virulent criticism at Western multiculturalist leniency following Chechen terrorist atrocities. In 2002, the presenter, Maksim Sokolov, noted sardonically that “the charm of modern European multiculturalism (multikul’tural’nosti) consists in the fact that immigrants show not the slightest desire to acquire European culture, customs and morals and live as a state within a state” (3/4/02).

Elsewhere, the reporter represents the immigrants’ own words in approving Quasi-direct speech to counter the voice of the conservative politicians: “И эти люди, которые открыто курят наркотик-закрывают нам лицо?” (And these people who openly smoke drugs are trying to cover up our faces?). The words of the ridiculed Dutch other are, however, heavily reaccented; the Dutch Justice Minister is unlikely to have uttered the words “лицо голандской национальности должно быть открытым” (the face of Dutch nationality must be open). Rather, the reporter rephrases her proposal thus, so as to exaggerate its absurdity. The wide range of voices represented here - a Dutch minister, an ordinary (white) Dutch person, a Muslim man and his Muslim wife - are arranged in a stable hierarchy subordinated to the official Russian line promoting multiculturalist tolerance in contradistinction to (i) western assimilationist intolerance (ii) the rabid nationalism of the now sanitized Zhirinovskii, and (iii) the ridiculing of western “politkorrektnost” rife in Odnako until lately. (In a display of precisely such politkorrektnost, Russia’s other state channel, Rossiia, now broadcasts a programme celebrating Islamic tradition and fronted by a veiled Muslim woman.)

In official pronouncements, the phrase “our multinational, multiconfessional state” (”nashe mnogonarodnoe, mnogokonfessional’noe gosudarstvo”) is repeated, mantra-like. But media commentary on the recent flurry of governmental activity promoting “tolerantnost” is absent; again, the lack of metadiscursivity reflects Channel 1’s failure to internalise, reaccent and performatively enact the policy. This is hardly surprising given (a) the inconsistency with which the regime itself reads its commitment to multiculturalism; at a press conference in Italy in March 2007, Putin stressed the need to strengthen ties between Russia and Italy on the basis of their “common Christian foundation”; (b) the still “foreign” connotations attached to “tolerantnost” (even cosmopolitan commentators like Vladimir Pozner exhibit an awkwardness in deploying the notion; At the end of a May 2006 broadcast, Pozner speculated at length, yet inconsistently, on the meaning of the word: “There is this foreign word, tolerantnost’ which translates perfectly into Russian as terpimost’ [patience, tolerance]. What does it mean? It means a preparedness to tolerate another’s opinion than your own … yet we see that the world’s leading religions have not distinguished themselves by any particular tolerance [terpimost’iu]” (5/2/06); (c) still fresh memories of Beslan when, as Pozner’s Vremena demonstrated, the official Vremia line in which Russia staked a claim to a place in the West’s war on international Islamism masked a paranoid anti-Westernism. In response to Pozner’s increasingly frustrated question to all his guests about
the identity of “the forces which nobody cares to name” and for which “international terrorism is only one instrument,” Maksim Shevchenko, Director of The Centre for the Strategic Study of Politics and Religion, ventures that it is a shady combination of “transnational corporations and American elites” (26/9/04).

Russia: Case 3 (Channel 1, 12/12/06)

The discursive confusion besetting Channel 1 emerges again in a piece reporting celebrations of Russia’s Constitution Day. The report concentrates on the actions of the “Young Guard,” the youth section of the party most loyal to Putin, United Russia (Edinaia Rossiia), broaching the movement’s struggle to defeat nationalist extremism, and then its contradictory proposal to replace the phrase “multinational people” with “Russian people” in the country’s constitution. Rather than metadiscursively comment on this glaring inconsistency, the presenter opts for a neutral, non-committal hedging of bets: “решать теперь предстоит, очевидно, депутатам госдумы” (“clearly it now remains for the State Duma representatives to decide”). This has nothing to do with unwillingness to polemicise; in the Sunday edition of Vremia, the presenter (Petr Tolstoy) is given license to launch vitriolic attacks against whichever of Putin’s foes happens to have contradicted official policy in the last week. Russian news presenters either conceal the regime’s guiding voice within Western-style, pseudo-neutral discourse, or articulate it in open, Soviet-style polemic, but never engage in hegemonic mediation between official and popular culture(s). The hedging of bets we see here is rather a function of Channel 1’s inability to interpret as state policy itself riddled with contradiction.

CONCLUSIONS

Returning to the question we posed at the outset, we should, in conclusion, summarise the results of our comparative analysis of how key European media outlets have dealt with the pressures placed on hegemonic consensus values by the perceived growth of Islamic extremism.

Hybridity in multiculturalist discourse is highest within the UK, where a robust hegemonic chain which includes state, media, big business (cf. the BA story), and a diverse range of ethnic minority representatives (cf. the Britishness story) has facilitated representation of the widest range of voices in the most complex combinations, including multiple, complex examples of indirect quotation. Consequently, performativity and metadiscursivity are widespread. However, this has also meant that antagonisms between the positions are most evident in BBC news reporting, where the disruption to the consensus occasioned by Islamic radicalism is vividly expressed, and where we begin to sense that, in Tariq Modood’s words “the group most politically opposed to … Muslims is not Christians
... but the secular, liberal intelligentsia” to which the BBC itself owes allegiance (Modood, 2002, p. 126).

In France, consensus around laïcité and hostility to Anglo-Saxon “separatism” generally holds good for state and the media, whose internalisation of the values explains the high degree of performativity. The hegemonic chain incorporates state, media, public services (cf. the laïcité story), small business (the Boudjedal story), intelligentsia (the Redeker death-threat incident; see Table A2). However, its relative weakness beyond the official sphere, evidenced by its failure to represent antagonistic forces, results in reduced hybridity and metadiscursivity and, sporadically, the intrusion of significant discursive contradiction.

In Russia, low hybridity, performativity and metadiscursivity betray a lack of consensus and the virtual absence of hegemonic chains. Precisely because of the state-media symbiosis, television fails to internalise multicultural values (themselves riddled with confusion), alternative voices are represented only when rigidly framed from an official viewpoint, and indirect quotation is relatively rare and structurally simplistic. Discursive tension is correspondingly higher here than elsewhere and the attempt, confirmed by our preliminary data analysis, systematically to decouple Islam from discussions of extremism and promote a discourse of inter-ethnic harmony, is a product of precisely this tension.

Finally, we must caution that the “War on Terror” is disturbing the ground beneath European inter-ethnic cohesion policy with alarming unpredictability. Even as this article was approaching its final version, BBC news reported that the new Brown administration was, when commenting on domestic terror incidents, systematically replacing “Muslim” with “criminal,” and abandoning altogether the term “War on Terror” (02/07/07). That our research question will elicit different conclusions in future months, however, makes it all the more essential that we continue to pose it.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX

Table A1
Stories Selected for Quotation Pattern Analysis (and Case Study*):
UK, BBC, Ten O’clock news

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>STORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 27/11/06</td>
<td>Pope’s visit to Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 28/11/06</td>
<td>Pope in Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 30/11/06</td>
<td>Pope Benedict at Blue Mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 03/11/06</td>
<td>Protest Charges (cartoons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 04/11/06</td>
<td>Army Recruits [Muslims]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 10/11/06</td>
<td>BNP Cleared*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 14/11/06</td>
<td>Extremist Preacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 20/11/06</td>
<td>British Airways cross controversy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 24/11/06</td>
<td>BA Review*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 08/12/06</td>
<td>Multicultural Britain*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 05/01/07</td>
<td>Cartoons Verdict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 19/01/07</td>
<td>changes in BA uniforms policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 24/01/07</td>
<td>British Identity*</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 29/01/07</td>
<td>Muslim Extremism (BNP)</td>
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### Table A2
Stories Selected for Quotation Pattern Analysis (and Case Study*):
France, Channel 2, Journal de 20 Héures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>STORY</th>
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| 02/11/2006 | Les hôpitaux Britanniques adoptent la burqa médicale  
*British Hospitals Adopt Medical Burqa* |
| 15/11/2006 | Les titres : Soutien à R. Redeker  
*Headlines: Support for R. Redeker* |
| 15/11/2006 | Soirée de soutien à Robert Redeker, prof menacé  
*Evening of Support for Robert Redeker, Threatened Teacher* |
| 04/12/2006 | Les titres : Des incendiaires aux assises  
*Headlines: Arsonists in Criminal Court* |
| 04/12/2006 | Ouverture du procès des incendiaires des mosquées d’Annecy  
*Opening of the Trial of the Arsonists of Annecy’s Mosque* |
| 07/12/2006 | Le procès des incendiaires de mosquée d’Annecy  
*The Trial of the Arsonists of Annecy’s Mosque* |
| 07/12/2006 | La réussite de Mourad Boudjelal, PDG des éditions de BD Soleil*  
*The Success of Mourad Boudjelal, CEO of BD Soleil Editions* |
| 08/12/2006 | Incendiaires de mosquées : le verdict  
*Mosque Arsonists: The Verdict* |
| 02/01/2007 | Portrait de France: une famille musulmane*  
*Portrait of France: A Muslim Family* |
| 09/01/2007 | Menaces de mort contre Robert Redeker : arrestation du suspect**  
*Death Threats Against Robert Redeker: Suspect Arrested* |
| 18/01/2007 | Robert Redeker raconte son quotidien  
*Robert Redeker Recounts His Daily Life* |
| 28/01/2007 | Une charte de la laïcité dans les services publics*  
*A Secularism Charter in Public Services* |

**Robert Redeker is a French intellectual who spoke out against Islamic fundamentalism.
### Table A3

Stories Selected for Quotation Pattern Analysis (and Case Study*):

Russia, Channel 1, Vremia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>STORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 | 06/11/06   | День народного единства  
*People’s Unity Day* |
| 2 | 17/11/06   | Президент встретился с руководством “Единая Россия”  
*Putin met leaders of “United Russia”* |
| 3 | 25/11/06   | Голландия: предложения о запрете паранджи*  
*Burqa to be banned in Holland* |
| 4 | 28/11/06   | Папа прилетел в Турцию  
*Pope arrived in Turkey* |
| 5 | 30/11/06   | Предпоследний день визита папы (визит в Голубую мечеть)  
*Pope visits the Blue Mosque in Turkey* |
| 6 | 05/12/06   | Судебный процесс: футбольные болельщики, учинившие ряд расистских атак  
*Court trial: racist killings by football fans* |
| 7 | 06/12/06   | Путин: борьба с экстремизмом*  
*Putin: fight with extremism* |
| 8 | 10/12/06   | Путин встретился с представителями политических партий для обсуждения экстремизма*  
*Putin met members of political parties to discuss extremism* |
| 9 | 11/12/06   | Путин обсудил проблемы экстремизма, убийство корейца во Владивостоке  
*Putin discussed the problem of extremism (the murder of a Korean in Vladivostok)* |
| 10| 12/12/06   | День конституции в России*  
*Constitution Day in Russia* |
| 11| 11/01/07   | Путин встретился с советом по развитию гражданского общества в России  
*Putin met with members of the Civic Society Development Committee* |
| 12| 14/01/07   | Топ новости прошлого года: Россия  
*Top news of 2006: Russia* |
| 13| 14/01/07   | Топ новости прошлого года: СНГ и бывшие республики  
*Top news of 2006 year: CIS and former Republics* |
| 14| 22/01/07   | Общественная палата: подведение итогов 2006  
*Public Chamber: summary of 2006 achievements* |
| 15| 25/01/07   | Суд над подростками, убившими вьетнамца  
*Court case: teenagers who killed a Vietnamese man* |
## Table B1
Summary of Statistical Data for Three Channels

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<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>10 o’clock News</th>
<th>Vremia</th>
<th>Journal de 20 Heures</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total news stories</td>
<td>1555</td>
<td>2229</td>
<td>3566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total news time (6 month period)</td>
<td>67:33:30</td>
<td>94:20:41</td>
<td>106:03:15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Islam news stories (6 month period)</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>269</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average number of stories (per daily newscast monitored during 6 month period)</td>
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<td>Average number of stories (per month)</td>
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<td>69.2</td>
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<td>Average percentage of Islam news stories (per month)</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
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<td>Average news time devoted to Islam stories (per month)</td>
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<td>1h 53m 38s</td>
<td>01h18m53s</td>
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<td>26.9%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
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<td>Average duration of a news story</td>
<td>02:26</td>
<td>02:28</td>
<td>01:43</td>
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<td>Average length of an Islam new story as opposed to an Islam news story (per month)</td>
<td>02:37 (02:23)</td>
<td>02:28 (02:26)</td>
<td>01:37 (01:44)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>206 (209)</td>
<td>161(116)</td>
<td>66 (203)</td>
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<td>Percentage of national vs. international Islam news stories (6 month period)</td>
<td>49.5% (50.5%)</td>
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<td>24.5% (75.5%)</td>
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Table B2
Summary of Quotation Patterns

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<th>CATEGORIES</th>
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Pushkin was not only a founder of the Petersburg text tradition; he was the first Russian author who wrote in the style of fantastic realism. Its main feature is a combination of a fantastic plot with realistic details, such as “The Queen of Spades,” “The Broze Rider,” and “A Small Cottage in Kolomna.” The article focuses on a grotesque oral story about the lonely cottage on the Vasilyevsky Island, told by Pushkin and written down and then published by his acquaintance Titov. Based on a hint contained in its introduction, it is argued that the story about a lonely cottage was composed by Pushkin as a sort of a secret funerary composition, which explains the gloomy atmosphere of the narrative. The article also draws parallels between this story and other works by Pushkin in the style of fantastic realism. As a founder of the Petersburg text tradition, it is shown how Pushkin’s picture of the world was moving from a deterministic vision to a probabilistic one.

Key words: Pushkin, St.Petersburg, city, fantastic realism, Decembrists, chance

I would like to talk about the very beginning of a trend in Russian writing connected to St. Petersburg and initiated by Pushkin. A whole series of works by some of the greatest Russian authors has constituted what Vladimir Toporov (2004) has aptly called петербургский текст [the St. Petersburg text]. This is a large group of works written by different prose authors and poets but sharing some features that makes it a single tradition kept for many generations. All these features relate to the city on the Neva river, its architecture and sculptures and particularly to the statue of Peter the Great and the new mythology (the so-called Petersburg myth) created around the image of the founder of the new capital of Russia. To give only a few examples from modern literature: Toporov who had earlier studied this problem on the example of Dostoevsky published a book on the St. Petersburg
text and myth as seen in verses of Alexander Blok — one of the greatest poets of the beginning of the 20th century (Toporov, 2004). Andrey Bely, the most important prose author of the same symbolist period, wrote *Petersburg* — the novel that according to Nabokov deserves to be compared to the works by Joyce, Proust and Kafka (by the way, to each of their great novels an important European city corresponds: in *Ulysses* we see Dublin, in *À la Recherches du Temps perdu* — Paris and its suburbs, and in the imaginary city of *Prozess*, particularly in its temple, *Dom* — one can recognize Prague and its Gothic buildings).

But let us return to St. Petersburg and the beginning of the text created about it. Pushkin’s initial contribution to this tradition includes several poetic works, first of all, the long poem *The Bronze Horseman* that helped to create the myth about this sculpture of Peter the Great. Also such prose works as the short novel *The Queen of Spades* belong to this cycle. In it we see Pushkin not only as a founder of the whole Petersburg text tradition, but also as the first Russian author to write in the style of *fantastic realism*, to use the term later introduced by Dostoevsky (in his essay on Edgar Poe). Following Gogol, Dostoevsky would himself write about St. Petersburg in this style: its main feature is a combination of a fantastic plot with realistic details. To Pushkin’s writings connected to these serious works also the grotesque narrative *A Small Cottage in Kolomna* belongs. It is a funny story in which we see some details similar to the other works of the cycle, as Khodasevich (1991) was the first to recognize. It was characteristic of Pushkin that he could write on a subject in a highly elevated style, at the same time composing a sort of parody of it. Let us read a stanza from the *Bronze Horseman* where the poet directly addresses the city in an elevated style:

Люблю тебя, Петра творенье,  
Люблю твой строгий, стройный вид,  
Невы державное теченье,  
Береговой ее гранит.  
[I love you, Peter’s own creation;  
I love your stern, your stately air,  
Neva’s majestical pulsation,  
The granite that her quaysides wear].

The same images and details of the city landscape are repeated in another poem where the poetic mood is absolutely different, cf.:

Город пышный, город бедный,  
Дух неволи, стройный вид,  
Свод небес зелено-бледный,  
Скука, холод и гранит.  
[You are wretched, you are splendid,  
Stately air, cold, granite, spleen,
Servitude has never ended,
And the sky is pale and green.

The same expression стройный вид [stately air] is used in both passages. In the first of them it constitutes a part of the passionate description of the magnificent city that Pushkin admires. Pushkin saw in St. Petersburg and its architectural harmony the realization of what he understood as a thing of beauty. But, in the second poem the expression stately air is combined in the same line with the spirit of servitude (non-freedom, не-воля) hostile to Pushkin: since his youth Pushkin’s favorite word and notion was freedom (воля, свобода).

Also in both passages we find the image of granite. In the first one it refers to those pictures of the Neva river and its quaysides that belong to the traditional poetic view of St. Petersburg. It can be seen already in Pushkin’s Onegin where he referred to a poem of Muravyev, his predecessor in praising St. Petersburg who had written about the night spent by a poet near this granite. In Pushkin’s second fragment, cited above, granite is combined with spleen and cold to create a picture of a dull Northern city made of stone where the sky is green and not blue as in those Southern countries that Pushkin liked so much.

But the same short poem with a negative view of the city explains why life there was still possible and even pleasant to the poet:

Все же мне вас жаль немного,
Потому что здесь порой
Ходит маленькая ножка,
Вьется локон золотой.
[Still I feel a sort of pity
Since I see the foot so dear
Gently walking in the city,
Golden curls are waving here].

The women whom the poet admired were to him the essence of the beauty of St. Petersburg. The fates of young women in the city are at the core of what Pushkin wrote on St. Petersburg.

The whole cycle of mature Pushkin’s works connected to St. Petersburg and opening this large vista in Russian literature starts with his oral short story A Lonely Cottage on the Vasilyevsky Island (Ivanov, 2001, 2002/2004; Shulz, 1985). He told it several times to his friends and acquaintances, its first part while in exile in 1825. Then he repeated his improvisation after returning to the city in late 1827 or in the first months of 1828. Titov, a
young writer who was present at that event was impressed by Pushkin’s narrative. He could not sleep the whole night; he wrote down the story as he remembered it and brought his notes to Pushkin. The poet corrected the text, and Titov published it using a pseudonym. We may suppose now that Pushkin did not wish to publish it as his own story mainly because of the secret hint contained in the introduction. As Akhmatova (1990, pp. 129-136, 181, 184-185) found, it describes the place in a suburb of the city where Pushkin was looking for graves in which the five leaders of the Decembrists’ revolt had been buried. They had been hanged, and their fate was a cause of permanent suffering for the poet. In his drawings we often see pictures of gallows with five corpses on them (Figs. 1 and 2).

Once he added a line I also might have been on gallows (И я бы мог висеть). He was imagining himself among those who had been on the Senate Square on the day of the mutiny (that was a part of his first talk to the new king). To Pushkin Petersburg was not only the place of the royal military parades described in The Bronze Horseman, but also a city where the Decembrists’ revolt had been crushed and where The Spirit of Servitude [Дух Неволи] had ruled since then.

A landscape of the suburb where a road goes to the Smolensk German graveyard and farther to the hidden graves of the five Decembrists is common to several Pushkin’s works of this series, including the poem describing the poet’s visits to this graveyard. We have reasons to believe that the story about a lonely cottage was composed as a sort of a secret
funerary composition. That can partly explain the gloomy atmosphere of the narrative. Some of its fantastic symbols personify death and the forces of Evil. Devils in dresses and hats that hide their horns are playing cards in a house of a countess as they do in Pushkin’s poems about the card games of devils in hell. A coachman whom the hero met after he had lost his way somewhere in the suburbs of the city showed to him his face or mask: it was a scull of a dead man (Figs. 3 and 4). There was no regular number on the carriage of this miraculous coachman: his sign was the apocalyptic symbol of 666 (Ivanov, 2002; 2002/2004).

The idea that a large city is like hell was not new; at the beginning of the 17th century Gongora wrote *Madrid in 1610* - the sonnet beginning with the line: *Esto es Madrid, mejor dijera infierno* [This is not Madrid, it is simply hell]. A similar notion had been developed later on by many predecessors of Strinberg’s *Inferno* where such a diabolic image of Paris anticipated urbanistic works by symbolist authors like Rilke and Blok (who was influenced by Strindberg). But Pushkin did not simply succeed in constructing a poetic image of a sort of a branch of hell in a modern city with devils playing cards in a *beau monde*. In the style of fantastic realism (in which he might be seen as a forerunner not only of Dostoevsky and Bely, but of Bulgakov with his Voland in *The Master and Margaret*) he combined these fantastic pictures with stories about simple girls living in small cabins with their mothers. While fantasy transforming his dark experience lead to the Devil, as a realistic author he wished to depict the women who lived in the city. Thus it turns out that the plot is based on relations between women and creatures connected to the Devil if not the Devil himself. In *A Lonely Cottage* the devil seduces a young woman whom the hero has loved, and in *The Queen of Spade* a demon-like hero Germann misuses naïve feelings of Liza in an attempt to find secret of the old lady’s card number.
As was often the case with Pushkin, while composing a narrative he had chosen a Western European story as a pattern the scheme and images of which he wished to recreate or follow. If one permits me a metaphor taken from the history of the city, I might point out a similar way in which Peter the Great was thinking of his favorite Western European city Amsterdam when he was building a part of St. Petersburg called New Netherlands [Новая Голландия]. In Lonely Cottage as well as in the projected small tragedy The Devil in Love Pushkin was following Le diable amoureux by Cazotte (Shulz, 1987), a French author of the 18th century whose images attracted many admirers from Baudelaire to Apollinaire. Schulz’s remarkable works have shown that Pushkin had imitated not only some episodes in Cazotte’s story, but also drawings that accompanied it in its original edition that Pushkin possessed (Fig. 5).

He liked Cazotte because of his mystical inclinations close to German romanticists: during that period Pushkin was also reading Hoffmann. By that time Pushkin had already gone far away from the optimistic rational thinking of the Enlightenment. In The Queen of Spades the number game is a symbol of the role of a chance; to Pushkin “Chance is the God-Inventor” (Случай-Бог-изобретатель). It is not accidental that there were several treatises on probabilities theory in his library. In modern terms we might say that he was moving from a deterministic picture of the world to a probabilistic vision.

In The Queen of Spades the name of Svedenberg appears (approximately at the same time Balzac writes his Seraphita based on Svedenberg’s idea; the image and the name are revived later in Osip Mandelstam’s poems dedicated to one of the most beautiful ladies of prerevolutionary Petersburg). Mystical images border on hallucinations as the card numbers that appear to Germann in his ravings and as the statue of the Peter the Great following poor Evgenii in The Bronze Horseman. In The Queen of Spades St. Petersburg was shown as a background for the tragedy of Germann whose greed led him to madness. In The Bronze Horseman Evgenii becomes crazy after the catastrophe of the flood. The theme of abnormality haunts Pushkin at this time; he is afraid of madness. But it seems to be inherent in the city itself, in its atmosphere; nothing can be more distant from the rational classicism that made him admire Petersburg’s palaces.
His Petersburg stories are full of contrasts. One of the main reasons for conflicts is social inequality. The woman whom the hero is fond of in the beginning of *A Lonely Cottage* comes from a poor family; the hero temporarily forgets her as the Devil introduces him to the countess whose guests would offend him as an outcast (Ivanov, 2001; 2002/2004). In *The Bronze Horseman* the main opposition is that between a hero who is a penniless clerk with employment in some office and the king who in Evgenii’s ravings follows him in the streets of the city. The center of the Petersburg myth was created by Pushkin when in his poem the statue of Peter the Great came to life. This main part of Pushkin’s personal mythology, as discovered by Roman Jakobson (1979), remained important for several generations and became integrated into the Petersburg text. The same statue of the Bronze Horseman enters the pub where the hero of Bely’s *Petersburg* is sitting and then climbs up the stairs in his house.

In Pushkin’s poem behind the opposition between the king and the young man there is another one: Peter and St. Petersburg are opposed to Russia as a whole. Here again the direct continuation will be found in Bely’s *Petersburg* where the geometrically structured capital is contrasted with the chaotic rest of the country.

To show the instability of the artificial structure of the city Pushkin had chosen the story of a flood. Similar to his study of Pugachev’s revolt, the choice of this subject and the way in which he writes about it show that he wanted to demonstrate how the forces of nature and human history can destroy a seeming balance achieved by culture. At the end of the flood Evgenii sees the cottage where Parasha and her mother lived: in a poem it is a sign of the dreamlike fragility of reality. At the end of *A Lonely Cottage* the house of the female hero where she lived with her mother perishes in fire (Ivanov, 2001; 2002/2004). A fireman seems to have recognized a smiling face of the Devil similar to what we may observe on Pushkin’s pictures of the inhabitants of hell (Figs.6-11).

Pushkin was a
poet of harmony and at the same time he admired the abyss where we may experience ecstasy near its borders. Both these attitudes are seen in his Petersburg tales. He understood the role of Chance that not only makes creation possible, but also destroys what has been created. Thus he showed us more than pictures of Petersburg of his own time and of a century before that. In his Petersburg text we may anticipate a vision of the catastrophes that were later to befall the city.

**NOTE**

The text represents a talk given at the University of Yale at the conference dedicated to the celebration of the 300 years of foundation of St. Petersburg. I would like to express my gratitude to Michael Heim who helped to shape the English translation of a short poem by Pushkin.

**REFERENCES**


Cyberpsychology and Computer-Mediated Communication in Russia: Past, Present and Future

Alexander E. Voiskounsky

The paper presents an overview of the Internet related studies carried out in Russia within the fields of social sciences and psychology. The overview briefly covers the earliest studies in the field and a critical review of the current status of the studies; some prospects for the nearest future are outlined. It is shown that the earliest adopters of the new research paradigms — namely, computer-mediated communication (CMC) and cyberpsychology, were Vygotskian psychologists; later social scientists joined the CMC research field. The discussion concludes with the claim that the Vygotskian paradigm is among the most heuristic approaches to be followed in future studies.

Keywords: computer-mediated communication, psychology, social sciences, cyberpsychology, Vygotsky, remediation.

The two disciplines to be briefly discussed in this paper are targeted at the studies of human network activities, though the actual interests and research methods of the two disciplines are, generally speaking, different. Cyberpsychology has its origin in psychology and is growing from traditional fields such as instructional, social, cognitive, clinical, organizational, differential, and developmental psychology as well as some less developed and/or newer fields such as transpersonal or positive psychology. Additionally, cyberpsychology often embraces studies done within non-psychological fields such as semiotics, communication or media science, and these studies seem to gain a borderline status until they are fully “chewed over” and enter the body of psychology.

The field of computer-mediated communication (CMC) is much less rigid: it embraces studies done within diverse disciplines, such as culture studies, sociology, communication science, education, philosophy, law, political and regional studies, some facets of studies in

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human-computer interaction (HCI), religion, linguistics and technical communication, etc. CMC’s goal is presenting a social science perspective of studying humans on the Internet. The Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, one of the most respected sources in the field, presents itself in this way: “Its focus is social science research on computer-mediated communication via the Internet, the World Wide Web, and wireless technologies. Within that general purview, the journal is broadly interdisciplinary, publishing work by scholars in communication, business, education, political science, sociology, media studies, information science, and other disciplines” (http://jcmc.indiana.edu/). It is likely that the “other disciplines” most often do not include psychology, although scholars in many social disciplines occasionally use some psychological theories (for example, personal constructs theory or social learning theory) and methods (for example, tests of personality traits) while doing CMC research. Thus, cyberpsychology and CMC are separated, just as psychology and social sciences are. At their very beginning stages, the two disciplines had much more common roots than they seem to have currently.

Neither cyberpsychology nor CMC can boast their status on the list of traditional academic disciplines known in Russia. Both disciplines began their development simultaneously and have shared the same developmental phases; their current separation is neither total nor complete. In the historical (“Jurassic”) section the simultaneous start of the two disciplines will be discussed in more detail.

The earliest studies were done before Russians had wide access to computer telecommunications. This was an obvious challenge, since to develop successfully the two disciplines strongly depend on large numbers of users of various WWW and Internet-related services; otherwise, no representative study might be planned and completed. Russia has always lagged behind in new online services such as broadband connections or web auctions. Recently the lag-behind process in the acquisition of the newest technologies has shortened, although we still should consider the tempo of mass access to the newest services: for example, Russians do not seem to be very active in the numerous online shopping venues such as Ebay and Amazon.com. The reasons lie outside the area of cyberspace, partly in economics and partly in mass psychology: for example, few Russians possess credit cards; the English language competence of the overall Russian population is far from being high; the delivery of purchases is unsafe in Russia; Russians are mostly biased toward the expectation of online shoppers’ dishonesty, etc.

In this paper we are not attempting to present the full list of relevant references written and published in Russian. Instead, we refer, whenever possible, to publications (papers in peer-refereed journals or edited books) in English, original or translated.

**PREHISTORY: THE EARLIEST RESEARCH PROJECTS**
Putting aside technology related work in telecommunications, in the 1980s the patterns of computer telecommunications usage were first studied by psychologists who all shared the same theoretical background, namely, the socio-historic theory of psychological development (Vygotsky, 1962; 1978). Vygotsky emphasized that human higher mental processes are of social origin, their development based on joint child-adult actions (especially within the zone of proximal development) and interpersonal communication, and presumably on mediated forms of behavior. Within this theory, mediation is fundamental since it includes acquiring and using instruments: material tools, signs, and semiotic systems. Genuine human forms of behavior are mediated by culture-related sign systems. Thus, acquisition of personal skills and social norms through signs is the mainstream of the psychic development. Sign systems develop and very often mediate behaviors which have already been mediated, and probably not once. Thus Cole (1996) reminds us of the importance of remediation: the term refers to psychologically significant changes in the selection of newer mediating semiotic systems; an example is a transfer from syllabic to alphabetic writing systems.

Investigation of mediated and remediated forms of behavior is traditional for the Vygotskian approach. In the 1980s psychologists first became aware that by using computer facilities, software and service programs, databases and networks, etc., individuals could mediate and remediate their cognition and interactions in business and entertainment. Also, they realized that a program run on a computer is, in its essence, a binary semiotic system. Being universal mediators in almost any type of activity, the developing information technologies (IT) impact (e.g., remediate) human behaviors; this process is of primary interest to psychologists sharing the Vygotskian approach. As far as the 1980s, representatives of social sciences and humanities, philosophers, sociologists, economists, historians, or philologists did not become professionally interested in the field of computer mediation of numerous human behaviors. At that time, neither communication science nor human-computer interaction were developed enough to be put on the list of the academic disciplines in Russia. With decades passing, we believe that the Vygotskian perspective is among the most promising in both areas, cyberpsychology and CMC, although not many research projects have been carried out within the socio-historical paradigm (Arestova et al., 1999).

Years before the regular access to global telecommunications became available two research projects were carried out in Russia (then the USSR): the first started before 1985, i.e., shortly before the period of perestroika, and the second one began in 1985.

The first study - Selection of Partners and Speech Patterns Analysis in CMC - was done in the Psychology Department at Moscow State University, and was based on the observation and analysis of behavior of local area networks (LANs) users at Moscow State University, other academic institutions in Moscow, and on the content analysis of listings presenting interactions within several Usenet newsgroups. The project ended in 1991 when
the researchers got access to computer telecommunications. The psychological result was the description of several selective (orienting) mechanisms supporting the choice of interactive partners among the variety of network subscribers made prior to entering an actual interaction (Voiskouns ky, 1995). The result obtained in the field of CMC was the description of numerous verbal patterns specific to the so-called telelogues (including dialogues, monologues and polilogues), significantly borrowing the terminology from sociolinguistics (Voiskouns ky, 1998a).

The second study - VELHAM (Velikhov-Hamburg) joint Soviet/Russian-American project on “Cognition and Communication” (1985-1994) - was based on the cooperation between the Californian (University of California at San Diego) and the Moscow (Institute of Psychology, Academy of Science) research groups; the former provided the hardware, telecommunication facilities and network connections, while the latter introduced CMC into the Soviet/Russian academic institutions, libraries, primary and high schools. The studies were carried out in the Vygotskian paradigm (Griffin et al., 1992). The main results (Griffin et al., 1993) referring to cyberpsychology were based on observations of schoolchildren in educational environments, i.e. working and entertaining in computer-rich environments, e.g., the one called the 5th Dimension (Cole, 1996). Also, the patterns of computer-mediated interactions of novice adult users, mainly researchers in humanities were observed and described (Belyaeva, 1994). The main results are published in Russian in (Lomov et al., 1988).

Thus, both “Jurassic” projects were done by psychologists and combined both lines of research discussed in the paper - cyberpsychological and CMC.

**FURTHER DIRECTIONS OF RESEARCH**

After the regular access to computer telecommunications (later - the Internet) became widely available in Russia (Press, 1991), both social scholars and psychologists faced a problem: at first, the number of regular Internet users, or probable respondents in future studies, had not been large enough. However, the process of acquiring statistically significant numbers of users of diverse online services took an improbably short time due to the extraordinary rapid enlargement of the RuNet (Russian Internet) community and the simultaneous growth of the audience of respondents in scholar studies. In the 1990s the RuNet was developing at an astounding pace, and several of its histories have been described in monographs and edited books, e.g., the history of the RuNet from the point of view of content projects, including journalists, collectors, writers and poets; the history of the RuNet from the point of view of numerous competing and cooperating start-up network businesses; the history of the RuNet seen as a series of competing political projects, including forums (earlier — newsgroups) related to politics, web pages of politicians, pro-establishment and counter-establishment political web-sites, and scandalous web publications compromising top officials and candidates; the history of RuNet viewed as a series of initiatives of creative
teams of computer programmers and web designers; the history of the RuNet viewed from the perspective of technical and financial support offered by foreign industrial companies and charity foundations, etc. There is one more, more academic but less known history of the development of the RuNet, carried out from the perspectives of social sciences and psychology. It is worthy to mention that academics sometimes ignore or are unaware of, the history of the RuNet developed in Russia from this perspective: for example, a chapter on psychology of CMC (restricted to e-mail interaction) in the newest book titled *Communication and Cognition* (Barabantschikov & Samoilenko, 2007) has reference to exclusively foreign sources.

**Current CMC Studies**

Two books initiated and sponsored by foreign foundations, although different in value, need to be mentioned. *Rossiiskii…* (2000) — a book initiated by the IREX (USA) — presents a large number of interviews, mostly with CEOs of diverse companies, associations, online media and services developed within the RuNet (no translation or summary in English available). The views expressed in 1999-2000, shortly after the default of August, 1998, probably changed soon after they had been completed. Some interviewees moved to other businesses, and in general the book did not become a milestone for the Russian online audience. From the very beginning, we believe, the interest in the book was rather low, and the book was not often referred to.

*Semenov (2002) [The Internet and Russian Society],* the book initiated by the Carnegie Moscow Center, has greater value since it contains a representative collection of research papers on the RuNet. While devoted to the specifics of Russia, the book covers many perspectives of the global cyberspace research. Discussing the role of the Internet, the authors characterize the difficulties in the wide penetration of computer telecommunications in Russia due to its vast geography and shortage of telecommunications. They reveal the origins and directions of social resistance to the adoption of new technologies; describe the uses of the Internet in current politics; show the potential of new technologies in raising the effectiveness of the social institutions; underline the specifics of managerial (e-government) work mediated by the Internet; show the role of the RuNet in attracting investments from abroad; reveal the problems in developing electronic libraries; describe religious content placed on the Internet by the Russian Orthodox Church; analyze the effects of the Internet on Russian scientists; show the specifics of psychological studies related to the Internet, i.e., cyberpsychology; and discuss the importance of cultural projects on the Internet for the Russian province, e.g. projects in classical and modern art. Thus, this volume is quite valuable, which is enhanced by its web publication (see http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/2002/08is).

An overview of cultural and social events of that period which constituted much of the RuNet content is presented by Kuznetsov (2004), written as an author’s personal view, and
also in the book titled *Control and Shift* (2006) compiled by a team of Western and Eastern European authors. In that book, for example, Gorny (2006a) gives a detailed chronological (up to early 2000s) description of virtual, fictitious personae created and promoted on the RuNet web-sites dealing with creative projects in literature and journalism; the author notes he is not taking into account multiplayer role games like MUDs and MMORPGs where thousands of gamers accept a certain virtual status. In his other chapter Gorny (2006b) discusses the reasons for the success of a new service, namely *Live Journal*, among the newborn community of Russian bloggers, and the individual ways of operating within this service. Konradova (2006) presents a post-modernist review of verbal literature (*belle-lettre*, or the so-called net-literature) placed on the RuNet web-sites; Gornykh and Ousmanova (2006) present a post-modernist review of culture related visual products on the RuNet. Most of the other chapters published in the book are also written in the post-modernist vein. For example, Goriunova (2006) analyzes a specific “male style” of obscene verbal texts popular on the RuNet both in net-literature and web publicist products, and in various forums and blogs. She discusses such texts as an offline profane literary genre and at the same time as a protest, counter-culture project — both marginal, although not alien to the Russian cultural tradition. This tradition happens to be widely known abroad, cf., a Russian-like marginal style of speech *nadsat* invented by Anthony Burgess, the author of *A Clockwork Orange* (1962); this style of speech was also used in the famous movie by Stanley Kubrick (1971). Some publications (in Russian) on the RuNet obscene verbal products include the works by Gasan Gusejnow (http://speakrus.ru/gg/microprosa_erratica-1.htm), Pavel Protasov (http://ru.su/politics/lyudi/p_utina_vypusk_25), Artyom Vernidub (http://www.runewsweek.ru/theme/?tid=16&rid=215), and Henrike Schmidt (http://www.netslova.ru/schmidt/radosti.html), the latter being one of the editors and authors of *Control and Shift*, mentioned above. The entries on the subject of obscene male style of speech can be found in web encyclopedias, such as http://ru.wikipedia.org/ or http://wiki.traditio.ru.

In this context it is important to note Trofimova’s (2004) monograph (in Russian) on the impact of computers, WWW and the Internet on the functioning of Russian language. Finally, it is useful to mention Gerovich’s (2002) book, which presents a review of the development of information technologies in the Soviet Union and later in Russia; the change of speech styles reflects, as the author suggests, the transition from the older to the more modern modes of professional thinking and decision making.

It is important to note that the diaspora of Russian speakers (either ethnic Russians or non-Russians, partly residing outside Russia within the former Soviet Union and partly worldwide) has strongly influenced the development of online content, the changes in the styles of the network (later — the Internet) related behavior, including verbal behavior. The influence of “Russia abroad” is thoroughly traced, with special attention given to the web resources originated in the Ukraine, Israel and Latvia, by Schmidt et al. (2006). Also, Lejbov (2006) shows one of the ways of collaboration among within-Russia and outside-Russia
experts (mostly in humanities) in the area of retrieval of web documents. The RuNet is known to be a global community which is partly located at the outside-Russia web-servers, since the diaspora is active in the organization of its local communities of Russian speakers; an example of a study done within such an emigre web community is Sapienza’s research (1999). Along the same lines, Saunders (2006) discusses the role of the Internet in the process of the globalization of ethnic Russians residing outside Russia.

The themes of democracy, human rights, social activism, politics, copyright and law are widely discussed by the RuNet authors. In this respect, two books must be mentioned: *Internet i glasnost* [The Internet and glasnost] (Gorbanevsky, 1999) and *From Glasnost to the Internet. Russia’s new infosphere* (Ellis, 1999), in which the issues of democracy and glasnost are discussed from the perspective of the developing media. The information presented in the books is now in need of significant updating. There are several more up-to-date chapters on this subject in Smoljan et al., (2004), including chapters on the economics of the Internet in Russia and on the forecasts (both optimistic and pessimistic) of the RuNet development through 2010. The prognosis is based on a script methodology developed in the systems theory. Soon everyone will be able to compare, e.g. the actual numbers of hosts, audiences, amounts of investments, estimates of the online services, etc., with those predicted.

Going beyond the systems methodology Bowles (2006) presents a history of the cultural events which she believes had a positive influence on the development of the RuNet within the given frames of changing political and financial conditions. The presentation follows the events and processes viewed and formulated by a clubbing community of smart and active persons engaged in various online projects and WWW services. However, the author seems to overestimate the influence of this community on the RuNet development (its members self-name themselves “the elite,” and the author also uses this name). Interpreting the results of the surveys of the computer networks’ (later — the Internet) audience administered every year since 1992, we were able to find out that the respondents often did not consider the online cultural projects initiated by the members of the creative “elite club” to be very important (Voiskounsky, 1998b). The clubbing community represents one of several ways of identity formation within the RuNet culture, as described by Schmidt and Teubener (2006a, p. 14). In the same book, Gorny (2006b, pp. 85-86) also discusses the “Internet elite” on the RuNet, as well as the “elite” of *Live Journal* bloggers’ community. The “elite” members, in Gorny’s terminology, are the earliest adopters of this service in Russia and are at the same time the most talented, productive and widely-read bloggers.

In the abovementioned book Ellis (1999) compared the earliest period of the Internet development with the development of the independent media in Russia. More recently similar research has been conducted by Zassursky (2001) and Kratasjuk (2006) who discuss ways of presenting news along with journalists’ and experts’ comments to the audiences of end users, or in more traditional terminology, readers, viewers and listeners. Schmidt and Teubener (2006b) describe, with real-life examples, the diverse mechanisms of taking
control over the Internet content (close to what is being done with the traditional media content) and of intellectuals’ opposition to such processes.

Practical sociology of the RuNet started in the second half of the 1990s, with several agencies publishing the results of representative surveys of the RuNet audience (their limitations are discussed in Voiskounsky et al., 2000, pp. 156-168). At the turn of the century, the Foundation Obschestvennoje mnenie [Public opinion] (http://www.fom.ru/), or FOM took leadership in sociological study of the RuNet audiences; since that time the FOM has provided, on a quarterly basis, the results universally believed to be the most correct and representative. The FOM has recently published its first book presenting textual explanations, maps, and diagrams with the full results of the surveys administered by this organization (Rossiya setevaya, 2006). The detailed results of the newly-administered studies are being quarterly updated and placed on the FOM web-portal (http://www.fom.ru/projects/23.html).

There are several other sociological agencies that perform fieldwork studies of Internet penetration; unlike the FOM, none of them present their full results to the public on a regular basis. Here, two main problems need to be mentioned. First, these agencies have not yet come to a unified basic terminology; for example, different agencies mark differently — as a user or a non-user — those respondents who use the Internet irregularly, e.g., only once in the last month or in three months. Second, no data is available on the number of adolescents and teenagers using the Internet. The FOM Foundation surveys respondents whose age is 18+, thus restricting the overall Internet audience to the population of adults. An agency known as COMCON (http://www.comcon-2.com/), a pioneer in the Internet related sociological fieldwork in Russia, administers surveys to younger teenagers, but unlike the FOM, it does not survey rural citizens (either adults or children), besides, COMCON presents its results exclusively to subscribers and not to the general public, meaning no open comparison of data provided by various agencies can be made. Chugunov (2006) presents a detailed analysis of numerous problem areas connected with the practical sociology studies of the RuNet audiences.

Some non-representative sociological studies have been targeted at the K-12 population. For example, Sobkin and Evstigneeva (2001) present the results of their fieldwork, administered mostly in Moscow and characterizing the use of information technologies by students of secondary and high schools as well as by schoolteachers. Sobkin and Adamchuk (2006) present the results of the survey conducted in 2005-2006 in provincial regions of Russia, dealing with the attitudes of school principals, teachers and students toward information technologies. A non-representative survey on the use of the Internet, with university students in Moscow as respondents, has been administered and reported by Palesh et al., (2004). An empirical study of the social stratification resulting in an unequal access to computers and of the “gender divide” problem has been performed by Sobkin and Khlebnikova (2000). Voiskounsky et al., (2000) report the results of successive, non-representative all-Russia surveys administered from 1992 until 1998, and present full
comparative data (an English summary available); parts of this information are presented in English (Voiskounsky, 1998b).

We should also mention several other publications in sociology that deal with cyberpsychology and CMC. Bondarenko (2004) presents a detailed and highly elaborate theoretical model of social structures pertaining to diverse network communities, e.g., social networks of the Internet users or instant messaging services, or networks of the cell-phone users. The researcher stratifies network communities and describes the models of typical within-community styles of behavior, including deviant or delinquent behaviors. Ivanov’s book (2000), written in Russian with a long summary in English, is devoted to the processes of virtualization of society, presenting an overview of multiple theories of modernization and virtualization in economics, politics, science, art, family relations, and finally a theory of a virtual society as a whole. From an educational perspective, network communities have been investigated by Patarakin (2006).

Such quantitative measures as the number of users, estimates of the number and quality of hosts, domains, backbones and service providers are discussed by Sadovnichy et al., (1999). The updated data of this type, including the number of computers and Internet connections, the most frequently used survey words and the most often visited web pages are systematically presented by major providers and/or owners of popular online services, e.g., http://rumetrika.rambler.ru, http://spylog.ru, http://www.idc.com/russia, http://stat.yandex.ru, http://mediarevolution.ru. This type of data is gathered using statistics and mathematical models, tracking programs, and analysis of reports of producers and providers.

Goroshko (2006) investigates gender specific structures of the RuNet web-sites; other gender studies were conducted by Arestova and Voiskounsky (2000) and later by Mitina and Voiskounsky (2005). These studies showed that the gender roles exposed on the RuNet differ from the online gender roles described by foreign researchers.

CURRENT CYBERPSYCHOLOGY STUDIES

In 1992 academic venues in Russia began getting access to computer networks, allowing scholars to plan new empirical studies related to the emerging cyberspace environment. However, for psychologists more time would be needed to identify those who were familiar with computer telecommunications (later — the Internet) and who could thus serve as participants in such studies. At the same time a new methodology of empirical work, namely online research methods, needed to be mastered, and the benefits and drawbacks of this new methodology needed to be thoroughly explained to the board members of academic journals and the members of the Ph.D. committees (see Arestova et al., 1995). Also, the main
directions of studies carried out by the colleagues working abroad were analyzed; books and journals became much more available than before, partly due to electronic databases and full-text online collections.

For researchers in psychology, the last decade of the 20th century can be characterized as a period when their research priorities changed, slightly or radically, due to the following three factors. First, in many cases new theories and methods parallel or alternative to the traditional ones began to be adapted and used. Second, in earlier times older colleagues would not allow younger researchers to use certain theory or method, partly due to tradition, and partly (or altogether) due to political and ideological reasons. Once most of the external barriers had disappeared, many researchers started to employ a new theory or methodology, or turn to entirely new research themes within or outside his or her area of research. Third, those who teach always feel the pressure of students who are apt to read new books filled with new ideas. Such students demand further explanations from professors and push them to get acquainted with previously unknown theories and methods. Some of these issues are discussed in the book titled States of Mind (Halpern & Voiskounsky, 1997).

The above paragraph makes it clear why the current studies in the area of cyberpsychology are not en masse following Vygotsky’s views, contrary to the opinion expressed by Arestova et al., (1999). Methodological analysis performed in the Vygotskian paradigm shows (Babaeva et al., 2000) that just three major human activities can be said to be (re)mediated while using the Internet: interaction, cognition (including learning/instruction) and entertainment (including video/computer/online gaming). Shopping or gambling — behaviors, which in today’s culture have high popularity — have not yet been emphasized in the Russian respondents’ reports at the time the work in question was done. The authors stress that the Internet and WWW should be qualified as a neutral or ambivalent instrument of human psychological development. Like any instrument, neither computers nor the Internet bear any responsibility, e.g for the Internet abuse/overuse and the respective negative consequences of one’s character or behavior.

The mediation/remediation paradigm has been significantly used and developed while carrying out research in this area. An empirical study of motivation of the Internet users was carried out, based on interviews and surveys of the Internet audience in 1992-1999. In the resulting paper the following major types of motivation were selected: profession and business; cognition; interaction; collaboration; self-affirmation; affiliation; self-realization; and self-development (Arestova et al., 2000). At the same time, an empirical study of the impact of the Internet use on processes of adolescents’ virtual identity formation was published: the virtual identity was found to influence their personal or social identity (Zhichkina & Belinskaya, 2000).

Several more books on the cyberpsychology related themes need to be mentioned.

A collection of papers in philosophy, psychology and culture studies devoted to various phenomena of virtual reality and its applications (with rather little empirical data) was published in Russian (Virtual’naya..., 1998). Babaeva and Voiskounsky (2002, 2003)
suggest that the IT-giftedness needs to be accepted as a new type of giftedness, and needs to be intensely investigated. At the same time the authors identify and discuss some of its boundaries, e.g., the boundaries of social and psychological character, and provide educational and psychological recommendations for IT-gifted children and adolescents, their parents, teachers and care-givers. The concept of IT-giftedness is also briefly mentioned in the book compiled by Spanish and Russian authors on numerous educational and psychological issues dealing with the impact of the information technologies on human beings (Van Povedskaya & Dosil Maseira, 2007). In addition, this book contains chapters on the issues of information society and knowledge economics, cyber-ethics, specific educational options in the information societies, including, e.g., distant education, lifelong education and education of the disabled and elderly populations, and technological stresses and addictions.

As explained above, a previously little-known theory or methodology can often be fascinating. For the present author the methodology called *optimal experience* also known as *flow experience*, introduced by Csikszentmihalyi (2000/1975), turned out to be the most fascinating one. While interviewing dozens of respondents, including professional and amateur dancers, chess players, rock climbers, surgeons and many others who would express a deep devotion to their preferred sort of activity, Csikszentmihalyi selected the often reported characteristics of a special feeling common to many of them, which they estimated very highly. This devotion is undeniably related to what they believe constitute an optimal level of their experience. During the interview sessions, Csikszentmihalyi found that his respondents’ verbal descriptions turned out to be worded almost identically regardless of the particular sort of their activity. Almost everyone mentioned “being in the midst of a flow”, or, to express it in a slightly different manner, “flowing from one moment to the next, in which he is in control of his actions, and in which there is a little distinction between self and environment, between stimulus and response, or between past, present, and future” (Csikszentmihalyi, 2000/1975, p. 36).

Optimal experience seems to take place very often in situations where human beings use information technologies; indeed, flow has been described and measured in numerous computers or the Internet related behaviors, e.g. online types of instruction, entertainment, interaction, explorative behavior, usability testing, web marketing and shopping, psychological rehabilitation, etc. (for a detailed overview see Voiskounsky, in press). Flow experience can be considered an important component of the behavior of computer hackers (Voiskounsky & Smyslova, 2003) and online gamers (Voiskounsky et al., 2004; Voiskounsky et al., 2005).

Prior to the study of the optimal forms of experience in the hackers’ underground communities, attitudes toward computer hacking and toward hackers themselves had been studied. It was shown that at the time the study was conducted in Russia, the public attitudes towards hackers were partly positive (Voiskounsky et al., 2000). In the study of the hackers’ experience it was shown that only the least and the most competent hackers report flow
(Voiskounsky & Smyslova, 2003). These findings are important for the global program of computer security, i.e., in addition to technical, legislative and firewall-programming actions, psychological and cyber-ethical actions should be taken; then the least-competent (newbie) hackers might develop in the direction of gaining computer competence, instead of specific hacker’s competence (Voiskounsky, 2004).

Online gamers of multiplayer role games have been shown to experience flow; this factor was found to be no less important than such other widely explicated factors as achievements, interactions or cognition (Voiskounsky et al., 2004; Voiskounsky et al., 2005). Thus flow experience can be one of the major factors attracting gamers and pushing them to playing their favorite games and/or mastering newer ones. In one of our studies (Voiskounsky et al., 2005) the respondents were elder teenagers and young adults. Elementary school students as gamers have been studied by Smirnova and Radeva (2000) who conclude that videogames differ from traditional games for schoolchildren of this age, and cannot replace traditional, i.e., non-video, non-computer offline types of games.

**CMC AND CYBERPSYCHOLOGY IN THE NEAREST FUTURE: A PROGNOSTIC VIEW**

One can conclude from the above discussion that studies in the field of CMC conducted in Russia since the early 1990s have embraced at least half a dozen disciplines, including culture studies, sociology, media studies, linguistics and sociolinguistics, philosophy, political science, education and gender studies. This means that the CMC field is differentiated but not elaborated enough (with few exceptions, cf. Rozina, 2005). Thus, the prognosis is simple enough: in the near future the studies in the CMC field need to be integrated into the discipline of communication sciences.

One more discipline needs to be mentioned — the human-computer interaction (HCI), known also as computer-human interaction (CHI). It is well-developed globally, but totally absent in Russia as an academic discipline with no HCI/CHI departments in colleges, no periodicals, no manuals or text-books, no degrees and almost no professionals in the field. This discipline is truly desired, and if it existed, it would certainly be included as part of the CMC studies.

As far as cyberpsychology is concerned, the return to the Vygotskian paradigm seems to be the most promising. The period when Russian professionals’ greatest interest was concentrated around the theories developed elsewhere seems to be coming to an end. Theoretically, the general postulates introduced by Vygotsky and developed by his followers promise a very high value in the studies of behavior patterns mediated by sign systems, including those realized in the modern information technologies. This view cannot of course be taken too rigidly: every adequate and useful theory, every reasonable research method can
and should be used to enlarge our knowledge in the fascinating fields of cyberpsychology and CMC studies.

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In his renowned autobiography, archpriest Avvakum Petrovich (1620-1682) of the Russian Old Believers describes vividly how his co-martyr Priest Lazar fared on their arrival in exile at Pustozjorsk on the Arctic Ocean, in a banishment which was to end in burning at the stake: “He placed his right hand on the block and it was hacked off at the wrist. The hand itself arranged its fingers as tradition demanded and lay long before the people, bearing witness even in death to the immutable sign of the Lord.” This hand was for certain less miraculous than Lazar’s own tongue, which had been cut out on the same occasion but by the grace of God gradually regenerated to near normal. The hand merely froze into a two-fingered sign of the cross. Such a gesture was emblematic of Old Believers, in contrast to the three-fingered variant which was current in South Russia and which Patriarch Nikon of Moscow had made mandatory on the instigation of his Greek counselors.

Why was (and is) the two-fingered sign of the cross so unshakably essential to Old Believers that for its sake they would turn schismatic and as raskolniki flee to borderlands, endure atrocities, and even embrace martyrdom? It was only a matter of either stretching or bending the fourth finger. Avvakum and his co-religionists had elaborated gestological refinements (thumb, ring finger, and small digit together stood for the trinity, index and middle finger for the joint divine and human nature of Christ), but such symbolism alone hardly explains fanatical resistance to reform. The intransigence of the schismatics must have some more cogent underlying cause.

If Lazar’s severed hand seemed to exhibit a two-fingered stretch, the probable reason was an abnormally cramped fourth finger, which leads from theology into the realm of pathology. Perhaps Lazar and other priests were hamstrung by some innate deformity which was visible even on a dead hand and hampered a three-fingered sign of the cross, so that their options were reduced to resigning office or resisting reform.

Two male acquaintances of mine were recently diagnosed with “Dupuytren’s syndrome”, a tightening and thickening of subcutaneous palmar tissue which cramps the...
fingers, starting usually with the fourth and fifth. The deformity can be severe and debilitating for hand use but can nowadays be alleviated by surgery. Its formulator was Guillaume Dupuytren (1777-1835), renowned pioneer of plastic surgery, French court physician and professor at the Sorbonne, eponym of Rue Dupuytren near the old Medical School in the Latin Quarter.

The syndrome is typical of males of North European extraction and has a clear genetic foundation. One of the patients is from an age-old North Russian priestly family, the other from an indigenous Swedish clan in Finland’s Ostrobothnia. The data point to a genetic mutation stretching back at least a millennium, in view of its spread from the British Isles and the North Sea region through Scandinavia to Finland and Northern Russia. The Vikings are the most probable originators, bearers, and disseminators of the mutation. By the Varangians it was introduced to North Russia and perpetuated especially in the genes of the hereditary priesthood whose bloodlines were less disrupted by the genetic cocktail of the Tartar invasions.

Curiously the instigator of all the schismatic cruelty and suffering, the power-hungry Patriarch Nikon, who at times substituted for Tsar Aleksei Mihailovich as the secular ruler, was not even Russian but of Ugro-Finnic Mordvian stock. No wonder he had little empathy for Varangian-Russian idiosyncrasy, where the sign of the cross had over centuries hereditarily deviated from the three-finger Byzantine norm. Regardless of Nikon’s own later disfavor with Tsar Aleksei, the reform took root with the support or indifference of the southerly majority. Thus once again a non-Russian “put it over” on the natives, an old phenomenon that ranges from the Varangian incursions to the “Tartar yoke” to the Georgian-Ossetic despot of the Soviet Union.

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Inspired by Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, Alexander McGregor carried out a comparative analysis of the ways in which American and Soviet establishments and cultural producers shaped popular consent by employing visual arts during 1929-1941. This book is designed, and quite successfully laid out, as a discussion challenging the existing binary orthodoxy which “holds that the difference between American and Soviet politics, society, economy and ideology were not only polar but also plain and obvious” (3).

The author begins by posing the macro question: “How did the two establishments use similar means to inculcate their approved values and virtues into the public mind to win consent in a decade of particular strains for both of them?” (30). In order to answer the question, McGregor analyzes such visual arts as cinema, painting, plastic arts, theatre, and architecture. He first examines to what extent the Soviet and American establishments promoted themselves as virtuous through historical heroes such as, Abraham Lincoln and Alexander Nevsky. Additionally, he looks at how the two establishments tried to promote the theme of utopia-within-reach. The second part of the book focuses on looking at how the two establishments sought to represent the outside world, especially its external enemies. The final part explores what attributes and values were ascribed to internal villains, outsiders and independent groups such as religious institutions and individuals, as well as law and economic subversives.

One of the major findings of this comparative study is that even though American and Soviet establishments did not promote exactly the same themes in exactly the same manner, they similarly created a “psycho-dynamic form of public identification/identity which bound the people to the establishment” (321). McGregor claims that this process of inculcating Soviet and American establishment’s values, “wisdom,” and “conception of the world” illustrates Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Thus, the Soviet and American establishments promoted unquestioned adherence to their ideology and conformity with the social moral code among the population, but at the same time wanted the masses to believe that “their
intellectual decisions and choices... were made through their own conscious, cognitive analysis of, and participation in, the making of history and the modern world” (321).

Another conclusion drawn by the author is that both the USSR and the US stand out among all other countries in the way they claimed and perpetuated the belief that their particular political, social, and economic systems represented “the end of modernity,” “pinnacle of human achievement,” and the only possible “order of society.”

McGregor’s findings represent a fascinating insight into the workings of the two “superpowers” and how they both utilized, in spite of obvious differences and sometimes acrimonious opposition between them, visual arts as media to communicate their respective values and construct the ideology of Sovietism and Americanism among the population. One of my critical observations is that, in this research, visual arts and their creation by cultural producers are somewhat separated from the masses. The author does not explore how the masses in turn might have co-constructed or influenced the hegemonic views. Although the author clearly states at the beginning that he will focus on “intention not perception” (9), and will “examine the iconography in its purest form before it has entered the public domain” (9), I believe that his approach somewhat denied people any cultural participation, making the U.S. and USSR establishments exclusive creators of ideology, and manufacturers of popular consent through the skills of cultural producers.

This book is very rich in examples, and it provides an extensive historical background of the time period. It lets the reader experience the visual arts culture of both countries during 1929-1941, thus allowing the reader to make comparisons and draw conclusions. The author’s research goals are very clear and transparent. He defines the concepts and theoretical approaches he used and outlines the limitations of his research. The layout of the book is very convenient and concise. It presents an enjoyable read, with the author reiterating all the chapter’s main points in the conclusion. I enjoyed the set of questions McGregor asks at the beginning of each chapter and the way he made me actively participate in the polemic with the current orthodoxy and common assumptions about the U.S. and Soviet cultures. I would recommend this book to those who study the way visual arts are used to communicate and construct ideologies and to those exploring cultural dynamics within the U.S. and Soviet Union/Russia.
Angela Brintlinger and Ilya Vinitsky (eds.). *Madness and the mad in Russian culture.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006, 331 pp., ISBN 978-1-904764-98-4, $70.00 (cloth)

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This book stems from a conference held in 2003 at Ohio State University under the heading “Those Crazy Russians.” The event brought together an international team of scholars that produced a handsomely packaged volume that should appeal to readers far beyond the Russian studies field where the project originated. Those familiar with the academe will know how much collaborative effort is needed to carry out such a vast undertaking and how much credit its organizers, sponsors, editors, translators, and participants deserve.

The collection is divided into three parts, each one illuminating a key facet of insanity as a socio-historical phenomenon. Essays gathered in the first section explore how mental illness was institutionally framed in 18th century Russia and redefined throughout the 19th century. Special attention is given to the parallel developments in the Russian and Western European legal codes and cultural discourses. Part II examines the bond between war, insanity and revolution, as well as the construction of mental illness, notably suicide, in the early Soviet era. Part III is devoted to the debate about the linkage between madness and creativity.

Angela Brintlinger introduces the volume with a helpful survey that highlights the long-standing ambivalence the Russians feel toward insanity. The phenomenon met with awe in medieval Russia where *iurodivyi* or the holy fool was celebrated as someone who dispensed with the ceremonial niceties and renounced conventional pursuits in exchange for the right to voice critical opinions which were certain to get into trouble anyone unprotected by the saintly halo surrounding the inspired madman. This archetypal figure makes frequent appearance throughout Russian history. It is instantly recognizable in literary characters like Count Myshkin, a hero of Dostoyevsky’s novel provocatively titled *Idiot*, or *Venechka Erofeev*, a soviet-style holy fool conjured up in Venedict Erofeev’s beloved crypto-autobiographical novel.

In a key chapter, Ilyia Vinitsky demonstrates how the traditional attitudes toward insanity began to change under Catherine the Great. In the late 1770s, the Empress introduced to Russia asylums for the insane that would become known throughout the country as zheltye doma or “yellow houses.” Holy fools who once roamed Russia’s countryside would find themselves increasingly committed to such institutions. Catherine the Great waged a bitter battle against melancholy, a seditious mood she banned from the court where her subjects were expected to display a cheerful disposition as a token of their loyalty to the throne. Any sign of disaffection, according to the new affective paradigm, was suspect. Melancholy types were judged to be trouble makers, morally corrupted beings harboring illicit sentiments injurious to the state.
Catherine’s views were inspired by the Enlightenment’s opposition to traditionalist forces, particularly in the church hierarchy, but its modernist agenda had a peculiarly Russian twist. When Aleksandr Radishchev wrote a pamphlet lamenting the wretched conditions of the nation’s poor, Catherine promptly dispensed with Voltaire’s advice, banned the book, declared its author a madman, and committed him to a mental institution. In her diagnosis she blamed the ideological transgression on the “hypochondriac,” “bilious” disposition of the author. Many Russians who showed an impious attitude or ventured critical opinions about the affairs of state would subsequently share Radishchev’s fate – from Petr Chaadaev and certain Decembrists to Petr Grigorenko and Dmitri Prigov. Catherine the Great’s campaign of enforced cheerfulness followed the path charted by Peter the Great’s modernization, reminding us yet again that the very ruthlessness with which modern institutions were imposed on Russia undermined their liberal thrust.

Lia Langoulova offers an overview of the legal and psychiatric definitions used in Tsarist Russia to circumscribe mental illness, tests designed to identify the legally insane, and state institutions set out to treat the disease. Elena Dryzhakova, Robert Wessling and Lev Losev analyze how insanity has been constructed in the Russian cultural discourse.

Starting with the premise that mental instability was central to Dostoevsky’s literary explorations, Dryzhakova argues that the author’s interest in the subject might have been influenced in part by his own psychological abnormalities. Wessling shows how Vsevolod Garshin, a Russian popular author who committed suicide, emerged as a cult figure among the Russian intelligentsia. Wessling ties the Garshin cult to the intelligentsia’s precarious status in the late 19th century. Losev acts as a literary sleuth as he traces Joseph Brodsky’s poem “Gorbunov and Gorchakov” to the author’s brief encounter with mental institutions in soviet Russia. It is noteworthy that Brodsky entered a mental hospital voluntarily, at the behest of his friends trying to save him from prison, but the horrors he experienced therein taught him that the conditions in the asylum could be worse than in prison.

Ever since the French Revolution, scholars and popular writers sought to link madness with the riotous behavior threatening to topple the established regimes. Martin Miller cites Pinel’s 1806 Treatise on Insanity as a landmark study that introduced the idiom of revolutionary insanity and documents its impact on the Russian psychiatric movement and popular culture. As several contributors to the volume note, the idea made a strong impression on Dostoevsky whose novel The Demons pictures Russian revolutionaries as mentally disturbed, sometimes patently deranged creatures whose political passions are fed by their personal pathologies – the view shared by a prominent Russia psychiatrist Vladimir Chizh. The authors contributing to the famous turn-of-the-century publication Vekhi offered another influential account of the mental disturbances afflicting the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia. Declining to medicalize symptoms, the Vekhi authors drew attention to the fact that the Russian people in general and Russian intellectuals in particular sorely lacked what we would call today “emotional intelligence.” It is their chronic irritability, maximalism, over-confidence, and lack of follow-through, according to the Vekhi authors, that explains the Russian intelligentsia’s disastrous infatuation with revolutionary violence.

Irina Sirotkina investigates the role Russian psychiatrists played during World War II, making the case that Russian doctors were more sympathetic to war veterans’ complaints than some of their Western counterparts. Kenneth Pinnow presents interesting data on the
ideologically-colored optics through which Soviet psychiatrists viewed the “possible worlds” of suicide victims in the Red Army. The political agenda clearly comes through in the post-mortem reports where the experts strenuously sought to bind the victims’ fateful decisions to their non-proletarian roots or their association with ideological malcontents and alien life styles. Dan Healy rounds up Part II with a study analyzing the expert testimony about sexual crimes and the manner these were interpreted in the early Soviet era. As it happened, the accused often pressed the narrative of mental illness to explain, if not excuse, their criminal conduct while the medical doctors insisted on the perpetrators’ fitness to stand trial.

The last section explores the relationship between mental illness and creativity. Angela Britlinger makes an intriguing observation about differences in the manner Russian doctors cast psychological problems in men, whose abnormalities they tied to the latter’s physical and mental exhaustion, and in women, whose difficulties they traced to dysfunctional family life. Helena Goscilo makes a kindred point regarding the gendered nature of psychiatric diagnosis and the propensity of Russian writers to privilege masculine imagination in explaining the linkage between madness and artistic genius. Margarita Odesskaya reviews Anton Chekhov’s stories where madmen and madness figure prominently, particularly Ward No. 6 and The Black Monk. Yvonne Howell shows how the romantic trope about the deranged artistic genius in the biological morphed into a theory of Vladimir Efroimson, a Russian geneticist whose views on the bio-social roots of genius put him on a collision course with the Russian authorities. Daun Khaus updates the historical picture painted by her colleagues with a lively account of assorted pathologies and nutty characters populating in the post-soviet literature. And finally, Mikhail Epstein offers an elegant literary-philosophical meditation on madness and genius where he draws parallels between Friedrich Hölderlin and Konstantin Batiushkov, near contemporaries who, according to Epstein, fell victims to their over-abandoned artistic imagination which pushed the seminal writers over the brink.

I cannot do justice in my brief review to these fine essays, which form the most comprehensive interdisciplinary survey of its kind and which will be welcome by students working in diverse fields. Let me just single out one thing I found missing in this collective exercise.

Not a single article in this collection mentions a classic study of mental institutions written by an eminent sociologist Erving Goffman. Published in 1961, this book – Asylums – gave a devastating account of the degradation ceremonies involuntarily confined patients undergo in mental institutions. Goffman’s focus on the continuity between asylums and prisons bears an uncanny resemblance to Chekhov’s Ward No. 6, which might have been known to Goffman whose parents emigrated from Russia in the 1910’s. More pertinent for my argument is the fact that Goffman’s interest in the subject was spurred by his wife’s mental illness and institutionalization. Goffman’s stance on de-institutionalization must have played a part in the release of his wife. However, right after she was released from the hospital in 1964, she committed suicide. Goffman subsequently revised his views on mental illness, acknowledging that it might have organic roots and intimating that he would have written a different book if he had a chance to rewrite it.
Here is the lesson I would like to draw from this story: There is more to madness than the excess of imagination, artistic or otherwise. The vast majority of exceptionally creative people are not insane, just as the vast majority of mentally ill are not exceptionally gifted. In the last few years of his life when Nietzsche lost touch with reality, he was observed dancing naked like the dancing god Zarathustra he extolled in his writings, but he was also given to the misogynist ranting, anti-Semitic slur, and plain gibberish. Whether he was “mad about” matters conjured up by his philosophical genius is far from clear. The genius as madness metaphor will continue to nourish artistic imagination, but this Romantic trope still popular in Russia is overdue for a sober bio-sociological examination.

**Reviewed by Galina Miazhevich**  
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*Pride and Panic* lays emphasis on unpacking the imaginary of the western “Other” in post-Soviet Russian films. Drawing on a cross-disciplinary approach which includes psychoanalysis, cultural and film studies, Yana Hashamova’s necessarily selective account of the last six years of Russian cinema is an instructive analytical overview. Examples derived from diverse films both by established and less well-known Russian directors flesh out a discussion of the connection between an unsettled Russian national identity and Western cultural expansion. Russia’s dialogical relationship with the West is explored through an unorthodox approach which likens Russian society’s collective identity dynamic to the stages of development of an individual.

The book is organized into five, broadly chronologically sequenced chapters, which cogently trace the dynamic of Russia’s collective fantasy about the West after the fall of the Soviet Union through the gaze of the camera. The first chapter examines the dialectic of the immediate cinematic reaction when fears of the West coexisted with the temptations of a largely unknown and therefore glorified “western Other.” In subsequent chapters the discussion shifts to fantasies of victimization by the destructive western presence and of “wounded national pride.” This is followed by the next stage: that of a fixation on the glorious Russian past. After achieving a certain level of cultural autonomy, Hashamova argues in her fourth chapter, the cinematic focus switches to the search for new ways of communicating, and ultimately unifying with, the West. Finally, the turn to Russia’s responsibility and/or its ambivalent position in the world global order is analyzed. In the concluding chapter, where several films involving father-son relationship are analyzed, Hashamova goes beyond the East-West framework and refers to universal human values.

*Pride and Panic*’s exploration of Russia’s fantasized identification with the West in post-Soviet film is an engaging read. In several instances the author offers an original elucidation of such well known movies as Sokurov’s “Russian Ark” (Russkyi Krovcheg, 2002). Also perceptive is her observation of the gender dynamic of Russia’s collective imagination in which the boyish Russian male hero fails to conform to the muscular Hollywood norm, but still achieves “masculinity,” Russian-style. However, the interpretations of such acclaimed films as Mamin’s “Window to Paris” (Okno v Parizh, 2003) and Balabanov’s “Brother 2” (Brat 2, 2000) struck this reviewer as somewhat one-sided and superficial. For instance, “Window to Paris” could be seen as self-consciously playing with, and exposing, stereotypes on both sides (West and Russia) rather than merely indulging in them, as Hashamova claims. Similarly the negative reading of “Brother 2” ignores the way the film achieves a certain ironic distance from its own nationalistic certainties through devices such as the comic inclusion of the Chapaev “machine gun” scene in its narrative. Furthermore, the argument creates the impression that Russian film only
really started reacting in earnest to western influence after 1991, when in fact throughout the Soviet period such classic “socialist realist” films as Alexandrov’s “Circus” (Tsirk, 1936) and the Vasil’ev brothers’ “Chapaev” (1934) indicated a constant process of absorbing, adapting and transforming elements of western cinematography. At times the argument exhibits a tendency misleadingly to identify the views and behavior of the lead characters with the definitive “meanings” of the films. Nonetheless, and despite these drawbacks, students wishing to acquaint themselves with some of the broad concerns of post-Soviet cinema would do well by starting with *Pride and Panic*.

The author’s approach combines both textual and contextual analysis, synthesizing its treatment of images, themes, characters and political/social environment. The precise focus, as well as the depth and degree of elaboration of the analysis, are adjusted to the requirements of the author’s argument at any given point. Whilst generally justified, this strategy accounts for the presence of sometimes unpredictable diversions, such as the marked shift of the main focus later in the book from the West to the related issues of gender and power. Unfortunately, the full connotations of the book’s central notion is not clarified anywhere, thus further confusing the reader by creating an impression of the West as a homogenized whole.

Hashamova encounters difficulties in integrating the diverse theories used in her main argument. It remains unclear to readers how the vast array of theoretical paradigms ranging from Lacan, Freud, Klein to Bakhtin and Zizek are compatible with one another. Moreover, several theories are applied to Russia without any adaptation (e.g. Zizek’s theory of the logic of democracy). The attempt to transpose a psychoanalytical model intended for the individual psyche onto an entire national culture by labeling Russia’s current stage of development as “adolescence” is unconvincing. Similarly unpersuasive are the constant references to an undifferentiated “Russian collective mind.” The inconsistent usage of the psychoanalytic model comes to the fore in the author’s attribution of “impartiality” to Sokurov’s “Russian Ark” by comparison Mikhailov’s “The Barber of Siberia” (Sibirskij Tsirjulnik, 2000); for psychoanalysts, surely, authorial/directorial impartiality is an illusion.

As a result of its broad-brush generalizations, the book’s conclusions are somewhat predictable and its innovative value to our understanding of post-Soviet cinema’s attitude to the West is accordingly diminished. Having said this, being the first of its kind, the book constitutes an original and timely project. It demarcates a number of key issues that remain to be explored in this largely uncharted territory. To conclude, Hashamova speaks to a wide constituency of readers. The accessibility of *Pride and Panic* commends it as a course reader and handbook for undergraduate students of contemporary Russian film and culture. It can be also recommended as a good introduction for members of the general public keen to know more about Russian cinematography and its bearing on the complex identities emerging in post-Soviet Russian society.

Reviewed by Brion van Over
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In this work, Ledeneva offers the reader an elaboration and extension of the work done in her prior book, “Russia’s Economy of Favors.” In, “How Russia Really Works,” she moves away from the Russian practice of blat (the use of personal networks to obtain goods or services outside formal procedures), which is the focus of her earlier work, into a discussion of the informal practices that are deeply entangled in post-Soviet political and economic institutions.

The book begins with an introduction that lays out the structure of the book along with the methods employed in the research, largely ethnographic, and ends with a concluding chapter that nicely summarizes the themes woven throughout.

The chapters are structured so that each practice is discussed in a dedicated chapter, including the use of black and gray PR or “piar”, Kompromat (information used in bribery), Krugovia Poruka (holding communities or groups responsible for individual action), Tenevoi Barter (shadow barter and barter chains), Dvoinaia Bukhgalteriia (double accountancy), and Tolkachi (alternative enforcement and use of law).

Ledeneva suggests that these informal practices, bred from a lack of formal rules plagued by enforcement problems, and lack of social investment, should not be seen in a simplistic way as wholly negative for the prospects of Russia’s future democracy and economy, but instead should be seen as, “a resource for Russia’s modernization.” (p. 195) This follows the general theme of the work that focuses on the duality of these practices as both supportive and subversive of the institutions they operate in and around.

Early on the author argues that in order to understand, “How Russia Really Works,” and furthermore, to understand how Russia’s democratic and economic systems function, one must understand the informal practices that sustain and subvert these systems. She further argues that the only way to get a proper sense of how these informal practices function is through ethnographic investigation that engages those people who have access to the largely unknown and publicly inaccessible body of knowledge about their inner workings.

The author does a nice job of synthesizing a large amount of complex, historically entrenched research and data into a coherent narrative that is easy to follow and generally engaging even for those who are not intimately familiar with contemporary or historical Russian politics, economics, media institutions etc. The book will undoubtedly be a satisfying read for anyone interested in the interrelationships between the informal practices that have evolved throughout the history and movement of Russia’s political and economic systems and how the continuation of those practices are both functionally necessary in a system attempting to repair itself, but also undermining the very repairs they encourage.
However, the book may leave some readers disappointed with the results of the author’s admirable attempt to create theoretical movement between macro and micro levels of analysis. Ledeneva sets out to bridge the theoretical gap between institutions and those social players who through their repetitive actions sustain and (re)create those same institutions, but in the end we are left much closer to a structuralist position than the proposed middle ground.

In her introduction Ledeneva tells us, “that most fundamental post-Soviet changes would be grasped in language,” and that she plans to look for, “the new language games in the vernacular and colloquial ways of describing the new order of things.” (p. 4) In line with this stated plan, much of the book offers quotes from informants that are used to support the definitions of particular terms the author introduces and her analysis of them, but without an investigation into the symbolic system that sustains and bounds these practices her descriptions become elaborate folk definitions that lack interrogation in their own right.

A potential problem with this kind of treatment is that it allows informants reports to act as proof instead of data. When coming to understand the symbolic worlds that sustain the systems the book engages, informants quotes are used to show that the way Ledeneva is describing the system, is, in fact, the way the system operates because these people say so, instead of using informants data as an entry point into the rich cultural text they are producing to account for the system and their role in it.

The work might have been a more successful integration of ethnographic methodology and political/structural analysis if it treated ethnography as deeper than a qualitative set of interviewing practices and recognized the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of contemporary ethnographic work.

One consequence of this inattention is a repeated discussion of the informal norms that often operate in conflict with, or absence of, formal rules, without giving the reader a clear systematic analysis of what these informal norms are, or their place in the larger social normative environment.

There is a rich and available body of ethnographic literature in communication, anthropology, and sociology, a review of which might have added some additional layers of subtlety to the analysis, allowing us to understand what sustains these practices, their cultural meanings, and further, the way these practices then sustain and subvert the institutions discussed while simultaneously being re-created and re-imagined in their shadow.

Overall the book is an interesting, engaging, and thoroughly researched production, but it may also be disappointing for those who hoped to find an innovative blend of macro-political and micro-ethnographic processes.
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

IGOR E. KLYUKANOV

The second issue of Russian Journal of Communication is comparative. Everything is said to be a matter of comparison, or, as they say in Russian, “Все познается в сравнении” (literally, “everything is cognized through comparison”). If we compare the two expressions, we might feel a difference; the former seems to have a more inclusive and factual (“matterialistic”) sound to it while the latter refers more to a process rather than an established state of affairs, emphasizing the nature of thinking in this process. That is why, perhaps, because thought manifests itself fully in language, it is language and thought that have been in the center of the Russian tradition of comparative studies. In the English-speaking and — broader — Germanic tradition, it seems, comparative research has been more grounded and institutionalized, embracing in addition to linguistics and psychology, social, political, philosophical, economic and legal factors. It is, of course, just a feeling, a hypothesis, and a comparative study of comparative studies in different cultural traditions would be needed to (dis)prove it. What is beyond doubt, however, is that comparison and communication go hand in hand and, consequently, comparative studies and the study of communication are interconnected.

It is tempting to believe that one can defy comparison, stepping out of it, as it were. To quote O. Mandel’shtam, “не сравнивай: живущий не сравним” (“do not compare: one who lives is beyond compare”). Cultures face this temptation as well; after all, cultures are “compact persons” (Ch. S. Peirce). In this respect, Russia is often viewed (mostly by Russians) as unique, beyond compare. And yet, over centuries it has been looking out and comparing itself — to the East, to the West, to the always significant (statistically or not) Other.

Indeed, comparison can be conceptualized as meaningful points presented in the form of “this vs. that” or “us vs. them.” If possible, comparison is brought down to numbers, statistics; this way, it becomes possible to see how “this” measures against “that,” “us” against “them.” Then, communication between various agents can be made more successful, balancing the distance between meaningful digits. In the long run, all agents are drawn into the flow of communication by forces transcending their uniqueness. O. Mandel’shtam, a true genius, saw that side of the coin, too: “Время срезает меня как монету, и мне уже не хватает меня самого” (“Time cuts me off like a coin, and I now don’t have enough of myself for me”).
The flow of communication carries us all, and we look for answers to questions big and small, e.g., what to make of time, how to develop trust through everyday encounters, which obstacles might prevent us from ethical conduct, or how media coverage and consumption create our attitudes to each other. We try to figure out what matters to us — individually and together. Even from our “unique” position we wave hands, as it were, to the Other. Our life is all about particles of matter and waves of thinking. And in this life, we cannot not communicate and we cannot not compare.
RUSSIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST?
REMARKS ON COMPARISON OF CULTURES

VYACHESLAV V. IVANOV

The article continues the discussion between Westernizers and Slavophiles (and later Eurasianists). Differences between the traditional European philosophical thought and the Wisdom of the Russian mind are presented in metaphorical as well as in modern neuropsychological terms, e.g. the difference between the left-hemispheric type with the stress on the logical functions of the brain and the right-hemispheric model of the world for which creative possibilities of music and visual art are particularly important. The diglossia, i.e., a functional difference of Church Slavonic and the Old Russian language is supposed to be connected to the parallel existence of the two rows of religious and mythological symbols in the double faith. The possibility of a more adequate expression through non-verbal art forms is shown using the examples of S. Eisenstein’s and V. Kandinsky’s creative experiments. Also discussed are the differences between the Russian culture and other peoples (particularly those of the Western Europe) regarding the role of intuition, the institution of holy fools, the perception of time and history and the concept of a human being.

Key words: Russia, West, Asia, Wisdom, holy fool, time, community.

1. THE TWO POLES IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE RUSSIAN CULTURE

The two opposite views on the Russian culture go back to the debates in the first half of the 19th century between Slavophiles who argued for an original Russian path of development and Westernizers who wanted to see Russia restructured after a Western European pattern. In these debates, one can see the importance of geographical (spatial) reasoning. A more radical view is found in the philosophy of history developed by Peter Chaadayev (1991) who wrote, “We belong neither to the West nor to the East, and we
possess the traditions of neither” (p. 20). To him a lack of a “feeling of continuity” was among many negative sides of the situation in Russia. To some extent, this aspect of the Russian broken historical communication was made even more evident after the Bolsheviks had come to power as they tried to destroy the only original strong unifying force presented in the pre-Revolutionary Russia by the Orthodox Church. Just at that time the Eurasian movement arose among the Russian intellectuals living in exile. The Slavophile concepts were given new life by Prince Nikolay Trubetzkoy, a great Russian émigré scholar. Already before his forced escape from Russia to Western Europe he had started a series of works on the old Russian spiritual legacy. These ideas were developed later on in some of his studies published abroad (Trubetzkoy, 1991). He insisted on the importance of the Eurasian contribution to the shaping of the Russian mind.

Roman Jakobson, his colleague in the Prague Linguistic Circle, put forward the idea of a Eurasian linguistic league (or zone - Sprachbund), which included Russian and other Eastern Slavic languages typologically similar to all the other linguistic systems spread between Japan and Lithuania. The league was characterized by the phonological category of palatalization (distinction between two ways of pronouncing consonants) and the absence of polytony (tonal oppositions) (Jakobson, 1972). Some other cultural features of a more Oriental character are typical of the cultures of the peoples ascribed to this complex. Also, Trubetzkoy argued that the legacy of Genghis Khan was still valid for Russia. Stalin’s despotic rule seemed to confirm some ideas of Eurasianists. However, to them links with the nomadic peoples of the steppe would not necessarily mean atrocities of the kind we find in Stalin’s regime. More important to them was the possibility of a specifically Russian historical path of development that might be different from that taken by the rest of Europe. These ideas influenced Lev Gumilev, a famous Russian historian (and the son of the great poet Nikolai Gumilev, executed at the beginning of the Soviet period). Due to his influence a new variant of Neo-Slavophile-Eurasian half-fantastic ideas has recently become popular not only in the academic environment, but in the broad political discourse as well. It becomes necessary to compare different points of view presented in the works of the followers of the two traditional points of view that identify the Russian type of culture with either the Eurasian (Oriental) model or the Common European (Western) prototype.

2. WISDOM AND RATIONAL REASONING

A difference between traditional European philosophy that continued the line of the great Greek thinkers and the way how the Russian saints, holy people and prophetic minds understood the world was investigated by many important philosophers such as Gustav Shpet (1917) and poets such as symbolist Vyacheslav I. Ivanov and other authors of the early 20th century. To Shpet, who perished at the time of Stalin’s terror and only now begins to be rediscovered both in Russia and in the West as an important follower of Husserl’s phenomenology and also a predecessor of modern semiotics and philosophy of language,
tragedy started with the provincial character of the late Byzantine Christianity, its great Greek sources already weakening. As the Old Russian tradition continued a Byzantine line of that period, it was not possible to get acquainted with the Ancient Greek foundations of all the European culture. At the same time, Shpet considered such mystical trends as Byzantine hesychasm continued by Russian monks to be a most important object for rational philosophic analysis. These two opposed methods of perceiving the truth were called “Jerusalem and Athens,” based on the metaphor often used in the Russian philosophy of culture, particularly by Lev Shestov in the philosophical treatise of the same title (Shestov, 1968).

Modern neuropsychological research makes it possible to interpret this difference in terms of positivist science. In the light of R.Sperry’s experiments on the split brain and similar studies by the Russian neuropsychologists L.Balonov and V.Deglin (see Trachenko, 2003; Ivanov, 1983), one can think of the reflection in these oppositions of the difference between two main types of a human being and a culture. It can be supposed that the left-hemispheric type with the emphasis on the logical functions of the brain characterizes the cultures in which scientific view of the world is predominant (for example, Chaadaev stressed that just in this aspect, as in the whole moral realm, the traditional Russia where modern science had not been developed was opposed to the Western Europe). Different from it is the right-hemispheric model of the world for which creative possibilities of music and visual art are particularly important, as must have been the case in Old Russia after the advent of the Eastern Christianity. It is interesting to note that, in a mystical exchange of letters between Vladimir Solovyev, one of the greatest Russian philosophers, and the gnostic incarnation of the Divine Wisdom Sophia, the documents signed by the latter were written by Solovyev’s left hand, commanded by the right part of the brain, while his own texts show his usual handwriting produced by his right hand linked to the dominant left hemisphere.

Taking a bilingual situation in the light of the functional asymmetry of the brain, the left (dominant) hemisphere is normally in charge of the main means of logical communication in society while the other part of the brain is responsible for language used in some specific areas and speech genres, e.g., in folklore and mythology. Diglossia, i.e., a functional difference of two languages, typical of the Old Russian culture made it possible to use Church Slavonic as the main language of theological thinking while colloquial Old Russian was used mostly in compositing written texts of a poetic character such as that of “The Igor’ Tale.” The continued use of Church Slavonic or later, in the 18th century, of the “high style” of literary Russian influenced by Church Slavonic borrowings might have become detrimental for the development of logical reasoning in everyday language. The linguistically complementary character, understood in the meaning introduced by Niels Bohr, of the functions of the two languages revealed in diglossia had its religious counterpart in the parallel existence of the two rows of the religious and mythological symbols in the double faith characteristic of Old Russia. After the introduction of Christianity the ancient paganism did not disappear. For a long period of time a complex system existed in which a
Christian saint might have his counterpart in an image inherited from the traditional pre-Christian system of beliefs. For example, the horse connections of the St. Flor and St. Lavr in the popular rites of the Russian Orthodox Church can be explained by the substitution of the ancient couple of the divine twins by this pair of the saints. Substitutes for the divine twins have been preserved in later Slavic traditions, cf. Boris Pasternak’s memoirs describing how he saw the horse rites at a Moscow church dedicated to these saints.

The dualistic social organization and mythologies explain the role of the Divine Twins in different Indo-European (I-E) traditions: they are represented as the Sons (Children) of the God of the Sky (Old Indian divo naptā, Greek Διόσκουροι = Dióskouroi, Baltic-Lithuanian Dievo sunelai and Latvian Dieva deli) in the Eastern I-E (Indo-Iranian—Greek) and some Western I-E (Germanic, Baltic) traditions. The images associated with the Twins in different I-E traditions are usually those of two horses, e.g. Old Indian Ashvins, the divine twins associated with aśva—“horse,” Anglo-Saxon Hengest and Horsa as mythological kings in Western Germanic—Old English legends, the two horse sculptured images of Dioskouroi. Double horse symbols were put on the roof of a house in Germanic, Baltic and Slavic traditions: see, for instance, Wooden Horses by Abramov as a recent example in the Russian “village” literature. This ancient image reappears also in poetry: “horselets” (коньки) on the decorated roof in early love lyrics by Alexander Blok. Blok who as an owner of an estate had known well the Russian village graduated with a dissertation on the poetry of the peasant charms and incantations. Some of them were so close to the transrational futurist style that the great avant-garde poet Velimir Khlebnikov (who had learned them through his friend Roman Jakobson) used them in his futurist compositions. In the poetry of Blok the images of Russian folklore were combined with the symbols of the gnostic love for the Eternal Feminine, continuing Solovyev’s religion. As a whole, Russian symbolism was not a purely literary movement different from a movement with a similar name in Western Europe. In Russia symbolism was connected to a religious philosophy at the center of which was the notion of a symbol revealing the ultimate truth of the universe, cf. the idea of Sophia in its gnostic variant in Solovyev’s philosophy and poetry continued by Blok. As the notion of a symbol was linked to that of an artistic image, a kind of the new aesthetic variant of the new religion appeared possible. Later post-symbolist trends developed just the technical side of the avant-garde writing, devoid of any mystical content.

The possibility of a more adequate personal expression in non-verbal forms of the art was discussed by Sergei Eisenstein, a well-known cinema director. His own drawings, that only now are revealing their secret character, together with his famous silent films such as “October” (as one of the first attempt at “intellectual cinema”) can be viewed as examples supporting his theory. According to his idea expressed in his recently published posthumous books “Method” and “Grundproblem” (Eisenstein 2002; Ivanov 2006), the impression produced by the artistic form depends on the archaic levels of the psyche it addresses. On his return from Mexico where some of his anthropological ideas had been expressed in fragments of his film “¡Que viva Mexico!,” he thought of a plot of similar movies on the
Russian history and he discussed this concept at a private seminar in which the linguist N.Ja.Marr, together with great psychologists L.S.Vygotsky and A.R.Luria, participated. These scientists shared Eisenstein’s interest in the “main problem” (Grundproblem) according to which the modern logical content should be expressed by means of a formal structure that depends on deep ancient layers of the subconscious. A similar interest in the ethnological data on the primitive art (especially in the North of Russia) had prepared V.Kandinsky’s experiments of creating abstract paintings similar to music and radically different from compositions with a plot that can be translated into words. It can be suggested that the parallels seen in the Russian avant-garde visual art and the modern science with the new concept of space (Henderson, 1983) show the intense character of intuition characteristic not only of the best artists, but also of many great Russian scientists. For example, Mendeleev’s famous story of his discovery of the final form of the periodic system in a dream can be compared to other similar cases. Comparison to the Oriental cultures is here again appropriate. One can recall the great Indian mathematician Ramanudjan who told his friends that he had got his knowledge of numbers from an Indian goddess visiting him in a dream; his results, including the notes in the recently found diaries, are important for the modern science. Andrey N. Kolmogorov, a leading Russian mathematician who belonged to a generation that was far from mysticism, told me that he would often go to sleep with a formulation of a theorem and get up with its proof. It is by no means accidental that in an early article he put forward one of the important principles of the intuitive logic. A development of similar ideas by Andrey Markov, Jr. and his “constructivist” school constituted an important part of the beginning of work on the artificial intelligence in the Soviet period. If one accepts the well-known metaphor of God playing dice (and, in Hawking’s words, throwing them far away from us), it is possible to say that for many Russian thinkers this kind of play seemed natural: the probabilistic view was developed by them already in the 19th century. This might explain why the pre-existentialist ideas of the émigré Russian philosophers such as Nikolay Berdyaev and Sergey Bulgakov were ahead of their time, their importance rediscovered only later after comparable concepts started to be dominant in the Western thought.

It can be supposed that similar to the normal brain where both hemispheres work together, a culture makes it possible to combine logical thinking with intuition. Examples of such creative combination are present in the work of classical Russian authors such as Alexander Pushkin and Lev Tolstoy. From this point of view, Pushkin’s attitude towards Peter the Great seems representative. This tsar remains the most controversial ruler in Russia. In the Russian culture there are two contradictory images of the tsar himself (seen as a sort of Antichrist by the Old Believers) and of his Westernizing efforts. In the mainstream of the literary tradition, starting with Lomonosov and continuing with Pushkin, Peter draws praise. The so-called Petersburg myth centers on the tsar as Pushkin’s revived sculpture of the “Bronze Rider.” This heroic topic has been developed and discussed by many Russian
writers and thinkers who follow Pushkin’s line of depicting Peter the Great as the Great Westernizer.

Rethinking the problem of Peter the Great in the light of our historical experience, we can say that he was the first to introduce mainly those aspects of Western modern technology that were important for the might of Russia. To achieve this modernization, however, Peter had to begin the enormous task of creating an entirely new framework for science in Russia, and this effort in turn led to the establishment of the Academy of Sciences, the emergence of the encyclopedic mind of Lomonosov, and the reform of the educational system. A paradoxical result of that development is found in the situation at the end of the Soviet period when the most gifted scientists such as Sakharov whose work was essential for the preservation of the military power, at the same time became politically dangerous for the regime.

3. Holy Fools as an Institution and the Relations between the Church and the State

The neuropsychologist Jaynes (1980) made an interesting attempt in applying the notion of the functional asymmetry of the brain to the societies in which the traditional forms of religion had become the main instrument of control. According to his hypothesis the right hemisphere of a prophet in a typical Ancient Near Eastern society was supposed to receive messages from God. As these messages were transmitted through the prophecies they became the main regulatory mechanism for the society. Some traces of a similar way of translating divine orders into a human language may be seen later in the Middle Ages, but the story of Jeanne d’Arc shows that the limits of such a system were restricted. The Byzantine tradition continued in Old Russia in some respects still was comparable to the ancient Oriental type.

The problem of the history of madness as studied in the Western Europe (Foucault, 1988) seems to be particularly interesting. The traditional peasant village in Russia and later also small towns had completely different methods of social treatment of insanity. The institution of holy fools was borrowed from Byzance (Ivanov S., 2006). In Russia they became particularly important for the whole organization of the hierarchical state. According to the formula proposed by the great religious philosopher N.F. Fedorov, the Russian state can be defined as an absolute monarchy (autocracy) restricted by the social institute of the holy fools. A poetic illustration of this idea is found in the scene in Boris Godunov in which the holy fool blames the tsar for his crimes; due to Mussorgsky’s musical presentation this particular episode became famous in the Russian theatre as well.

The status of a holy fool as being outside of the church hierarchy made it possible for him to contradict the ruler and even condemn him. Otherwise, the dissident would be punished even if he represented the highest church authority, cf. the fate of the leader of the Russian Church Metropolitan Philipp (Fedor Kolychev) who was murdered after his public denunciation of the tsar Ivan the Terrible who had been originally his friend in their early
years. Not only was Kolychev himself killed on the order of the tsar, but also many members of his family and other relatives suffered. Thus, the limits of possible critique of the tsar were restricted. The institution of holy fools was possible only as being completely outside of the hierarchical relationship of the church and the worldly power. When at the beginning of the Soviet period there was a conflict between the Bolshevik state and the Orthodox Christianity some priests decided to continue their struggle for spiritual freedom entering a secret ("catacomb") Church. The founder of this catacomb church - the Bishop Mark - was arrested by the secret service and put to prison where he died. The peculiar role of the holy priests whose activity was outside of the hierarchical structure supports the opinion of the great Russian historian Klyuchevsky who said that in Russia there was God without a Church, while, to him, the Western (Catholic) organization seemed to be a Church without God.

At the time of reforms in Russia the main difficulty that is repeatedly faced by the Church follows from the constant tendency of the government to use it as its political instrument. A hostile attitude towards the ecumenical movement has been recently revived in the Russian Orthodox Church, especially after the murder in 1990 of the brilliant priest Alexander Men’ who was popular among intellectuals. One of the most dangerous scenarios for the future of Russia is that of the theocracy of the late Byzantine type described in the writings of Vladimir Solovyev. The views of the dark part of the priests can be compared to those of the Islamic fundamentalists in their struggle for the isolation from the rest of the world.

According to Max Weber, the Protestant ethic suggesting the positive function of wealth had an important role in the development of capitalism in Western Europe. In Russia one can see the opposite attitude of religious people, particularly those sharing the ideas of the “non-acquiring-property” movement (нестяжательство) and influential intellectuals with the negative view of the material side of life. A complete change of values in this sphere that occurred in the top part of the society after the reforms of Alexander II and was repeated recently in the post-Soviet period did not spread to the other layers of society.

4. THE CATEGORY OF TIME

The “hot” and “cool” cultures (in Lévi-Strauss’s terminology) are opposed in their relation to the category of time. The hot culture, the best example of which can be found in the North American society, with its rapid change of fashions in all activities, is oriented toward new achievements and growing amounts of information. The cool cultures to which all traditional societies belong tend to repeat the canonical texts and patterns without any change. Most of the Oriental cultures share with India a relative indifference towards the evolution in time. Since the publication of Chaadaev’s Philosophical Letters it has been assumed that the Russian indifference to time is compensated for by the importance of space. We are consumed by geography, and we have no real history. The cyclical (non-linear) character of the repetition of similar or identical events is common to Russia and other large
countries of Eurasia such as India and China. It is remarkable that at the beginning of the 20th century some Russian writers such as Velemir Khlebnikov and scientists such as the economist Kondratieff seriously discussed cycles (waves) or recurrences in the world history. Khlebnikov attempted to build mathematical equations of history by calculating regular intervals between similar events. As he himself noticed, a comparable variant of the idea of an eternal return can be found in the philosophical and religious systems of the Orient, particularly in India and in the Buddhist science. One can find parallels to Khlebnikov’s “Tables of Fate” also in the prose book “Vision” by the great Anglo-Irish poet Yeats who had been influenced by Indian thought. But, in Khlebnikov’s case, the tendency to use the mathematical language of modern science seems to be significant. To him the idea of the possibility of time travel was important as expressed in his short narrative “Ka” in which his own double goes through millennia discussing philosophic problems with the doubles of other great thinkers. Recent development of the theory of the great logician Kurt Gödel who denied the existence of the global time in the universe has led to serious discussions of time travel and recurrence of events in the rotating world. The notion of time-space (chrono-tope) was borrowed by the great Russian physiologist Ughtomsky from relativistic physics and introduced into biology. His friend Mikhail Bakhtin applied this notion to literary and cultural studies.

Among the topics important for the Russian world outlook the theme of the end of the history should be stressed. The performance of the Mysterium that Skriabin had planned to be achieved in India in 1917 (he died in 1915) was supposed to put an end to the world history. This problem had been anticipated by him long before it became fashionable following Fukayama’s work. As Skriabin thought on the deepest topics of the religious philosophy of his time, using all of the most radical devices of modern avant-garde art, his Mysterium might have became a decisive breakthrough in cultural history. The Mysterium and The Preliminary Action (L’Acte Préalable) by Skriabin are partly known thanks to his manuscripts most of which are kept at Glinka’s Musicological Museum in Moscow. Gershenson published the verbal poetic text of The Preliminary Action four years after the death of the great composer, and not long ago Nemtin reconstructed its musical text using Skriabin’s drafts and later works that appeared to be connected to it or supposed to be its constituents. The necessity of a holistic semiotic approach follows from Skriabin’s wish to impress all the senses of the audience, not only by using communication by means of sound and color, but also addressing tactile and olfactory perception and taste. In The Preliminary Action as well as in his earlier works such as Prometheus Skriabin developed the aesthetic ideas of European and Russian symbolists. He composed a sound-and-color music based on the assumption of a one-to-one correspondence between the colors and the elements of the harmonious structure.

From a purely aesthetic point of view, the form of Skriabin’s Mysterium seems extremely avant-garde. Skriabin uses the Prometheus tritone approaching atonal music in his own way. In his technique in such works connected to Mysterium as Prelude, op. 74, one
finds features of musical cubism. He also thought about a new spatial and temporal arrangement of the whole structure of the performance. Keeping in mind Berdiaev’s idea about modern politics as a kind of continuation of the avant-garde art, one can ask whether the performance planned by Skriabin has been continuously rehearsed after his death by the forces that determine the modern history of the world.

Traditional Russian religious philosophy is interested in the end of time seen in the apocalyptic vision. N. Fedorov developed the idea of the common cause of all scientific endeavor that should lead to the physical resurrection of the dead. His project influenced Tsiolkovsky and other creators of the Russian cosmic philosophy, leading to space exploration. Particularly significant from the point of view of modern cosmology are the ideas of the great Russian playwright and philosopher Sukhovo-Kobylin, published only in 1995—almost a century after they had been written. In his “All-the-World” concept he proposed a classification of civilizations according to the range of energy they would use, belonging either to the planet Earth or to the Solar system and to the Universe at large. Similar ideas were developed many decades later by the astrophysicist N. Kardashov in the framework of possible communication with extraterrestrial civilizations.

Diachronic differences are less important for the traditional Russian philosophy of history as it is oriented more towards the synchronic characterization of the main types of cultures. For example, Danilevsky (1995) compared the main civilization types, anticipating the ideas of Spengler and Toynbee. Some of his predictions, e.g. about the absence of political revolutions as an important part of the Russian history were absolutely wrong, as was the case with many other Slavophiles whose line he continued. But, his hope for a future synthesis that can be achieved by Russia deserves special attention. Similar views on a possible creative combination of different cultural traditions in Russia were expressed by Dostoevsky in his famous talk on Pushkin. Analogous ideas led Khlebnikov to his declaration of the “Presidents of the Globe” (Председатели Земного Шара), in which one can see the anticipation of such important thoughts of the global age as making the World Government an urgent necessity.

5. PERSONALITY AND COMMUNITY

The concept of a human being constitutes one of the main aspects in which, according to many scholars, a difference between the Russian culture and those of many other peoples, particularly living in the Western Europe, can be found. It is possible to suppose an underdeveloped notion of personality in Russia. According to V.V.Vinogradov, “in the Old Russian language until the 17 century there was no need for a word that might correspond at least distantly to modern representations and notions of a personality, an individual, a separate human being. In the system of the Old Russian world view features of an isolated person were defined by his (or her) relation to God, the community and the world, to different layers of society, to the power, the state, the country, the native soil presented from
a different point of view and expressed in other terms and notions. Of course, some features of a personality (such as uniqueness, separateness or an isolated character, psychological consistency revealed in some signs of behavior, a concentrated and highly motivated line of actions etc.) might have been alive and evident for the consciousness of an Old Russian human being as well. But they were dispersed in different designations and characteristics of a man, a person … .” (Vinogradov 1997, pp. 296-298)

The words used in this connection were either collective terms, cf. “human mass” (людие) from which “one man”8 (людин) was derived by the suffix of uniqueness, or denoted originally “a child (son)” of a tribe or a social group; cf. probable etymology of человек “man”< *čel-o-věků, a compound that included stems cognate to Russian чеł-ядь “homely people” and Lithuanian vaikas (“son”) and some parts of the person (лице “face” from which later the word личность was derived with a Church Slavonic suffix), his (or her) “soul” (душа) or “essence” (существо). The word designating a separate person (особа) referred usually to the very important person and by its origin seemed to point to the sacred character of the referent (compare the related Hittite—zipa in Dagan-zipa “The God of the Earth”). According to Vinogradov’s thought, this linguistic feature showed that the culture until the 17th century lacked understanding of the role of an individual, also seen in the absence of the genre of autobiography9 and of the narrative concentrated around one person (the Lives of the Saints as well as religious portraits showed the generalizing style that corresponded to the task of representing the type, not a particular individual). Slavophiles like Kireevsky spoke of the dominance of the popular (common) point of view that made a personal aspect less important for the Old Russian culture. To them, as later to modern representatives of similar views, the necessity to elaborate common opinions (сборность) became one of the main points of the whole program of a return to the ancient institutions.

Traditional Russian views on the relationship between society, community and individual were expressed in a way that seems similar to the phrases used in the Eastern Indo-European languages. To an ancient period of the early (Eastern-) Slavic-Iranian connections one can trace back the Russian term mir “community, peace” related to Iranian *mi(h)r- <mitr-< (Indo-) Iranian Mitra “the object of Mithraistic cults, the god of agreements.” The notion of social agreement (typologically similar to Rousseau’s idea of the “social contract”) is seen in the function of the Indo-Iranian god *Mi-tra; it is supposed that prehistoric Iranian influence explains the origin and later development of the Slavic notion of *mirū> Russian mir - “peace, agreement, universe.” In the old Russian village all main decisions were made by “the whole community”- vsem miron; a similar phrase višva-mitra is found in Vedic (Toporov, 1968; 1993; 1998). It can be supposed that this tendency towards a collective elaboration of the main line of behavior was at least partly due to the Oriental influences.

In the traditional Russian village not a separate peasant, but a whole “community” (община) was important. A.I. Herzen who was a Westernizer in his general outlook thought that the modern continuation of that tendency might lead to the creation of the Russian
peasant socialism. The idea was criticized by Karl Marx; but, in his later years having mastered Russian and studied the Russian history, he came to a similar conclusion that he expressed in his letters to V. Zassulich (Marx, 1973; Yassour, 1987). A tragic paradox consists in the fact that it was Marx’s followers, not paying attention to his letters, who were instrumental in eradicating the last traces of the traditional peasant community in Russia.

In the later period of the history of the pre-revolutionary Russian Orthodox Church the monks closest to the strict ascetic ideals were the ones most venerated. Those “elders” (старцы) like Zosima depicted in Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazovs embodied the true Christianity to many Russians belonging to different social classes. The Christian Orthodox ideal was that of a truly wise man who had lost all interest in worldly matters. This ideal seems quite close to that seen in Buddhism and some other Oriental philosophical and religious traditions whose influence on the Old Russian world view seems possible.

The late great Russian scholar Vladimir Toporov in his study of the Russian saints (Toporov, 1998) described the personality of Saint Sergius and discussed the features common to Buddhism and the Byzantine sources of the Old Russian tradition. First of all, he mentions a relatively small importance they placed on the notion of Self, realized in silence and the absence of speech. He discussed the Indian example of Nagarjuna who rejected Self as an illusion. To Toporov, Sergius’ silence belonged to the main principles of his mysticism. For a certain period of time the culture (of the right-hemispheric type described above) was more engaged in such artistic ways of expressing itself by visual communication, e.g. architecture of temples and icons as well as singing and church music. Andrey Tarkovsky in his wonderful film showed the great icon painter Andrey Rublev at the time when, as a monk, the painter had refrained from speaking. In this metaphor the essence of the Old Russian spiritual life is revealed.

It is really remarkable that the ideal type of a wise person not interested in his own self-assurance and prosperity has remained important throughout the Russian history in spite of all the changes happening to the society and its ideological infrastructure. This popular Christian ideal closely corresponds to that of a Russian intellectual, who was usually either an atheist or did not have pronounced religious convictions. It was considered that a typical representative of the Russian intelligentsia should not pay any attention to himself or herself, just like the mediaeval ascetic monks or elders. In Russian society such religious and secular persons had immense authority that was larger than that of representatives of the state. The situation is partly comparable to what was said about the holy fools, but one should take into consideration the difference of the reasons for their veneration. Thus, it can be suggested that there are several types of wise people as they appear in the Russian cultural history. The neurophysiologic model discussed above can, to some extent, be applied to these historical examples, although it needs restructuring in respect to the situations in which the opposition of Wisdom and Reason is not connected directly to the problem of the pathological psychology.
It was argued by several scientists that the privileged position of the academician Andrey Sakharov as a critic of the Soviet government before his exile to Gorky was another example of a similar Russian tradition. One can object to this idea, however, by saying that Sakharov based his statements on the logical reasoning, not on the religious revelation. At the same time, it can be noticed that before him such important members of the Russian Academy of Sciences as the great physiologist Ivan Pavlov had used their moral power to criticize the Soviet state. I was told by the famous physicist Noble prize winner Peter Kapitsa that Pavlov before his death had told him about the necessity for Russia to have at least one person who could speak openly and frankly. Kapitsa himself tried to realize this difficult mission, also without going out of the sphere of logical reasoning. One can see the results in his correspondence with Stalin, particularly in the letter against Beria that caused Kapitsa’s loss of all his official positions although he remained a member of the Academy of Sciences and continued his work in a private manner using the money given to him by the President of the Academy. It is possible to ask, however, whether the moral impulses behind the behavior of Pavlov and Kapitsa continued the ancient Russian tradition. In a country that lacks the tradition of a developed individuality the person that has an all-national moral authority is much more than just one human being: he or she is at the same time an incarnation of the soul of the whole country. Such was the mission of Lev Tolstoy. The anathema given to him by the ecclesiastic authorities (and still remaining despite all the historical events) is a sign of an open competition between one person and the official Orthodox Church.

The highly abstract character of both ideals and goals of such heroes is a prominent feature of the Russian culture. But, these abstract ideas are often realized in a very practical way. As an example one might cite the prehistory of Russian space rocketry. The idea of conquering space originated in connection with the common task according to which the dead can literally be resurrected as suggested by Fedorov. Fedorov was concerned about possible positive consequences of such an experiment which no longer might seem too fantastic given the successes of cloning and molecular biology. The existing space on the Earth would not suffice in the event of resurrection of all the generations that had lived on the planet. Thus, while the West was amazed at the success of the Russian sputnik, nobody realized that the project had originated with Fedorov’s concern over how to deal with the physical resurrection of the dead.

The abstract ideas put forward by Russian intellectuals are to be realized in an aesthetically perfect form. Since the story of Vladimir’s choice of the Christian faith as told in the ancient chronicles, this aesthetic aspect seems to have been of utmost importance. According to Dostoevsky’s celebrated formula, “The world will be saved by Beauty” (Мир спасется красотой). Thus, literature, visual art, theater, music and later cinema became the most important parts of the whole culture, competing with philosophy as well as with governmental institutions and partly substituting for them.
ENDNOTES

1. Jakobson 1972. Later studies of such Yenisseyan languages of Western Siberia as Ket and Yug (the last speakers of the latter died some decades ago) made it probable that they were polytonic, i.e., had phonologically relevant musical tones) and thus did not share this particular feature.

2. The correspondence is preserved in his archive in the Manuscript Section of the National (former Lenin) Library in Moscow.

3. A long discussion on a time when the text was composed is over after the linguistic evidence presented by Zaliznyak (2007) who has shown definitely that it belongs to the 12th century AD.

4. See comments in Baylor 2001 (where probably too much attention is given to the study of the Soviet historian of science Kedrov who had tried to diminish the importance of dreaming for the discovery); Barrett 2001.

5. A special chapter in Perloff 1990 is dedicated to this comparison.


7. For Skriabin India was important not only because of the ancient Indian thinkers with whose ideas he became acquainted through theosophy. Skriabin studied Sanskrit and remarked that one had to go through it but then to come to something that is higher.

8. In literary Russian of the classic literature the stem was preserved in a compound просто-людин - 'a person belonging to common people'. See a line of Osip Mandel’shtam’s poem: Были мы люди, а стали людьё ['We were human beings, and now we are human mass'] with a deliberate use of an Old Russian word to denote the situation of the Soviet time similar to that of the ancient period.

9. The Testament of Vladimir Monomakh is not an exception as it is written according to the pattern of the Ancient Hebrew Testaments known to the Old Russian intelligent monks.

REFERENCES


PERCEPTIONS OF TRUST, COMPLIANCE AND ACCOMMODATION IN POLICE-CIVILIAN ENCOUNTERS: A RUSSIAN, TURKISH AND AMERICAN CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

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Research in Asia, South Africa, and the United States has produced models of police-civilian interaction that highlight the effect of officers’ communication accommodation on attitudinal outcomes. Specifically, this research has demonstrated that officers’ accommodative practices are potent predictors of civilians’ attributed trust in police and their perceived likelihood of compliance with police requests. The present study continued this line of work in Russia, using Turkish and American comparison groups; 617 university students reported how accommodating they perceived police to be, the degree to which they trusted officers, and their inclinations to comply with them. In addition to intriguing differences that emerged between the nations, overall results revealed that officer accommodativeness indirectly predicted civilian compliance through trust. The hypothesized model was largely supported and culturally sensitive.

Keywords: Law enforcement, civilian, cross-cultural, intergroup, accommodation, trust, compliance.

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Scholars and law enforcement officials have, for years, known that a key factor in the prevention of criminal activity is the degree to which civilians and police work together cooperatively and proactively (Bayley, 1994). However, residents in many communities sustain negative images of local enforcement, and experience problematic communication with associated agencies, thus hindering their willingness to assist law enforcement in combating crime (National Research Council, 2004; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a). Whereas social psychologists (e.g., Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004; Wells, 2001), sociolinguistists (e.g., Gibbons, 2001; Heydon, 2005), and criminologists (e.g., Solan & Tiersma, 2005) have touched upon some communicative parameters of policing, scholars in the communication discipline have not generally focused on such phenomena in a programmatic sense (see nonetheless, Giles, 2002; Gundersen & Hopper, 1984; Kidd & Braziel, 1999; Perlmutter, 2000). Furthermore, few investigations have offered empirical data. Scholars’ lack of attention to police-civilian communication is surprising, given the view that, in many settings, the lion’s share of police work involves communicating with the public (Thompson, 1983). Indeed, this sentiment is underscored by Womack and Finley’s (1986) position that communication is “the central most important commodity that the officer has at his [or her] disposal” (p. 14).

Research has suggested that individuals’ willingness to defer to legal authorities — such as police officers — is, in part, shaped by motive-based trust (Tyler & Huo, 2002). Pivotal to the present study, these scholars add that authorities’ ability to gain compliance from community members may be accomplished by treating them in ways that encourage judgments that procedures are fair, and that the authorities’ motives are benevolent. What Tyler and Huo refer to as dignified and respectful treatment, we regard here as features of communication accommodation.

Gaining an understanding of the role of accommodative practices, trust, and compliance in police-civilian encounters is complicated by regional, cultural, and historical differences. It is intuitively obvious from television news and film content that police agencies around the world differ dramatically not only in the nature of their uniforms, demeanor, and equipment, but also in practices of corruption, abuses of power, and thresholds for the use of force. Given our interest in understanding the extent to which these differences influence attitudes toward law enforcement, we offer the current analysis — part of a cross-cultural program of research aimed at solidifying empirically applied advances in this area (see AUTHORS, 2006-a, 2007-a, b). Specifically, we report results from Russia, incorporating Turkish and American comparison groups, to test a model of behavioral and attitudinal factors in police-civilian interaction. Turkey was chosen due to its changing political structure (in terms of its democratization) and culture that straddles Eastern and Western influences. The North American context was included as a Western contrast, in part due to its being a well-established democracy. Its value as a baseline is also grounded in its culture being the source of the majority of research on the communicative dimensions of
attitudes toward law enforcement, insofar as accommodation, trust, and compliance are concerned. What follows is a review of relevant historical background and attitudinal research in each of these three locations.

RUSSIA: A NON-DEMOCRATIC TRADITION

Post-Soviet Russia is a fascinating context for studies of intergroup and cross-cultural communication, as it has garnered world-wide attention for its radical social and political changes over the past two decades. As a function of these changes, policing policies have undergone significant scrutiny. Additionally, relations between civilians and the police (called the Militia in Russia) have not fared well. This has been due to the geographic and political breakdown of this region (Gilinskiy, 2003), that has fostered mistrust in the minds of Russian civilians toward the Militia (e.g., Beck & Robertson, 2005; Sergeyev, 2001; Zveki, 1996). An investigation of the existing structure in the Russian Militia — and its historical origins — should clarify factors at the root of these attitudes.

The former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 with a three-fold policy initiated by President Gorbachev. This policy included perestroika (restructuring), glasnost (openness), and demokratizatsiya (democratization) (Gilinskiy, 2000, 2003; Solomon, 2005). Currently, however, power is still retained by the ruling class, and the non-democratic methods of the former Soviet Union are still evident (Gilinskiy, 2005). Furthermore, governmental corruption and the militarization of both economic and political policy are still prevalent today (Gilinskiy, 2003). Whereas there have been efforts to change the existing structure in order to develop efficiency in the Militia, and to create more positive police-civilian relations, actual changes in policy have not taken effect immediately in Russia. The reason for this pace may rest in the former Soviet Union’s cultural norms, wherein plans for change are created, yet implementation of those plans is rarely executed (Gilinskiy, 2003). Sergeyev (2001) has described a vague, “gray zone,” that can be found between the new laws of post-Soviet Russia that are poorly implemented, and stable patterns of social behavior that existed well before the Soviet collapse. We now turn to an analysis of the current structure of the Russian Militia and how the civilian and Militia relationship is affected by this unique transition period in Russia’s history.

The policy changes of post-Soviet Russia have left the Militia depleted of its financial resources and its appeal to develop a qualified workforce. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has shifted toward a market economy and the instability during this transition has created a sharp increase in inflation and crime (Gilinskiy, 2000). These changes were accompanied by a widening gap between the rich and the poor between 1991 and 1994 (Gilinskiy, 2003). The under-funded and under-equipped Militia of the post-Soviet period has experienced increased turnover of both senior administrators and members of specialized police forces (Sergeyev, 2001; Solomon, 2005). To survive through the unstable economic period and to create security for their families, Militia members have turned to
other more lucrative career choices or have looked for ways in which to take advantage of the apparent weaknesses in the existing system.

Responding to the disorganized state of the government in the 1990s, private businesses were forced to depend on commercialized security services rather than the established local Militia (Solomon, 2005). In a survey conducted to understand the current state of the Russian Militia, 41% of the Militia members interviewed claimed that their comrades were doing illegal policing during work hours (Solomon, 2005). Additionally, members of the Militia have been forced to find supplemental income due to the limited finances offered by the government. Corruption within the Militia is also a serious problem and bribery is still considered normal behavior (Beck & Robertson, 2005; Gilinskiy, 2005; Sergeyev, 2001).

All aspects of Russian government and society have gone through a significant transformation since the departure from communism (Sergeyev, 2001). While other aspects of the government have experienced change since the fall of the Soviet Union, both the methods and the characteristics of the Militia have remained the same (Beck & Robertson, 2005). As the abuses of human rights and corruption within the ranks of the Soviet Militia were commonplace during the time of communism, these standards and norms of the old system continue to exist, and there are many officials that are still resistant to change (Gilinskiy, 2003; Solomon, 2005). In the former Soviet Union, police officials were not held accountable to the people, but rather to the higher-ranked leaders of the communist party (Solomon, 2005). As a result, members of the Soviet Militia abused their authority and expressed their freedom to operate in an unethical manner without repercussions.

Currently, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) is responsible for the three armed divisions of the Russian government: the internal army, specialized police forces, and the Militia (police). As a division in Russia’s three armed power structures, the Militia is still very military-like, and acts with little regard for the interests of the Russian people (Beck & Robertson, 2005; Gilinskiy, 2003). The Russian Militia is in essence self-monitoring and lacks accountability beyond what is stipulated in the current constitution (Beck & Robertson, 2005; Gilinskiy, 2000; Zveki, 1996).

It is, therefore, not surprising that independent research has revealed Russian civilians’ increasing dissatisfaction with Militia activities (Mazaev, 1997), despite that throughout the 1990’s, police reform rested high on the political agenda (Beck & Robertson, 2005). Integral to this shift in priority, the Russian government has pushed for a change in the Militia’s directives by stipulating the following goals: provide citizens with personal safety, stop and prevent both crime and civil law breaking, solve crimes, and secure civil order and safety (Gilinskiy, 2003). Additionally, under the post-Soviet theme of glasnost, the Militia’s goal has been more attuned to lawfulness and consciousness of human rights (Gilinskiy, 2003; Solomon, 2005). Accordingly, in 1996, a plan called the “Concept of Development for the Internal Affairs Agencies and Internal Troops of Russia” was created to promote a positive change. This plan was given specific milestones in 1996, 2000, and 2005, to assess concrete
progress, and the MVD was restructured so that it could focus on its goals to restore and maintain public respect (Beck & Robertson, 2005). Unfortunately, however, achievement of the aforementioned basic goals has not been met (Gilinskiy, 2005; Mazaev, 1997; Solomon, 2005). Despite government efforts, both the Militia and the MVD are presently considered to be weak and disorganized (Beck & Robertson, 2005). Furthermore, while the 1996 plan and its milestones were noble in their conception, it was unsuccessful in practice (Solomon, 2005). To this day, there are instances of human rights abuse, the Militia still considers itself above the law, and there has been little change in the relationship between the Militia and the political structures of the government (Beck & Robertson, 2005).

However, there have been instances in which reports of poor Militia performance — especially as related to crime — have been exaggerated, thereby increasing public distrust (Beck & Robertson, 2005; Sergeyev, 2001; Solomon 2005). Notwithstanding exceptions, Russia’s citizens are not hopeful for change in the current state of relations between themselves and the Militia (e.g., Gilinskiy, 2003). The crime rate doubled between 1984 and 1997, and there was a particularly significant increase in violent crimes (Gilinskiy, 2003). The lack of faith in the Russian Militia has forced communities to act on their own to deal with the increase in crime (Sergeyev, 2001). Community organization and neighborhood watch programs have been used to decrease crime in local communities.

Findings of a panel study conducted in 1993 and 1996 (Zveki, 1996), indicated that 40% of the sample did not seek help from the Militia primarily because of mistrust. Survey data from Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Ekaterinburg revealed that there is a large portion of the population that considers the police to be corrupt, and that believe that the use of physical violence by the Militia has increased. These respondents also indicated that they had chosen not to report crimes to the police because they felt that it would be ineffective. The Russians also stated a lack of confidence in the Militia’s capabilities and willingness to serve the community. The opinion that the Militia could not assist citizens with crime prevention intensified between 1993 and 1996. Overall dissatisfaction with the Militia was reported in an alarming 66.9% of the sample.

In other attitudinal research, Gilinskiy (2005) conducted a comparative analysis evaluating four annual surveys of the population in St. Petersburg. The survey was administered to approximately 6000 respondents from 1999 through 2002. One third of the respondents evaluated Militia misconduct as a serious problem. In 1999, 36.5% believed that bribery was considered a serious problem, and this statistic increased to 46.5% in 2002. Only a third of the victims of crime made reports to the local Militia. Gilinskiy suggested that the problem of under-reporting was a direct reflection of the lack of confidence in the Militia. The manner in which Militia members treated civilians also changed for the worse during the four year period. Whereas 41.9% of the sample felt as though they were treated fairly by the Militia in 1999, only 24.5% of the respondents felt similarly in 2002. Lower levels of satisfaction were also reported regarding direct contact with Militia members, and those detained in the streets considered the conduct of the Militia as impolite or very impolite.
Russia has experienced considerable transformation in the last twenty years. While the policies and laws of the government have changed dramatically, the practices of the Militia and the way civilians are treated has worsened due to the alleged increase in the Militia’s unlawful behavior (Gilinskiy, 2000, 2003; Zveki, 1996). Whereas the government has made efforts to ameliorate this situation and to create more trust between civilians and the Militia, the implementation of these plans have lacked considerably.

**Turkey’s Democracy: A Cultural Bridge Between East and West**

Turkey has assumed critical importance as a bridge between Asia and Europe — geographically, economically, politically, and culturally. Some of its developing Western characteristics have been due to social and economic reforms that occurred during its attempts to gain access to the European Union (Cao & Burton, 2006). Of interest here, many of these reforms related directly to the country’s security system and its developing emphasis on democratization and human rights. Other efforts focused on improvements in police education and public relations campaigns enacted to improve the image of the police. In terms of general background, policing in Turkey is enforced by three national forces: the civil police, gendarmerie, and the coastal security. The traditionally centralized and coercive style of policing in Turkey was adapted from the French Centralized Policing System. Most recently, public complaints (as presented in the news media), as well as research reports by academicians, have made local police departments realize the importance of police-citizen coordination and cooperation. In fact, “community policing” and highly improved educational programs are the main framework of the policies in today’s Turkey. This emphasis on positive relations between police and the communities they serve underscores the importance of studies that assess police accommodation, trust in police, and perceived tendency to comply with police officers.

Despite advancements in the Turkish police organization’s person-centered goals, public attitudes toward the police have not been the subject of significant research. Studies conducted through the turn of the last century indicated primarily negative attitudes. For example, Aksit and Demirtas (2003) conducted a comprehensive qualitative study (focus group) that revealed that Turkish civilians and police perceived one other in “us” versus “them” terms. Both perceived social distance between the police and the public, and both groups believed that healthy intergroup cooperation between civilians and officers could not be established. Other research has indicated that Turkish civilians consider police officers to be largely uneducated, and has highlighted a communication gap between police and the public they serve. Not surprisingly, Turkish citizens expect officers to behave more professionally, ethically, politely, make more objective decisions, be more democratic, and avoid the practice of bribery (Aksit & Demirtas, 2003; Dundar, 1983; Erdag, 1998; Erdogan, 2000; Oztaner, 1990; Oztekin, 1997). These research findings have emphasized the Turkish
police organization’s need for more successful public relations efforts aimed at increasing public awareness of the functions and powers of the police force.

However, in interesting contrast to the above, the European and World Value Surveys (Institute for Social Research, 2000) reported increases in Turkish civilians’ confidence in police over time. The percentage of those expressing confidence increased from 62.5% in 1990, to 68.6% in 1995, to 70.0% in the year 2000. These levels are quite high compared to those in other EU member states, with Turkey’s neighboring countries, and with other Muslim nations (Cao & Burton, 2006). Although no research could be located for the current study, the role of socio-demographic factors is likely to be important in predicting judgments about police in Turkey, as it is in other nation states.

In sum, notwithstanding improvements in the police organization and goals for improved public relations as evidenced in the organization’s slogan, “Police-public hand in hand,” the police organization in Turkey is the object of negative prejudices and stereotypes.

**The United States: A Western Perspective on Police-Civilian Interaction**

As seems to be the case in Turkey, many American civilians hold “contradictory perceptions of the police” (White & Menke, 1982, p. 223). That is, police officers are almost revered — and yet despised — at the same time (Molloy & Giles, 2002). This ambivalence contributes to making street police work an emotionally stressful occupation (Howard, Tuffin, & Stephens, 2000; see also, Toch, 2003) and one in which the vast majority of officers concede that they have an image problem (Oberle, 2004). Such images are not alleviated by the largely negative representations of police on television programs, many of which focus on officers’ alleged abuses of force (e.g., Lawrence, 2000; Ross, 2000), media reports that document a long history of police having problems with their image (e.g., Gwynne, 1995; Halbfinger, 2003), and research that highlights officers’ inequitable treatment of citizens (e.g., Friedrich, 1980; Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998; Norris, Fielding, Kemp, & Fielding, 1992; Smith, Visher, & Davidson, 1984).

In line with our present examination of indirect (e.g., parasocial via media) as well as direct contact with police, Rosenbaum, Schuk, Costello, Hawkins, and Ring (2005) found that vicarious contact with police was more important in predicting attitudes than was personal contact. In particular, a positive experience reported by someone the respondent knew in the last year was associated with less negative images of law enforcement. Although no comprehensive meta-analysis of attitudes toward the police across cultures exists, many Western investigations have pointed to the role of socio-demographic factors in predicting such judgments, albeit these vary greatly from community to community (e.g., Frank, Brandl, Cullen, & Stichman, 1996; Klyman & Kruckenberg, 1974). In general, older, female, urban, better educated, higher-income, married, and Caucasian respondents in comparison to their social counterparts consistently manifest more positive views of law enforcement.
(e.g., Benson, 1981; Eschholz, Sims Blackwell, Gertz, & Chiricos, 2002; Olsen, 2005; Peek, Lowe, & Alston, 1981; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Weitzer, 1999; Yates & Pillai, 1996) as do many of those who reside in communities where the level of criminal disorder is purportedly low (Hennigan, Maxson, Sloane, & Ranney, 2002). Ethnic perceptions of law enforcement in the West have also received widespread empirical attention. Taylor, Turner, Esbensen, and Winfree (2001) found that Caucasians and Asians had the more favorable views of police, followed by Hispanics and Native Americans, and then African Americans. These results, particularly as they relate to African Americans’ trust in law enforcement (Huo & Tyler, 2000; Tyler, 2001; Tyler & Huo, 2002), have been confirmed by many others (e.g., Parker, Onyekwuluje, & Murty, 1995; Prine, Ballard, & Robinson, 2001; Smith & Hawkins, 1973; Wortley, 1996).

As the preceding review indicates, civilians’ attitudes toward police officers in Russia, Turkey, and the United States share similarities and differences. Research in Turkey and the U.S.A. indicates that officers are simultaneously disapproved of and, yet, respected. Additionally, citizens in these countries expect both abuse and respect from those sworn to protect them. Russian attitudes, in contrast, are quite negative in nature. We ask then, what implications do these contradictory attitudes (both within and between locations) carry for expected communication, and across cultures? Furthermore, what are the effects of these perceptions on citizens’ inclinations to assist officers in performing their duties, vis a vis compliance with officer requests? Other than general prescriptions that officers’ styles should be respectful of the communities they serve (Miller, 1999; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003b), little empirical data are available pertaining to the types of communicative acts civilians in different cultures expect or experience when encountering police officers. We now explore these questions as we offer an important theoretical approach to the study of police-civilian interaction, and introduce a line of research inspired by it.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ASSOCIATED DATA

Key aspects of police-civilian interaction can be understood from a communication accommodation theory perspective (CAT) (Giles, Coupland, & Coupland, 1991; Gallois, Ogay, & Giles, 2005). The theory has been described as one of the most prominent theories in the social psychology of language (Tracy & Haspel, 2004), and, having been applied in many contexts, it has expanded into an “interdisciplinary model of relational and identity processes in communicative interaction” (Coupland & Jaworski, 1997, pp. 241-242). The theory explores the ways in which individuals vary their communicative behavior to accommodate others given where they believe others to be (see Thakerar, Giles, & Cheshire, 1982), their motivations for so doing, and the social consequences arising. An accommodative climate is one in which conversational partners listen to one another, take the other’s views into account, desire to understand their conversational partner’s unique
situation, and explain things in ways that “sit right” with their partner. An accommodative climate also features pleasantness, politeness, and respect.

In addition to being oriented toward interpersonal issues, CAT is also closely linked to the intergroup stakes of an encounter (Gudykunst, 1986; Harwood & Giles, 2005). For example, many civilians are likely to perceive — and hence communicate with — police officers in terms of their social category membership and unique roles rather than react to them as idiosyncratic individuals (let alone as co-citizens); indeed the badge, uniform, visible equipment, and even hairstyle are likely to have engendered strong feelings of intergroup boundaries since childhood (Durkin & Jeffrey, 2000; Giles, Zwang-Weissman, & Hajek, 2004; Singer & Singer, 1985). Creating an accommodating climate is challenging for officers who, probably more than most, communicate with “numerous people whose backgrounds, needs, points of view, and prejudices vary dramatically, moment to moment” (Thompson, 1983, p. 9); such interactions may be considered “intergroup” to the highest degree.

The present study is part of a series of studies that have attempted to empirically explore the perceived role of officers’ accommodation across cultural boundaries. The first of these studies examined differences between ethnic groups within the United States (AUTHORS, 2006-b). For this study, three large samples of Californian respondents (Mexican-Americans, European-Americans, and a mixed sample of university students) were asked in a variety ways and contexts about their attitudes toward specified local law enforcement agencies in southern California. In general, ratings of satisfaction with local police were significantly above the neutral mid-point, with males, non-European-Americans, and younger people being less positive in these regards. In addition, and invoking separate structural equation models for the three different populations, socio-demographic factors had very few direct effects on assessments of local officers and rated satisfaction with them. However, officers’ communication accommodation skills very strongly predicted assessments of officers — and to a much greater extent than did rated trust in the police.

The next stage of this research program involved discovering whether the potent role of officers’ perceived accommodativeness in predicting attitudes toward law enforcement was context-specific or more universal in a global sense. Targeting “police in general” rather than specifying a local agency, AUTHORS (2007-a) examined the generality of previous structural equation models with students in another U.S. region (viz., in the Midwest, Kansas) and the other two in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan. Besides the large ethnolinguistic differences between the American locales and the latter, these three (in contrast to the agencies in southern California) also had prior histories of police misuse of force and/or corruption. In summary, structural equation models for the three settings had much in common. Perceived accommodation and trust were co-determinants of attitudes towards the police, and both shaped respondents’ expressed obligations to obey them. Nonetheless, important cross-cultural differences did emerge. In the Taiwanese model, whereas trust in the police was influential in predicting satisfaction with the police, officer accommodation was perceived to be more influential. In the Kansas and PRC models, while
perceptions of officers’ accommodation largely determined trust in them and vice-versa, it was only the trust factor in these settings that predicted the outcomes.

Given intriguing findings among accommodation, trust, and the relationships of these phenomena to civilians’ inclinations to comply with police requests, the next stages of the research program involved tests of a streamlined model of communication accommodation with a focus on these three key variables only. To this end, we investigated racial and ethnic differences within and between the United States (Louisianans) and South Africa (AUTHORS, 2006-a), and conducted a similar study to explore differences around the Pacific Rim — sampling specifically in Japan, Korea, Guam, and Canada (AUTHORS, 2007-b). In both studies, in addition to differences that emerged between nations and/or ethnicities, we found that officer accommodativeness indirectly predicted civilian compliance through trust.

THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION: RATIONALE, HYPOTHESES, AND RESEARCH QUESTION

Our rationale for the present study originates in our previously stated questions. That is, what implications do contradictory attitudes toward law enforcement carry for expected communication, and across cultures? Moreover, what are the effects of these perceptions on citizens’ inclinations to assist officers in performing their duties, insofar as compliance with officer requests is concerned? This study represents the further exploration of these questions — and the universality of their answers — with an analysis of communicative dimensions of police-civilian interaction in Russia, along with Turkish and American comparisons. As mentioned above, the Turkish locale was selected for regional comparison purposes, and because its changing culture has straddled Eastern and Western influences. The North American context was included as a Western contrast, and to represent a baseline for comparison given that its culture is the source of the majority of research on the communicative dimensions of attitudes toward law enforcement.

Not only has the study of “compliance” as an outcome variable enjoyed a long history in interpersonal communication research (e.g., Anderson, Dillard & Knobloch, 2002; Wilson, 2002), the concept has been extremely potent to police officers at a practical level. Indeed, officers look to their communication skills to effect voluntary compliance wherever possible rather than having to resort to physical coercion to gain it. Based on our prior findings regarding perceptions of accommodation in the law enforcement context in diverse geo-political regions, we proposed to test a model that perceived officer accommodativeness would predict two paths to reported civilian compliance; one direct and the other indirect through trust. This model, together with the importance of assessing perceptions of police, what we know about the Russian, Turkish, and U.S. cultures, and highlighting our belief in the symbiotic relationship between compliance and public safety — a particularly salient
issue in such regions engaged in rapid political and social change — one hypothesis (H) and a research question (RQ) are posed as follows:

**H:** Perceived officer communication accommodation will directly, as well as indirectly through trust, predict perceived voluntary compliance with police in Russia, Turkey, and the USA.

**RQ:** Generally, what differences (if any) will emerge between Russia, Turkey, and the USA, in perceived officer accommodativeness, trust, and voluntary compliance?

### Method

#### Sample

Undergraduate students (N = 617) from universities in three countries participated in the study. Russian participants (n = 198; 96 females) ranged in age from 18 to 27, with a mean reported age of 20.70 (SD = 1.88). All of these participants were ethnically self-identified Russians, and were students at Saint Petersburg State University in St. Petersburg, Russia. The Turkish participants (n = 219; 119 females) ranged in age from 17 to 29, with a mean reported age of 21.63 (SD = 1.91). They were all Turkish, and students at Baskent University and Ankara University in Ankara. American participants (n = 200; 102 females) were recruited from a large university in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Their ages ranged from 17 to 50, with a mean reported age 20.70 (SD = 3.86). All of these participants were Caucasian, to maintain consistency with the mono-ethnic Russian and Turkish comparison groups.

#### Procedure and Materials

The 38-item instrument was adapted from previous surveys of attitudes toward local law enforcement (AUTHORS, 2006-b), and included items about perceptions of police officer accommodation, trust in police, and attitudes about compliance with police requests (see Table 1). Likert-type items anchored by “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree” were used to assess accommodation, whereas bi-polar semantic differential scales were used (e.g., “very unpleasant” to “very pleasant”) to assess trust and compliance. The questionnaire also consisted of a number of demographic items. In Russia and Turkey, an English version of the questionnaire was translated into Russian and Turkish, respectively, and these versions were back-translated to English. Bilingual consultants checked these translations for consistency, and to ensure that the translations were sensitive to the cultural contexts, and that the original instrument’s meaning was not distorted. Questionnaires in the United States were administered in English.
TABLE 1
MEASUREMENT MODELS: CRONBACH ALPHAS AND STANDARDIZED REGRESSION WEIGHTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latent Variable Indicators</th>
<th>Regression Weights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Officer Accommodation (Cronbach Alpha)</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How pleasant are the police officers?</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How accommodating are police officers?</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How respectful of students are police officers?</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How polite are police officers?</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well do police officers explain things?</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported Trust in Police (Cronbach Alpha)</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you feel you should support the police?</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you feel the police protect citizen rights?</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence that the police department can do its job well</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust the police to make decisions that are good for everyone</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied are you with services provided by the police?</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate the police department?</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes About Compliance (Cronbach Alpha)</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You should obey the police</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would always try to follow what a police officer says I should do</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should obey the decisions that police officers make</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results

To test the Hypothesis, structural equation models were constructed for each of the three locations and tested for the influence of perceived officer communication accommodation and reported trust in police on attitudes about compliance with police officer requests. An initial test of each measurement model showed that all the indicator variables posted consistently high path coefficients from their latent factors in each location. See Table 1 for Cronbach alphas for the scales as well as the regression coefficients.

The outcomes for the final models were very similar across all locations with exception of the United States where the path from perceived police officer accommodation to attitudes about compliance was statistically significant. The statistics for each location are summarized in Table 2.

The relationships between perceived police officer accommodation and reported trust in police, perceived officer accommodation and attitudes about compliance, and reported trust in police and attitudes about compliance, are summarized in Figure 1.
The path from perceived officer accommodation to reported trust posted a strong positive relationship. Additionally, there was a strong, positive relationship between reported trust in police and attitudes about compliance with officer requests ($p < .001$) in all locations. Moreover, as mentioned above, the United States sample revealed a weak to moderate positive relationship between perceived officer accommodation and attitudes about compliance with police requests.

As an initial means of examining differences among the three countries (and to address the RQ), a 3 (location) x 2 (gender) MANOVA was conducted for accommodation, trust, and compliance. Respondent gender was included due to emergent effects in some previous studies on attitudes toward law enforcement (see AUTHORS 2006-a, 2006-b). The multivariate test indicated significant effects for location, $L = .878$, $F (2, 615) = 13.65$, $p < .05$.

![Figure 1](image-url)
FINAL MODEL: THE INFLUENCE OF PERCEIVED POLICE OFFICER ACCOMMODATION AND
REPORTED TRUST IN POLICE ON ATTITUDES ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH POLICE REQUESTS

.001, $h^2 = .06$. However, no effects were found for gender, $L = .990, F(1, 615) = 2.05, p < .11, h^2 = .01$, nor was an interaction effect found for location and gender, $L = .988, F(1, 615) = 1.19, p < .31, h^2 = .006$.

Given the insignificant gender finding, no follow-up tests were conducted for this variable. Follow-up ANOVAs were conducted to investigate the role of location, and they indicated significant effects for trust and perceived compliance. Means and standard deviations were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>3.53 (1.07)</td>
<td>3.43 (1.38)</td>
<td>3.54 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>4.16 (1.06)</td>
<td>3.75 (1.38)</td>
<td>4.53 (1.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>4.26 (1.24)</td>
<td>4.26 (1.44)</td>
<td>4.58 (1.27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The test for accommodation, $F(2, 612) = 0.48, p < .62, h^2 = .002$, was not significant, and suggested that participants in all three locations did not differ substantially in their perceptions of police officer accommodation. Participants in all locations found police to be moderately accommodating. The ANOVAs for trust, $F(2, 614) = 21.52, p < .001, h^2 = .07$, and perceived compliance, $F(2, 613) = 3.99, p < .02, h^2 = .013$, however, were significant. Participants in all locations differed significantly in their trust of police. Specifically, Americans trusted police more than did Russians who, in turn, trusted police more than did Turkish participants. Finally, Americans reported a higher likelihood of complying with police requests than did either Russians or Turkish participants (who did not significantly differ in this regard). In sum, the answer to the RQ was such that perceptions of officer accommodativeness did not differ among participants in the three settings, although potent differences were found for trust and perceived compliance.

DISCUSSION

The findings from the multivariate analyses underscore the value of examining differences across national groups in studies of this nature. Klyman and Kruckenberg (1974) suggested some time ago that each police precinct has its own set of unique problems, and we find that the same may be said of each nation given its unique socio-historical climate. In summary, and related to our Research Question, participants in all locations perceived of police as being moderately accommodating. Additionally, they expressed moderately high levels of trust and inclination to comply with police requests. Taken as a whole, these results indicate that young adults in the three locations are fairly respectful of the authority of police. That is, they seem to grant the police some level of authority to correct aberrant
behavior and, as citizens, they expect to comply accordingly. This finding was surprising as it related to the Russian sample, as the literature has suggested a rougher history of civilian-Militia relations in that cultural milieu. Also perhaps surprising was the lack of gender effects in that women did not report being any more compliant nor construed officers as more accommodating and trustworthy than their male counterparts in any cultural setting.

Our multivariate analyses also revealed that American participants trusted police more than did those in Russia, who were in turn more trusting than Turkish participants. Additionally, Americans reported a higher likelihood of complying with police requests than did either the Russian or Turkish participants. Generally, these results indicate that the Western model of law enforcement, as least as expressed in the U.S.A., is more likely to encourage trust in police and accompanying compliance than are other models. In regard to compliance, and as far as our particular American sample was concerned, we do not know, as yet, whether this was obligated from fears of recriminations or borne out of desires to maintain civic order. An argument in favor of the latter motivating factor rests in the fact that the American sample was comprised of Caucasians who were, arguably, collectivistic “Southerners.” As such, it would be expected that many of these individuals were members of extended families that were actively enmeshed in their community. As such, any misbehavior could be perceived as a reflection on family; thus expected compliance would be high.

Again, our prediction related to the roles of perceived accommodation in determining civilian reported trust and compliance provided partial support for the Hypothesis. The hypothesized relationship that accommodation would predict perceived trust in police which would, in turn, influence reported compliance, held in all three locations; however, a direct relationship between accommodation and compliance existed for the American sample only. The different solution emerging in this latter case is interesting. In a lawful society, it is essential that the custodians of the law be obeyed. In the Figure 1 model settings, trust is necessary but perhaps not sufficient for a lawful, police order-compliant society. In the U.S.A. — a country with a well-establish democracy, unlike Russia and Turkey — citizens may expect more accommodation from police officers. This effect may be amplified by the aforementioned possibility that popular Southern American expectations of politeness would, in many cases, make it difficult to not comply with a polite request. Therefore, an accommodating officer would be placing greater social pressure on a citizen to comply, not simply because of the officer’s position of authority, but because the request itself would be difficult to ignore when framed in the “correct” manner. On another note, and considering comparisons with Russia and Turkey, whereas trust is influential in all locations, perhaps the more long-standing democratic system in the United States has made trust of police per se less of a necessity, as noted above. From the data, it appears that behaviors (accommodative ones in particular) may be directly and/or indirectly influential in compliance gaining alongside attitudes such as trust — the latter being more crucial in developing democracies (or non-democratic ones), or perhaps Muslim, or Eastern, cultures.
While the strengths of the paths from accommodation to trust were quite high for all locations, it is noteworthy that the strengths of the pathways from trust to reported compliance differed between groups in the Figure 1 model. Given the strength of the path from accommodation to trust for the Turkish participants, it is interesting to note that the Turkish sample revealed the least robust path from trust to compliance. Again, this may have been due to more recent — and deliberate — changes occurring in that country’s culture as it adopts more Western European cultural perspectives and policies. Arguably, this could allow citizens a perceived freedom to question police power, and believe, accordingly, that they would comply (or not) with police requests.

From an applied perspective, the strengths of our model paths, and whether perceptions of officers’ accommodativeness have direct or indirect effects in predicting compliance with the police, albeit fascinating issues to tease apart cross-contextually in their own right, are perhaps moot. The data herein show that vicariously observing and/or directly receiving accommodation from officers will engender trust in police in general and likely relieve stress and frustration in the immediacy of an encounter. This might be the case especially for civilians in new and/or changing democracies, or nation-states with complicated histories that have, at times, involved the suppression of individuals’ rights. Additionally, the current results lend evidence to our claim that the importance of trust in police and officer accommodation may be of universal importance in obtaining civilian compliance.

Importantly, we make no claims for our findings in any one nation to generalize to other regions of it, yet the fact that our model holds up across very different cultural contexts is testimony to its robustness. Furthermore, we acknowledge that work is needed in more cultural contexts and with samples other than college students. That said, undergraduates are likely, arguably, to have as much if not more contact with police officers late night downtown on the weekends than other sectors of the population, lending further validity to our findings. For future research, we need to determine from police-civilian encounters (see Solan & Tiersma, 2005) what can be coded (verbally and nonverbally) and discursively analyzed as accommodative and confirming actions on the one hand, and nonaccommodating and disconfirming actions on the other (see Sieburg, 1976). Furthermore, future explorations may address the extent to which sexual orientation, age, gender, and ethnic make-up of the police officer and civilian impact their drawing upon their accommodative-nonaccommodative resources, as well as a myriad of respondent variables (non-student, political orientation, prior nature of contact with police, ethnic identification, etc.).

Indeed, individuals’ accommodative skills may comprise an unrecognized statement about their communicative competences (see Burleson & Greene, 2003) and, in this way, CAT has the potential to be associated with a very wide range of their uses of communicative actions in both interpersonal and intercultural settings (see Gallois, 2003). In terms of CAT, and in light of our findings, we again suggest that a key motive for officer convergence is the desire to gain compliance. Such motives underlying convergence are
centrally to communication in other service contexts and organizations as well. For example, Hajek, Villagran, and Wittenberg-Lyles (2007) applied CAT to physician-patient encounters, and found evidence for the positive relationship between perceived physician accommodation and compliance with physicians’ treatment recommendations. Such benefits of accommodation skills have also been observed in settings where, for example, a travel agent accommodated her pronunciation to the different socio-economically-based language styles of her Welsh clientele (Coupland, 1984) and, in Taiwan, where salespersons converged more to customers than vice-versa (van den Berg, 1986). Whatever, the work herein highlights the value in further developing CAT — theoretically as well as empirically — so as to incorporate consequences of accommodating in terms of attributed trust and anticipated compliance, as well as longer-term institutional goals such as intergroup cooperation, and in our case, effective community-policing.

Paradoxically given the above findings, communication skills are given short shrift in police officer training (see however, Thompson, 1983). In fact, almost all training in the U.S.A. is devoted to officer safety through acquiring arrest, control, defensive, and weapon techniques. It is an empirical question as to what extent invoking the latter techniques could be avoided, or at least attenuated in terms of level of force delivered, if appropriate accommodative skills — as prescribed by CAT — were engaged (McCluskey, 2003). While the importance of officer safety through re-learning perishable physical skills and muscle memory cannot be under-estimated, our findings regarding the importance of officers’ accommodative practices in determining trust in and compliance with them (new developments for CAT) suggest that far more attention should be directed at developing communication skills in general, and accommodative ones in particular (Huang, Flanagan, Longmire, & Vaughn, 1996). Such training could include education about how to solicit respect through the use of situationally-appropriate address forms, listening skills, empathy, explanations, and nonverbal skills (e.g., smiling). Of course these tactics should be sensitive to the values, customs, and needs of a wide variety of civilians within a given culture. While civilians often see “the badge” rather than the person behind it, officers, too, should be person-centered rather than over-categorically oriented, especially in changing social systems such as Russia and Turkey, and in ethnically-charged environments such as the United States. Of course, we also acknowledge that accommodation would be dysfunctional, and therefore ill-advised, in certain life-threatening circumstances.

This is not to conclude that communication interventions in this sphere should be a one-way street. The public, in tandem, require educating about the sometimes necessary but perceptually under- or non-accommodating stances that officers need to take for their own (as well as others’) safety. These situations include most traffic stops, wherein officers have no idea whether those stopped have just committed felonious activities, possess weapons, and so forth. If community-oriented policing and collaborative efforts to reduce crime are to launch in any meaningful way — especially in cultures with troubled histories, or periods of significant social change as is the case in Russia and Turkey — intergroup boundaries
between law enforcement and the community need to be dissolved. One approach to this is to improve the quality of communication occurring between these parties through accommodative practices that have herein been shown to promote trust and compliance.

Finally, we hope to stimulate more research in Russia on the aforementioned issues as well as the relationships between crime, law enforcement, and communication here. Clearly our model can be expanded to include more antecedent factors (e.g., perceived safety of local neighborhoods) and outcomes (e.g., complaints received about officers). Moreover, there is also room for longitudinal studies to be conducted in Russia as societal and political changes inevitably ensue in a globalizing world as well as a need for more behavioral and ethnographic work to be engaged. The fact that Russian officers were perceived as moderately trusted and accommodative is perhaps unexpected given the tenor of the background literature. How Russians (and of different ethnic persuasions) account for current and changing levels of trust and construe police actions as accommodative-nonaccommodative is obviously a valued empirical direction to undertake so that we might add flesh and meat to the bones of our structural equation model.

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REFERENCES


ETHICS IN PUBLIC RELATIONS: AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN STUDENTS’ PERSPECTIVES ON PROFESSIONAL CHALLENGES

BRUCE BERGER AND ELINA ERZIKOVA

This study investigates Russian (n=206) and American (n=204) public relations students’ perceptions of relationships between ethics and public relations practice. The results suggest that, although there are some similarities, students in the two countries view professional public relations ethics and leadership quite differently. Russian participants were more likely than their American counterparts to see obstacles that might have prevented them from ethical conduct. More American than Russian participants reported intentions to confront an unethical decision of superiors.

Key words: public relations, ethics, leadership, Russia, United States

In recent years, public relations scholars, educators and practitioners have paid increasing attention to ethical frameworks in decision making and to codifying ethics in practice. However, few studies have examined perceptions of ethics on the part of public relations students. This comparative study explores this important topic through the perceptions of 206 Russian and 204 American public relations students.

The results suggest that, though there are some similarities, students in the two countries view professional public relations ethics and leadership quite differently. First, more American participants (39 percent) than Russian respondents (23 percent) said there were no obstacles that might have prevented them from following ethical rules. Second, while identifying the most important characteristics of public relations leadership, Russian students valued management skills, whereas American students placed greater emphasis on honesty. Third, more American respondents (85 percent) than Russian participants (59 percent) appeared to be ready to confront management if they made an inappropriate or
unethical decision. This exploratory research helps increase our understanding of similarities and differences between the two groups, which represent the next generation of public relations professionals.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

**Public Relations and Ethics**

Public relations scholars have proposed a variety of ethical frameworks and models to bring ethical criteria to strategic decision-making processes in organizations. Edgett (2002) suggested 10 criteria for ethical advocacy in public relations: *Evaluation* of the issue before considering its merits of advocacy; *priority*, or loyalty to the client or employer; *sensitivity*, which is the balancing interests of the client with those of publics; *confidentiality*, or the protection of clients’ morally justified secrets; *veracity*, or full truthfulness; *reversibility*, which implies “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you;” *validity*, or argumentation based on sound reasoning; *visibility*, or identification of originators of persuasive messages to the public; *respect* to the audience; and *consent*, or clearly articulated rules and agreement to them of the parties involved in the communication process.

David (2004) outlined a comprehensive framework by which to evaluate professional values in public relations. He argued that public relations practice might be affected by a fear of litigation and financial losses in case of malpractice. As a result, professional values are likely to be trumped or compromised to avoid embarrassment or lawsuit.

Bowen (2005a) created a deontological analysis, which is, according to Berger and Reber (2006), comparable with public relations professional and organizational codes of ethics. Deontological ethics, in Bowen’s (2007) words, “[R]equires that the respect and dignity of others be maintained in ethical decision making” (p. 281). These and other theorists (e.g., Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier, 2002) contend that ethical practices help organizations do the right things in society, build trust with stakeholders, and strengthen the profession.

**Professional Associations**

Professional public relations associations also have long emphasized the need for ethical practice through codes, accreditation measures, training programs and other means. The most recent Public Relations Society of America Code of Ethics, for example, is introduced with this statement: “Ethical practice is the most important obligation of a PRSA member” (PRSA Member Code of Ethics, p. 5). The PRSA code is founded on professional values of advocacy, honesty, expertise, independence, loyalty and fairness, and the document concludes by asking professionals to “work constantly to strengthen the public’s trust in the profession” (p. 13).
Many researchers and practitioners have pointed to well-known shortcomings of existing codes of ethics, including the general nature of their provisions, lack of enforcement measures and cultural differences. Nevertheless, at least one recent development suggests such codes are expanding globally. The Global Alliance for Public Relations and Communication Management, founded in 2000, consists of more than 60 member organizations that represent more than 150,000 practitioners internationally (Molleda, 2004). One of the alliance’s first initiatives was development of a protocol to standardize the various codes of ethics in the profession (“Worldwide standard,” 2003).

Another issue is differences among practitioners regarding professional ethics. In a study funded by IABC, Bowen (2005b) found significant differences between men and women regarding ethics training, ethical issues and preferred styles of moral discussion. Although females are found to be more ethically grounded than males (Bowen, 2005b; Ludlum & Moskaloinov, 2005), there is still lack of knowledge why the gender differences regarding ethical issues exist and how they are formed (Bowen, 2007). The present study does not aim to explain the differences in ethics perceptions between men and women but examines whether the differences exist in college age individuals whose ethics perceptions have not been influenced by public relations experience. Previous research on public relations majors in these American and Russian universities indicated that females appeared to be more ethical than males (Erzikova & Berger, 2007b).

Kim and Choi (2003) concluded from their survey of practitioners that ethical standards appeared to change with age and ideology. Older practitioners showed a higher level of agreement with the Code of Ethics, and professionals with high idealism and low relativism showed a greater tendency to make strict ethical judgments of professional standards than practitioners with other ideologies. Wright (1985) also found that the level of ethical standards increased with age among PR practitioners and business professionals.

Individual professionals also may see themselves as more ethical than other PR practitioners. Sallot, Cameron, and Lariscy (1998) found that practitioners hold their peers in comparatively low esteem, seeing them as unprofessional and unenlightened compared to the way they view themselves. “Practitioners see themselves individually as having higher status, being more accountable, and having more professional skills in strategic planning and research than their peers” (p. 14). Berger and Reber (2006) found that 15 of 65 practitioners they interviewed admitted to having leaked information to external publics, planted rumors in the grapevine, or used similar tactics that may blur ethical boundaries. However, nearly twice as many (29) of those interviewed said they thought other practitioners used such techniques.

**Education**

Recently, a few U.S. universities have initiated the process of ethical scrutiny of its applicants (Rhode, 2006). These schools require to provide letters of recommendations in
which applicants’ integrity is ranked on a five-point scale. Prospective students are also asked to discuss ethical problems that they have experienced. Although the screening of applicants for moral character might not look like an effective method to reduce the number of unethical students, it nevertheless reveals a great concern of educators over what kind of values future practitioners possess and what kind of norms they will bring to the professional environment.

In this regard, increasing attention has been devoted to the importance of teaching professional ethics in education, and to what ought to be taught (Gale & Bunton, 2005). Harrison (1990) surveyed public relations and advertising professors and found nearly all of the educators believed that studying ethics was important for their students.

Emphasizing the fact that modern public relations is defined by ethical standards, the Commission on Public Relations Education (2006) acknowledged the importance of public relations professional education as the process of defining and teaching professional ethics; as education that helps students to acquire skills necessary to identify and resolve moral dilemmas in a way that leads to an ethical outcome.

VanSlyke Turk (1989) surveyed practitioners regarding public relations curricula and found that they believed the top five skills for success as a manager in public relations were planning and organizing, problem solving and decision making, goal setting and prioritizing, time management, and ethical and legal issues. Toth (1999) reported that educators and practitioners agreed that ethics and codes of practice were one of a number of important areas of study in public relations. One recent study examined the impact of ethics instruction (Gale & Bunton, 2005). The researchers surveyed 242 alumni with majors in public relations or advertising and found that graduates who had completed a media ethics course were more likely than those who had not to value ethics more highly, better identify ethical issues, and deem ethical issues to be important in their professional work.

**Ethics and Leadership**

Arnaud and Schminke (2007) stated, “Leadership and ethics represent a natural combination of constructs” (p. 213). This is why history of leadership is a study of ideas about leaders *and* the ethics of leadership (Ciulla, 2002). Leadership is a type of relationship, and by understanding ethics we better understand the relationship between leaders and their followers (Ciulla, 2003). The ethics of leadership was defined as “the obligations of leaders to promote justice, fairness, trust, and the conditions necessary for people to live well in communities that flourish” (Knapp, 2007, p. xii).

Thomas (2002) stated that the recognition of the fact that leadership, strategy, and communication are integrated is the first step toward organizational success. Ashley and Patel (2003) found that a leader, who was an effective communicator, attracted a high degree of support of people. O’Neil (2003) argued that public relations managers’ effectiveness is based on their ability to deal with multiple relationships, with both internal and internal
Ethics in Public Relations

Berger and Erzikova

In Springston and Leichty’s (1996) words, public relations practitioners “represent the management philosophy to external publics and interpret the concerns of external publics to the organization’s management team” (p. 697).

Lowe, Kroec, and Sivasubramanian (1996) argued that in the past, organizations focused on the development of leaders at the upper level, whereas new organizational paradigms, emphasizing a more active involvement in decision-making process, implies the development of leaders across organizational levels. This implies that interviewing practices would involve not only the assessment of technical skills of prospective lower level leaders but also the evaluation of their interpersonal abilities. An implication for teaching public relations is that more attention should be paid to the development of leadership qualities in students who might be expected to be effective leaders at their workplace in spite of their young age.

Thayer (1986), speculating about leadership in public relations, said that traditional and so-called “modern” societies differ in their interpretation of leadership. In the latter, the leader is a change agent, whereas in the former, the leader is selected to conserve the truths of that society. Thus, one should be careful in using a single “yardstick” to measure attitudes toward leadership in Russia, in which authoritarian culture prevails (Bahry, Boaz, & Gordon, 1997) and the United States, which is regarded as a “modern” society (Thayer, 1986).

The importance of national context was reinforced by Spicer, Dunfee, and Bailey (2004) in their investigation of ethical evaluations of American managers working in Russia. The researchers found that national context influenced managers’ ethical decision-making process by attuning them to local norms.

Deshpande, George, and Joseph (2000), conducting a survey of Russian managers, found that if information was detrimental for managers’ self-interests, they withheld it. Such a behavior might be perceived as unethical by Westerners but Russians did not see violation of ethics in this case. The reason was that the managers had a limited control over resources in the situation in which goals were externally imposed, and this is why the practice of the exaggeration of results and cover up mistakes were not taken as unethical.

While examining the present, one should take into account the past. The Soviet regime created an economic and social environment extremely different from the Western context. Since Gorbachev’s perestroika in the middle of the 1980s, the market economy has grown rapidly in Russia, but modern economic enterprises still suffer from inherited long-standing norms and expectations. As Sidorov, Alexeyeva, and Shklyarik (2000) stated, “Many problems ordinary to business ethics in developed market countries are new in Russia. Ethical issues regarding business responsibility, risk, profit, property, leadership, decision making, communication, etc. have no tradition in our country” (p. 922-923). Another scholar opined that in the past, the average Russian needed such “street” virtues as dishonesty and deception to beat the corrupt system and survive (Mitchell, 2003).

In public relations, Russian managers are concerned with such factors as unfair competition, bribery, and so-called “black PR” (dirty and manipulative) that hinder the
development of the field in accordance with ethical codes (Erzikova & Berger, 2006). This background suggests that Russian respondents might significantly differ from American participants in ethical projections of their future experiences in public relations.

Despite increasing research into ethics in public relations, we still know relatively little about students’ knowledge or perceptions of professional ethics. This study contributes to the current literature by comparing ethical orientations of Russian and American public relations students. Such a cross-cultural study might help uncover between-society differences and challenges that the respondents as young professionals will face in the near future. The study also provides an indirect assessment of cultural differences that may lead to differences in ethical decision making (Moon & Franke, 2000).

**Research Questions**

Based on the above discussions, this study attempts to answer the following research questions:

**RQ1:** What are the perceptions of American and Russian public relations students regarding ethical aspects in public relations practice?

**RQ2:** What are the perceptions of American and Russian public relations students regarding leadership characteristics in public relations practice?

**RQ3:** Are there any significant demographic differences between the participants’ self-reports regarding ethics and leadership in public relations?

**METHOD**

**Participants**

The survey was administered to convenience samples of 410 public relations students in Russia (n=206) and the United States (n=204). The total sample included 81 males and 329 females. The average age of the students was 19.8 (SD=1.7).

The Russian data was gathered in two Russian universities, with 480 and 250 public relations majors respectively. In the first university, located in a city with 500,000 population, 125 students (19 males and 106 females) were surveyed. Eighty-one students (14 males and 67 females) participated in the same survey in the second university, which is located in a city with one million residents. The researchers chose the two universities for practical reasons. In the first university one of the researchers taught a course at the public relations department a few years ago, which facilitated access to students, while the second university was selected because the head of the public relations program there had
participated in a previous research project (Erzikova & Berger, 2007) and agreed to undertake another initiative.

Overall, 206 Russian public relations students participated in this study. Ages ranged from 17 to 26, with a mean of 19 years old ($SD=1.53$). The majority of participants (117/206) were 18 and 19 years old. The sample consisted of 55 freshmen, 63 sophomores, 40 juniors, 35 seniors, and 13 fifth year students (higher education in the Russian Federation requires completion of five years). The fact that only 16 percent of the overall participants in two studies were males reflects the general situation in the public relations field in Russia, where the majority of practitioners are women (Tsetsura, 2005). In addition, statistical data from the universities in which the surveys took place indicate that 21 percent of all students in the first university were male, and 15 percent of all students in the second university were male.

Two hundred and four American public relations majors (48 males and 156 females) participated in the same study. American students (all public relations majors) were recruited from an introductory public relations course, an introductory communication course, and three upper-level public relations courses at a large southeastern university with more than 500 public relations majors.

The majority of students completed the survey outside of class time and received a small grade credit for their participation. Similar to the Russian sample, the American pool was a convenience sample with a predominance of females (76%). According to statistical data, about 75% of all PR students in this university were females. This number also is consistent with the overall figure of females (70%) in the public relations field in the United States (Aldoory & Toth, 2002).

Participant ages ranged from 18 to 33, with a mean of 20 years old ($SD=1.72$). The majority of participants (113/204) were 19 and 21 years old. The sample consisted of 23 freshmen, 60 sophomores, 44 juniors, 75 seniors, and 2 graduate students. American respondents ($M=20$) were slightly older than Russian participants ($M=19$).

**Instrument**

Three open-ended questions were designed to examine the respondents’ perceptions of ethical issues and leadership in public relations practice. These questions were drawn from previous studies on ethics and leadership in public relations (Berger & Reber, 2006). Students were expected to provide written responses to the following questions:

1. Are there specific situations, issues, or reasons that might prevent you from following ethical rules as a PR professional? Please describe them.

2. Please identify and briefly describe two or three characteristics of leadership that are most important in PR practice today.
3. What do you think it means “to do right thing in PR” when management of your organization makes a poor or inappropriate decision?

The questionnaire was translated into Russian by one of the researchers. Two Russian professional journalists then examined the text independently and offered several suggestions for improvements, which were incorporated into the final survey instrument.

The students’ ethical perceptions (the process of acquiring, interpreting, selecting, and organizing ethics ideas and concepts) were the dependent variable in this study, whereas nationality, age, gender, level of education and completion of a course in ethics were the independent variables. The survey was administrated in classroom settings in Russian and American universities. Completion times ranged from 15 to 30 minutes.

To analyze the obtained qualitative data, the researchers read the student answers several times to identify emerging themes and develop a coding list. After that both authors coded 100 percent of data independently. To check intercoder reliability, they used Holsti formula. The agreement percentage on categories for the first, second, and third questions were 100, 99, and 91 respectively.

RESULTS

In general, the researchers found significant differences between the two samples in their attitude about ethics in public relations. Therefore, patterns of cross-cultural variations in ethical orientations across the two samples are the main focus of this data.

Question 1

Responses for the question, “Are there specific situations, issues, or reasons that might prevent you from following ethical rules as a PR-professional?” were coded as “No” if a participant revealed a strong commitment to ethics. The following answer is an example of “No” category: “No. Ethics should be something you look back on and would even sacrifice your job or career to make sure your decision is the right ethical one!”

Responses were coded as “Yes” if a respondent indicated a clear intention to violate ethics, or provided a vague answer such as “I don’t know yet” or “Maybe.” An example of “Yes” answer is the following statement: “Some things are very personal and you cannot really go by ethics because just something is ethical does not make it right. Every situation is different.”

These data were analyzed using cross-tabulations to inspect levels of statistical significance through application of the Pearson Chi-Square test. The significance level established for all tests was .05. The test showed a significant difference between the two
samples (chi-square =13.06, df=1). Twenty three percent of Russian participants said there were no obstacles that might have prevented them from following ethical rules, compared to 39 percent of American students.

Chi-Square tests did not reveal gender differences within both samples. Russian females were similar to Russian males (chi-square =1.11, df=1), and American females were similar to American males (chi-square =1.92, df=1). Thirty percent of Russian males and 20 percent of Russian females were positive that there were no issues that might have pushed them toward unethical behavior. As for the American sample, 29 percent of males and 42 percent of females were confident that they would not violate ethical rules.

The Pearson Chi-Square test did not indicate significant differences between Russian and American males (chi-square =0.00, df=1). However, there was a statistically significant difference between ethical orientations of Russian and American females (chi-square =16.82, df=1). Compared to Russian women, American women indicated they were more likely to follow ethical codes in all situations.

Both Russian and American participants named specific reasons or situations that might cause them to ignore ethical rules, and the collective responses yielded 19 pages of single-spaced text that was subjected to qualitative analysis and data reduction (Lindlof, 1995). After responses were carefully read, they were organized in seven categories according to the emerging patterns and schemes of interpretation (Table 1). Answers that indicated respondents’ readiness to violate ethics after an unethical act was undertaken against them were included in the category Response to Another’s Unethical Behavior. The second grouping, Protect Job Security, embraced answers that showed participants’ intentions to abandon ethics if their job was at stake. Participants’ self-reports about their readiness to act unethically to benefit financially were categorized as Financial Self-Interest. Statements that indicated respondents’ willingness to sacrifice ethics under pressure from management were included in Pressure from Superiors group. Competition in the Public Relations Market was the category for reports that were concerned with a fierce competition between public relations firms as a force that made practitioners to violate ethics. Some participants said that their acts would depend on a concrete case, and the category for such answers were It Depends on a Situation. Finally, Physical Threat embraced answers that mentioned physical threat as a factor that would lead students to ethical misconduct.

Chi-square tests revealed statistically significant differences in two categories: Response to Another’s Unethical Behavior and Protect Job Security. Russians participants were more likely than American participants to act unethically in response to the unethical behavior of a colleague, rival, or client. As one Russian participant said, “It is very difficult to follow ethics when a dirty campaign is led against you.”

On the other hand, American participants were more likely than Russian students to abandon professional ethical codes if their job security was at stake. As one American respondent put it, “If your job was on the line and you thought that something is unethical,
TABLE 1

ISSUES THAT MIGHT PREVENT THE RESPONDENTS FROM FOLLOWING ETHICAL RULES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Russian Students</th>
<th>American Students</th>
<th>Chi square (df=1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response to another’s unethical behavior</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect job security</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.73*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial self-interest</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure from superiors</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition in the PR market</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“It depends on a situation”</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical threat</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.01; ** Yates’ correction performed.

you would probably go against your belief to save your job.” Similarities between Russian and American students were found regarding financial self-interest (“Too much ethics leads to too little money”), pressure from superiors (“If your boss asks you to do something unethical, you have to do it”), and competition in the PR market (“I might violate ethics in the situation of a harsh competition among PR agencies”). Approximately the same number of Russian (5) and American (6) students said that their decision to violate ethics would depend on a concrete situation.

Importantly, the nature of physical threat was interpreted differently by students from the two countries. Russian participants perceived the threat as a dangerous situation for themselves (“I will violate ethics if the case is linked to criminals and I and my close people are strongly jeopardized”), whereas American respondents perceived the threat as a risk to others (“The only time I might not follow ethical rules is if it would cause physical harm to others if I did”).

Question 2

The majority of the responses for the question, “Please identify and briefly describe 2 or 3 characteristics of leadership that are most important in PR-practice today,” were reflected in 11 categories: Management Skills, Sociability, Effective Communicator, Determination, Honesty, Positive Attitude, Creativity, Responsibility, Confidence, Charisma, and Loyalty (Table 2). Russian respondents named 648 traits (3 characteristics per person), whereas American participants came up with 408 features (2 characteristics per person). This unexpected discrepancy prevented the researchers from performing Chi-square tests and
TABLE 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF LEADERSHIP IDENTIFIED BY RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Russian Students (n=206)</th>
<th>American Students (n=204)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responses</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management skills</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>65.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociability</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>39.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective communicator</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>38.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determination</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>38.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>30.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive attitude</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creativity</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charisma</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

limited their analysis to counting percentages to detect between-samples similarities and differences.

The responses of Russian and American participants suggested a similar view of only one dimension — responsibility. Respondents’ perceptions of the rest of the features revealed substantial gaps between American and Russian students. More than half of Russian participants (65.05%) mentioned management skills as the most important characteristic in PR practice today, compared to one-third of American respondents. Almost two-thirds of American responses (60.78%) referred to honesty, whereas this trait was found only in one-third of Russian answers. Sociability was brought up in 39.81% of Russian responses and in 21.57% of American answers. Such a skill as an effective communicator was more valued by Russian than American respondents: 38.83% versus 9.31%. Students from Russia and the United States differed in their views of the significance of positive “Can Do” attitude in PR practice: 30.10% of Russian responses mentioned this trait versus 7.35% of American responses. Creativity in the profession appeared to be more vital for Russian than for American participants, 21.40% and 3.92%, accordingly.

Although there were clear differences between the two samples, it is worthy to note that in American and Russian groups, management skills and sociability were two of the top three leadership’s characteristics.

**Question 3**

Responses for the question, “What do you think it means ‘to do right thing in PR’ when management of your organization makes a poor or inappropriate decision?,” were
examined in two ways. First, responses were coded as “Confront” or “Agree.” If a participant reported a strong intention to confront management about the decision, these responses were coded as “Confront.” The following answer is an example of the “Confront” category: “I think it means to stand up for what you believe in even if it means sacrificing your job with a particular company. If management makes an inappropriate decision then you should call them out and let who is in charge know how you feel about the situation.”

Responses were coded as “Agree” if a respondent thought that the best way to deal with superiors was to go along with them or compromise with them. An example of the answer that fits the “Agree” category is: “If an organization makes an inappropriate decision I feel there is not too much you can do about it.”

These data were analyzed using cross-tabulations to inspect levels of statistical significance through application of the Pearson Chi-Square test (alpha = .05). The test showed a significant difference between American and Russian samples (chi-square =34.18, \(df=1\)). Eighty-five percent of American students were ready to oppose a poor decision, or confront management, compared with 59 percent of Russian participant.

Chi-Square test did not reveal gender differences within the samples. Forty-nine percent of Russian males and 61 percent of Russian females intended to confront management (chi-square =1.24, \(df=1\)). As for the American sample, 85 percent of both males and females said that they would oppose an unethical decision (chi-square =0.00, \(df=1\)).

However, the Pearson Chi-Square test did indicate significant differences between the samples. This was found for Russian and American males (chi-square =11.08, \(df=1\)) as well as for Russian and American females (chi-square =23.52, \(df=1\)). Compared to Russian participants, then, American respondents indicated they were far more likely to dispute what they considered to be an inappropriate decision.

Responses of Russian and American participants were also coded according to seven categories of advocacy developed by Berger and Reber (2006) in their study of more than 700 American PR practitioners. (The results for the present study are shown in the Table 3.) According to Berger and Reber (2006), “doing the right thing” varied among respondents based on (a) the extent to which PR professionals would advocate, (b) the type of advocacy approaches they would use, and (c) the framework or perspective from within which they would advocate.

Following their research, they identified seven categories of advocacy.

_Loyalty advocacy_ refers to the situation in which a PR practitioner expresses a concern about an inappropriate decision, but if his or her voice was not heard, the practitioner carries out the decision because executives, not PR professionals, are responsible for making strategic organizational choices.

_Self-protective advocacy_ focuses on PR practitioners’ actions to document their attempts to change management’s mind and possibly, causing the PR practitioners to refuse to execute a poor decision in to prevent themselves from losing their jobs and damaging their careers.
### Table 3

**Differences Between Russian and American Students in Advocacy Category**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Russian Students (n=206)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>American Students (n=204)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Chi square (df=1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Loyalty advocacy</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14.08</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>8.78**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Self-protective advocacy</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.74</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>10.87*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rational advocacy</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>32.04</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>13.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Stakeholder advocacy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14.22</td>
<td>23.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ethical advocacy</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13.11</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>37.75</td>
<td>16.51*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Activist advocacy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td>6.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Exit advocacy</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Other</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17.48</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *p<0.001; **p<0.01; ***p<0.02*

*Rational advocacy* means providing professional PR consultation by bringing cases, laws, alternative solutions, rational arguments, and expertise to persuade management to change their decision. Compared to loyalty and self-protective advocates, rational advocates do not specify what they would do if their attempts fail to overturn a poor decision.

*Stakeholder advocacy* refers to speaking on behalf of stakeholders, relations with whom might be damaged if an inappropriate decision is implemented.

*Ethical advocacy* means “doing the right thing” by supporting choices that are based on human values and professional or organizational codes of ethics.

*Activist advocacy* refers to PR practitioners who will use virtually any approach — from forming employee coalitions to whistle-blowing to authorities — to pressure decision makers to change a bad decision.

*Exit advocacy* is similar to rational advocacy. PR practitioners attempt to change management’s decision; however, if their efforts fail, they indicate they would leave the organization.

Chi-square tests revealed significant differences between Russian and American samples in 6 out of 7 of these advocacy categories (Table 3). Participants from the two countries were similar only in their choices of exit advocacy: Seven percent of Russian students and 6 percent of American respondents said that they would prefer to leave the organization to avoid taking part in an unethical practice. The rest of their choices were significantly different.

Thirty-two percent of Russian students preferred rational advocacy, whereas only 17 percent of American students did the same. Thirty-eight percent of American respondents...
TABLE 4
DIFFERENCES AMONG PR PRACTITIONERS AND STUDENTS REGARDING ADVOCACY IN PUBLIC RELATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>American Practitioners (n=707)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Russian Students (n=206)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>American Students (n=204)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Loyalty advocacy</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14.08</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Self-protective advocacy</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.74</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rational advocacy</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>24.61</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>32.04</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Stakeholder advocacy</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ethical advocacy</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>23.76</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13.11</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>37.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Activist advocacy</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Exit advocacy</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>19.94</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Other</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17.48</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

chose ethical advocacy versus 13 percent of Russians. Fourteen percent of Russian respondents revealed themselves as loyalty advocates, whereas only 5 percent of American participants did the same.

Self-protection was an important issue for 9 percent of Russian students, but only for 1 percent of Americans. Stakeholder advocacy was chosen by 14 percent of American participants versus 1 percent of Russian respondents. As for activist advocacy, 11 percent of American participants said they would actively voice their concerns about an unethical choice, whereas only 4 percent of Russian students were ready to oppose an inappropriate decision. In sum, compared to American respondents, the majority of Russian participants appeared ready to compromise rather than confront an inappropriate or poor decision.

Berger and Reber’s (2006) study of American PR practitioners concluded that advocacy in some form was “the right thing” to do when management makes an inappropriate decision. However, their study of practitioners revealed different results from findings obtained from both students’ samples. The professionals’ scores on categories of advocacy lay somewhere in between Russian and American PR students’ scores, with exit advocacy as an exception (Table 4).

DISCUSSION

Results in this study highlight some important differences between the two samples. However, such differences are not unexpected. Previous research has indicated significant differences in the types of behaviors considered ethical in Russia and in the West (Deshpande, George, & Joseph, 2000).
The fact that 17 Russians (8 percent of the Russian sample) said that another’s (a boss, a client, or a rival) unethical behavior might cause them to violate ethical rules might have indicated defensive attitudes, or anticipation of external challenge in a relatively unfriendly environment. The number of Americans in this category was notably low — two students (1 percent of the American sample).

Another category in which the two samples differed was “Job security.” Of the 204 American students who completed the survey, 13 thought that to protect job security, they might disobey ethical standards, compared to only 3 out of 206 Russian students who brought up this issue.

Approximately the same percent of Russian (4) and American (5) participants mentioned a physical threat as the reason to break ethical law. However, Americans understood the threat as a risk to others as a consequence of their — PR professionals — actions, whereas Russians considered the threat as a danger to themselves. This is also a mark of Russian reality, in which both businesses — small and big — are criminalized (Buss, 2001; Sidorov, Alexeyeva, & Shklyarik, 2000). Russian students did not preclude they might face a dangerous situation while working in a profit-making company.

Along with a chaotic recent history and underdeveloped systems of legal and ethical laws in Russia, another factor contributed to different perceptions of ethics by the participants from Russia compared to Americans. Puffer (1994) stated that in Slavic cultures, there are two sets of ethical standards — one is for personal relationships and another is for official relationships. In Russia, honesty is perceived as essential in personal but not professional conduct. Presumably, it stems from the past, particularly, from the Soviet period, when a saying regarding economic relations with the government was created: “The state cheats you, you should cheat the state.”

Compared to Russia, “In the West, particularly, in America, people are expected to employ the same set of ethical standards regardless of the situation” (Puffer, 1994, p. 47). In the United States, honesty is on the business agenda (though not always practiced), and the American participants confirmed this assumption by ranking honesty as the number one trait in PR leadership. For Russian students, management skills appeared to be more important. There are three possible reasons for this.

First, it might be a reflection of university programs’ efforts to overcome negligence toward managerial functions in the Russian past. Second, it might be an evidence of Russian students’ interest in the “technical side” of business conduct, which shaded other traits such as responsibility and loyalty. Finally, the emphasis on management skills might indicate Russian students’ perceptions of public relations as a field in which success depends on managerial talents. Still, there is a need for future investigation of why certain leadership traits made the top of the hierarchy and some were disregarded by Russian and American participants.

Important similarities also were observed between the two groups: Management skills and sociability were identified as two of the top three leadership characteristics. This finding
suggests that in spite of the cultural and economical distinctions between the two nations, identity with the profession of public relations has formed similar perceptions in surveyed students.

Previous research has shown that ethical perceptions of American managers have been relatively stable for several decades (Moon & Franke, 2000). Unfortunately, comparable empirical data are not available for Russia, and one can only hypothesize that new economic and political conditions have impacted the ethical sensitivity of Russian managers. A recent study has shown that while the Russian business world is rejecting egalitarianism and promoting a competitive attitude, Russian mass consciousness is still skeptical of such capitalist features, if not hostile toward individualism, competition, liberalism, and democracy (Kliucharev & Muckle, 2005).

Simplicity and straightforwardness are associated with standard Western business practices (Puffer, 1994). It might be argued that these features were reflected in the finding that 85 percent of American students intended to confront poor or inappropriate decisions by management, compared to 59 percent of Russian respondents. Such a sober attitude of Russian students might be explained by disbelief in their ability to win confrontations with superiors, or to suffer undue consequences in confronting superiors. This disbelief seems to be rooted in Russian culture: Russians perceive their future with a profound pessimism (Tongren, Hecht, & Kovach, 1995).

It might also be argued that the reluctance of Russian students to challenge management has its roots in Russian collectivist culture. Triandis (1993) argued that the image of an ideal leader is different in individualistic and collectivistic cultures. For individualists, a good leader is the one who allows his or her subordinates to follow their own agendas and stimulates them with interpersonal competitions. In collectivistic cultures, a nurturing and supportive — “like a father” — leader is considered to be ideal.

After analyzing the results, the authors contacted three Russian professors who taught public relations in one of the universities in which the survey took place. Independently from each other, they provided similar comments on the results, emphasizing that in general, Russians perceive an organization from a paternalistic perspective. In other words, Russians do not mind that the dominant role in an organization belongs to the leader, who has his or her exclusive right to make the final decision. This picture of an authoritative and respected supervisor might have caused Russian participants to be careful in their virtual reactions to management’s poor decisions. Many responses of Russian students underlined the necessity “To try to convince management to act ethically,” “To express a disagreement in a soft manner,” “To point out management’s mistake tactfully.” Such a delicate tone in Russian responses contrasted with American students’ voices: “Do not cover up,” “Confront management about the decision,” and “Be honest, be upfront, take responsibility.” Future research might further explore to what extent the current situation in Russian economic, political, and social life as well as public relations practices, influence Russian students’ perceptions of ethics.
Responsibilities in public relations are conflicting by their nature: A professional needs to meet the expectation of a manager, to please the client, and at the same time to keep in mind that his or her activities also affect publics. The public relations practitioner’s duties become even more complicated against a background of economical, political and social turbulence in a nation. In such situations, an ethical adjustment seems to be a necessity. The question is, to what degree? Some flexibility allows a practitioner to remain in the profession, whereas lack of flexibility may force the individual to leave the public relations field due to endless confrontations. A survival mentality, or obedience to the boss, does move an individual’s career, but it does not advance the profession.

CONCLUSION

The results of this study contribute to a small but growing body of conceptual and empirical knowledge on cross-cultural ethical differences in public relations. The findings suggest that the cultural environment and the degree of economic development of the students’ native countries may have influenced the ethical perceptions of Russian and American students. The type and extent of public relations education, on-the-job training in the field and professional association support also may have helped them to shape both public relations perceptions and practices. In Russia, a conflict between two values systems — Russian (“traditional”) and the Western (liberal) in Russian mass consciousness (Kliucharev & Muckle, 2005) presumably complicates the professional lives of public relations managers: Having Western roots, public relations is being cultivated in the Russian soil, and its products then have a special flavor. In the United States, public relations practice is perhaps more evolved and professional, but issues of ethics and leadership remain contested.

The findings of this study cannot be generalized to the rest of the population because of the convenience samples. Nevertheless, it is useful to know how some public relations students in Russia and the United States perceive themselves in regard to ethicality today, when concern about the lack of ethical behavior among many public relations practitioners in both countries is a highly controversial issue. In addition, the study underscores the need for more research focused on student ethics perceptions. Such studies might serve as a background for re-evaluating the format and content of ethics instruction in public relations educational programs if such programs do, in fact, favorably influence professional ethics.

REFERENCES


This study examined the news coverage of the Three Mile Island and the Chernobyl nuclear accidents and the role of political ideology in deciding the content of news in two elite U.S. newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post, and two elite Soviet newspapers, Pravda and Izvestiya. The findings indicated that the U.S. press coverage of Chernobyl had a predominantly negative bias compared to the U.S. press coverage of Three Mile Island. Soviet press coverage of Three Mile Island had a more negative bias than the news coverage of Chernobyl. The study concludes that both the U.S. and the Soviet news media were heavily influenced by the Cold War climate and the dominant ideology of each society.

**Key words:** media coverage, ideology, hegemony, Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, nuclear policy.

**N**uclear energy is perhaps the one technological invention that has transformed human progress and human history in terms beyond what historians and social scientists dared to predict. Depending on the observer’s viewpoint, the discovery of nuclear energy is lauded as one of humanity’s greatest scientific triumphs or lamented as the ultimate Faustian bargain. Yet, the importance of nuclear power over the years has been put beyond doubt and has defined the very terms in which we perceive the ideological opposition of the Cold War and the accompanying hazards of the nuclear weapons race.
In the nuclear age, the news media play a central and even growing role in society, defined and often controlled by its technological inventions. Audiences often learn how to conduct themselves in ordinary and extreme social and work situations through the mass media, but they also learn how to evaluate major social institutions and their actions following the news coverage. Despite the fundamental political and ideological differences between the Soviet and the Western world, however, this statement held true for both democratic and totalitarian societies. In the United States, the news media are deemed powerful guardians of political norms because the American public believes that a free press should keep it informed about the acts and the decisions of the government. This is one of the basic beliefs of the role of the news media in democratic societies — in democracies, governments are viewed as fallible servants of the people. The professional media organizations are regarded as objective reporters of good and evil who scrutinize the passing scene on behalf of a public that can and must appraise the performance of the officials. In contrast to this view, the role of the news media in the Soviet society was determined by its power to influence and mobilize the social and political system. For the Soviet press, there was no pretense to “objectivity,” as understood and practiced in the West. On the contrary, the press ought never to be seen as a mere reporter of “the news”—rather, it was the duty of the journalist to “change the world” and raise the level of class-consciousness and social cohesion.

While freedom of expression is certainly a sign of a democratic society that functions without the constraints of a major political ideology, it does not guarantee the complete lack of economic, cultural or social domination of the ruling class in society. The concept of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971) seems useful for a coherent analysis of cultural practices without losing the plurality and the particularity of democratic theory. In a democracy, hegemony provides an ideology that supports political society and encourages consent by the dominant class. When hegemony in civil society is strong, political domination is easily achieved without reliance on coercion. In this ideological and cultural domination of the elites in Western societies, the news media play a crucially important role. This is particularly true in cases of national emergencies and hazardous situations threatening the public safety and the local and international environment. Nuclear accidents, beyond doubt, present such critical moments and the crucial role of the news media in reporting these events is unquestioned.

In the Cold War environment, nuclear power presented yet another dangerous weapon of destruction. However, nuclear power used for civilian purposes served the opposite purpose — it was a demonstration of progress, a sign of technological advancement, an indication of prosperity and higher scientific development. The question of how safe nuclear energy really was and how well authorities communicated radiation safety issues to the public has been studied widely in the field of communications studies (Wober et al., 1992; Gwin, 1990; Farell & Goodnight, 1989). As Gwin (1990) argues, American cultural understanding of nuclear power is “strewn with rhetoric and images that have minimized
safety concerns and promoted nuclear power development — images that have become imbedded in modern nuclear risk communication” (xiv). Additionally, when political interests are the major determinants of international relations, the news media, research has shown, play a significant role in forming public opinion and placing national and international events in the public eye.

The present study provides a comparative analysis of the news coverage of the two of the most massive nuclear industry failures of our times, TMI (henceforth — TMI) in the United States and Chernobyl in the Soviet Union. While scholars in mass communication research have explored the news coverage of TMI and Chernobyl (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, Wober et al, 1992), it seems necessary to establish how the two press systems of the superpowers covered these important nuclear accidents. TMI and Chernobyl provide an appropriate parallel between the social and political conditions dictated by the Cold War. Even more, the press coverage of these nuclear failures might provide an important indication not only to the behavior of the press in moments of national emergency, but also to its role either as a supporter or a contender of the dominant ideology of society. This study examines two elite U.S. and two elite Soviet newspapers to analyze the coverage of TMI and Chernobyl and the role of ideology in deciding the content of the news. A quantitative and qualitative analysis was conducted to determine the connection between the empirical observations and theoretical impression of the relationship between the news media and the dominant ideology of each society.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

It has become commonplace in mass communication research to emphasize not only journalism’s role in the dissemination of information, but also the news media’s contribution to the construction of meaning in society (Carey, 1975; Hall, 1982; Gitlin, 1980). Influenced by journalistic routines and practices (Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978), news stories as symbolic accounts provide the public with definitions of social and political reality. The current focus on the news media as significant agencies of symbolic, socially determined production reflects a broader, paradigmatic shift away from a transmission model of communication to a cultural or ritual model of communication (Barkin & Gurevitch, 1987; Carey, 1975).

However, conflicting interpretations of the news media’s relationship to political authority have been a significant part of mass communication research for a long time. While numerous studies have noted the news media’s contribution to the construction of meaning, neo-Marxist researchers have argued that news content routinely supports and extends a dominant ideology. In this view, journalistic constructions of reality legitimize and reinforce the political and economic status quo; as agencies of social control, news organizations denigrate and restrict dissent (Hallin, 1987; Hall, 1982; Dahlgren, 1982; Gitlin, 1980).
These observations challenge the long-established idea that the news media are powerful guardians of political norms growing out of the public belief that a free press is vitally important and necessary for the existence of a democratic society. However, the practice of the news media is less clear-cut than its theoretical frame. In the United States, neither news people nor governmental officials are completely at ease with the media “watchdog” role (Graber, 1993). While journalists claim for themselves principles of objective and unbiased coverage, for many communication scholars objectivity is less of an ideal than a tactical process in news reporting intended for news media institutions to create a perception of centrist ideology and to attract and preserve a mass audience (Ognianova & Endersby, 1996). As Fishman (1980) pointed out, “ideological hegemony in the news media can occur without the direct intervention of publishers or editors, without the existence of informal news policies into which reporters are socialized, and without secret programs in news organizations to recruit reporters sharing a particular point of view” (p. 140). The ideological character of the news often follows from sources other than the journalist’s immediate social environment and the rules of the profession. On the contrary, news bias often originates in political and social conditions, deeply rooted in the structural organization of authority in society.

**TMI AND CHERNOBYL IN THE NEWS MEDIA**

Stephens (1980) contended that the story of TMI was generally one of information — “its presence, absence and evasive nature” (p. 5). In reporting a nuclear incident which posed a severe threat to the public safety journalists were facing a new, unprecedented, type of event to cover on an otherwise-slow news day. “This was a story of confusion, waste and ineptitude in search, often not for information, truth or success, but for public attention” (p. 73).

The magnitude of this event undoubtedly involved immense news media attention. As many authors have argued, the press was at the center of TMI. The press was charged with interpreting the event for the nation. However, as Stephens also contended, when accepting this task, the news media came under more criticism than any other group involved — criticism for sensationalism, for being antinuclear, for being pronuclear and for not keeping reactor specialists on the reporting staff.

Not only did the media play a critically important role in informing the public, but they also played a major role in creating and communicating the symbolic meaning of TMI to the viewing and reading audiences. Farrell & Goodnight (1981) studied the communication practices at TMI in order to examine the rhetorical techniques and specific rhetorical devices used in communicating the nuclear power crisis which ensued after the accident. In their evaluation, TMI presented a crisis not only in technical terms, but also in communicative adequacy. What is more, Farrell and Goodnight found that the TMI communicative practices signal an overall failure of technical rationale itself to offer communicative practices which
address the larger issue of dealing with the public rhetoric of communicating nuclear power in the 20th century. In studying a rich selection of media reports on TMI, the authors concluded that nuclear failure at TMI constituted a unique communication crisis which revealed “the most fundamental limitations of present conceptions of public discourse,” expressed by the failure of both public officials and media sources alike to clarify the distinction between social and technical discourse when communicating society’s “unsteady relationship with technology and the environment” (p. 299).

Rubin (1982) conducted thorough research on the amount and nature of information about the TMI disaster released to the public. In a content analysis of the two major wire services (AP and UPI), the three broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC), and the three major newspapers (the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times), Rubin recorded the coverage of specific critical factors and the sources of the available information. Rubin also explored the sources providing the reporters with information and how reporters were in turn interpreting and presenting the information to the public. This study discovered that the complex motivations of the sources and the peculiar needs of journalists contributed most to the poor flow of information to the public.

In a comparative study of the TMI and the Chernobyl accidents, Rubin (1987) discovered that while there were many striking parallels in the flow of information during both nuclear catastrophes, ranging from absence of emergency communication plans to the deliberate withholding of data on radiation releases, there were also many significant differences. Rubin’s analysis demonstrated that information about the accident at TMI was available in greater quantity in shorter time and with fewer restrictions than Chernobyl. Nevertheless, he pointed out that both U.S. officials and the utility personnel of the TMI power plant were more protective of the nuclear industry than open about faults and problems with nuclear technology. To further exemplify the difficulty of drawing a clear line between the Western press approach to handling a nuclear disaster and that of the Soviets, Rubin quoted Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency: “The Soviet reporting was late, meager, but probably not untrue. The Western reporting was fast, massive and often misleading. Can there be not anything in between?” (p. 54).

In a similar vein, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) offered one of the most complete examinations of both the TMI and Chernobyl nuclear accident in their study of the relationship between media discourse and public opinion in communication about the issue of nuclear power. In their examination of media discourse, Gamson and Modigliani take on a constructionist approach, arguing that that the change in public opinion is not caused by changes in media discourse, but rather, is the result of part of the process of constructing symbolic meanings that are socially defined and are influenced by the way in which journalists and other vessels of cultural meaning “develop and crystallize meaning in public discourse” (p. 2). In explaining how media discourse is organized, the authors identify what they call “media packages” — a set of interpretative packaged reports that give meaning to an issue. In this sense, media packages resemble frames, which indicate organizational
devices which journalists use to report on events and which media audiences use to understand such reports. In reporting on the issue of nuclear power, the authors argued, the most widely used media package is that of progress followed, secondly, by the package of energy independence. Simultaneously, the authors observed other, less pro-nuclear packages also began to appear in media discourse, including what they call the environmentalist package of soft paths as well as the public accountability package.

The findings of Gamson and Modigliani’s qualitative analysis of both major nuclear accidents are fascinating. In studying the media discourse stimulated by TMI, the authors argued, there was “an accelerated shift from progress to runaway and devil’s bargain as the most popular schemata among the attentive public” (p. 33). However, after Chernobyl, media discourse changed from pro-nuclear progress to the fatalism of runaway or the ambivalence of devil’s bargain and from ambivalence to outright opposition. And while these findings allow us to scrutinize the relationship between media discourse and public opinion, they fail to explain the role of the ideological rift between the two superpowers at the time which might account for the noticeably distinct treatment of TMI and Chernobyl by the American press.

In the immediate aftermath of Chernobyl, an entirely new set of questions about the role of the news media in covering nuclear disasters was raised. Many parallels were drawn between the press coverage of the TMI and the reaction of the news media to this unprecedented environmental problem. In a content analysis of the radiation reports in the U.S. news media, Friedman, Gorney, and Egolf (1987) discovered that the press and television failed to provide enough radiation or risk information in their coverage of the Chernobyl accident. To support their argument, the authors also examined the results of different studies of the TMI accident, which generally led to the conclusion that the U.S. coverage of the TMI radiation was “abysmally inadequate.” The Task Force on the Public’s Right to Information of the President’s Commission on the Accident at TMI charged the reporters covering TMI with making improper comparisons and factually impossible statements and providing insufficient background information (Rubin & Cunningham, 1980).

On the other hand, Wilkins and Patterson (1987) analyzed the Chernobyl news coverage from a different angle. They contended that the news media committed fundamental errors of attribution in their coverage of a risk situation, such as Chernobyl, by treating it as a novelty, failing to analyze the entire system and using insufficiently analytical language. A very important observation which Wilkins and Patterson’s qualitative analysis illustrated is that the news media failed to analyze fully the technological and social system in which the event occurred. Moreover, the authors contended that the news reports of the Chernobyl accident tended to blame people and institutions for what appeared to be societal problems that needed to be addressed in a different manner. Also, the content analysis of television network news related to the Chernobyl accident indicated that the news media, in covering an event of such enormous magnitude, used a cultural and dramatic frame for what risk experts viewed as primarily technological problems. “Television viewers, for example,
were not told that Chernobyl was considered in some respects a ‘normal accident’ but that Chernobyl was an ‘accident’ of an inept, callous, and secretive political system” (p. 87).

In their book on television and public opinion on nuclear power, Wober et al. (1992) offer an in-depth and globally inclusive analysis of the media portrayals of the public debate over the society’s potential to use the nuclear technology for the benefit or harm of humanity. More importantly, the authors demonstrate the specific ways in which television has disseminated, transmitted and sometimes, manipulated the aggregate body of knowledge on the power and danger of nuclear energy. In this volume particular interest to the study at hand is Shlapentokh’s contribution (1992), who examined the ideological nature of the ecology debate in the Soviet Union, recognizing that the media played a huge role in not only concealing the facts of the impact of Chernobyl, but also contributed to the ideological manipulation of the Soviet public opinion while dismissing Chernobyl as a mechanical failure that does not merit the “malicious reaction of the West” and the “anti-Soviet hysteria” that followed. As Shlapentokh pointed out, “Soviet propaganda also attempted to exploit Chernobyl disaster for two other purposes — as an argument in favor of Soviet foreign policy, presented at this time as the only one concerned about nuclear disarmament ... as well as for praising the altruism, heroism and the friendship of the Soviet people” (p. 103).

Another study of the television news coverage of Chernobyl contended that Soviet television manifested all elements of the control, the persuasive and the hortatory functions expected of the media by the new regime initiated by Gorbachev (Mickiewicz, 1988). Similarly, a content analysis by Eribo and Gaddy (1992), which examined the press coverage of the TMI and the Chernobyl nuclear accidents demonstrated significant differences between the press coverage of the two nuclear accidents in the United States and in the Soviet Union. Their content analysis of the New York Times and Pravda compared the Chernobyl news reports with those of the TMI accident and found that the New York Times gave earlier, greater and more detailed coverage to the nuclear accidents at both Chernobyl and TMI.

A qualitative study conducted by Young and Launer (1991) presented another perspective on the nature of the Soviet press coverage of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. By reviewing the coverage of the accident in three Soviet newspapers, Pravda, Izvestiya and Pravda Ukrainy, and on Soviet television news, the authors contended that the coverage of Chernobyl was not entirely uniform, but went through several distinct stages which were highly influenced by the changing political and social conditions of the Soviet society. The authors pointed out that “the Soviet government ‘ideologized’ the event by attempting to link it to the Soviet proposals for arms reduction and to reinforce the image of the United States as the primary threat to disarmament” (p. 109).

Remington (1988) offered another perspective on the Soviet approach to covering social or environmental crises. In an analysis of the crisis management of the KAL Flight 007 and the Chernobyl incident, Remington examined the decision-making process whether to run these important stories or not. The author concluded that in dramatic situations,
timpliness as the primary newsworthy factor concedes to political considerations by the high-
levels of Soviet authority.

For many scholars, Chernobyl was a milestone in Soviet media studies. Marples and
Young (1997) contended that “Chernobyl was first and foremost a media event” (p. 125). In
their analysis, the authors acknowledged the sensitivity of the nuclear safety theme and
compared the way in which the United States and the Soviets handled their own nuclear
fiascoes. However, Marples and Young provided a rather limited and traditional perspective
on the news coverage of the accidents, failing to analyze the importance of the complex
political and international environment. “Whereas the Western media is and was free to write
accounts of TMI at their leisure, the Soviet press has espoused the opinion of the leadership
in Moscow, by and large” (p. 126). Thus, Marpole and Young argued that the “free” and
democratic press of the United States handled the sensitive topic of nuclear catastrophe in
a more responsible and open fashion, while the Soviet press withheld and manipulated
important information not only to their own citizens but to the international community as
well.

In a similar argument, Haynes and Bojcun (1988) pointed out that the Western media
were hampered in their work by the paucity of information — or the complete lack of it
before the 28th of April — from the Soviet government, and by the prohibition against
Moscow-based foreign correspondents traveling to Chernobyl to pursue their inquiries. “In
what was clearly perceived by the Reagan administration as a propaganda opportunity
against the Soviet Union, government officials joined the fray once the Soviet government
admitted the disaster” (p. 62). Haynes and Bojcun also argued that while the initial
sensationalism of the exaggerated reports of the number of victims and geographical scope
of the accident were eventually corrected, they “received a good deal of play in the world
press” and influenced the manner in which the nuclear accident was perceived by the
international audience.

Luke (1989) contended that the news of Chernobyl fit well within the mechanism of
“conditioning and suggestion” in both the Eastern and the Western world. While analyzing
the role of ideology in the Soviet and the U.S. press, the author maintained that shifting the
focus in covering such an important nuclear disaster from the event itself to the ideological
perspective of the society in which it took place, summarized the intrinsic complexity of
events with international significance the rank of Chernobyl. “When causation is assigned
to the Chernobyl reactor operators or designers’ technical blunders, the disaster can be
attributed to inept magicians, who rightly paid the price of serious trouble for lacking
‘technical vigilance’” (p. 183). Luke’s critical analysis strongly emphasized the importance
which the dominant ideology of a given society, whether the “free,” democratic society of
the West, or the tightly controlled society of the Soviet Union, had on the content and
direction of news coverage.

To summarize, while there is a significant amount of literature written on failures of
nuclear energy and their coverage by the U.S. and Soviet press, only a limited number of
these studies explore the influence of political ideology on the content of news. Thus, it seemed necessary to examine the role of ideology and political rivalry in the press coverage of these two events, which while not political in nature, present an opportunity for political opposition and power struggle.

**RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES**

According to the hegemony thesis, the news media are not autonomous institutions capable of exercising their own power; rather, the news media serve as instruments in the voluntary ideological mobilization of the society. To examine the applicability of the hegemony thesis to the press coverage of TMI and Chernobyl, this comparative study accomplishes further research on the role of ideology in news coverage by addressing these research questions:

Was there a difference in the ideological perspective presented in the U.S. press coverage of TMI compared with the coverage of the Chernobyl accident? Was there a difference in the ideological perspective presented in the Soviet press coverage of TMI compared to the coverage of Chernobyl?

Was there a difference in the usage of sources in the U.S. and the Soviet press coverage of Chernobyl and TMI?

Did the language of the U.S. news coverage differ in reporting the two accidents and was the language used in the news reports ideological in nature?

Did the language of the Soviet news coverage differ in reporting the two accidents and was the language used in the news reports ideological in nature?

To examine these research questions, the following hypotheses were postulated based upon the literature review and the historical context of the Cold War:

H1: U.S. press coverage of Chernobyl will have a more negative ideological slant than the U.S. coverage of TMI and the Soviet press coverage of TMI will have a more negative ideological slant than the press coverage of Chernobyl.

H2: More official sources will be used in the U.S. press coverage of TMI than in the U.S. press coverage of Chernobyl and more official sources will be used in the Soviet coverage of Chernobyl than in the Soviet news coverage of TMI.

H3: More negatively charged ideological words will be used in the U.S. news coverage of the Chernobyl nuclear accident than in the news coverage of TMI and more positively charged ideological words will be used in the U.S. coverage of TMI than in the U.S. coverage of Chernobyl.
H4: More negatively charged ideological words will be used in the Soviet coverage of the TMI than in covering the Chernobyl accident and more positively charged ideological words will be used in the Soviet coverage of Chernobyl than in the Soviet coverage of TMI.

While content analysis studies of both Chernobyl and TMI have been accomplished before, this study offers a new approach to the media analysis of coverage of these nuclear crises as it examines them cross-culturally while emphasizing and conceptualizing measures of ideological influences in news content which contribute further to the existing body of knowledge in the communication studies discipline.

Method

From the large selection of newspapers with significant national circulation in the United States, two newspapers, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, were selected. The *New York Times*, journalism scholars contend, ends up influencing the content” of the media and the knowledge of the opinion leaders (Cohen, 1961; Davidson, 1976; Weiss, 1974; Saikowski, 1983; Graber, 1993) and that it may not be a bad indicator of the general public perception about news events (Page & Shapiro, 1984). The *Washington Post*, as one of the influential newspapers which originates in the nation’s capital, also enjoys great popularity as an opinion leader and an elite newspaper.

To study the news coverage of TMI and Chernobyl in the Soviet press, this study analyzes *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* as representatives of the Soviet press. These newspapers were selected because as Young and Launer (1991) argued, “the national press remains the medium of choice for placing events into the proper ideological prospective” (p. 108). *Pravda*, the official organ of the Communist Party, was published seven days a week and had a circulation of almost 11 million in the 1980s, the largest circulating newspaper in the world (Kurian, 1982; Hecht, 1982). *Izvestiya*, published by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to provide a more balanced representation of the Soviet press. *Izvestiya* had a 6.4 million circulation in the late 1980s and while not as authoritative as *Pravda* and rarely diverging from the official party line (Boxburgh, 1987), *Izvestiya* differed in appearance and on occasion, in content, from the official voice of the party (Murray, 1994).

This study also analyzes *Izvestiya*, published by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to provide a more balanced representation of the Soviet press. *Izvestiya* had a 6.4 million circulation in the late 1980s and while not as authoritative as *Pravda* and rarely diverging from the official party line (Boxburgh, 1987), *Izvestiya* differed in appearance and on occasion, in content, from the official voice of the party (Murray, 1994). This study encompasses two separate time periods — the first two months after the TMI accident starting from March 28, 1979, and ending May 31, 1979, and two months after the Chernobyl accident, starting from April 26, 1986, and ending on June 30, 1986.

A preliminary examination of all newspaper issues from the study period yielded a total of 438 TMI stories in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* and a total of 4 stories in *Pravda* and *IzveStiya*. For Chernobyl, the total number of stories printed in the U.S.
newspapers was 411 against 102 stories printed in the Soviet newspapers. Table 1 is the distribution of news items in the two U.S. and the two Soviet elite newspapers.

This study uses a systematic sample of 25% of the convenient sample of U.S. newspapers for the two nuclear accidents, a total of 211 stories. For the Soviet newspapers, the study considers the whole convenient sample of 106 stories. For the purposes of this study, all newspapers were examined in their native language — English for the U.S. dailies, and Russian for the Soviet dailies.

Overall, the paragraph was used as the coding unit and the unit of analysis for hypothesis one. Hypotheses three and four required that the word be the coding unit and the unit of analysis.

To find out whether there were any differences in the TMI and Chernobyl news coverage, the following variables were established:

Slant — ideological slant was measured by recording whether a paragraph conveyed a favorable and positive impression of the actions of the respective country, unfavorable or negative impression, or whether the paragraph conveyed both or neither, in which, it was considered neutral.

Ideological Words — ideological words were decided through a preliminary review of the U.S. and the Soviet coverage of the accident. Certain words, conveying ideological opposition were recorded and thereafter, coded by the researcher. For example, ideological words were accident vs. nuclear disaster; damaged reactor vs. crippled reactor; immediate reactor vs. slow and untimely reaction, open communication vs. withholding information; mechanical failure vs. human error; among others. These ideological words were examined and recorded to establish the role of language in the reporting of international and national news in the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Number of stories</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Number of stories</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The New York Times</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Washington Post</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pravda</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izvestyia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.23%</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source — after a careful reading of randomly selected, non-sample issues of the examined newspapers, the following categories of sources were established: journalistic (journalist’s observation or investigation); wire sources; official sources (governmental or other state institution); scientific (a study or an identified scientist); nuclear industry source (national or international); unofficial sources (any unnamed and dissidents’ opinion) and other (any other sources).

Inter-coder reliability was established at 95% for ideological slant and 100% for ideological words. In addition, a qualitative analysis of the major themes of coverage in both the U.S. and Soviet newspapers was conducted to discern the subtle and frequently, obscured, ideological references which might not become apparent from the statistical analysis. The qualitative analysis examined the language and rhetorical devices used by the journalists to cover TMI and Chernobyl.

**FIN DING S AN D D ISCUSSION**

The statistical procedure yielded a total of 3,170 paragraphs, 2,248 (71%) of which were found in the U.S. press coverage of TMI and Chernobyl and 920 (29%) in the Soviet coverage of the two accidents. These initial results of the statistical distribution of stories in the U.S. and the Soviet press are in themselves illuminating. The volume of coverage in the U.S. press of both the TMI and the Chernobyl accidents was significantly higher than the volume of coverage of the same events in the Soviet newspapers under examination.

The first hypothesis was supported. The data yielded statistically significant results (chi-square=477.00, p < .05) and demonstrated that the slant of the U.S. news stories about Chernobyl was more negative than the slant of the U.S. news stories about TMI. The slant of the Soviet news reports about TMI was also more negative than the slant of the Soviet news report of the Chernobyl accident. Results are presented in Table 2.

The news coverage of Chernobyl in the two U.S. elite newspapers was more negative (38.8%) than the news coverage of TMI which was not reported in a negative ideological slant (0%). In the two Soviet elite newspapers, the news coverage of TMI was also more negative (65%) than the Soviet news coverage of Chernobyl which was not reported in a negative ideological slant (0%). In testing hypothesis two, the statistical procedure yielded significant results (chi-square=110.473 p < .05), presented in Table 3.

Contrary to the theoretical assumptions, however, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* cited almost an equal amount of official (49.5%) and non-official sources (50.5%). The news stories in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* used more official sources in covering Chernobyl (96.1%) than in covering TMI (3.9%). However, even though the results of the
TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF PARAGRAPH USE OF NEGATIVE IDEOLOGICAL SLANT
BY NEWSPAPER AND ACCIDENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuclear accident</th>
<th>Negative mentions in the U.S. newspapers</th>
<th>Negative mentions in the Soviet newspapers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>% of total slant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernobyl</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 477.00 \]

statistical test were significant and the findings indicated that the Soviet press used more official sources in the news coverage of Chernobyl than in the coverage of TMI, the U.S. press used an equal number of official sources in reporting both TMI and Chernobyl. Thus, hypothesis two is rejected.

For the purpose of testing hypothesis three, the following procedure was established. The negatively charged words could also be labeled as “provocative” because used in the coverage of the opposing power’s nuclear accident, they convey a critical and negative interpretation. Similarly, what earlier was described as positively charged ideological words could also be described as “defensive” words because when used in reporting one’s own nuclear failure, they convey a more supportive and positive interpretation. The statistical test which was applied to the collected data in testing this hypothesis was conducted while collapsing the two sets of words into two separate categories which were labeled accordingly. The findings of the test yielded significant support (chi-square=103.1226, p < .05) and are described in Table 4.

The news coverage of the TMI in the New York Times and the Washington Post 62.9% of the time used positively charged ideological words such as “accident,” “mechanical failure,” or “strong reactor design” and only 37.1% of the time employed negatively charged ideological words. Moreover, the U.S. press coverage of Chernobyl 63.4% of the time used negatively charged ideological words such as “secretive,” “nuclear disaster,” “human error,” or “unsafe nuclear science,” while only 36.6% employed positively charged ideological words. These results clearly lend support to hypothesis three.

The recording procedure applied to the data set in testing hypothesis three which collapsed the total number of ideologically words into two separate variables was also used
to test hypothesis four. The test yielded significant results (chi-square=46.01313, p < .05) which are presented in Table 5.

The Soviet press coverage of TMI employed in 68.4% of the time words with ideological meaning which were critical of American nuclear science and the U.S. handling of the nuclear accident, such as “unprepared to handle nuclear accidents,” “nuclear disaster,” or “incompetent operators,” and “slow and untimely reaction” and which were defined as “negatively charged ideological words.” On the other hand, only 31.6% of the time the Soviet newspapers used words were carried a positive ideological meaning. Also, the Soviet newspaper reports of Chernobyl 87% of the time used positively charged ideological words such as “safe nuclear science,” “immediate evacuation and mobilization,” or “strong design” and “sophisticated control” while only 13% employed words and terms that had a negative ideological meaning. Therefore, hypothesis four is supported.

**Table 3**

**Distribution of Paragraph Use of Official Sources by Newspapers and Accident**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Usage of official sources in U.S. newspapers</th>
<th>Usage of official sources in Soviet newspapers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMI</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernobyl</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2=110.473$  
$p=.00000 \ (p<.05)$

**Table 4**

**Distribution of Ideological Words in U.S. Press Coverage of TMI and Chernobyl**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Usage of Negatively Charged Ideological Words</th>
<th>Usage of Positively Charged Ideological Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMI</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernobyl</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2=103.1226$  
$p=.00000 \ (p<.05)$
Usage of Negatively Charged Ideological Words | Usage of Positively Charged Ideological Words
---|---
Event | N | % | N | %
TMI | 13 | 68.4% | 6 | 31.6%
Chernobyl | 90 | 13.0% | 604 | 87.0%

$\chi^2=46.01313$ $p=.00000$ ($p<.05$)

**Qualitative Analysis**

**The New York Times and the Washington Post**

The news coverage of TMI and Chernobyl in the U.S. press significantly differed in areas of concentration and themes of interest. The similar nature of the two technological mishaps suggested a consistent tone and focus of news stories over the two time periods. However, the U.S. press exhibited notably different behavior in the case of TMI and Chernobyl. While TMI was a unique technological disaster, unprecedented in coverage and importance, Chernobyl presented an opportunity for the U.S. journalists to improve their knowledge and skills in handling risk communication which threatened public safety on a national and international level. During the TMI crisis, the U.S. newspapers directed the public attention to the potential hazards of civil nuclear power and the assumed consequences of nuclear fallout. Moreover, the news media’s reaction to, and handling of, the TMI nuclear failure in itself became a newsworthy event, which received significant attention in the press. While the volume of material printed about the accident was almost prodigious, reporters often admitted their fear of the consequences of radiation exposure and their failure to understand the workings of a nuclear reactor and thus, their failure to communicate effectively the risk of a possible fallout at TMI.

Along with stories that focused exclusively on the information provided by the governmental commission in charge of investigating the accident, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* printed stories on anti-nuclear protests and risk assessment that often questioned the safety of U.S. nuclear technology. A *New York Times* story, for example, discussed the dangerous consequences of a possible meltdown at TMI, warning the public of the dangers of civil nuclear technology. Similar in tone articles questioned the necessity
of using energy produced by atomic power plants, turning the attention of the public to alternative energy sources.

Moreover, U.S. newspapers devoted a significant part of their news coverage to discussing international reaction to the manner in which the TMI accident was handled by the government and the nuclear technology authorities. While many of these reports were positive and, for the most part, supportive of the safety measures developed as a universal standard in the Western world, the news reports which discussed the Soviet coverage of TMI were exclusively critical. An article printed on April 2, 1979, in the New York Times discussing the Soviet reaction to the accident accused Soviet authorities of misrepresenting facts and exaggerating the consequences of the nuclear failure. Moreover, the Times report pointed out that all Soviet accusations of incompetence were groundless, particularly when only one Soviet reactor had the safety concrete containment dome which all nuclear power plants in the United States had. The Times report also emphasized a statement by a Soviet dissident scientist who testified to a Soviet nuclear explosion which released dangerous nuclear wastes but was never reported or confirmed by Soviet authorities. The effect was to question the safety standards and procedures of Soviet nuclear science and raise further doubt in the safety of Soviet nuclear science and technology in general.

On the other hand, the New York Times and the Washington Post applied a different approach to the coverage of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. The initial reports on Chernobyl in the U.S. newspapers concentrated heavily on the lack of information and Soviet unwillingness to cooperate and release the facts around the circumstances and the scope of the nuclear accident. One explanation of this different perspective was offered by Sood, Stockdale and Rogers (1987) who contended that while the TMI disaster increased the news value of Chernobyl, the Cold War relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union also played a significant role in the perspective through which the news media depicted the failure of the Soviet nuclear power. Overall, the U.S. press expressed the mistrust and negative attitude of the West to the general safety and reliability of Soviet nuclear science. Moreover, a majority of early news reports questioned the strength of the Soviet industrial base and sought to expose the weaknesses of the Soviet system in general. In the news reports, the Chernobyl reactor was often described as “crippled,” “lacking basic safety regulations,” “an enormous explosion,” “having the worst safety measures in the world.” Journalists openly spoke of “the shadow of Chernobyl,” “the slow reaction and heavy bureaucratic machine” of the Soviet government. In the same tone, the secrecy of the Soviet government occupied the attention of reporters, who wrote that the Soviets were putting “an extraordinary effort to restrict information about the worst nuclear accident so far” and that this was apparently “a reflexive retreat into secrecy that again seemed to show the Kremlin loath to concede any failing before its people and a hostile world.”

Other news reports attempted to estimate the importance of this nuclear disaster and its implication to the future development of U.S. nuclear science. An article in the Washington Post cited an U.S. scientist who announced that “Hiroshima was a major lab for
studying radiation, and now, this will be another one.” An even more insensitive comment was quoted in a *New York Times* cover page news story which stated: “It’s too bad it did not happen closer to Kremlin.”

While the majority of initial reports of Chernobyl in the U.S. newspapers concentrated on the Soviet delay of information of the nuclear fallout to the international community, many of the follow-up reports focused on the comparison between the safety of the two powers’ nuclear technologies, which often metamorphosed into an open discussion of the difference between the two political and social systems. Many of these stories often discussed the TMI accident, emphasizing the safety of the American reactors in comparison to those of the Soviets. One official was quoted in a *Washington Post* news story stating that “the difference between TMI and Chernobyl is like the difference between heaven and hell.” A nuclear scientist declared that “while the U.S. authorities were extremely cautious in handling the nuclear incident at TMI, the Soviet authorities displayed reckless disregard for safety.”

**Pravda and Izvestiya**

A striking observation was made at the beginning of the data collection stage when the search located only four stories in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* discussing the TMI accident in its immediate aftermath. An examination of the study period indicated that most of the international news coverage was devoted to foreign policy conflicts and the Cold War power struggle, mainly reviewing the Arab-Israeli conflict and the “aggressive” American involvement in it. In fact, both Soviet newspapers devoted only two of the six total pages in each daily issue to international news, one page of which was solely devoted to news from the “brotherly peoples” of the Socialist republic in the Eastern bloc. However, despite the small number of stories, the ideological inclination of the Soviet reports was hard to overlook. The news stories in both newspapers spoke of “panic-stricken people” and an “unexpected and uncontrollable situation.” Perhaps the best description of the Soviet reaction to TMI was an extensive news analysis of the event published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. What the U.S. was initially portraying as an incident was interpreted in the Soviet bloc as “a serious, major accident, one that threatened at any moment to turn into a catastrophe, even terrible tragedy.” Moreover, the news report said that the only explanation of the accident could be “either that the personnel were not adequately trained or that the emergencies technology demands further attention.” The author of the article drew attention to the irresponsible behavior of the private nuclear energy companies. “For the public, TMI serves — no, it already served — as an example of the criminally irresponsible use of the atomic energy by monopolies, and people indignant about what happened.” Interestingly, the Soviet reports of TMI also mentioned the lack of reliable safety system in American nuclear plants, which contrary to the U.S. reports, were described as weak and unreliable, and most of all, “malfunctioning and cheap.”
Moreover, in the same edition of the newspaper, another article took the opportunity to emphasize the superiority of the Soviet nuclear technology. The article, titled “No Task Is Beyond Soviet Science” criticized the U.S. for experimenting with nuclear science and technological advance in the name of private profit, rather than in the name of the progress of humanity. On the other hand, “the USSR’s mighty scientific and technical potential,” the article contended, allows it to solve problems that withstand various sorts of tests and blockades.

The discussion of TMI, as well as of many other minor nuclear mishaps in the Western world, found place on the pages of Pravda and Izvestiya almost immediately after the worst nuclear failure so far took place in April 1986. While ideological opposition and anti-American sentiments found a reflection in the news coverage of TMI, Chernobyl presented yet another opportunity to the Soviet press to apply ideological control to the content of domestic and international news.

Perhaps the most striking element of the Soviet news coverage of Chernobyl was the four-day delay in releasing information to the international community, and most of all, to the Soviet people directly affected by the scope of the accident. However, the Soviet authority presented an explanation which was to excuse the lack of early reports — in order to avoid panic and assess the short- and the long-term plans of action for fast recovery from the accident, the Soviet authorities needed four days to thoroughly research and examine the situation at Chernobyl and its consequences to the people of the Soviet Union and the international community. Interestingly, what was perceived as a token of bad faith and reckless secretiveness in the Western world was described as a necessary measure of selective approach to information in the interest of the Soviet people and the fast and effective elimination of the radiation threat.

Moreover, the areas of concentration and the focus of news stories in the Soviet press differed significantly from the coverage of Chernobyl in the U.S. press. While the number of stories printed in the Soviet newspapers did not match the volume of coverage which the accident received in the U.S. press, the news stories discussing the Chernobyl tragedy in the Soviet newspapers were mostly feature or human interest stories which occupied the front pages of the newspapers and enjoyed significant length. Contrary to the U.S. press coverage of the Chernobyl accident, instead of approaching the nuclear mishap as a major technological disaster which presented an excellent opportunity to test the safety and the reliability of the nuclear system of a competing world power, the Soviet news coverage was directed in a more humane and spirited perspective. The majority of the early stories and in fact, most of the follow-up reports, focused on the brave effort of all plant operators and emergency workers who helped in the immediate evacuation and mobilization of the local populations. However, none of the articles failed to mention the skilled and considerate leadership of the Communist Party, which was often called “the great and wise leader,” “true friend of the victims,” “protector of the survivors.” Moreover, rather than depicting a portrait of a weak industrial base and incompetent emergency force, Pravda and Izvestiya openly
praised the highly qualified team of emergency workers on the site, who “performed enormous human feats” and the medical team who was “doing the impossible to save the life of the brave Chernobyl firefighters.”

A great amount of attention in the Soviet newspapers was also given to other nuclear accidents which took place around the world, particularly, failures of nuclear technology in the Western hemisphere. Most of these articles criticized the “apparent lack of responsibility on the side of private interests” and while clearly ideological in their anti-Western sentiments, presented ideologically charged, yet true, facts of nuclear mishaps all over the Western world. Of particular interest to the Soviet journalists were the technological failures in all spheres of U.S. science. A significant amount of coverage, for example, was given to the “Challenger” catastrophe and to investigating the reasons for the accident. Several articles in Pravda and Izvetyia described the “cruel and “heartless” decision of the NASA authorities to allow the flight to take place regardless of their knowledge of failing safety systems in the space shuttle. NASA was described as “willingly and consciously closing its eyes on blatant technological defects,” as “opportunistic,” and “recklessly adventurous” and the astronauts were said to be “doomed” at the “mercy of irresponsible administration.”

Many of the journalistic reports also discussed the Western reaction to Chernobyl and the Western depiction of the accident in the news media. To the Soviet journalist, the purpose of these reports was beyond clear — “with these images, the capitalists are hoping to divert the attention from the numerous nuclear accidents that take place on American soil, the reasons for which are either defective equipment, insufficient qualification of the personnel or reckless disregard for safety measures,” one reporter wrote. Others described the Western media coverage as “desperate attempt to divert the attention from the criminal aggression of the U.S. expressed in the recent bombing of Libya, and the undeclared war against Afghanistan and Nicaragua; to justify future effort in the weapons race, the continuing nuclear tests and the refusal to accept the peace proposals of the Soviet Union.”

The accusations of the Soviet press were almost universally present in each news report, emphasizing the lack of understanding and compassion from the West to the terrible tragedy of the Chernobyl people. Moreover, the critical U.S. media coverage of Chernobyl was also used as a political sign of unwillingness to negotiate the nuclear disarmament — a note heavily played in the Soviet coverage of the Chernobyl disaster. In this connection, it is important to note that many journalistic reports shifted the focus from the scene of the accident to painting apocalyptic images of what might happen in case of a nuclear war with the United States. “The world, humanity in general should never forget what a terrible danger lies in nuclear arms,” a press release in Pravda stated. Thus, instead of questioning the governmental policies or expertise in handling nuclear technology and the lack of immediate and sufficient information about the danger of nuclear energy and nuclear science in general, the Soviet press depicted the Chernobyl disaster as a “test to the human strength and spirit,” as an unavoidable “glitch in the wheel of progress” and a chance for the Soviet
people to prove to the world that theirs is a just, closely knit society which always strives to help comrades in distress, nuclear or civil.

The present study had several limitations among which the most apparent one was the small sample size of Soviet news stories on the TMI nuclear failure. The small sample size poses questions about the validity of the test results and calls for further examination to determine the strength of the statistical conclusions. In addition, while this study focused on the influence of ideology on the news coverage in the United States and the Soviet Union, other influential factors that determine the direction of news reports also come to mind. For instance, the role of journalistic norms and journalism education both in the United States and the Soviet Union could be a decisive factor in directing the news coverage of domestic and international events and could contribute valuable findings to future research of the news coverage of nuclear accidents in the different press systems.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to illuminate the role of political ideology and the Cold War confrontation in the news coverage of two nuclear events which while sharing many common characteristics, significantly differed in the manner in which they were presented in the news media. While a significant amount of studies in mass communication have examined the news coverage of nuclear danger, and specifically the news media reaction to TMI and Chernobyl, none of those studies compared the two from an ideological perspective as reflected in the news reports. Thus, one of the contributions of this study is that it has enriched the existing literature with a unique comparative study which examined the role of ideology in the U.S. and the Soviet press coverage of TMI and Chernobyl.

The results of this study confirmed that the ideological confrontation between the two world powers in the Cold War years swayed the news coverage of TMI and Chernobyl to present two universal ecological hazards as an opportunity to attack and criticize the beliefs and technological prowess of an opposing political regime rather than truthfully inform the public about the immediate and real dangers of radiation releases.

Moreover, the qualitative examination of the news coverage in the New York Times, the Washington Post, Pravda and Izvestiya illuminated yet another difference in the way in which the two countries approached the news coverage of their nuclear accidents. The U.S. press bombarded the public with news reports, frequently exaggerated and contradictory, and devoted significant attention to the future of nuclear energy and its consequence to the U.S. energy corporations. On the other hand, the Soviet press coverage was almost exclusively devoted to the fate of the victims of the radiation fallout. In the Soviet press, Chernobyl was depicted as a test to the Soviet people, another cruel manifestation of the forces of nature, which despite its tragic end, presents yet another opportunity for the Soviet people to mobilize their assets and prove to the whole world that Soviet science will continue to progress with more sophisticated control and more safety measures. As a result of this,
hundreds of letters were published in the Soviet newspapers, describing the Soviet people’s selfless desire to help the victims of Chernobyl. An article in Pravda, entitled, “I want to work at the Station,” quoted a member of the Chernobyl community who addressed these words to the Western press: “Screaming from the grave, we are alive! We stand firm on our land. We are going to fight for a clear sky above us to the very last breath. We are the brave people of Chernobyl.”

Thus, while ideology was a decisive factor in determining the angle of news coverage in both the Soviet and the U.S. newspapers, it is important to note that there were also significant differences in the topics of interest and themes of coverage in the two press systems. The U.S. newspapers described the Chernobyl accident in a noticeably negative light, emphasizing the lack of safety measures and sophisticated control while the Soviet newspapers presented the Chernobyl accident as nature’s “test” to the strength of the Soviet people. This observation leads to yet another important finding of this study — while ideology seems to impact the direction and bias of news coverage, other factors, such as journalistic norms and personal values, might also influence the final news product. Moreover, while this study had certain limitations, it pointed to a prominent role played by the dominant ideology and the superpower competition in the coverage of domestic and international news during the Cold War years. In the context of newswork, the dominant, anti-Communist or anti-Western ideology of either the United States or the Soviet Union appeared to function as a major source of news bias which also served as a powerful mechanism for transmitting and perpetuating the Cold War power competition and ideological opposition between the two countries. Ultimately, even nuclear hazards such as TMI and Chernobyl, which posed a serious threat not only to the country in which the nuclear failure took place but also to the entire international community, became not just a nuclear threat, but a political and ideological one as well.

ENDNOTES

1The New York Times has a large circulation and influences to a great extent the content of smaller newspapers and many other national and local media outlets (Gitlin, 1980; Antush, 1994). Moreover, this newspaper publishes a significant amount of foreign news (Haque, 1983; Riffe, 1984).

2While Pravda has been the center of many studies examining the role of the Soviet press in the contemporary social and political sphere (Berezhnoi, 1975; Bogdanov & Viazemski, 1971; Okorov, 1974; Ovsepyan, 1975), it has also been contended that Pravda was one of the most inalienable parts of the ideological development of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union and the Kremlin’s primary tool of ideological control (Merrill & Fisher, 1980). In addition, Western leaders and their political advisers often “search Pravda’s content for clues to the changing direction of Soviet’s policy” and as a “useful index to the Soviet behavior” (Markham, 1967, p. 170).

3Murray (1994) contended that during Khrushchev’s era and even after his death, the language of Izvestiya had more first-person reportage and clearly attempted to move away from the official language to a more literary style. Also, greater coverage was given to foreign news.
Because the hypotheses that this study explores examine bias of the coverage, editorials, letters and opinion pieces were left out of the analysis because they do not purport to be objective; these forms of communication are intended to take a stand on an issue, and present the author’s personal point of view.

All related stories in the U.S. newspapers were identified through their respective indexes. For the Soviet newspapers, because the index to Pravda and Izvestia could not be accessed, the related stories were identified through a careful and thorough examination and recording of all available (certain newspaper issues were not recorded in the microfilm sequence) issues.

While the data were being collected, a pilot study was conducted to establish inter-coder reliability. The inter-coder reliability was determined by comparing the coding of 30 randomly selected cases from the total sample. Each item was independently coded by two coders for each variable. The agreement level for each variable was calculated by dividing the number of items that both coders agreed by total number of items examined. The total number of paragraphs coded for inter-coder reliability was 518. The two coders agreed 482 times on ideological slant and 518 times on ideological words.

The U.S. articles were examined by the author who is fluent in English and Russian. To ensure accuracy in replicating meaning in the translation process from Russian to English, the author employed the help of a native Russian speaker who assisted in enhancing the accuracy of the translation.

At the completion of the data collection, the data were entered in the computer and examined for entry errors and coding inconsistencies. The analysis of the data was done in the statistical package in SPSS. To examine whether the collected data lent support to the hypotheses stated previously, this study used chi square statistical tests to compare the observed distribution of the examined variables with the distribution expected by chance. For the purpose of this study, the alpha level was defined at .05 (which indicated that a hypothesis which tests at a probability level bigger than .05 will not be supported and a hypothesis which tests at a probability level smaller than .05 will be supported).

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NATION BRANDING AND RUSSIA: PROSPECTS AND PITFALLS

IGOR E. KLYUKANOV, EDITOR

Nation branding is popular these days, both as a practice and as an object of study. More and more countries are embracing nation branding. Also, more and more academic publications are dedicated to it. Recently Keith Dinnie (see his contribution below) published the book, entitled *Nation branding: Concepts, issues, practice* (Elsevier Ltd., 2008), which is arguably the most comprehensive volume on this phenomenon.

This phenomenon is hardly new (cf. Dinnie, p. 17). Typically associated with identity, image, position, or Zeitgeist (Dinnie, p. 41/151), no nation could have avoided it in its interaction with the Other. Like Molière’s Monsieur Jardin, who was surprised to discover he’d been speaking prose all his life without knowing it, nations might be surprised to learn they’d been “doing branding” whenever they came into contact with each other.

That the phenomenon is controversial and complex, however (Dinnie p. 13), is easier to agree with. Nation branding might appear omnipotent while in real life, it is hardly the case. For example, in one of his comic strips, Doonesbury shows Duke and his son trying to brand the fictitious nation of Greater Berzerkistan where the President-for-Life has been bombing his own citizens. The two are looking for the perfect pitch to spin ethnic cleansing and wonder if “something bluesy” would work with genocide.

The term itself — “nation branding” — is controversial and not universally accepted; alternative variants have been suggested, usually with less commercial overtones, e.g. “reputation management” or “public diplomacy”. Simon Anholt, a leading authority in the field (see his contribution below) now prefers to call his approach “competitive identity” (Dinnie, p. 22). Such various labels for the concept are an indication of its complexity. Scholarly frameworks have been developed and practitioner insights given in order to understand its nature; many of these are found in Dinnie’s book, which approaches nation branding from the (most wide-spread) economic and marketing perspective (p. 20). However, even such a pragmatic approach to nation branding, e.g. in terms of principles of integrated marketing communication (Dinnie, pp. 195-197), must draw from a number of academic disciplines and fields. In his book Dinnie lists quite a few (p. 21), ranging from
political geography to social psychology to international law; conspicuously absent from the list is the discipline of communication, which is indispensable in order to remedy the situation where “little existing theory” is admitted (Dinnie, p. 13).

Nation branding, in essence, is a process of helping a country to manage its image while interacting with the Other; thus, the discussion of nation branding as an impression management process cannot avoid such theories as Symbolic Interactionism and Dramatism. Naturally, applying these theories, developed in the realm of interpersonal communication, to a higher, more abstract and impersonal, level of interaction, is not an easy task. This task, by the way, cannot be successfully accomplished without making some use of ethnographic theories. Also, the goal of nation branding is constructing a clearly identifiable image of a country; distinctiveness is often mentioned while discussing its nature (Dinnie, p. 52). This discussion can be made more fruitful by using the conceptual framework of constructivism, because the relationship between, e.g. cognitive complexity and communication can hardly be denied. Also, the final product of nation branding usually takes the form of a slogan, cf. “All Ways Surprising” and “Always Surprising” as the two main slogans used for the new country brand of Chile (Dinnie, p. 59). To determine whether a country’s Zeitgeist is successfully captured by such a slogan, one can turn to Speech Act Theory; after all, each slogan is a speech act, and it is impossible to construct or interpret one without following certain rules and meeting certain felicity conditions. One can also look at nation branding in semiotic terms, cf. the section on the country-of-origin and semiotic theory in Dinnie’s book (pp. 93-94). For example, the role of myth, mentioned in his book (p. 116) or sonic branding done through music, voice and sound (p. 124), all fall within the framework of semiotics where clearly related to nation branding are such works, as, for example, Marketing and Semiotics (edited by J. Umiker-Sebeok in 1998) and, more recently (2002) Persuasive Signs: The Semiotics of Advertising by R. Beasley and M. Danesi.

Applied to Russia, the phenomenon of nation branding is developed by V. Lebedenko in the chapter entitled On National Identity and the Building of Russia’s Image (pp. 107-111). The author notes a deep self-identity crisis in Russia during the 1990s (p. 107), believes that nation branding must be left to professionals, e.g., PR agencies and companies (p. 109), and admits that its mechanism is not yet formulated (p. 110). With that in mind, and considering everything said earlier, I asked a number of communication scholars and practitioners in the field to share their ideas about branding Russia. I sent them several questions as “prompts,” making it clear that everyone was free to address any issues considered relevant and worth discussing. Some of the contributors chose to answer the questions while some used them as a springboard for their short essays, all given below. I’d like to thank one more time each contributor for his or her input. I found their contributions insightful, thought-provoking and useful. I hope you do, too.
What are some most urgent purposes for nation branding for Russia?

First of all, there is no such thing as “nation branding” — in other words, some kind of demonstrably effective campaign or initiative that can “brand” (promote, reframe, change the image of) a country. “Branding” campaigns in the commercial sense, based on marketing communications techniques, can only have an effect on the country’s communications output. No link to real outcomes (in terms of altered perceptions in general overseas populations, still less changed behaviours towards the country) has ever been demonstrated.

When I coined the phrase “nation brand” in the late 1990s, I simply observed that countries have brand images, and that those images are as important to their progress and prosperity as are the brand images of corporations and products. I have never claimed that countries can be branded like corporations or products.

However, the value of an enhanced national reputation is beyond question: every country on earth could benefit from a better image. The question is not whether Russia needs to improve its brand, but how, and whether, it is possible to do this deliberately.

What are some discursive and practical techniques that can be used in branding Russia?

The same as for any other country:

1. The image must be measured and analysed in all of Russia’s key overseas “markets” (whether for trade, cultural relations, political relations, talent, tourists or consumers).

2. A working coalition of the top decision-makers in government, business and civil society need to agree on what image the country needs and deserves to have in order to achieve its economic, political and cultural objectives.

3. Government, business and civil society need to start conducting themselves in accordance with that vision.

What steps are involved in the creation and communication of a nation brand?

See above: it’s a matter of proving that Russia deserves a different reputation, not telling people how they should perceive Russia, or projecting more and more information about Russia. We live in an information age: the problem is not a lack of information, it’s people’s lack of desire to access that information and change their minds and their behaviours as a consequence.

What problems might exist for branding Russia?

A lack of clarity about these basic concepts.

The lack of a shared vision amongst the different stakeholders.
The lack of coordination between these stakeholders.
The lack of long-term political and social will to maintain the chosen course for long enough to affect Russia’s international reputation.
The desire on the part of many vested interests to treat “nation branding” as a costly media-based exercise.

*How can branding Russia work on rational and emotional levels?*
Russia’s image, just like the image of any country, works at the emotional level, fundamentally conditioning the “rational” decisions of people around the world.

*How likely are Russians to “live the brand”, performing attitudes and behaviors developed by the brand strategies?*
That entirely depends on how well they relate to the strategy, and how effective the leadership is in communicating it to them. A national “brand strategy” needs to be both true and exciting, and that’s the fundamental problem: most things that are true aren’t exciting, and most things that are exciting aren’t true.

*Is there a danger for nation branding increasing the nationalist discourse in Russia?*
Yes, like many other topics of this sort, it can easily be distorted by a nationalist agenda.

*How can nation branding be helpful for Russia’s collective self-identification?*
It should be absolutely fundamental to it. The basis of a strategy of this kind is capturing the will, the genius and the aspirations of a people in a globalised world.

*What are some things (if any) that nation branding cannot do?*
All nations have their “brand images”, and these can be influenced by good, consistent, long-term, coordinated policies, investments, innovation and leadership. But the idea that a nation’s “brand image” can be deliberately manipulated through a process called “nation branding” is entirely false. The “brand image” of Russia exists in the minds of billions of people living in other countries, way beyond the reach of anything that the Russian government, Russian business or Russian people can directly alter. As Socrates says, “the way to achieve a better reputation is to endeavour to be what you desire to appear.” Changing your behaviour is the only way of changing your image. Nation brand is not a campaign or a project, a self-standing initiative: it is a perspective on planning and policy-making which government, business and society needs to acquire. Once it has been acquired, it will influence the way they go about their normal business, and this will ultimately re-shape the international image of Russia. There are no short cuts to this.
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NATION BRANDING FOR RUSSIA:
ARCHETYPAL CONSTRAINT IN AN AGE OF OPPORTUNITY

Nearly twenty years removed from the end of the Soviet Union, Russia stands at the crossroads of national identity. From all directions, the factions that contend for political and economic control of the country now converge in disharmony, vying for a voice in determining the features with which Russia will face the world. On surface, Putin’s strong leadership has forged an element of stability. Yet below the surface, the schizophrenia of national evolution wanders from one suitor to the next, from democracy toward authoritarianism, from open market to state controlled monopoly, from freedom to constraint.

Amidst this constant ebb and flow, deciding the value of nation branding for Russia seems fundamentally obvious. Certainly forging a consistent national image would unite the Russian people in identity and purpose. But no matter how carefully a national brand or identity might be constructed, no matter how consistent that brand might be with national cultural trends and social conditions, and no matter how anticipatory that brand might be, it simply cannot provide sufficient flexibility to sustain national identity beyond the present, foreseeable future. More importantly, national identities once established become bureaucratized in the nation’s institutions and in the people’s psyches. Very simply, branding may provide some temporary identity with which to rally national sentiment and mobilize social continuity, but the far-reaching effects are equally likely to invite political calcification and cultural attenuation. As a result, nation branding may constrain rather than encourage national development.

Political calcification may be one of the most limiting potential aspects of nation branding. For example, Russia’s political history is grounded in the imagery of the powerful authoritarian leader. From the tsars through Lenin, Stalin and other Soviet leaders, Russia and the Russian people have become accustomed to a national identity that embraces benevolent authoritarian leadership. In the early years after the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia floundered economically. Yeltsin’s leadership did little to restore people’s faith in their nation (Shevchuk, 2008). However, since Putin’s ascendance to power, and his adoption of the role of authoritarian leader, Russia has seemingly righted its course in the international arena. Similarly, at least since the time of Katherine the Great, Russia has consistently engaged in colonialism to sustain the image of a great empire. Soviet attempts to extend the revolution and expand the U.S.S.R. reaffirmed Russian greatness. Today, Russia has proclaimed itself a democratic state, eager to join a welcoming world as a nation that shares the values of other free societies. However, post-Soviet expansionism and petro-colonialism contradict those self-proclamations. In both instances, the transformed images
of Russian identity persist beyond their initial incantations and severely constrain the emergence of other possible images or other potential policies. Ultimately, once national identities become brands, they seem to function archetypically, constraining and shaping future events, and prohibiting alternatives as they ensure their continuance (Bertelsen, 1992).

Cultural attenuation constitutes another potential shortcoming of national branding. National branding can only occur insofar as the brand is consistent with the nation’s existing culture, or insofar as the imagery of the existing culture can be employed as a source of legitimation (Aronczyk, 2008; Berger, 1966). Each transformation of a nation’s identity co-opts the fundamental symbolic attributes of the culture without guarantee of adhering to the essential principles of that culture. For example, Russian culture emerged from a rich intellectual tradition. The elegance of Russian prose, poetry, drama, opera, and ballet have long been proclaimed and recognized as the hallmark of Russian identity. This cultural foundation, renewed and enriched by succeeding generations, served for many centuries as a source of national pride and as the inspiration for patriotism. In all, Russian culture constituted an essential feature of Russian national identity that was deeply intertwined with the fundamental principles of daily life, an identity that captured the essence of the lived experience of what it meant to be Russian. During the Soviet era, this cultural tradition was enlisted and transformed to support the revolutionary political and ideological system. Although Soviet contributions to Russian culture were often constrained by practical politics, the tradition was nurtured and encouraged, and some degree of cultural continuity was maintained. Today, the declaration of a democratic identity presents what might be described as a cultural disruption for Russia. Democracy represents a significant transformation in Russian social organization, one with little grounding in the nation’s cultural tradition. Breaking dramatically from its discursive foundation, contemporary Russian culture seems but a caricature of Russian life (Shevchuk, 2008). Listening to an opera star like Nikolai Baskov adapt a traditional art form to the tawdry, glitzy, lip-syncing variety show format, or watching ballet dancer Anastasia Volochkova altering her craft to suit the free-flowing movement of modern dance offer subtle hints about the ways in which cultural forms may become politically expedient in the service of national identity.

The brooding Russian of Dostoevsky’s novels seems inconsistent with the expanding opportunities of democratic society. Certainly the appeal of the free-spirited cosmopolitan enjoying the trappings of contemporary life is sexier, more attractive, more likely to entice adherents who wish to live through that image. At the same time, it speaks loudly of the cultural attenuation that nation branding can encourage. Cultural attenuation is largely a result of the reductionism inherent in the act of transforming archetypal cultural images to legitimize national identity (Chesbro, Bertelsen, & Gencarelli, 1990). The risk of cultural attenuation increases as national brands move away from the initial archetypal image. Ultimately then, dramatic shifts in national identity are constrained by those images that already exist. However, shifts in national identity may occur incrementally, without dramatic break from existing brands.
If national identity functions archetypically, constraining politics and culture, and limiting opportunity, on what might a national identity be constructed? In the past, national identities were built on conquests, on riches, and on possessions. But they were also built through the achievements of artists, scientists, and scholars, on the symbolic resources of creative human action. In short, national identities emerge from the efforts of a nation’s people. The old adage that actions speak louder than words seems most appropriate when discussing national branding, particularly insofar as Russia is concerned. Simply naming for the sake of recognition creates an epistemic façade grounded in motion; an illusion craftily tied to convenient sentiments, symbols, and slogans (Machiavelli, 2003/1513). Certainly a national brand may simplify complex social and political relations, may serve as a unifying device among intellectually, demographically and geographically diverse peoples, and may order the randomness of daily life. But through their inherent reductionism national brands may also mask the issues, ensure the maintenance of the existing structure of power relationships, and certify the status quo (Bertelsen, 1992). Ultimately, a single national brand can only constrain individual opportunity and national development. At the very least, some combination of defining imagery must coalesce into a nation’s identity. Ideally, national identities are forged through dialogue, they are not promulgated (Heath, 1997). As Russians struggle for a lasting post-Soviet identity to fashion allegiance and loyalty among the population, and to identify their role in the world community, they might carefully consider the broader implications of branding. Boulding was most prophetic when he said: “We must always operate with the concept of an inventory of images, and we can never replace this inventory by a single image, not even that of the most important person in the organization” (Boulding, 1956/1961, p. 63).

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What are some most urgent purposes for nation branding for Russia?

This is really a question that must be answered by the people and the government of Russia, rather than by outside observers. Russia, like any other country, will have its own strategic priorities and these priorities should guide the development of any nation branding efforts. Having said that, as an outside observer, I would imagine that the following issues are probably prominent in the minds of today’s Russian decision-makers. First, in our age of instantaneous global media reporting and news coverage, what image does Russia wish to project to the rest of the world? To use a jaded term, what are Russia’s “brand values” in a post-communist era? Under Vladimir Putin’s rule, Russia has rediscovered a desire and ability to assert itself on the world stage, but there appears to be a clear dichotomy between Putin’s high level of domestic popularity and a less enthusiastic response from international audiences. Therefore a focus on building the strength of Russia’s soft power may be required, rather than the flexing of military muscle. Second, Russia needs to start planning now to ensure that it gains the maximum possible benefit for its nation brand from its hosting of the 2014 Winter Olympics. Third, a strategic decision needs to be taken on Russia’s attitude with regard to foreign direct investment. Does Russia welcome FDI, or would it rather maintain a high level of control by domestic corporations? A clear position on this issue would help guide any nation branding efforts in the domain of inward investment attraction. Although there are obviously many other potential purposes for nation branding, the ones outlined above are probably amongst the more pressing issues for Russia’s nation branding.

What are some discursive and practical techniques that can be used in branding Russia?

Russia is already using many nation branding techniques. It has hired a Western PR agency to attempt to manage perceptions of Russia’s leadership and national image; it has engaged in “Church diplomacy”, a form of diaspora mobilization in pursuit of nation branding goals; and it has established an English language TV channel called “Russia Today”, to put across a Russian perspective on world events. However, one technique that has possibly been under-used to date by Russia is the promotion of Russian branded exports to help build a more multi-dimensional image of Russia, beyond the grim and intimidating Cold War stereotype that probably persists in the minds of many people in the West. We have seen a limited number of beer and vodka brands penetrate Western markets, but there needs to be a more diverse array of Russian brands for Western consumers to be exposed to. In this respect, Russia could maybe look to Japan and the ways in which positive perceptions of that country are based at least to some extent on great consumer brands such as Sony, Toshiba, Honda and so on. There is plenty of scope for Russia to enhance its nation brand through a greater commitment to export promotion.
What steps are involved in the creation and communication of a nation brand?

It is a fallacy to think that a nation brand can be created and communicated through a simple series of steps. A nation brand is not like a new product, where the marketing department can pretty much decide what brand it would like to build and then apply the necessary techniques to achieve that goal. Nations, unlike commodities or physical product brands, come with a history and a culture, and it has been argued that the culture of the nation is the nation brand. From this perspective, the nation brand already exists prior to any governmental desire to fashion it. However, this does not absolve government from the responsibility of ensuring that negative stereotypes do not damage the country’s economic and social interests. To build a positive national reputation, almost all the evidence seems to suggest that government and the private sector need to work together. Ideally, civil society would also be supportive of such public-private sector nation branding initiatives, but this would appear to be an overly optimistic wish.

What problems might exist for branding Russia?

Every country faces problems in its branding. It would be more positive to see these in terms of “challenges” rather than “problems”. This is more than mere semantics, it is reflective of a mind set that sees nation branding as an imaginative, creative yet rational and coherent undertaking. Specific challenges facing Russia include the complexity faced by any large, diverse nation to unify its many different domestic elements into a coherent perceptual entity; the need to deal in an effective way with an often hostile Western media; the embracing of branding techniques in ways that are more tuned to individualist audiences than old-style political propaganda; and the need to achieve better coordination between the different state and private sector actors engaged in Russia’s nation branding efforts.

How can branding Russia work on rational and emotional levels?

This is where there needs to be a clear focus upon who exactly is the intended audience. In marketing terminology, this refers to the concept of segmentation. In deciding whether to pursue a rational or an emotional branding message — or a combination of the two — the primary focus needs to be on what is required for the intended recipient of the message. Conventionally the belief is that an FDI audience would be more receptive to a rational message based on factual data related to the cost of labour, tax rates, and so on, whereas a potential tourist would be more receptive to an emotional message emphasizing hedonic benefits such as the pleasure of sightseeing, eating great food, drinking local wine, swimming in pristine seas, and so on. This is an area where any nation could benefit from adopting basic techniques of market research, profiling the characteristics of the intended audience and crafting an appropriate communication based on that profile data.

How likely are Russians to “live the brand”, performing attitudes and behaviors developed by the brand strategies?
It would be absurd to claim to have developed a nation brand and then expect the
country’s citizens to adapt their natural behaviour to fit an artificially created brand.
Although there are undoubtedly significant similarities in some respects between
nations and corporations, for example in terms of the existence of multiple
stakeholders, nations and corporations also differ in important respects. One way in
which they differ is that a corporation can try to impose a code of conduct on its
people, but it is far more problematic for a nation to try and do the same to its
citizens. Therefore, it is slightly ludicrous to expect all Russians to “live the brand”.
In the wider world of nation branding, what you see all the time is nations changing
their “nation brand” each time a new party or leader comes to power — should you
therefore expect the country’s citizens to “live the brand” when that “brand” changes
every few years? Obviously, that would be an unreasonable expectation. However,
I think it would be reasonable to expect a nation’s diplomatic corps, for example, to be
aware of any official nation branding campaign and to adapt their behaviour accordingly.
This is where the realms of nation branding and public diplomacy intersect, and there is little
evidence of best practice available yet in this domain.

Is there a danger for nation branding increasing the nationalist discourse in Russia?
It depends totally upon the nature of the nation branding strategy that is employed. If
there is an overtly militaristic tone to the nation branding campaign, focusing on power
and military strength, then obviously that could kindle nationalist sentiment. But most
nation branding campaigns are more benign and are aimed at inviting external audiences
rather than scaring them away. Also, it would be mistaken to believe that nationalism in
any country is a result of a mere nation branding campaign. There are deep political and
social roots to nationalism, and whilst nationalist propaganda can enflame nationalism,
that really has very little relevance to the contemporary conception of nation branding,
with its clearly stated objectives in terms of tourism, export promotion, FDI, and international
influence.

How can nation branding be helpful for Russia’s collective self-identification?
The relevance of nation branding for domestic audiences is yet to be proved. The issue
of collective self-identification is probably better left to sociologists, historians, and other
cultural experts rather than to marketing and branding professionals.

What are some things (if any) that nation branding cannot do?
As with PR for corporations, nation branding cannot forcibly create a positive
reputation for a nation if the reality of that nation is negative. Projecting a false image of
a nation is probably worse than projecting no image at all, as any informed audience will feel
that their intelligence is being insulted if, for example, a country enduring civil strife tries
to project itself as a tourist paradise. But countries need to decide on a case-by-case basis
what nation branding can or cannot do, given each country’s own unique set of
circumstances.
“We are not trying to push anyone to love Russia.” This quip was uttered at a world economic conference by Russian president-elect Dmitri Medvedev about a year ago when he was first deputy prime minister. The comment takes on special meaning when one considers the question of “branding Russia,” as the editor of this journal has asked us to do. Branding experts, such as Saatchi & Saatchi’s Kevin Roberts, tell us that great brands transcend normal consumer expectations and create emotional connections — they become “lovemarks.” Is there an opportunity for Russia to be a “lovemark” on the global stage, especially if its new President appears to be playing “hard to get”? This short essay explores some ideas toward making Russia a more “lovable brand.”

So, what is the purpose of nation branding, and is it necessary for Russia? Nation-branding guru Simon Anholt, in an issue of Place Branding Journal, argues that nation branding — which is primarily a result of globalization — is very important. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the spread of democratic-style governments, the world has become more open. This openness is fed by globalized media systems, an interrelated global economy and a growing desire for a greater array of consumer products. Free and less expensive international travel also encourages this openness. People around the world are more informed as well as curious about international governments and cultures. As Russia seeks to compete in a globalized world — to improve its political and economic standing and to prevent out-migration of its most valued and educated citizens — it must address its public image. Toward this end, nation branding for Russia makes sense.

Medvedev’s “love Russia” comment is somewhat ironic, especially when one considers the not-so-lovable image Russia possesses in most of the world. This image, personified by the unsmiling Putin and reinforced by media stories of internal corruption and external bullying, portrays Russia as anything but lovable. So must think University of Oklahoma history professor and Russian scholar Melissa Stockdale. She is calling her new book about Russia during World War I, “A Tough Country to Love.”

Improving its international image is Russia’s first challenge toward becoming a more lovable brand. Russia is plagued by many problems — a huge chasm between rich and poor,
a crumbling infrastructure and the absence of a free press. Additionally, Russia suffers from a plethora of international public relations disasters — reports of flawed elections, the arrest of opposition candidate Garry Kasparov, trouble with its former Soviet neighbors, and a widely publicized, spy-novel-like story about the presumed assassination of a former-Russian-agent-turned-dissident Alexander Litvinenko. None of these stories is an asset for a country trying to create a more positive image. This media coverage has projected an unlovable, almost evil Russia to citizens around the world.

But for those who know Russia on a personal level, they would say the country is easy to love. Lesley Rimmel, history professor at Oklahoma State University, claims her affair began with learning the language. Russian is a beautiful, complex language, which allows those who know it to experience the rich literature and poetry of the country. Others are smitten by Russia’s cities, including the beautiful imperial architecture of St. Petersburg and the glitzy lifestyle of modern inner-Moscow. International scholars practically swoon over its universities and extensive archives. Americans report wonderful vacation trips to Russia — the ballet, the caviar. If you’ve ever had the pleasure of working with or teaching a Russian, you know there are many reasons to love Russia. These lovable aspects of Russia should be promoted if Russia wants to improve its brand.

Another way to create a more lovable image of Russia is through interpersonal exchanges. The Russian government should make it easier for scholars and tourists to visit by improving the inefficient bureaucracy involved in obtaining a visa. They should endeavor to send more Russian students, visitors and professionals to other countries, where they can be effective citizen-diplomats.

One-on-one exchanges — much like long-term courtships — are extremely effective, but not efficient enough to influence worldwide opinion. Well-crafted international press releases should stress the good things Russia is doing, such as NGO projects, hosting the Olympic Games and G8 summit, membership in the United Nations and Russia’s role in fighting terrorism.

Despite Medvedev’s quip, the newly elected Russian President may be the country’s best opportunity to show Russia’s more lovable side. According to media reports, Medvedev’s style is a welcome contrast to the steel-faced Putin. Medvedev is young, speaks English and likes rock ‘n’ roll. He’s never served in the Russian security services, and he speaks about the importance of freedom and respect for the rule of law. Many nationalists even call him a liberal. Whether or not this persona is played out in his politics or policy, it could go far in portraying a more “lovable” Russia.

One essential ingredient of a great brand is a great brand name. Medvedev means bear — the long enduring symbol of the Russian state. The question is whether Medvedev will project himself as a cuddly teddy bear or a not-so-lovable grizzly.
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Over the past eight years, a considerable amount of attention has been paid to the question of developing new models of “national identity” and new visions of “unity” within Russia. New holidays like “National Unity Day,” the UN-inspired “International Mother Language Day,” as well as the increasingly prominent leadership role played by the Holy Synod and the Orthodox Church, have served this purpose at home and among the Russians of the Diaspora. At the same time, Russian media have been mobilized to assist in promoting Russia’s image on the global stage through the ever-expanding activities of the Voice of Russia, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, RIA Novosti and the new educational foundation “Russkii Mir.”

A number of commentators in Russia and abroad have made the point, and correctly I think, that Russia’s quickly changing and dramatically improving economic position in the world has been both condition and consequence of these new 21st-century commitments to promoting revitalized notions of “national identity” and “unity” both at home and abroad. As we consider the fascinating global phenomenon of “nation branding,” I think we would do well not to forget the character of this connection between economic influence and “national image” both at home and abroad. Forgetting this connection may easily blind us to some of the more problematic assumptions and practices of “nation branding,” a set of marketing practices devoted to the promotion of “national image.”

Melissa Aronczyk’s insightful critical analysis of “nation branding” in the most recent volume of the International Journal of Communication makes it very clear that many professionals working in this global nation-branding movement assume that “nations” can be packaged and marketed globally just like any commodity. More importantly, they have been surprisingly successful at promoting the idea that this is a fundamental necessity (a “market imperative”?). And when one studies the documents and global nation-branding surveys available online (cf. www.gmi-mr.com/gmipolls and www.nationbrandindex.com/allreports.phtml), one can see how survey questions and ranking criteria target the attitudes of affluent consumers/tourists and powerful foreign investors. Furthermore, year-to-year changes in the attitudes of consumers, tourists and foreign investors reflected in these same surveys index patterns of market volatility we have come to expect in this fast-moving world of financial capitalism: the “popularity” of nations, like the “popularity” of stocks, is a highly dynamic variable. As reflected in “nation-branding” surveys, then, “Russia” becomes little more than a shifting target for investment and consumption as defined by the logic and value-system of contemporary global capitalism.

At least as far back as the proudly ethnocentric and widely referenced travel memoir of the Marquis de Custine (Empire of the Czar), “Russia” as seen and defined by “interested” outsiders with outsiders’ agendas has a long, well-documented history. “Orientalism,” in
Edward Said’s very specific sense, has played an indisputable role in the construction of Russia’s “image” on prominent Western stages. And although I would not go so far as to accuse the professional community of “nation-branders” of either “demonizing” or “exoticizing” Russia, I am suggesting that by transforming very complex problems of national identity into one-dimensional, neoliberal concepts of “value,” nation branding and the strategic activities of nation-branding consultants significantly narrow the field of national and global discourses concerning the role of “nations” and “nation-states” in historical, cultural and social global orders that should never be reduced to the monolithic principles of any imagined “free-market” system.

So if not “nation branding,” then what is to be done? One well-known adage has it that if you don’t tell your own story, someone else will, and probably to your distinct disadvantage. The emergence of China as a major global power provides us with many instructive examples of a concerted national endorsement of the wisdom of this adage. Here we see at all levels of society (not just at the level of the central government) and across all forms of media an unrelenting commitment to educating outsiders about China. Two years ago in one of my undergraduate classes the students were discussing an autobiographical account of government repression of the world-famous “Falun Gong” religious sect in China. When my students decided to analyze this as a universal case study in “religious freedom,” my one student from China spoke out evenly but passionately about why, as she put it, “most Chinese” did not see this as a matter of “religious freedom” at all, but as a very difficult question of “political and social responsibility.” The importance of this student’s contribution had nothing to do with endorsement or rejection of her own position. Her contribution effectively challenged all of the other students to contemplate critically and openly the many different meanings of “freedom” and “responsibility” and to understand the essential importance of open, continuing debate about issues they simply took for granted. My students were suitably challenged; I was delighted.

And this week, in the wake of almost universal condemnation of China’s recent actions in Tibet, another young Chinese student at Bryant published a careful but courageously open critique in the student newspaper of the historical ignorance she claimed justified an uncritical, unquestioning pro-Tibet stance of western human rights activists. Again, in a political climate that commonly treats all questions of “human rights” as matters of moral certainty, this student performed an immensely valuable service to the university community by provoking a very important public debate about “moral certitude.”

In my opinion, the business of “nation-branding” and the strategic use of outside “professional consultants” have little to do with meeting the very real global challenges Russia faces today. Reading in the most recent issue of New York Review of Books Amy Knight’s review of Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov’s critical appraisal of President Putin’s Presidency, I personally found nothing at all surprising or even particularly enlightening about the substance of Nemtsov’s critique. At the same time, I wondered when I might be treated to a Russian counter-response of the now familiar Chinese type. I
wondered, in particular, who in Russia was prepared to respond to Nemtsov and Milov point-by-point. And, most of all, I wondered who in Russia was prepared to take up the greatest challenge posed in the conclusion to Amy Knight’s review — “Some Russians say that their compatriots have become once again a ‘nation of mutes,’ who sit glued to the state-dominated television absorbing the continuous propaganda glorifying their leaders.” (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21353)

“Some Russians say,” I’m sure, but I would like to hear from voices best equipped to put such vague judgments to the test. After all, I have also heard very similar critiques of Americans in recent years and at other times in American history, as well (remember the “silent majority” of the Vietnam Era?). And when I do hear such judgments, I begin to look for other views and other voices. I certainly do not take such comments at face value and I certainly do not allow myself the comfort of the moral certitude such judgments assume.
What are some most urgent purposes for nation branding for Russia?

One could answer this question in a very predictable way — that the purpose of national branding is to allow rapprochement with the West, and particularly European countries after a long period of distrust and animosity. However, the “client” — whether defined as the Russian elite or the Russian people — may not actually want that. Given the ongoing lack, or as some might say, hollowness, of Russian national identity, the question of whether national branding should be to ameliorate the image of Russia abroad is moot. Advertisers in the realm of domestic consumption have been moderately successful in peddling a national brand of a newly resurgent great power at ease with itself, and then have hitched their cigarettes/beer/margarine to that imagined national image. So perhaps this is the line to continue on a national scale — to encourage social and cultural cohesion at home. An intriguing question is whether Russia needs an external projection of soft power at all. I am not convinced of the merits of the Russkii Mir project, the new organization created by presidential decree and tasked with improving the image of Russia abroad. Traditionally/historically Russia’s cultural engine of writers, artists, musicians and thinkers, coupled in the twentieth century with a good dose of hard power have done all the branding needed. However, if I were to prioritize the aims of a branding project for both external and internal consumption I would, like in the case of Poland (Aronczyk, 2008, p. 53) be stressing normalcy: Russia is part of Europe, is a stable, normal country.

What are some discursive and practical techniques that can be used in branding Russia?

If we agree that Russia already has a strong brand image, whether this is due to its cultural or historical associations then a branding discourse can stress these facets of its national image — which of course already happens — though often it is to sell non-Russian goods: Smirnoff, for example. If anything, the exotic/alternative brand that is Russia (whether in terms of politics — ‘we’re a “socially orientated” state with nuclear weapons and we’ll do things our own way’, or culture — ‘look: churches that look like ice-cream-cones!’) the discourse of othering that the West offers at every turn in its representation of Russia is a form of branding that Russians have to continue to live with, and perhaps even riff off. However, this boils down to the same old story and is a zero sum game. The othering discourse paints Russia as a special ‘case’, but in the sense of basket-case which should learn the lessons of the ‘civilized West’, whether in terms of human rights or customer service. Again we return to a discourse of normalcy, stability, everyday business. Propagating the image of Russia as a normal European country may be a long shot, but ironically, given recent political and economic instability in those countries that consistently ‘other’ Russia coupled with relative newslessness at home, the discourse of domestic normality may not be
difficult for the media and elites to peddle, which of course is what is already happening. Recently during the financial crisis in the UK and USA I have seen two examples in print of commentators crowing that the turmoil suffered by the East due to the poor economic advice it received from Western financial institutions will soon be visited on those very countries in the West. Get used to living like the Russians did in the early 90s with rampant inflation, etc. The point is that this irony will not be lost on Russian branders.

On a lighter note, for this discourse of normalcy to begin to filter through in practice to others outside of Russia I would recommend two simple measures: an end to visa restrictions for rich countries, and the lifting of bans on low-cost airlines from western Europe to Russia. Low-cost airlines have completely changed the meaning of words like ‘Estonia’ and ‘Bulgaria’ in the minds of western Europeans, just as they have made internationalists of the citizens of those countries too, even if they never leave their homeland. Sooner or later this would have a feedback effect in Russia, too — where every second person suffers from wanderlust. Without wanting to sound condescending, many Russians of moderate means already travel frequently to Europe on organized trips; allowing a greater freedom to do this would signify a historic level of normalcy has been achieved in Russia.

What steps are involved in the creation and communication of a nation brand?

I have to say that advertising and television in general have already created a number of tropes of normalcy that have very powerful effects. The former, while occasionally dabbling in a projection of Russian otherness and specialness — usually in a rather heavy-handed way, in selling the mundane accoutrements of modern capitalist existence — deodorants, mortgages, low-fat spreads and other essentials, likes to stress the availability of an acquisitive, aspirational, middle-class lifestyle as a prerequisite of the enjoyment of these products. The Russian nuclear, sometimes extended family is utterly normal in the vast majority of mass-media iterations, whether in commercial advertising or soaps or otherwise. The exhaustion of models of enforced participation in social and pseudo-civic life has led branders to retreat to what is a psychologically comforting, if narrow, vision of ‘life’: friends and family. Even work becomes a kind of pseudo-extension of this range (although this myth had wide currency in Soviet times too). One shrewd commentator (Evgeny Popov)saw the victory of post-Soviet life as being the individual’s ability to openly adopt a petit-bourgeois attitude: ‘obyvatel’ [an average person with a narrow circle of interests] — that sounds ok’.

What problems might exist for branding Russia?

As indicated above, in discourse about Russian identity, both in Russia and without, there is a continuous background chatter of otherness — in the West we are continually invited to partake in the enjoyment of the non-European exoticness of Russia even when this so-called difference isn’t all that different or actually constitutes part of the core cultural heritage of Europe — in modernist art for example. ‘We’re Russian and we’re different’
always going to be a losing bet, or a hedge based on increasingly limited returns. I like the simple idea of more human interaction between Russians and foreigners because it counters the othering tendency.

How can branding Russia work on rational and emotional levels?

The urge to normalcy, to having all the things, material or otherwise that decades of branding have indicated are enjoyed by the West, is a very powerful emotional lever. Popular culture offers the endless spectacle of ‘Europeanness’ as a valorized state of being aspired to by all. Quality of service, quality of product, is often described using the modifier ‘euro’. Increasingly, normal and euro coincide — an apartment is normal and habitable if it is ‘euro-renovated’ and not worthy of purchase or sale if decorated to lower standard. Eventually ‘euro’ ceases to mean ‘not-Russian’ — this is already the case in fact. A grubby old apartment may be described as ‘sovkovy’ — having a Soviet level of furnishing. Your average consumer in their twenties who was a mere child at the end of the Soviet era does not associate ‘sovkovy’ with the brand image of their nation. Everyone aspires emotionally and rationally to acquiring a ‘euro-furnished’ flat, but this is ‘normal’. Modes of popular culture and consumption already mark what was ‘other’ as naturally falling within the purview of normal desires and behaviours. But perhaps this is a better answer for the following question:

How likely are Russians to ‘live the brand’, performing attitudes and behaviors developed by the brand strategies?

As the previous answer indicates, if branding is about playing down cultural difference, or, at least, not viewing it as either a selling point or a drawback, living the brand would be stressing in-commonness of needs, desires — a common tactic of international commercial brands. Perhaps though, and a lot of western media seem to indicate this, there is an expectation from without that Russians live up to the imposed image of difference. It is as if the West is disappointed when it fails to find exotic difference everywhere in its probing of Russian life and mores. This is potentially a problem. The head of Russkii Mir fell into a similar trap in a recent speech: ‘If Russians weren’t white people, the West wouldn’t treat them the way it does.’ His branding — ‘Russians are white people but they are culturally quite different from other white people’ — wasn’t very reassuring from either an external or internal perspective and indicates the danger of the conflation of the political and cultural. In this sense perhaps Russians always have and always will ‘live the brand’ in deflating the image of difference whether imposed from without or within, and everywhere showing themselves to be rather normal folk.

Is there a danger for nation branding increasing the nationalist discourse in Russia?

Emphatically, no — especially if branding is about promoting normalcy. Nationalist discourse is a pastime, something of a spectator sport for Russians. You can cheer from the
sidelines without really being that interested in the game. Equally, the players may make a lot of noise and are politely interviewed, but that doesn’t mean anyone takes them (too) seriously.

*How can nation branding be helpful for Russia’s collective self-identification?*

It can show them that offering themselves as an ‘othered’ and ‘othering’ themselves isn’t a particularly fruitful form of identity formation.

*What are some things (if any) that nation branding cannot do?*

It can’t change the short-term geopolitical reality of Russia’s relations with the rest of Europe. This of course does impact on the effectiveness of any branding of the type I’ve described, though as a closet economic determinist I am optimistic about longer-term success. Having said that it is wise to bear in mind the priceless wisdom of one of the architects (V. Chernomyrdin) of normalcy in the 1990s in Russia when commenting on policy failure: ‘We wanted to make things better but they turned out the same as they always do.’
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Re-branding Russia — A Neighbor’s Perspective

Nation branding is in fashion in Europe. Especially small and medium-sized countries are adopting the soft power (Nye, 2004) means (1) to improve their image abroad and to make the achievement of their foreign policy goals easier. Big countries take a different approach to nation branding, as they count on their military power, the strength of their economy, or simply on their size and population.

Nation branding might be seen as a new discipline, stemming from economy and social sciences, which both affect the conduct of foreign policy. Practically, the efforts to brand or re-brand a country and its society have been well known since the humanity first built institutions of power and representation. The current popularity of nation branding is due to the impact all the media of communication have on our lives and to the changes in the logic of international relations, in which non-governmental institutions and organizations have much to say. Thus nation branding might not be seen as a remedy for the country’s failures in the international environment. Creating a brand for a nation means making it recognizable in terms of positive values of the people; places, where they live; products they provide, and the politics they conduct.

The notions of soft power and nation branding at a first glimpse do not suit Russia at all. Russia is perceived as a hard power country and if there is a discussion on a brand or an image, it usually relates to the state, not to the nation. Despite the way the country is perceived, soft power should not be seen as being in opposition to hard power, but rather as complementing it. The United States’ case after 2001 says a lot about the need of nation branding in anticipation of a crisis. Nation branding as a systematic action might be useful, even if a country such as the U.S., makes profits from products known worldwide and its popular culture.

The Russian case is different. The way Russia is perceived abroad is one-dimensional and dominated by its political and military power. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the old negative images have not been replaced by new, positive ones. The country has undergone total transformation, changed its borders, its political regime and even its name. The need for re-branding the country was realized rather late. The process started when Russia achieved success in economic terms and its society accepted the concept of “sovereign democracy,” including the strong political leadership of V. Putin. Russian efforts to re-brand the nation must be seen in this context as promoting a positive image of Russia abroad. In contrast to the predominantly negative perception in Western and Central Europe, Russia wants to present itself as a big country with a rapidly growing economy, one which is democratic and respects human rights.
Nation branding also means translating what the Russian nation is. According to the Russian constitution it is “the multinational peoples of the Russian Federation” (de Lazari, 2006, p. 8) and is understood as a community of citizens. Building a brand in this case relies on the state and power, on the bond between the citizen, the state and its political leader. As a result of the last eight years of V. Putin’s leadership, Russia is recognized abroad more as the state and the leader, than as a society. The positive image of Russians had been fading since 1956, buried under the rejection of hard power’s interventions in Central Europe and the wars and hardships of the transformation after 1991. As a result, Russia has a very strong political identity and a political brand. It is reflected in the assets of its capital, perceived as a political city and identified with the Kremlin and Red Square (Anholt, 2006, p. 11). Due to recent discussions on energy policy in Europe Russia has gained an image of a “monopipe state” governed by one gas company as it used to be governed by one party. (2) Thus, Russia needs re-branding as a state, and as a nation. The country has to deal with the rejection of its regime and might build on the fascination with its culture. It needs translation so that the public opinion abroad understands why Russians support “sovereign democracy” and what the reason for Putin’s success as a political leader is. The translation is being hampered by a huge values gap between Russians and at least a part of their target countries abroad.

Russia’s efforts to create its own approach in branding started in about 2005 — 2006. One of the most significant moves was the launch of the English language “Russia Today” television station, broadcast by satellite, representing the Kremlin’s vision of Russia. “Russia Today” is a perfect example of international relations as an information war, which is still present in Russia’s foreign policy and in fact, precedes any concepts of nation branding. The recognition of nation branding in Russia might be seen as one of the results of positioning Russia among the G 8 countries. When in 2007 S. Anholt published results of his Nation Brands Index of G 8 countries, Russia scored the last place in all categories. There was a striking contrast when juxtaposing Russia and United States in the category human rights, peace and security, as in both cases they were very poor (26th place for the USA and 36th for Russia, before China). Such evaluations might have contributed to the recognition of nation branding means by the Russian government but also by Russia’s political elites. The results of Anholt’s NBI were supported by the Reporters sans frontieres annual report for 2007. Whereas the other G 8 members “have recovered a few places” Russia was not progressing and its negative hard power state image was confirmed by the killing of the journalist A. Politkovskaya and the lengthy investigation afterwards (Annual Worldwide Press Freedom Index, 2007). In fact, it was the case of A. Politkovskaya, which contributed a lot to the deteriorating image of Russia and reminded the international community of the lack of respect for press freedom in the country, a very sensitive field for the logic of nation branding.

The surveys on G 8 images also define the main target countries of Russian re-branding campaigns as Western Europe, U.S and Asia. The post-Soviet region does not belong to the target group, as the countries are seen as less relevant in the international
community. On the one hand, they build their brands on their distance from Russia. On the other, distancing themselves from Russia affects the image of post-Soviet countries such as Poland, seen as a Russophobic Western neophyte. This attitude to Russia has had a negative impact on Poland’s image within the EU, where it is always perceived as being anti—Russian.

The exclusion of Central and Eastern European Countries from Russian re-branding campaigns sticks the label to these countries of being Russophobes and contributes to the petrification of negative clichés. It might be easily observed in the coverage of Polish media on Russia. Polish journalists define the negative climate of opinion towards Russia, by stressing the conflict and negative aspects of Russian politics and life in Russia, far from being impartial. Reporting about the democratic opposition in Russia is in Poland not politically correct, Russia is unknown as a tourist destination, growing economy is commented in the context of the endangered gas supplies and corruption. As a target group for re-branding Russia, Polish journalists have been totally neglected. The value gap in the Polish case relies very much on the conflict, which is deeply rooted in the history of Polish-Russian relations.

At the same time, nation branding is potentially important for the public at home. Any campaign will not be successful if it does not respond to the nation’s self-image. The concept of “sovereign democracy” still needs explanation for the international public opinion especially if a regime, criticized abroad finds support at home. The feeling of the Russians that the development of the country in the last eight years under V. Putin, was a success story needs to be translated by the means of nation branding. The aim of re-branding within the G 8 group - striving for the best place in the ranking - might again be understood as presenting the values which are shared by all the group’s members. Like many countries, Russia cannot rely on products and their “country of origin effect,” its popular culture is hardly transferable abroad and high culture defines the target groups very narrowly. According to the logic of nation branding, Russia would need a key message. “Creative tension” invented by W. Olin (3) for Poland four years ago reflects how risky the key messages might be. If they reflect contradictory assets of national culture, as in the Polish case, they are hardly implemental. But as many post-Soviet countries have made many efforts in nation branding in recent years, Russia can use their experiences to be more explicit in its brand. Russia needs nation branding to present itself and to explain why it has not been understood by public opinion abroad. Still, this soft power means does not replace the changes in Russian internal and foreign policy, which in many cases are contradictory to the soft messages reshaping its image.
NOTES

1. Soft power in international relations focuses on the image and reputation of the country and uses attraction instead of coercion. According to Nye (2004, p. 11) soft power of a country “rests on three resources: its culture (...), its political values (...), and its foreign policies (...).”

2. The notion of a “monopipe state” comes from Ivan Krastev, who used it in a discussion published in the Polish daily Dziennik, 9 February 2008.

3. W. Olins with a group of specialists worked on a coherent campaign for Poland, the central motto was one of the results of their work. (Ociepka, Ryniejska — Kieldanowicz, 2005, p.16).

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We can speak of two kinds of branding Russia — external and internal, i.e., one aimed at Russian citizens and the other for the so called “western world.” In both cases, the most effective channel of branding is television, which combines very successfully the purposes of entertaining and persuading.

Branding for Russia is closely connected with the phenomenon of mythologization. Creating secondary myths is an important part not only of branding, but also building a stronger national identity. It’s possible to identify several tendencies at work in this area such as the “Self/Other” opposition, the sacredness of Russia and the myth of its prosperity. The latter is represented on TV by different shows, three of them produced by “Pervy Kanal” (The First Channel). According to the Gallup International public opinion poll conducted in November, 2007, the most popular TV shows are “The Ice Age,” “The Big Races” and “The Field of Wonder” (the latter is a clone of the famous “Wheel of Fortune”). Since the early 1990s, this show has been a kind of the exhibition of Russian economic achievement. Participants of the show come from different regions, bringing food items and souvenirs to present to the showman who is perceived as a member of an extended family.

Another direction of branding Russia concerns revisiting and revising Russian history. For example, the film “The downfall of Empire: the lesson of Byzantium” (2008) presents Russia as a spiritual successor of the Byzantine Empire. Mythologization of Russian history is also popular in films of the genre of fantasy; in this respect, one can name such movies as “The Sovereign’s Servant” (2007) directed by Oleg Ryaskov, “1612: the Chronicles of the Time of Troubles” (2007) directed by Vladimir Khotinenko, “1814” directed by Anders Puustusmaa (2007), and “Alexander: the Battle on the Neva River” by Igor Kolenov (2008). All these films are based on real and significant dates in Russian history, i.e., the youth of the great Russian poet Alexander Pushkin, the Time of Troubles, the reign of Peter the Great, and the so called Battle on the Neva River. At the same time, all these films take artistic license with real events; thus history becomes an instrument in building the brand of a powerful Russia, creating the sense of a strong Russian identity.

The most recent example of external branding is the promotion of Sochi as the site of the Olympic Games in 2014. It has all the features of branding, i.e., a logo, a slogan, a message, an object and channels of branding. “The Sochi Project” is gradually contributing to the creation of the national idea. As a means of communication, media act as a part of public relations channel and therefore — the channel for branding.

According to the Russian Information Agency (RIA Novosti), after the public liturgy on Christmas, 2007, President Putin visited the residence of Father Frost in Veliki Ustug. Special attention was drawn to the model of “Father Frost’s Sochi Residence,” which is to be built by 2014. The project of Father Frost’s residence in Sochi was supported by the Russian business community. It is also interesting to note that the inhabitants of Sochi chose
a skiing dolphin as a new possible emblem of the Olympic Games in 2014, thus uniting two incompatible, almost oxymoronic images. Thus, the city of Sochi situated on the Black sea coast, is now connected not only with the Olympic Games but also with the names of Father Frost and President Putin. Here we witness the creation of a secondary myth and a political project at the same time. The South and the North — the two opposite poles of the world, as much as Christianity and fairy-tales, appear to create dynamic tensions of branding in present-day Russia.
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BRANDING OF RUSSIA AS AN ASPECT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

During the last several years both political figures and experts have realized that the international image of Russia is not very positive. This fact is supported by numerous international country ratings and publications about Russia in foreign media, low numbers of international tourists and students in Russia, little foreign investments in Russia and low credibility of Russian companies in potential foreign investors’ eyes.

Not surprisingly, Russian Governmental bodies and political figures have been making efforts to address the unfavorable image of Russia on the global scene, emphasizing the necessity of its strategic branding, which has been discussed at different forums, conferences and meetings. It can be said that, without a doubt, branding is one of the most important and urgent problems for Russia today.

Following the dissolution of the USSR, Russia has been going through an acute self-identity crisis. Today Russia is still trying to define its position in the modern system of international relations and determine its values and priorities. The question of constructing a more positive image of Russia to influence public opinion abroad was raised as part of the framework of the Russian Foreign Affairs Policy accepted in 2000 (http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/06/18/2014_type63377type63378_73022.shtml). Since then several isolated projects have been carried out, but still no coherent state program exists in this respect.

The best way to implement an effective branding policy is by make it a regular, controlled, strategic and global process. One of the first steps in that direction could be the creation of a special department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for nation branding. Some other steps already being taken by different Russian groups of interest to form a positive image of Russia include the following areas and activities.

Economy. It is one of the most important areas in the field of nation branding. The main objective here is overcoming the negative image of Russian business and increasing its investment attractiveness. Branding projects in economic spheres are actively supported not only by the Russian government, but also (and sometimes even more actively) by the Russian business-society.

Culture, Education and Science. Russia still enjoys a high reputation in these spheres of human activity. Conferences, round tables, exhibitions and festivals are held all over the world by the Russian authorities or representatives of cultural and academic circles in order to promote a more positive image of Russia. Following the Soviet tradition these projects frequently take the form of “Days of Russian Culture.” Educational projects are usually aimed at increasing the popularity of the Russian language and culture.
Sports. The development of nation branding in this area is usually concentrated on Russia’s participation in international sports and games events. One more kind of activity here is the international promotion of Russian competitions and championships, e.g. The Kremlin Tennis Cup or the Winter Olympic Games to be held in Sochi in 2014.

Tourism. The main objective in this area is increasing Russian tourist attractiveness for cultural excursions, extreme adventures and eco-travel. A high level of the involvement of Russian regions in this area is crucial.

Church. Religious diplomacy is playing an increasingly important role in modern policy.

National Holidays. Renewing some old national, religious, historical and cultural holidays or creating the new ones can be seen as an important part of nation branding for Russia.

Media Projects. This area includes creating Russian media outlets with international coverage, e.g. Russia Today TV Channel and their cooperation with foreign media.
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Russia’s Brand as a Problem and a Dream

The linking of such energetically saturated ideas as “Russia” and “brand” creates a powerful tension of mental and conceptual correlations. It is surprisingly productive and fruitful, not only in the sphere of political technologies for promoting a positive image of the Russian Federation, but - and this is the main thing - comprehending important aspects of the correlated ideas themselves.

It might seem that the topic of “the Russian idea” has been already analyzed inside out. It has come to mean “Project of Russia” and “Russian Doctrine.” However, “the brand of Russia” is a new and emerging topic, calling for attention.

Brand: from a mark to a social myth and a dream

The word “brand” has morphed over the past fifty years. It literally means a “mark” (“brand”). The creators of drakes and ships not only gave names to every drake, but also marked them with their own “brand,” confirming the work of a particular master. Later the word came to be used in North America, where in the West it was typical to brand cattle. There was no need for any documents: the bull with my brand is in your herd! Thus, brand was initially used as an earmark and identification of property, e.g. a product, a slave or cattle.

The concept of brand has come to business in this very meaning, i.e., as a registered trademark. However, in modern business “brand” means something more than just a symbol for an author, a producer or a mark. It can be intuitively felt, if we compare, for example, such automobiles as BMW and Moskvich, such drinks as Coca-Cola and Baikal or Kolokolchik. Despite the fact that all of them are registered trademarks, some of them are perceived as brands while others provoke a derisive smile or laughter when we apply this term to them. Why is this so?

In modern business, with its marketing technologies, “brand” isn’t just any name, but an image and reputation with market value for a specific mark. This is an important factor of non-material actives, stipulated by an image and reputation. An image is a concept of a product and its producer - something that they evoke in other people such as consumers, partners, investors and representatives of other target groups. An image and an opinion, the “right-hemispheric visualization” and the “left-hemispheric discursivity,” interrelating like Yang and Yin, create a brand.

Today we market not simply products or services, but just brands. D.Oraev (2005) has recently introduced “the new definition of brand from four words” as promise of realization of wishful feelings. Everything is in the magic bubbles! Not the chocolate waffles Wispa, but “the taste of tenderness.” People are offered their dreams, desires, hopes, their ideas of themselves, or what-they-would-like-to-be. That’s why the modern fully-fledged brand is
always a fantasy, a fairy-tale about a magic artifact that opens the doors to the kingdom of your dream (cf. Afanasjiev et al., 2007). Contemporary brand is a myth, a story, a narrative. BMW is a story about “cool dudes,” and Mercedes is about prosperity and comfort. Coca-Cola is a party with friends, even among white bears. And Moskvich and Kolocolchik are just marks, not real brands.

Brand as a System of Cultural Identities

In today’s society of mass consumption and mass culture brands do not simply play the role of modern social mythology. They are an important factor of self-identification: people wear brands, eat and drink brands, live in brands and drive brands, read and watch brands. In this connection it is possible and necessary to speak about a brand as a factor of new personology and anthropology (Tulchinskii, 2008).

Moreover, no brand exists alone. On the one hand, a company’s image can be used for the creation of brand stretching (Baltica for beer); on the other hand, separate goods create an image or reputation of a company (the sorts of sausage for Strelets, Nevsky Trust or Parnas). Some spheres, e.g. culture, art, and science provoke a positive attitude while others, e.g., nuclear energy or weapons’ industry cause a negative one. At the same time some companies can define the image of a whole industry, cf. Gazprom. The image and reputation of a country is obviously behind the brand of goods, as it was, for example, with the American auto industry. However, it is also obvious that brands of goods play an important role in the formation of an idea about the producing country, cf. Toyota, Sony and Honda for Japan. An important role is played by branding the whole industries or kinds of activity, which define in many respects the country as such, for example, Japanese electronics, Russian ballet, French perfume. It is in the context of the understanding of brand nature, brand phenomenon and the richness of interrelations between different levels of branding where all the ambiguity of the topic “the Brand of Russia,” or, to be more exact, “Russia as a Brand” is being revealed.

The Brand of Russia: the Problem of Dream

At present we hear a lot about the problem of promoting domestic brands for the foreign and even home markets, with the calls for the necessity of their state support. We can identify several aspects of this situation.

First, the failure of Russian trade brands against the pressure of brands with a long stable history on the globalized markets is striking. Our producers are beginning to give up their positions to Korean and Chinese producers, and this fact can hardly be blamed on the so called “American imperialism.”

Second, it becomes clear, if we consider this question more closely, that the Russian economy has a very serious problem: we practically don’t have full-fledged brands of goods. In other words, the Russian economy can’t offer anything to global markets. There are neither widespread brands nor even specialized, “boutique” ones. The domestic automobile
industry, which was developed on the basis of *Ford*, *Opel* and *Fiat* (*Pobeda* was the only domestic model), went under. The traditional sector of strong drinks was given up without a struggle; *Stolichnaya* is no longer a Russian brand. The raw material sector is truly Russian. But, oil, gas, nickel and forest can’t be brands. Some cultural brands from the past are still popular today, e.g. the Bolshoi Theatre, the Mariinsky Theatre, the Hermitage, or Russian ballet, but it is all in the past.

Third, we can’t but note one more important fact. The desperate desire to dream has always been typical for the Russian culture throughout its history. Everyday life has never been a valuable part of the Russian and Soviet spiritual experience. Life in the next world (“afterlife”) has always been of greater value, cf. the bright future, life overseas, but not here and now. The moral person in Russia has always been one who lives for the sake of some idea and can suffer for it if necessary. In Russia the law of property and the freedom of the individual have been less important than the grace of God.

Look at the Russian philosophers with their dreams! For example, N. Fedorov had the dream of the resurrection of all dead ancestors, and V. Solovjev dreamt of the kingdom of the good. G. Wells called V. Lenin the “Kremlin dreamer.” Truth be told, all such dreams were utopian like building the kingdom of God on Earth, or catching up with, and leaving behind, another country such as North America, Sweden and now more and more India and China. The recent “Project Russia” is also a dream desperate in its hopelessness - building the Orthodox Kingdom, which will withstand the worldwide Mammon. Russia dreams about its past greatness. Yet, it is not a dream, but nostalgia, the post-amputation pain in the lost extremity.

The “national idea” has been overused by philosophers, politicians and publicists. However, nation branding must be about some simple things understood by everybody. What is Russia’s dream? What door in what kingdom of dream does it open and with the help of what magic artifacts? What unites us? It cannot be what we fear with enemies inside and outside, but it must be something for which the soul strives. How good do we want to become? What treasure of our soul can we give to the world?

**References**


BOOK REVIEWS


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The attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent terrorist actions in Bali, Istanbul, Madrid and London provided the catalyst for an unprecedented surge of counter-terrorism policies and strategies across the globe. These policies and strategies emanate from an increasingly crowded policy arena claimed by a bewildering number of national agencies and international forums jockeying for influence and position. The proliferation of policies, strategies and policy-making machinery has, in turn, called forth an ever-expanding corpus of literature that describes, dissects, assesses and seeks to influence the structure and output of this thriving counter-terrorism industry.

The volume under review, a compilation of papers presented at a NATO Advanced Research Workshop in Washington DC in 2006, seeks to contribute to this literature by providing a comparative analysis of the various reactions to the challenges of “mass-scale terrorism” in the US, UK, France, Turkey and Russia. All 16 contributors are scholars and “operational people” from each of the countries. In the introductory chapter, Orttung, one of the editors, justifies the selection of countries by noting, “[t]he United States is now the world’s only superpower and has made fighting terrorism its top priority. However, Americans have little experience addressing this problem and could benefit from a better understanding of the experience of others.” The UK government’s counter-terrorism strategies were initially honed during its struggle with the Irish Republican Army. More recently, the strategies have been revised and updated to cope with “home grown Islamist extremists.” The Turkish government has a long history of devising policies to deter the violent actions of “leftist groups,” “radical Islamists” and “Kurdish separatists.” The Russian government’s development of a systematic counter-terrorism policy is of more recent vintage, beginning with the second war in Chechnya. Although the editors claim that the French experience is also part of the comparative analysis (see book’s subtitle) this is not really the case. While one can find sporadic paragraphs that refer fleetingly to the French context, no chapter is dedicated to a systematic examination of the French government’s counter-terrorism apparatus.
According to the editors, the comparative analysis yields at least three lessons for the US government. The first is the importance of recognizing and targeting the extensive links between organized crime and terrorism when combating the latter. This lesson is taken on board by Louise Shelley, a US contributor to the volume. In the final chapter she excoriates the US government for conceptualizing crime and terrorism as two separate issues. Shelley claims, for example, that many of the problems the Bush administration faces in Iraq can be traced to the US military’s failure to curb the illicit weapons markets that appeared in Iraq in the aftermath of the US invasion.

The second lesson involves the urgent need to improve the level of coordination among the various terrorism-fighting agencies even though increased integration may come at the expense of fewer checks and balances in the system. In the US, this has been a significant problem as officials have struggled to effect the largest re-organization of the federal government since the early days of the Cold War, namely reorganizing and consolidating multiple agencies under the new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security.

The third lesson is that the government must carefully calibrate the appropriate trade-off between protecting civil liberties and ensuring the overall security of society. Several of the country case studies show how the enactment of draconian laws designed to make it easier for the state to crackdown on suspected terrorist groups may seriously undercut civil liberties. This lesson seems to go unheeded by Bowman, a second US contributor. The author expresses irritation that law enforcement and counter-terrorism agencies need to operate within particular constraints when tracking down suspected terrorists. For instance, he complains about the privacy and due process considerations that regulate state wiretapping practices. Moreover, Bowman has little time for those who oppose the National Security Agency’s amassing of records and data mining practices. Unfortunately, this irritation is not accompanied by a sober critique of the concerns raised by civil libertarians. Instead, we are left with the author’s take that the critics are simply uninformed.

With respect to the third lesson, few of the contributors choose to seriously question the national security/trade-off frame. Acceptance of the frame inevitably leads to discussion about whether the public is willing to make the necessary sacrifices to bring greater national security. Yet little empirical evidence is presented that demonstrates enhanced law enforcement and counter-terrorism agency powers (e.g. enhanced state surveillance powers) are efficacious in preventing terrorist activities.

Given NATO’s sponsorship of the collection, it is not surprising that the collection as a whole tends to exhibit a state bias across a number of issues, though several chapters subtly buck the trend. First, this bias is evident in the way terrorism is defined and discussed by many of the contributors. Most of the authors work with an implicit or explicit understanding of terrorists as those who perpetrate particular kinds of violent practices against civilians and non-combatants. For the most part, terrorists are assumed to come from the margins of a country’s civil society or from some distant shore. The fact that “rogue” and “failed” states
are frequently implicated in terrorist activities is also discussed. However, there is no recognition of the fact that some Western states (e.g., the US state) have a track record of sponsoring terrorist activities (given the above definition). Among other things, the glossing over of this fact shores up the supposed moral superiority of these states when it comes to deliberations on terrorism.

Second, many of the contributions fail to adequately consider the dialectical relationship that often exists between states and “terrorists.” This point can be exemplified with reference to the Ozdogan chapter, the only contribution in the volume that systematically investigates the question: Where do terrorists come from? Ozdogan draws from a spectrum of social science theory to examine which social, political and global factors affect the supply of labor to terrorist organizations. He concludes that countries are more likely to produce terrorists if they have weak political institutions (e.g., low levels of democracy). He notes, “this result intrinsically offers hope for counter-terrorism efforts, as it is easier to change political institutions than social structural conditions.” Setting aside questions about how this “democracy” is to be brought about and by whom (e.g., invasion vs. internal struggle), the point to be made here is that Ozdogan does not choose to engage the literature that claims specific state actions or policies can contribute to the production of terrorism — through police or foreign policy actions, for example. Ozdogan’s account and the contributions of others in the collection create the impression that the state is a reactive and benevolent actor that is never a witting or unwitting contributor to the production of terrorists activities.

Not all the chapters are subject to this criticism. For example, Parker’s analysis of the relationship between the British state and the IRA show that at various times counter-terrorism actions actually contributed to the upward spiral of violence in Northern Ireland. In a similar vein, Abdullaev and Saradzhyan’s analysis of the Russian government’s response to terrorism highlights the fact that the indiscriminate use of force and suppression of religious groups could well have contributed to swelling “terrorist” ranks. Unusually for this volume, these authors go on to argue that the Russian government’s overall response to terrorism should be “expanded beyond the scope of tackling the hard security threat to address the root causes and contributing factors, which range from the socio-economic woes to the abuses of civilians’ rights and freedoms…”

Third, the bulk of the chapters appear to promote the notion that the recent proliferation of counter-terrorist policies and strategies is simply a natural and predictable response to the growth of new forms of “mass-scale terrorism.” This understanding is incomplete. The proliferation also reflects efforts by powerful state actors to take advantage of certain moments (e.g., terrorist attacks) to enhance their power. Again, a few contributions, including the Abdullaev and Saradzhyan chapter, seem to appreciate this dynamic.

No doubt counter-terrorism scholars and professionals will find a good deal of value in this volume. While the lessons provided by the comparative analysis will be familiar to
this audience, there is much granular-level information concerning counter-terrorism organizations and strategies that will be of interest. The more general reader may find it profitable to explore the tension between the many chapters that exhibit the state bias alluded to earlier and the few contributions that question this bias. The volume offers much less to those who believe that efforts to reduce terrorist activity must begin with a serious examination of the underlying causes of terrorism.

**Reviewed by Ellen Mickiewicz, Ph.D.**
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Laura Roselle’s book is the result of a stimulating and innovative research project: the comparison of political leaders’ use of television in both the United States and the Soviet Union as they both entered, gradually assessed the battlefield truths, and determined that withdrawal was the only strategy left in their unsuccessful wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, respectively. Professor Roselle (in the interests of full disclosure), with whom I worked decades ago during her undergraduate days at Emory University and then on her committee at Stanford University, has, many years and much research later, produced a book of thoughtful originality. At first, it might seem an unattainable, methodologically sound comparison — explaining defeat in a fuzzily defined war comparing two grossly different political and media systems — but it becomes apparent that if one knows both systems as well as the author and is armed with an extraordinary amount of data, including interviews with the Soviet leaders and correspondents on the ground, there is ample reason to open up what is, at a deeper level, a significant parallelism in the way leadership believes it *must* devise and implement a media strategy for explanation and support of what is essentially defeat. Furthermore, the author suggests that one of the attributes of great power status is the much greater importance this process has, as opposed to lesser powers; thus, it may be *only* in these two countries that the media strategy became so urgent.

The book’s structure helps to keep these comparisons well organized. It consists of parallel analyses: first, of the war in Vietnam divided into two sections — “War Waging and Reassessment” and “Withdrawal and Aftermath.” Then the author analyzes these two phases with respect to the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Roselle is able to do this with such clarity, because the phases, the necessities of changing media policy, and the explanations of the aftermath are surprisingly similar in such different systems. This is, in so many examples, the conclusion that emerges in so many of the parts of these comparative case studies.

On Vietnam, American readers will be much more familiar with the events, the key players, and the press. What I find most interesting are materials taken from presidential papers and tapes. These reveal at times obsession with the media, characterization of media anchors and programs in terms of bias, emotional rejection of media as permanently opposed
to President Nixon (this, from an angry Chuck Colson, who favors at one point, not dealing with the media at all).

While this research-packed concise story of Vietnam may introduce not much that is new, the main question is still of great interest. American presidents had to explain to the citizens who elected them why the war was taking place; what was happening as more bodies came home and cracks in support were revealed within the leadership, thus permitting a wedge of access for the press; and then how to explain that the great power had effectively been defeated by a small country of very limited means. This was called the first televised war, and that medium was the principal instrument.

On the Soviet side of the book, Roselle’s task is much more difficult. There is much less accessible information, although television itself had penetrated virtually the whole country. The leadership denied there was a war — it was referred to as an “internationalist duty of a limited contingent.” All television stories were sent to Moscow for review by the military before they could be shown and even if there was a puff of black smoke off in a corner, the story was spiked. There was no war; the Soviets were there to assist the development of the country and stave off the insurgents (of course, now familiar as the Taliban) funded by the West. Mikhail Gorbachev changed all that and ended the war, pushed by the advice of the inventor of glasnost, Alexander Yakovlev.

It is certainly a tremendously difficult challenge for the author to provide the reader with a parallel understanding when so much was hidden. She adds to what little we know about the Soviet leadership’s media strategy two forms of important and new material. Since the state implemented total control of the limited television news available, and since there was one thoroughly authoritative broadcast every day, the analysis of those broadcasts is tantamount to studying what the leadership’s media strategy is at any given point, and her content analysis of coverage is revealing. It would have been helpful to add to the appendix, if not the full codebook, at least the main categories and choices she used in evaluating content.

Professor Roselle’s second new instrument of analysis comes from her unparalleled access to the leaders who made the decisions about how and what to frame on television. Among these leaders are Politburo member and number two leader, Alexander Yakovlev, the father of glasnost, Vadim Medvedev, Politburo head of propaganda, Leonid Kravchenko, who headed television, and the correspondent who was most closely identified with the war: Mikhail Leshchinskii, in Afghanistan from 1985-1989.

Considered more broadly, these case studies of strategies were to persuade both domestic and international publics of the credibility and legitimacy of the hostilities. An essential element for both is withdrawal understood as leaving behind peace within a new structure: for the Soviets, it was “national reconciliation” among the resident ethnicities, and for the United States, it was worth a Nobel peace prize. Neither “solution” ushered in an era of peace and both had to deal in remarkably similar ways with the return of the dead, wounded, addicted, handicapped, and alienated. Roselle is always careful not to push too far
the similarities in two different political systems, but the fact of great power status, a technology that instantly delivers messages to the entire country, and the norms at issue at home and abroad do deliver new insights into both cases.

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This volume provides a valuable collection of studies in the “contaminated communities” genre associated with Edelstein (2004) and other social scientists. The chapters would stand on their own as studies of communities affected by toxic industrial and military-industrial operations, but the volume’s overarching theme provides additional significance. In his introduction, Edelstein remarks that the essays “examine a fascinating but sad historical fact: the two dominant and dominating societies of the 20th century, Russia and the U.S., shared a disregard for the health of earth, people, and bio-diverse species through the parallel pursuit of industrialization and militarization… If the driving force in the west was overconsumption driven by the marketplace, in the east it was state controlled production” (p. 2). Immerged in the symmetrical and pathological dynamics of the Cold War, both nations sacrificed political ideals, human health and safety, and environmental integrity to sustain a fierce and destructive industrial competition.

That Cold War tragedy is the book’s historical context rather than its analytical focus, however. The focus is on the effects of industrial pollution on communities and their associated ecosystems, and most importantly, on the responses of those communities. Thus along with the dark picture of toxic chemical and radiological contamination, we also encounter some hopeful stories of citizen mobilization, effective communicative action, and political and institutional change. The successes are neither total nor irreversible — perhaps eternal vigilance is the price of (post)modernity — but they provide useful lessons for community activism, institutional critique, and social science research in what Beck (1992) has called contemporary “risk society.” Another important aspect of the book is its origins in an international and interdisciplinary project that also bridges the gap between academia and activism. Funded by a grant from the Trust for Mutual Understanding, a group of U.S. researchers traveled to Russia in 2002 to visit a number of contaminated communities and to engage with Russian scholars, civic leaders, officials, and activists. The group toured polluted sites associated with industrial operations, chemical weapons programs, and nuclear weapons production, hearing a range of perspectives ranging from official denials of health hazards to passionate activism in the face of potentially demoralizing risk.

Later that year, a Russian group traveled to the U.S. on a parallel mission, visiting contaminated sites in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York and meeting with U.S. scholars, activists, Environmental Protection Agency officials, and environmental attorneys.
The group’s itinerary included Love Canal, New York, an epicenter of the late 20th century U.S. environmental movement; the Ironbound neighborhood in Newark, New Jersey, where citizens mobilized in the 1980s to address existing contamination and to defeat plans for further polluting activities; and the World Trade Center site in New York, where controversy continues over governmental responses and constraints on public disclosure following the events of September 2001. These “toxic tours” — examples of a phenomenon receiving growing attention within the field of environmental communication (e.g., Pezzullo, 2006) — provided the impetus for the essays that make up the volume. To maximize the essays’ academic impact as well as their reach, the editors arranged for them to appear in a venue that is both a serial publication — volume 14 of Research in Social Problems and Public Policy — and a self-contained book. The only disadvantage of this format is that the book lacks an index, which would have been a helpful tool for users of this valuable material.

The volume is organized in four parts, each including a brief editorial introduction and a set of thematically-linked essays. Part 1 explores the “social-psychological dynamics of chemical contamination,” opening with a chapter by Adeline Levine, author of a classic study of the Love Canal case. Levine sets the stage effectively for the chapters that follow by reflecting on her initial motivations to study a toxic community and on the methodological, practical, and institutional tensions entailed by that choice. A chapter follows on the Russian city Kirishi, where during the late stages of the Soviet era residents became increasingly aware of the health hazards posed by a biochemical manufacturing plant. The confluence of growing public awareness of risk and the beginnings of Gorbachev’s perestroika enabled an activist effort that parallels Love Canal as a landmark case of civic mobilization to address environmental harms. As an ironic footnote, the Kirishi plant has now been rehabilitated and dedicated to the production of vodka.

Although community mobilization at Kirishi lagged behind Love Canal by about a decade, the next chapter demonstrates that significant environmental awareness had emerged in the Soviet Union in the 1970s, not far behind developments in Western Europe and the U.S. In the small town of Sokol, host to two paper mills and later, a noxious yeast production plant, the first efforts to address pollution came not from the local community but from the central government. It took the reforms of glasnost and perestroika to open public discussion of problems that had already received the attention of the Soviet bureaucracy. Sadly, the Kirishi and Sokol chapters both indicate that environmental action (if not awareness) declined after the fall of the Soviet Union, as economic and employment concerns rose to dominate the national agenda. Again we see a remarkable parallel, to a cyclical pattern of environmental action that has also played out in the U.S., albeit for different reasons.

Three U.S. cases round out Part 1, focusing on a South Carolina landfill hosting hazardous wastes from 40 states, fear of cancer in an rural Appalachian community affected by one individual’s illegal disposal of industrial chemicals, and the persistent social and psychological trauma that haunted residents of a Houston, Texas neighborhood for years after the discovery of benzene in their water supply. Consistent with the contaminated
communities research tradition, these chapters examine the psychosocial effects of pollution using a range of qualitative and quantitative methods. One such effect is the social stigma experienced by residents of contaminated communities, a recurrent theme in other chapters and perhaps the reason for leaving the Appalachian community unidentified. Another is the disabling “subculture of distress” that afflicted the community in Houston.

Part 2 shifts the focus to a number of “closed cities” in the former Soviet Union, and one analogous setting in the U.S., where commitments to high-risk technologies have been accompanied — not coincidentally — by exclusionary communication practices. Three chapters examine Mayak, the largest Soviet nuclear weapons production facility and the site of multiple accidents kept secret for years. Another chapter addresses risk perception after Chernobyl, emphasizing the “radioanxiety” produced by that event and its implications for public attitudes toward nuclear power. Here the problematic nature of diagnostic language is implicit and worthy of further examination: although radioanxiety is a useful term for calling attention to a serious psychosocial phenomenon, it can also reify official characterizations of a hysterical or irrational public.

Part 2 continues with a look at Dzerzhinsk, the only non-nuclear case in this section, where the community’s image devolved from “the capital of Soviet chemistry” to “Dustograd” or “DDT City,” to “the dirtiest city in Russia.” There, industrial and military production programs, including chemical weapons production, cultivated a systematic blindness to hazards and “habitual risk taking” behaviors. The section’s final chapter examines the community that hosts the U.S. parallel to Mayak, the plutonium production facility at Hanford in Washington state. Here Edelstein draws on interview data collected in the 1980s, as Hanford’s hidden history of contamination was just becoming public. As Edelstein remarks, the combined effects of citizen activists and investigative journalists brought about a “virtual glasnost” at Hanford, paralleling the collapse of secrecy that was unfolding during the final years of the Soviet Union. One paradox at Hanford — which I also observed in my own fieldwork there, more than a decade later — is that the most proximate residents have been the most reluctant to recognize health and environmental risks. As at Dzerzhinsk, familiarity may breed blindness, or as in some of the volume’s other cases, employment and economic development concerns may further obscure the already-invisible hazards of Beck’s risk society.

Part 3 addresses the topic of mitigation, a welcome direction after the catalog of contamination comprising the previous sections. Not all of the mitigation efforts examined here have been unmitigated successes, however. The section’s first chapter provides a critical review of the U.S. “superfund” and “brownfields” programs, drawing on insights from grassroots activism. Although the brownfields program has been framed as a valuable alternative to the slow-moving superfund bureaucracy, and as an innovative merger of government and free enterprise, the chapter identifies several ways in which this approach can compromise both environmental cleanup standards and democratic community involvement.
The section’s four remaining chapters are all set in Russia, and examine a broad range of settings using a variety of approaches. A macro-level study reviews the national effort to deal with the world’s largest stockpile of chemical weapons, now stored at seven sites in densely populated areas; here organizational and public communication challenges are clearly as daunting as the technical ones. The next chapter takes a very different, micro approach to another problem of huge scale, returning to the case of Chernobyl as seen through the personal experience of a “liquidator” assigned to the cleanup five months after the initial fire. The liquidator’s autobiographical account, mediated through interviews with two of the book’s editors (who are his sister and brother-in-law), provides a compelling and informative narrative of an episode more typically viewed by academics from a safe distance.

The chapter that follows describes an unusual approach to the health problems faced by children in the Chernobyl region and in other “ecological distress zones” in Russia. Rather than seeking to mitigate the recalcitrant environmental conditions that threaten these children, medical researchers are experimenting with methods for adapting the children to their situations. In the section introduction, Edelstein links this approach to “the Russian tendency to accept conditions, no matter how dire, as the way that things are, and then to do one’s best under the circumstances” (pp. 310-311). Smirnova’s chapter, set in Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad), which she describes as “one of Russia’s top ten polluted cities,” examines a different approach. At the Volgograd Ecological Gymnasium, an educational program for children in grades 1-11 works to accomplish “social remediation” by cultivating ecological awareness and values. The editors associate both of these approaches with the distinctively Russian concept of “endoecology,” the pursuit of environmental balance through balance at the individual level. Edelstein remarks that when he first encountered this concept he viewed it with skepticism, but his skepticism has declined as he has come to better understand the cultural context from which the concept has emerged.

In section 4, the volume’s last localized case study diverges from the domain of Cold War legacy contamination, but perhaps appropriately: new contaminated communities continue to appear on the post-Cold War landscape. One dramatic example is New York’s World Trade Center site, a product of a new, but in some ways uncomfortably familiar, pattern of conflict. With community leader Catherine McVay Hughes, Edelstein examines the often-problematic interactions among citizens, technical experts, and policy makers as the environmental, social, and political aftershocks of the World Trade Center attack continue to reverberate. Their chapter is followed by a survey-based study of “environmental altruism” in Russian and U.S. university students, which raises important questions not only about comparative cultural values, but also about the methodological challenges of measuring and interpreting those values.

In the book’s final chapter, Edelstein and Smirnova extend the cultural focus further to provide some closing reflections. By now, it is evident that the book’s title can be read in at least three ways. Particular “cultures of contamination” exist at each of the sites examined
in the case studies, but two larger, national cultures inform the problems and practices evident in those settings. At the broadest level, however, the volume documents a global culture of contamination linked to overarching values, practices, and ways of life that are in dire need of reexamination. The volume offers a wide range of cautionary tales that can help to motivate that reflexive process. It also offers us glimpses of positive and creative responses grounded in both national traditions.

In addition to the editors, the volume’s contributing authors include Tatyana J. Andruschenko, Robert Binford, Alla Bolotova, Nikolay G. Britanov, Stephen R. Couch, Boris N. Filatov, Margaret Gibbs, Oleg S. Glazachev, William K. Hallman, Janice L. Hastrup, Madelyn Hoffman, Catherine McVay Hughes, Valentina V. Klauchek, Sergei V. Klauchek, Ivan Kulyasov, Antonina Kulyasova, Nadezhda Kutepova, Adeline G. Levine, Natalya Makarevich, Nicholas D. Martyniak, Anne E. Mercuri, Natalia Mironova, Jonathan Reisman, Sherilyn N. Thomas, Olga Tsepilova, Abraham H. Wandersman, and Irina A. Zykova. All should be commended for producing a unique resource of value to scholars, activists, and policy makers in both nations and beyond.

REFERENCES


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In the name of tourism, moderns have carried out missions of exploration and expansion, cultural imperialism and commercialization, espionage and escape, time travel and — lest we forget — leisure. If for the breadth of topics alone, Turizm: The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism illustrates how Russia and East Europe are no exceptions to the strange complexities of modern travel.

Anne Gorsuch and Diane Koenker’s fine edited volume brings to light understudied and significant historical perspectives in its two parts: one, travels in capitalist Russia and parts of Eastern Europe (i.e., Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Latvia) before 1917 and, two, socialist tourism ranging from Sevastopol to London after 1917. The volume’s fourteen articles widely examine the tradition of tourism from Tsarist Russia to the 1970s Soviet Union, developing topics such as nation-making and empire maintenance, the geographic margins of European-ness, the regulation and utopianism of socialist tourism, individual and collective preoccupations with self-interest and self-improvement, and the reconciliation of labor and relaxation in the Soviet mind. In the editor’s introductory think-piece Rudy Koshar reminds us the word “travel” derives from “travail,” or suffering and labor — which should surprise few familiar with travel in the former Soviet Union. Leisure travel is importantly hard work.

McReynolds points out Peter the Great was the “quintessential Russian traveler” who “journeyed to western Europe to find not only himself but, more to the point, to find a nation he embodied” — a trend that correlated cultural sophistication with consumption abroad and that persisted throughout the nineteenth-century capitalist Russia. It is then no surprise the period’s travel literature, let alone the works of Pushkin or Tolstoy, should require an appreciation of the French language, ennui, and silk blouses. Yet tourist authorities also leveraged nationalism in imperial Russia, fin de siècle Hungary (Vari), and interwar Latvia (Purs) to deepen an appreciation of native lands, to bolster national economies against foreign spending, and to protect citizens from exposure to undue “difference.”

Travel in the Soviet Union is also an education in the complexities of contradiction: as Shawn Salmon reads in Western travelogues, the experience of traveling to the Soviet Union became marketable for the very absence of leisure and consumption. Inturist — the Soviet state apparatus for foreign tourism — struggled to sell everything to a controlled flow of consumers with foreign currency, tourists complained there was nothing to buy: the top selling good, it seems, was the experience of non-market conditions. In “Time Travelers’
Anne Gorsuch extends Larry Wolff’s useful phrase “demi-Orientalism” to the Western European construction of Eastern Europe during the Enlightenment with an inversion: “for Soviet citizens, Eastern Europe was ‘a paradox of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion,’ Soviet but not Soviet.” Ever on the margins of and at once directly between European and Slavic identities — as Gorsuch, Koenker, Gilburd, Bracewell, Moranda, and others examine — Eastern Europe remains a perplexingly rich region for the sociological study of human travel.

In lieu of a full review of the fine volume, consider a few points on why the historical study of tourism in these regions may claim broader interest to students of communication. In few other corners of the world have so many nations existed in so little space and over so little time. As Ernest Gellner notes in *Language and Solitude*, centuries of instable Eastern Europe states have sped the modern invention of culture as a social constant and counterbalance to regime change. Long under the influence of others, culture can be understood as something of an Eastern European experiment in locating people in places. There the past still blows especially strong in the wind: we need only stand still to find ourselves transported through past times of transition.

Russia too makes a useful geographic lens for focusing study of the Cold War employment and exacerbation of the same language of foreignness and bipolar difference implicated in tourism. The justification of both state-sponsored violence and state-sponsored temporary citizen exchange (i.e., tourism) depends on a subsequent separation between Self and Other, native and foreigner, and a popular acquiescence to such ideas of cultural difference best sustained over long distances by the symbols, signals, and media so firmly rooted in the province of communication studies. Studies of how such ideas materialize and migrate, from currency controls to passport stamps, can try tourism, together with Cold War politics, for enabling and profiting on the symbolic separation of foreigner and native. Travel places us in physical proximity; tourism sanctions and approximates our cultural differences; and as the case of Eastern Europe illustrates beautifully, we are left somewhere between.

In short, tourism may be to the modern study of cultural difference what glass (think beakers and test tubes, lenses and windows) was to modern science: both media make possible sterilized observation at very close and very far distances. This fine volume offers a rare look at the understudied complexities of tourism in a comparative approach to a fascinating part of the world. Students and scholars alike would do well, with the book in hand, to carry on the conversation it has begun.
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

IGOR E. KLYUKANOV

The theme of the present issue of Russian Journal of Communication is “Bakhtin and Our Response-ability.” Bakhtin was a philosopher, a literary critic, a semiotician, a teacher. But Bakhtin also was—and is—a sign, freely moving (mediating) between the “real world” (cf. “objects”) and the “world of meanings” (cf. “interpretants”). For that he did not need fancy foreign trips, professional development money to attend academic conventions, or high-speed Internet access. All Bakhtin needed to transcend his physical and temporal boundaries was the word, which—he never tired showing us—is dialogic in nature. When and where most heard but one voice that often spoke in the imperative mood, Bakhtin was able to hear many voices, constantly communicating.

In this complex dialogue it is tempting yet impossible to pinpoint one's own voice, for other voices are always present in their absences, cf. то, что сейчас говорю я, говорю не я [What I am saying now is being said not by me] (O.Mandel’shtam). We may claim things and ideas as our own all we want, but we don’t really own the word; rather, it is communication itself that carries us down the stream of thought, to new and newer shores. Our fate is in-betweenness, and to come to terms with it means, first of all, to acknowledge the ever-changing and virtual character of communication. Ironically, it is physicists and mathematicians, i.e., the scientists dealing with the supposedly soulless matter and cold numbers who speak of the indeterminacy and incompleteness of life. In the so-called communication sciences we tend to search for certainty, craving closure. We seem to be so full of ourselves, or simply insecure, that we are unable to handle the lack of a single truth. Fortunately, there are voices such as Peirce’s and Bakhtin’s, reminding us that semiosis is unlimited, communication unfinallizable.

Communication, however, is not complete chaos with the word’s meaning being up for grabs. It is, or rather always strives to be, a process with its own rhythm, and one wrong turn—conversational or non-verbal—can ruin it. For Bakhtin, the (ontological) nature of the word was inseparable, if not derivative, from the aesthetics and ethics of communication. If in the beginning was the Word, then the world can only be saved by its beauty and righteousness.

A religious man, Bakhtin never preached or imposed his thoughts upon others. Nor did he pose any direct questions for us to answer. However, every communicative act is not so much an answer as a response; a flower, for example, does not ask us to water it, yet we do. Similarly, we feel our response-ability to the world that Bakhtin brought to life, as a sign.
There has been no shortage of responses to that world; “Bakhtin and (one’s research topic is to be put in here)” has been employed or attempted as the formula for academic success by many. But have we really lived up to our responsibility to Bakhtin? Treating Bakhtin as a sign beyond space and time seems to run counter to his very ideas. To respond means not only to answer, but also to question. What voices might he have failed to hear? What is there after Bakhtin? Are we able to respond to Bakhtin also along those lines? Are we able, together with Bakhtin, to view communication itself as our super-addressee? Are we able to respond to Bakhtin as a sign, as interpreters and interpretants on our way to becoming signs ourselves?
Bakhtin’s Theory of Language from the Standpoint of Modern Science

Vyacheslav V. Ivanov

The article studies the relevance of Bakhtin’s theory of language and discourse for modern science. Special attention is given to his dialogue with Saussure, his insistence on the study of utterances and texts that should be broader than a strictly linguistic approach restricted by the scope of one sentence. That makes possible a completely new approach to the relation of linguistics and poetics; also of particular importance are Bakhtin’s views on the opposition of monoglossia and polyglossia. The article also looks at the new science of urban linguistics as manifest in Bakhtin’s remarks on the language of a city. Such parts of Bakhtin’s ideas as heteroglossia and theory of quotations, the dialogical principle in its relation to the difference of the direct speech and the indirect one (both in synchrony and from a diachronic point of view) as well as the role of a dialogical approach for the speech genres are also explored. It is shown how Bakhtin’s remarks on the importance of language for a world view and the foundation of onomastics have made him a predecessor of modern semantic studies. It is also shown how Bakhtin’s broadly conceptualized notions of “laughter culture” and of carnival lead to a new view on the parody of language. Finally, it is demonstrated how recent studies on the early stages of the linguistic theories have confirmed Bakhtinian view on the sacred word in its relation to a free word.

Keywords: metalinguistics, urban linguistics, poetics, onomastics, heteroglossia, speech genres, sacred word

The present paper discusses the relevance of Bakhtin’s theory of language and discourse for modern linguistics, trans(=meta)linguistics, and for verbal communication theory. Bakhtin was by no means just a professional linguist; he was also well-read in modern linguistic literature (some names important for him are mentioned below) and had good
philological expertise in Greek, Latin, Romance, German, Russian and Church Slavonic texts. He approached language from the viewpoint of some of his general philosophical anthropological concepts, such as the idea of the Other and the dialogical principle, the opposition of official and unofficial elements of culture and the role of carnival. Language was an important part of his thinking about the humanities, verbal art and, particularly, the novel. His ideas had much in common with those of other great thinkers of the century, such as Wittgenstein, Russell, Bohr, Florensky, Spet) whose philosophy had a characteristic “linguistic turn”. Bakhtin’s ideas influenced modern studies of language and helped to redefine the boundaries of linguistics itself. The main difficulty in understanding Bakhtin’s early views on linguistic theory is a consequence of the peculiar character of the sources; Bakhtin’s early thoughts on language are known only through the works he wrote ‘in disguise’ where a dose of “Marxism” was made necessary by the goal of his work.

**Bakhtin’s ‘Dialogue’ with Saussure**

Bakhtin’s attitude towards the pre-structural, algebraic, view of language systems (particularly in Saussure’s *Course of General Linguistics*) was determined by his dialogical principle that Bakhtin applied to language. That original view completely transformed the conceptual framework of linguistics. Bakhtin opposed all the main positions of Saussure’s theory (Stewart, 1986). For example, he rejects the view of a unitary language (langue) and an individual speech (parole), using the history of European languages that does not imply universal linguistic laws:

> The victory of one reigning language (dialect) over the others, the supplanting of languages, their enslavement, the process of illuminating them with the True Word, the incorporation of barbarians and lower social strata into a unitary language of culture and truth, the canonization of ideological systems, philology with its methods of studying and teaching dead languages, languages that were by that very fact “unities”, Indo-European linguistics with its focus of attention, directed away from language plurality to a single proto-language—all this determined the content and power of the category of “unitary language” in linguistic and stylistic thought, and determined its creative, style-shaping role in the majority of the poetic genres that coalesced in the channel formed by those same centripetal forces of verbal-ideological life. (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 271)

This seems particularly important today, since the number of endangered languages grows rapidly; it is predicted that no more than 600 languages out of 6,000 will survive in the nearest future. In linguistics, the theory of generative grammar has been based originally on one unitary language only, without paying much attention to *heteroglossia* inside American English.

Another aspect of Saussure’s theory that Bakhtin opposes deals with the nature of the linguistic sign. According to Bakhtin, an isolated linguistic sign does not exist in reality: a *monological* utterance is “already an abstraction.” “Any utterance—the finished, written
utterance not excepted—makes response to something and is calculated to be responded in turn” (Stewart, 1986). To translate this view in terms of linguistic theories that appeared after Bakhtin’s main works on language had been published, one might say that, for him, performance, not competence, is crucial. In other words, he considered a language system to be secondary to the primary significance of text.

Bakhtin’s critique of Saussure’s linguistic theory is partly similar to his critique of the Formalist approach to literature. In both cases he opposes a systematic description that, he believed, leads to simplistic formulae. One can compare the opposition of Saussure and Bakhtin to that of Hilbert and Gödel. No matter how attractive Hilbert’s program of developing mathematics as a purely formal system based on an initial set of axioms might seem, Gödel’s theorem rejects a complete, non-contradictory formalization of a relatively simple field of arithmetical knowledge. Even after Gödel’s theorem had been proven, such great structuralists as Kuryowicz suggested Hilbert’s program of axiomatization as a pattern to be followed by linguists. When Bakhtin did not approve of Saussure’s views of language, he was arguing just against those aspects of his system that made it similar to a mathematical one.

In retrospect, one can distinguish two main trends in linguistics of the 20th century. The dominant line of research followed Saussure or appeared to parallel his ideas. This way, an elaboration of formal and/or structural principles was achieved by the Prague and Copenhagen linguistic circles, and descriptive linguistics, generative grammar, and related fields of computational and mathematical linguistics were developed. However, scholars such as Leo Spitzer (Bakhtin’s favorite linguist) and other philologists, influenced by Vossler and Croce, opposed that purely formal view, finding it hostile to cultural and aesthetic apprehension of verbal texts.1 Bakhtin was also influenced by the school of Vossler. His views on Croce parallel those of Sapir expressed approximately at the same time. Particularly important for Bakhtin were Spitzer’s stylistic studies.

The present-day post-structuralist movement has found in Bakhtin some arguments in favor of the second approach. But, as Bakhtin’s views (particularly in his later period) were sufficiently broad, semioticians, partly developing Saussurean ideas, have also seen Bakhtin as their predecessor. In the future, one can hope for a synthesis of post-Saussurean studies of linguistic signs and the aspects of verbal texts discovered by Bakhtin and his followers. The two approaches seem to be complementary in the sense of Niels Bohr’s notion of complementarity. If a scholar is interested in a set of linguistic units and features that characterize grammar as such, e.g., comparative historical reconstruction, he or she would attempt to concentrate on “langue” in the Saussurean sense. If utterances or verbal texts are the main object of research, the Bakhtinian point of view would prevail. To use another metaphor from physics, the great unifying theory yet to be built should unite a macro-world of a language system (“langue”) and a micro-world of an utterance (text).
**METALINGUISTICS: STUDY OF UTTERANCES AND TEXTS**

Mikhail Bakhtin was the first to discover a difference between an abstract linguistic system of signs and a concrete utterance, in which each sign gets another function due to its role in the whole of discourse. Later, that distinction was rediscovered by the great French linguist Émile Benveniste who suggested that a purely semiotic approach to language would be possible only insofar as linguistic signs are concerned. The structure of texts should be studied by semantics. The gap between system and text constituted the main point of Benveniste’s semiotic theory of language (1969) and influenced later research (Malmberg, 1977).

In his early works Bakhtin stressed the importance of purely linguistic study of texts (utterances) that are larger than a complex sentence. Surveying the underdeveloped fields of linguistics, he wrote:

> Nothing has been worked out yet in the department concerned with the study of large verbal entities—long utterances from everyday life, dialogue, speech, treatise, novel, and so on—for these utterances ... can be and must be defined and studied in purely linguistic terms, as verbal phenomena. The examination of these phenomena in old handbooks of poetics and rhetoric and in their contemporary variant, descriptive poetics—cannot be considered scientific owing to ... mixing of the linguistic point of view with those completely alien to it—logical, psychological, aesthetic. The syntax of large verbal wholes (or—composition as a department of linguistics, as distinct from composition which takes into account an artistic or a scientific task) still awaits its foundation and validation: scientifically, linguistics has still not moved beyond the complex sentence. The complex sentence is the most extended phenomenon of language that has been scientifically examined by linguistics: one gets the impression that the methodically pure language of linguistics suddenly comes to an end at this point, and what begins at once is science, poetry, and so on, and yet the purely linguistic analysis can be continued further, no matter how difficult it is and how tempting it may be to introduce here points of view that are alien to linguistics (Bakhtin, 1990a, p. 293).

This field of research, later called **metalinguistics** by Bakhtin, and **translinguistics** by Roland Barthes, examining discourse as a field much broader than a sentence, became popular among scholars (Ivanov, 1998). In the studies of Russian grammar of the 1950s, among the first to investigate “units that are larger than phrases” (sveryxfrasnye edinstva) was Leonid A. Bulakhovsky (1952). Nikolay S. Pospelov tried to study “complex syntactic wholes” (slozhnye sintaksicheskie tcelye) as a problem of Russian and general linguistics (Pospelov, 1960). His example shows how difficult it is to separate a purely linguistic approach to syntactic wholes (upon which Bakhtin insisted in his early work) from the one based on poetics. Such wholes depend not only on the genre and verse structure. In each larger, poetic composition by Pushkin, one has to study the problem separately. In this
respect, one can also mention Vinokur’s pioneering study of the language of The Misfortune of Being Clever (trans. 1990). In it, Vinokur studied the structure of theatrical cues, each of which might contain several dozen lines. The relationship between linguistics and poetics is discussed in more detail later in the present article.

In his pioneering studies of larger syntactical units Nikolay S. Pospelov showed that in Russian, as in Serbo-Croatian, according to Belich’s earlier work the results of which had been summed up by Pospelov, it is impossible to speak about the value of verbal tenses without describing the whole of discourse. Similar methods were applied to determine the value of Japanese verbal forms by Nikolay Syromiatnikov (1971). In the 1960s and 1970s, linguistics of text became an established field in the Russian science of language (Gindin, 1977). Partly parallel ideas were seen in the works of American linguists developing discourse theory, starting with Zellig Harris’ works of the 1950s and early 1960s. The functional grammar stressing the difference between theme and rheme, topic and comment (“given” and “new” in the Czech variant of the theory) was moving towards building a bridge between the study of a discourse and each separate sentence; the link between the two aspects is clear also in the referential approach to pronouns and articles. In the study of clitics that became popular in the 1970s and 1980s, structural features of an utterance became most prominent. While in the first draft of syntactical structure, as attempted by Chomsky and his followers, it was supposed that a sentence can be seen as consisting of a nominal phrase and a verbal phrase (S\NP&\VP). For many languages, a tripartite scheme of an utterance was proved to be valid. In Anatolian and many other ancient Indo-European dialects, such as the Old Novgorodian dialect of the birch-bark documents (Zalizniak, 1993, pp. 280-308; 1995, pp. 167-171), an utterance begins with a stressed word (often a conjunction) after which a long chain of grammatical enclitic elements follows (Zalizniak, 1993). They refer to the pragmatic and verb-actant scheme of discourse and may go beyond the scope of a sentence (Watkins, 1997). To describe such structures, Zalizniak introduced the notion of “barrier” after which a new chain of enclitics might reappear. The place of such a barrier is determined by the pragmatic features of the discourse. The necessity to reconstruct Indo-European syntactic structures including such elements shows that this new viewpoint also enters the field of reconstruction that earlier belonged predominantly to the Saussurean research paradigm (see also below on the problem of the Indogermanische Dichtersprache). At the same time, to study the order of enclitic elements in a chain, one should develop a rank grammar that corresponds to the general principles of structural linguistics. In this example it is possible to see how the fusion of the two different points of view can be achieved.

There were several trends in modern science that helped to elaborate on the theory of utterance. Particularly rewarding was the work on the theory of speech acts, theory of reference and pragmatic methods. In the writings of the Tartu-Moscow School an attempt was made to overcome the line separating system and text. In the works of the scholars belonging to this school, literary and other verbal texts became the main objects of study.
MONOGLOSSIA AND POLYGLOSSIA: BILINGULISM IN THE DIALOGICAL LIGHT

Monoglossia, i.e., absolute dominance of one language typical, e.g., of ancient cities such as Athens, is opposed to polyglossia, i.e., coexistence of two languages, for instance of English and French in medieval England. A spoken language in a modern society may seem to be more or less unified, but there are not only different social dialects as studied in sociolinguistics, but also individual differences between speakers. A monological attitude is connected to monoglossia while a true dialogue is made possible through polyglossia, cf.

Language is transformed from an absolute dogma it had been within the narrow framework of a sealed-off and impermeable monoglossia into a working hypothesis for comprehending and expressing reality. But such a full and complete transformation can occur only under certain conditions, namely, under the condition of thoroughgoing polyglossia. Only polyglossia fully frees consciousness from the tyranny of its own language and its own myth of language. (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 61)

A synthesis of a synchronic and diachronic views of language (again different from the orthodox Saussurean position) is necessary to discern polyglossic elements inside what seems to be monoglossia. Synchronically speaking, a modern literary language seems to represent monoglossia. However, its history reveals traces of polyglossia: “After all, one’s own language is never a single language: in it there are always survivals of the past and of a potential for other—languagesness that is more or less sharply perceived by the working literary and language consciousness” (Bakhtin, trans. 1994, p. 66).

Recent research on Greek dialects and on the different layers of substrate words and later borrowings in Greek supports the general scheme suggested by Bakhtin:

Contemporary scholarship has accumulated a mass of facts that testify to the intense struggle that goes on between languages and within languages, a struggle that preceded the relatively stable condition of Greek as we know it. A significant number of Greek roots belonged to the language of the people who had settled the territory before the Greeks. In the Greek literary language we encounter behind each separate genre the consolidation of a particular dialect. Behind these gross facts a complex trial-at-arms is concealed, a struggle between languages and dialects, between hybridizations, purifications, shifts and renovations, the long and twisted path of struggle for the unity of a literary language and for the unity of its system of genres. (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 66)

Particularly interesting is Bakhtin’s explanation of the reasons for the success of Roman laughter (as in early comedies by Plautus):

Roman literary consciousness was bilingual. The purely national Latin genres, conceived under monoglossic conditions, fell into decay and did not achieve the level of literary expression. From start to finish, the creative literary consciousness of Romans
functioned against the background of the Greek language and Greek forms. From the very first steps, the Latin literary word viewed itself in the light of the Greek word, *through the eyes* of the Greek word, it was from the very beginning a word “with a sideways glance”, a stylized word enclosing itself, as it were, in its own piously stylized quotation marks. (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 61)

According to Bakhtin, Latin was characterized by “the interanimation” of at least three languages and cultures that intersected with one another—Greek, Oscan and Roman to which probably one should add Etruscan and Punic (a literary form of Carthaginian Phoenician as seen, for instance in the beginning of Plautus’ “Poenulus”).

The importance of bilingualism and on the mixed character of every language was characteristic of Baudouin de Courtenay and his students and followers, such as Shcherba and Polivanov. The views of these scholars of the St. Petersburg linguistic school might have been known to Bakhtin since his formative university period. Similar views of Hugo Schuchardt who had partly anticipated linguistic geography in its Romance part, familiar to Bakhtin, influenced Leo Spitzer, whose works Bakhtin had read in his early twenties. In respect to the role of spatial differentiation of dialects, an approach different from a unitary monoglotic one, was developed by Bartoli (Crowley, 1989, pp.83-85). At the time when Bakhtin reformulated that linguistic position in a dialogical way and applied it to the theory of the novel and its languages, comparable ideas led to the introduction of the concept of *Sprachbund* by Prince Nikolaj Troubetzkoy and Roman Jakobson. Recent research on Creole and Pidgin languages continues the trend started by Baudouin de Courtenay and Schuchardt, e.g., seen in such traditional fields as Indo-European comparative grammar. To interpret its reconstruction, the notions of Indo-European dialects and isoglosses between them, anticipated already at the second half of the 19th century in the theory of waves of J. Schmidt, become more and more important. Troubetzkoy and later Vittore Pisani completely transformed the unitary concept of Proto-Indo-European, referenced by Bakhtin in his critical remark cited above. In the reconstruction of *Indogermanische Dichtersprache* it became possible to deal with utterances in different dialects that belong to a particular speech genre. However, wider cultural implications of these notions still elude the majority of contemporary linguists.

**THE LANGUAGE OF THE CITY**

Bakhtin was among the few scholars of the second quarter of the 20th century who attempted to develop *urban linguistics*—a new field of linguistics that studies features of speech communication in large cities. As with Larin, who was the first to write a theoretical study on the subject, Bakhtin carried on the pioneering work by Sainéan (Larin, 1977). For Bakhtin, a collection of materials presented by Sainéan in his study on the language of Rabelais was particularly important (Sainean, 1922). Bakhtin reinterpreted the data presented
by Sainéan as a neutral description, from a perspective close to that of sociolinguistics. To him, characteristic features of Rabelais seemed to belong to the city market. He analyzed such genres as curses and “cries of Paris,” the latter representing a special type of advertising. Much later the same cries of tradesmen became an object of a special study by Peter Bogatyrev, the great Russian folklore specialist, one the first to study ethnology in the structural, functional way. In his magnificent study of the Old Czech “Medieval Mock Mystery” (completely parallel to the work of Bakhtin on carnival) Roman Jakobson analyzed similar verbal devices of advertising found in the polyglotic texts of medieval Prague (Jakobson, 1985).

Polyglossia was the main feature of most large cities throughout the history (Ivanov, 1998). Describing linguistic situation at Samosata, Lucian’s native city, Bakhtin remarks:

The original inhabitants of Samosata were Syrians who spoke Aramaic. The entire literary and educated upper classes of the urban population spoke and wrote in Greek. The official language of the administration and chancellery was Latin, all the administrators were Romans, and there was a Roman legion stationed in the city. A great thoroughfare passed through Samosata (strategically very important) along which flowed the languages of Mesopotamia, Persia and even India. Lucian’s cultural and linguistic consciousness was born and shaped at this point of the intersection of cultures and languages. (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 64)

This polyglot situation is seen as a dialogical prerequisite for the creativity of the novelist.

**HETEROGLOSSIA**

The word “heteroglossia” means “the simultaneous use of different kinds of speech (or other signs), tension between them and their conflicting relationship inside one text.” The term was coined (from the Greek stems meaning “other” and “speech”: *etero-* + *gloss-* + *ia*) by Bakhtin in his theoretical work on the novel in 1934-1935 and has become extraordinarily popular in linguistic, literary and anthropological work since the 1980s. In Bakhtin’s view, at any given moment of its evolution, language is stratified not only into linguistic dialects in the strict sense of the word (according to formal linguistic markers, especially phonetic), but also—and for us this is an essential point—into languages that are socio-ideological: languages of social groups, ‘professional’ and ‘generic’ languages, languages of generations and so forth. From this point of view, literary language is itself only one of these heteroglot languages—and it in its turn is stratified into languages (generic, period-bound, and others). And this stratification and heteroglossia, one realized, is not only a static invariant of linguistic life, but also what insures its dynamics: stratification and heteroglossia widen and deepen as long as language is alive and developing. Alongside the centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces of language...
carry on their uninterrupted work; alongside verbal-ideological centralization and unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization and disunification go forward. (Bakhtin, 1994, pp. 271-272)

Bakhtin had in mind both the stylistic and social differences inside the language of any modern developed society and a writer’s intention to recreate them in prose (particularly in the novel), operating with different artistic images of languages and styles; for example, in Joyce’s “Ulysses” each chapter is written in a different linguistic style. Heteroglossia is opposed to both monoglossia and polyglossia.

Conflicting tendencies are hidden in the semantic potential of almost every word and they can be realized in everyday speech. Particularly pronounced are such features in the social contexts that make ambivalence relevant for the whole society. This aspect of language in a totalitarian country was depicted in Orwell’s *Newspeak*. In a single utterance, different speech attitudes may appear together. It was told that the Soviet Communist party leader Leonid Brezhnev used to say to his family at night: “It’s time for me to go to read Marx.” Without the knowledge of the real situation, a stranger might have heard in this sentence a genuine intention of a Marxist official to reread works of the founder of the whole movement, cf. rereading of a Biblical text by a bishop. Actually, Brezhnev had in mind his cynical hatred for this old-fashioned duty that had become a senseless ritual. To him Marx’s works (that he barely knew) were terribly dull and might cause one to get drowsy. Thus, what he really meant was his wish to go to bed. Even if this joke was not real and belonged to the Soviet folklore of the period, it was quite symbolic in that it showed the complete loss of the former communist creed, in which Marx had acquired a role of a substitute for an apostle. A similar problem in connection to a real religion (and not its fake substitute, in which the Soviet ideology deteriorated) has been discussed by Bakhtin in his study of Rabelais and the folk culture of the Middle Ages and Renaissance. In this work, finished by 1945, Bakhtin (as later Le Goff) discovered linguistic and semiotic heteroglossia that was characteristic of the medieval European culture. It was characterized by a possible use of signs and words pertaining to the sphere of the official Church culture and of those which belonged to the unofficial folklore. The latter used parody of the official language as well as another set of symbols continuing the carnival tradition. As rites with the inversion of official symbols seem to be universal, according to the anthropological works of Leach (1961) and Turner (1969), semiotic heteroglossia that includes grotesque carnival images may be among the most important features of almost all known societies. Heteroglossia (often called by different terms), as a parallel or simultaneous use of different signs and images belonging to conflicting spheres, may represent one of the common features of all cultures.

In the particular case of medieval carnival studied by Bakhtin, heteroglossia can be seen at the purely linguistic level, as well as on the higher level of signs, to be encoded with verbal expressions. Thus, in the medieval Old Czech mystery studied from a similar point
of view by Roman Jakobson, Latin songs coexist with grotesque jokes in Old Czech and remarks in Hebrew (Jakobson, 1985).

**DIALOGICAL THEORY OF SPEECH GENRES IN BAKHTIN’S LAST WORKS**

In his last years, Bakhtin was working on the general system of speech genres. The manuscript of the book that he had finished before leaving Saransk was lost (as Bakhtin told me when he lived in Podol’sk). But its contents may be reconstructed from what was published (Bakhtin, 1990). Developing some ideas close to those of Spitzer, Bakhtin tried to see which forms of verbal communication are used in a given society and are reflected (selected and/or transformed) in its literature. In one of his later polemical remarks concerning the Saussurean opposition of *langue* vs. *parole* Bakhtin says: “Saussure ignores the fact that in addition to forms of language there are also *forms of combinations* of these forms, that is, he ignores speech genres” (Bakhtin, trans. 1986, p.81).

Certain features of language (lexicological, semantic, syntactic) will knit together with the intentional aim, and with the overall accentual system inherent in one or another genre: oratorical, newspaper and journalistic genres, the genres of low literature (penny thrillers, for instance), or, finally, the various genres of high literature. Certain features of language take on the specific flavor of a given genre; they knit together with specific points of view, specific approaches, forms of thinking, nuances and accents characteristic of a given genre.

In addition, there is interwoven with this generic stratification of language a *professional* stratification of language, in the broad sense of the term “professional”: the language of the lawyer, the doctor, the businessman, the politician, the public education teacher and so forth, and these sometimes coincide with, and sometimes depart from, the stratification into genres. It goes without saying that these languages differ from each other not only in their vocabularies, they involve specific forms for manifesting intentions, forms for making conceptualization and evaluation concrete. And even the very language of the writer (the poet or novelist) can be taken as a professional jargon on a par with professional jargons. (Bakhtin, 1994, pp. 288-289)

This main understanding of Bakhtin’s later works has been developed by Anna Wierzbicka in her outstanding study on speech genres in the modern Polish society of the totalitarian period. According to her, the Polish system of speech genres included denunciation absent in such varieties of English as Australian (it does not seem that this distinction would be relevant for a comparison with some other systems inside the English-speaking communities).
DIRECT-INDIRECT SPEECH AND THE DIALOGICAL PRINCIPLE

It seems that one of the main problems in Bakhtin’s studies is presented by interconnections between different parts of Bakhtin’s work. The link between the Spitzer-influenced study of the reported/indirect/direct speech and the dialogical principle is a key question. Different forms of the direct, quasi-direct and indirect speech, reported speech and transposed discourse and pseudo-objective motivation (as studied by Lerch, Lorch and Spitzer) were seen in much broader perspective; Bakhtin incorporated these discoveries into his general theory of the speech of the other person connecting it also to problems of the poetics of novel.

An extraordinarily interesting discovery made by Bakhtin was his finding of the possibility to connect the philosophical dialogical principle to the stylistic study of the speech of the other person. This field of research, in the Bakhtinian sense, covered not only the sphere of the quasi-direct speech as studied by Spitzer (whose book is cited by Bakhtin), but also the formalist studies of narration (skaz) inaugurated by Eichenbaum at the time when the device became fashionable in the modern Russian prose (Bakhtin’s interest in this experiment can be seen in his lectures on modern Russian authors). In his book on Dostoevsky, Bakhtin suggested a whole system of labels meant to describe the different kinds of the Other’s speech that can be seen as a sort of a “periodic table” in which any new particular item should find its place. He studied the use of these metalinguistic devices in Dostoevsky’s writings.

In an early work, a ‘disguised’ Bakhtin was particularly interested in the relation between the direct speech and the free indirect speech. In the latter, using the transformation of the verbal tenses and persons, it is possible to put the character’s actual utterances (preserving their word order) into the past tense as if they were parts of a narrative. As Voloshinov (Voloshinov, 1986), Bakhtin repeats the French example from Balzac analyzed by Lerch:

Direct Speech: il protesta et s’écria: “Mon père te haït”;
Indirect Speech: il protesta et s’écria que son père la haïssait;
Free Indirect Speech: il protesta: “son père, s’écria-t-il, la haïssait”

Among the different forms of the speech of the other person analyzed by Spitzer, Bakhtin became particularly interested in pseudo-objectivized speech. Due to this device, common truths are formulated in the atemporal present tense, cf.: Et c’est auprès de sa soeur, à sa sortie de l’hôpital que Berthe vécut. Auprès de sa soeur, parce que les idées de famille sont plus fortes que toutes les autres idées at parce qu’une soeur sera notre soeur, quoi qu’il arrive (“it was with her sister that Berthe lived when she came out of the hospital. With her sister because family values are stronger than any other, and because a sister will be our sister whatever happens”) (Spitzer, 1961). As Bakhtin explains, the pseudo-objective
motivation is characteristic of a certain type of novelistic style. It can be called a hidden word of the other (Bakhtin, trans. 1994).

**History of Direct and Indirect Speech**

Bakhtin remarks that “the representation of another’s word, another’s language in intonational quotation marks was known in the most ancient times; we encounter it in the earliest stages of verbal culture” (Bakhtin, trans. 1994). In the oldest written traditions such ‘quotation marks’ usually render the direct speech. Let us compare data of the languages of the Ancient Near East. In ancient Egyptian, inscriptions of the Old Kingdom quotations were introduced by the verbs of speaking dd (>Coptic èw), wd (“to order”), dbh in constructions with embedding, cf. jnk mjw pw ‘ɔ nt(j) m jwnw dd (.w) r’w [p]w r z3=f hrw “I am this great cat who is (ntj) in Heliopolis”. This (pw) is what Re says (dd.w) to his son (r z3=f) Horus” (Loprieno, 1995) ; in Sinohe text: jnj wj ‘mmwnnšj ḥq3 pw h(jj) (r0tnw-hrj.t dd=f n=j nfr tw hn=j sdm=k r3 n(j) km.t “Ammunenshi, the ruler of Upper Retjenu, took me (jn j wj) and said to me (dd=f n=j): ‘You will be happy (nfr t “you are good”) with me, and you will hear (sdm-k) the language of Egypt” (Loprieno, 1995); in the texts of Pyramids 1295a: wd.n jnpw hntj ḥ3y=k m sb3 m ntr dw3(j) “Anubis, who presides over the god’s booth (zh-ntr) has ordered (wd.n) that you descend (h3y=k) as star (sb3), as the Morning Star (ntr dw3j “the morning god”)” (Loprieno, 1995).

In Sumerian the particle of direct speech—e-šē is supposed to be derived from the verbal root e- (“to say”). As an example, one of the oldest written specimens of a laughter fable belonging to the sphere of the Bakhtinian carnival imagery might be given: A.AB.BA TUN-bi kas-gu—um-e—šē “[The fox, having urinated into the Sea,] said: “The whole of the sea is my urine” (Gordon, 1962). In Akkadian the particle of direct speech ‘um-ma precedes the words of the other person that may be marked also by the enclitical particle—mi. Hittite and Luwian use enclitic particles of direct speech—wa(r)-/ -wa- (cf. also later Milyan or Lycian B we) (Fortson, 1994). They originated from the verb of speaking preserved in Palaic wer-ti («cries out») (about the Sun-god). In a Hurrian-Hittite bilingual text Hittite wa(r) translates Hurrian—an (Neu, 1996).

In Sanskrit the use of indirect speech is very limited by such specific cases as indirect questions. In them, there is a tendency to leave the reported speech unchanged, adding to it some markers of direct speech such as iti (Debrunner, 1947). Bakhtin analyzed the later development of the indirect speech in Western European and Russian literature. His work influenced such studies as one by Vinogradov of “The Queen of Spades.”
QUOTATIONS

As a special linguistic device that is particularly interesting from the Bakhtinian point of view one should study types of quotation. Bakhtin himself discussed the problem mainly using the example of Medieval Latin texts. In Sanskrit there is a way to point to long quotations without repeating the whole text. In that case, the latter is given only at the beginning of the discourse. In later occurrences, only the first words are indicated, then itiady (<iti, marker of the direct speech+ ady) follows: ato ‘ham (=aham) bravimi anagatavatim cintâm itiady “To this I’ll say: ‘The thoughts related to the future’ etc.” (“Hitopadesha”).

In addition to the importance of direct speech in rendering quotations, documented in the most ancient written languages, recent ethnolinguistic work on the languages of the South America has shown the extraordinary importance of such methods of introducing quotations in direct speech as verbs of speaking. In Kuna, the role of quotations was found particularly striking in the language of the chief medicine man Olowitinappi. As it is with his oral speech, reported, quoted speech is a formal property of the text, which is literally punctuated with soke (say) and takken soke (see he says). The repetition of these forms, at the end of lines, typical of the Kuna formal speech-making style (Sherzer, 1986) can be illustrated by the following fragment: ‘Teki teukki nainukanki ina tiket’ takken soke. ‘nainu, tayleku pululet pe niymartipa’ soke. ‘pinsa pe tiko’ soke. ‘nekkwepurkatitte’ soke (‘well with regard to the fields planting medicine’ see he says. “If you, indeed have a communal farm,’ he says. ‘You must plant for free’ see he says. ‘No money’ he says. ‘For it belongs to the village,’ he says” (Sherzer, 1986). In the Bakhtinian terms, we can speak of the monological use of quotations to render the authoritative opinion of a single person. The verb of speech follows each separate part of this monological discourse used by the speaker.

In “Avesta’ the verb mru- (“to speak”) follows Ahura Mazda’s speeches in the frame of a pattern typologically close to this Kuna formal structure. Quotation, to Bakhtin, becomes an important criterion to distinguish different branches of knowledge:

In the humanities—as distinct from the natural and mathematical sciences—there arises a specific task of establishing, transmitting and interpreting the words of others (for example, the problem of sources in the methodology of the historical disciplines). And of course in the philological disciplines, the speaking person and his discourse is the fundamental object of investigation. (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 351)

SEMANTICS. LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD VIEW

While discussing different languages contrasting each other in a heteroglotic text, Bakhtin often speaks about a “language and world outlook.” To him, they constituted a single notion. From this standpoint, Bakhtin might be compared to the scholars who...
continued the Humboldt-influenced tradition of finding a linguistic base for a mental model of the universe (as Sapir, Whorf and Spitzer did). The latter seems again particularly close to Bakhtin as he studied the verbal expression of ideas (Spitzer, 1948).

While insisting on the lack of semantic studies in contemporary linguistics, Bakhtin suggested an idea that contradicts recent semantic research constructing a system of lexical meanings or semantic features comparable to a phonemic or morphological pattern. According to Bakhtin:

> the word does not exist in a neutral and impersonal language (it is not, after all, out of a dictionary that the speaker gets his words!), but rather it exists in other people’s mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other people’s intentions; it is from these that one must take the word, and make it one’s own. (Bakhtin, trans. 1994, p. 294)

To Bakhtin semantics is concrete and social.

Among particularly interesting discoveries made by Bakhtin in his semantic studies is his conclusion about the combination of praise and abuse in the language of the city market in Rabelais. This ambivalent semantics and the grotesque verbal imagery of the bottom of the body remind us of the similar ideas Freud studied in Bakhtin’s first book written in ‘disguise.’ In a critical article on the place of language in Freud’s discovery, Benveniste did not agree with this psychoanalytic concept. But at the same time, when Bakhtin studied ambivalent meanings of the Rabelaisian verbal abuse, a similar discovery had also been made by Abaev, a great Russian-Ossetian specialist in Iranian, who was influenced by Marr’s semantic concepts. Abaev finds linguistic correlation to Catullus line “Odi et amo…” or to similar passages in Dostoevsky. Words with magical connotation are usually ambivalent, according to his study (Abaev, 1935).

To Bakhtin, internal contradiction was connected to heteroglossia: “It frequently happens that even one and the same word will belong simultaneously to two languages, two belief systems that intersect in a hybrid construction” (1994, p. 305).

**Parody of Language**

The use of language in parody has been studied by Bakhtin particularly in connection with the process of setting thinking free of language. A position of an observer who becomes absolutely independent of language is possible because of the role of parody. It is a prerequisite for a future novelistic word, based on the new apprehension of language as a thing to be described. A representative case of heteroglossia is found in ironical use of speech forms, particularly in a parody. In several places in “Ulysses” Joyce suggests a parody of the new Irish drama: “It’s what I am telling you, mister honey, it’s queer and sick we were, Haines and myself, the time himself brought it in…” In the chapter “Nausicaa” a woman’s magazine style is taken over, in the chapter “Eumaeus” a parody of provincial
journalesse is introduced. In the other parts of the novel there is a grotesque mixture of several styles, as in the mockery of learned English in the speech of a ghost of Bloom’s grandfather.

**NAMES: THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF ONOMASTICS**

In his study of Rabelais’ language Bakhtin comes to the conclusion that “his common and proper names are not differentiated” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 62). Most of the personal names have clear etymologies and thus can be understood as nicknames (in the brilliant Russian translation by Nikolay Liubimov some of them are rendered in Russian as nicknames; that would have been impossible for usual proper names). Some of traditional names that are not clear are explained by the artificial etymology; for instance, Gargantua from Grangousier’s exclamation _Que grand tu as (le gousier)_ “What a big (gullet) you have!” All such nicknames belong to one semantic sphere—that of words related to a gullet or a throat in our example. To prove it, Bakhtin reverts also to scholarly etymologies of some names.

Using the example of the name _Nemo_ in scholarly Latin, Bakhtin discusses linguistic paradoxes that might seem parallel to famous logical paradoxes.

In connection to Bakhtin’s interest in proper names, a new approach to his publications in ‘disguise’ might be suggested. His play with the last names of some of his friends and followers can be connected with the idea of linguistic games as studied later in Wittgenstein’s writings.

**LINGUISTICS AND POETICS**

In his early work, Bakhtin distanced himself from an attempt to unify linguistics and poetics as it was suggested by scholars linked to the Formalist movement. Bakhtin insisted on the necessity to study language before linguistic results are used to understand stylistic devices.

But at the same time, Bakhtin agreed that the material of the art is not absolutely neutral. It has an expressive side that is particularly important for the verbal art, cf. “And these expressive habits of using language (giving utterance to oneself and designating objects) are transposed by us into our apprehension of verbal art” (Bakhtin, 1990, p.96). The Bakhtinian point of view was close to the studies of the expressive or affective language begun at the beginning of the century in the works of Bally, Vendryes, van Ginneken and Sapir, not to mention the school of Vossler and Spitzer. Later development of linguistics, particularly in generative grammar, moved away from those brilliant insights, as the one-sided rationalist approach made investigation of the expressive side of language difficult, if not impossible. Still, there are such important exceptions as the last book of Roman Jakobson written in collaboration with Linda Waugh.
WORD IN THE NOVEL: THE CORE OF BAKHTINIAN VIEW OF THE GENRE

To Bakhtin the Word (*Slovo*) was the central notion of his theory of the novel. The importance of the theory was determined by his particular attitude towards the novel as the most important literary genre. The neglect of the novel to him was a proof of the internal deficiency of the formalists’ study of the prose. His literary studies, step by step, concentrated on the theory, prehistory and history of the novel. At that time, a true theory of the novel did not exist. Post-Hegelian and Marxist philosophical foundations were crucial for Lukaczk’s classical books on the topic, in which the novel was studied in connection with the history of consciousness. Later works by Lukaczk and some of his followers such as L.Goldmann concentrated on the social background and the reasons for its transformation of decay; that idea had been anticipated in Osip Mandel’shtam’s brilliant essay on the end of the novel.

Bakhtin’s theory of the novel was, in essence, a theory of *Word* in the novel. The dialogical word is considered to be the main constructive element of the novel. The essence of the novel is in its heteroglossy. This feature of the novel is reflected in the way a writer characterizes each of the heroes. In the novel, the main hero usually speaks in a way different from the rest of the other characters. Each hero may have his or her own stylistic sphere or linguistic “zone.” A literary “reflection” of the urban heteroglossia and polyglossia in Joyce’s novel can be seen in the structure of Velimir Khlebnikov’s “supertale” (*sverkhpovest*) “Zangezi,” in which each part is written in a special language (of gods, of birds etc.).

The following main types of compositional and stylistic units are distinguished by Bakhtin inside the novelistic whole:

1) Direct authorial literary-artistic narration;
2) Stylization of the various forms of oral everyday narration [*skaz*];
3) Stylization of the various forms of semi-literary (written) everyday narration (the letter, the diary, etc.);
4) Various forms of literary but extra-artistic authorial speech (moral, philosophical or scientific statements, oratory, ethnographic descriptions, memoranda and so forth);
5) The stylistically individualized speech of characters (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 262).

In Bakhtin’s studies of classical Russian and Western European novel, each of these types has been investigated.

A completely new approach was suggested in Bakhtin’s idea of an image of a language, for instance, in a parody, cf. “The author encases his own thought in the image of another’s language without doing violence to the freedom of that language or to its own distinctive uniqueness” (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 409).
Bakhtinian View of the History of Linguistics: Sacred Word and Free Word

According to Bakhtin, linguistic consciousness “constituted itself outside … direct word” (Bakhtin, trans. 1994, p. 83). He proposed several main periods in the process of the development of this possibility, and in every period, the word is sacred. The first linguists were priests. This point of view can be supported by recent research on Indogermanische Dichtersprache, particularly, Saussure’s notes on Indo-European priests; in this special field of study one finds complete coincidence of the ideas of Saussure and Bakhtin (Ivanov, 1998). In this period the native language is studied in the background of the sacred one. The Old Indian grammar based on Sanskrit, as an artificial (sams-krta) language, can be given as an example. From the written languages of the Ancient Near East, starting with the Ebla cuneiform archive, one can see a special mark of a heteroglotic word; the scribes who wrote documents in a sacred or official language used the so-called Glossenkeil, to point to a word borrowed from their own native speech (Luwian in the Hittite empire, Old Canaanite in Egypt of the time of El-Amarna).

According to Bakhtin, the next period was marked by a parody of a sacred word, cf.:

The Middle Ages produced a whole series of variants on the parodic-travestying Latin grammar. Case inflections, verbal forms and all grammatical categories in general were reinterpreted either in an indecent, erotic context, in a context of eating and drunkenness or in a context ridiculing church and monastic principles of hierarchy and subordination. Heading this unique grammatical tradition is the seventh-century work of Virgilius Maro Grammaticus. This is an extraordinarily learned work, stuffed with an incredible quantity of references, quotations from all possible authorities of the ancient world including some that had never existed; in a number of cases even the quotations themselves are parodic. Interwoven with serious and rather subtle grammatical analysis is a sharp parodic exaggeration of this very subtlety, and of the scrupulousness of scholarly analyses; there is a description, for example, of a scholarly discussion lasting two weeks on the question of the vocative case of ego, that is, the vocative case of “I.” Taken as a whole, Virgilius grammaticus’ work is a magnificent and subtle parody of the formalistic-grammatical thinking of late antiquity. It is grammatical Saturnalia, grammatica pileata. Characteristically, many medieval scholars apparently took this grammatical treatise completely seriously. And even contemporary scholars are far from unanimous in their evaluation of the character and degree of the parodic impulse in it. (Bakhtin, 1994, p.73)

In this description, as in all of Bakhtin’s other works on Medieval and Renaissance culture, one can see one feature that distinguishes it from the official academic literature on the subject. Bakhtin sincerely followed Rabelais poetic instruction in the motto to his novel
Bakhtin explains this new function of the Latin word by its interplay with the native one:

another’s sacred word, uttered in a foreign language, is re-evaluated and reinterpreted against the backdrop of these languages, and congeals to the point where it becomes a ridiculous image, the comic carnival mask of a narrow and joyless pedant, an hypocritical old bigot, a stingy and dried-up miser. This manuscript tradition of “parodia sacra”, prodigious in scope and almost a thousand years long, is remarkable and as yet poorly read document testifying to an intense struggle and interanimation among languages, a struggle that occurred everywhere in Western Europe. It was a language drama played out if it were a gay farce. (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 77)

Bakhtin found that “in the linguistic satires of the Renaissance, The letters of Obscure People, the poetry of the macaronics three languages… animate one another: medieval Latin, the purified and rigorous Latin of the humanists and the national vulgar tongue” (Bakhtin, trans.1994, p. 81).

At the last stage of development, “language, no longer conceived as a sacrosant and solitary embodiment of meaning and truth, becomes merely one of many possible ways to hypothesize meaning” (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 370).

Bakhtin has transformed the history of linguistics by adding this new dimension to the history of human thought on language and verbal communication.³

NOTES

1. Polemics between Spitzer and Bloomfield in which both points of view had been expressed was commented on in: Vinokur 1957. As an interesting exception one should consider Edward Sapir. Being exceedingly formal in his approach to phonology and morphology he (as to some degree also Roman Jakobson, especially in his later years) did not lose an aesthetic and cultural perspective while studying language. Such linguists as Sapir and Jakobson as well as Bakhtin can be viewed as forerunners of a synthetical view of the future century. Wilhelm Humboldt’s view of language as creative energy (important for early Chomsky, but not for his followers) seems particularly interesting from the point of view of a projected synthesis.

2. In this respect the Bakhtinian view of language can be compared to that of Roman Jakobson and other representatives of the Prague linguistic school of the 1930s.

3. The article has been based on the position paper for the Bakhtin Workshop “Bakhtin in Context(s)”, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at Indiana University (Bloomington), December 3-4, 1999, and on a series of lectures on Bakhtin presented at UCLA in the following years. The author is grateful to his colleagues and friends in Moscow, St.Petersburg and Los Angeles for many fruitful remarks and suggestions.
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Mikhail M. Bakhtin’s philosophy is the philosophy of the word. However, reference is not to the word related to the system of language, the word understood as the dead cell of language, the word as sentence. Instead, reference is to the word understood as utterance, the word turned to the other and calling for listening; therefore, a word that is always accentuated, where signification is inseparable from significance, where meaning and value are inseparable. In the second edition of his book on Dostoevsky (1963), Bakhtin introduces the term ‘metalinguistics’ to indicate his approach: metalinguistics understood as surpassing linguistics, not beyond it but before it. Return to the live word. It is on the background of these considerations that the present paper deals with the issues proposed in the title.

**Keywords:** metalinguistics, dialogism, value, otherness

The aim of this paper is to show how fundamental categories in language and communication theory can be renewed and improved in the light of what Mikhail M. Bakhtin (1895-1975) calls “metalinguistics.” Bakhtin introduced this concept in the 1963 edition of his monograph on Dostoevsky (first ed. 1929), after using “philosophy of language” in another monograph of 1929 signed by Valentin N. Voloshinov, as well as in a later essay, of 1959-1961, “The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences.”

Bakhtin critiques the language sciences and the connection between such concepts as sign, utterance, text, discourse genre, and linguistic creativity and the logic of identity. Bakhtin commits to redefining these concepts in terms of the logic of otherness freeing them from their connection with the category of identity, and does so with the instruments of the language of literature (Petrilli & Ponzio, 1999, 2000b, 2003b, 2005a).

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Bakhtin and his Circle (whose work is represented, for example, by such monographs as the 1929 *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, signed by Valentin N. Voloshinov, and *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship*, signed by Pavel N. Medvedev in 1928) contribute significantly to a critique of language and communication which does not focus exclusively on verbal language, nor limits itself to confrontation with linguistics and its various approaches. On the contrary, Bakhtin analyzes the sign in its different verbal and nonverbal expressions, opening to confrontation with general semiotics. *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* offers a critique of Saussurean linguistics as formulated in *Cours de linguistique générale* (1916), therefore of the Saussurean model of sign, as well as of the behaviorist conception of communication. Furthermore, in the 1965 writing, *Rabelais and His World*, Bakhtin makes a thorough study of nonverbal language with special reference to the signs of carnival and their translation into verbal language, and of the processes of renewal and regeneration that intersemiosic translation and carnivalization of literature involve for the literary word (Petrilli, 1992b, 2003, 2005c, 2006, 2007c). Bakhtin’s treatment of the literary text—with which he explains its semiotical consistency and resistance and, therefore, its capacity for dialogical reaction with respect to its interpretations—contributes to a conception of language and communication that is founded on the categories of otherness, answering comprehension and listening (Petrilli, 1998a, 2005a; Petrilli & Ponzio, 1998, 2003a, 2005b; Ponzio, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997a).

This orientation is a distinguishing feature of Bakhtin’s research. He dedicated a large part of his research to literary theory and criticism, but at the same time he superseded boundaries of disciplines that were immediately concerned with literature and art in general, as much as with language and communication studies understood in a broad sense. Bakhtin aimed to demonstrate that a literary text can only be adequately understood by shifting one’s gaze beyond literature and art in general, to view it from different disciplinary perspectives, according to a process of extralocalization. Studies on verbal and nonverbal signs come into play, for example, both at a theoretical level—that of general semiotics—as well as at the level of the specification of these studies, relative to different cultural systems, folklore traditions, festivities, rites, myths, and cults (Petrilli, 1990a, 1992a, 1993a 1993b). In addition to the study of verbal and nonverbal signs, other perspectives that come into play in the study of the literary text include the study of ideology, of the psychological and psychoanalytical relation between consciousness and the unconscious, the problem of social stratification and of the relation among social classes, the relation between history and structure, and between the genetic and the morphological approach.

Bakhtin’s approach to the study of the literary text inevitably involves all human sciences, though he never abandoned his special interest in the problem of the specificity of the literary word. In *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship* (Medvedev, 1925), Bakhtin uses the problem of the specificity of the literary word and the way it is dealt with as a criterion for criticizing the Russian Formalists who thought they had solved the issue.
Bakhtin also critiques recourse to superficial sociological formulae and pseudo-Marxist slogans.

Bakhtin dealt with issues connected with literary writing from the perspective of literature itself. His excursions outside the field of literature do not imply recourse to an external viewpoint with claims to offering a description that is totalizing and systemic. On the contrary, Bakhtin remained inside literature and never left it, literature was his observatory. Literature was the perspective from which he conducted his critique, which was anti-systemic and detotalizing. Bakhtin reveals the internal threads which connect the literary to the extra-literary, therefore underlining the structural intertextuality that subtends the connection between literary and extra-literary texts. In Bakhtin’s view the literary text subsists and develops in its specificity as a literary text thanks to its implication with the external universe, in an ethical sense as well.

Consequently, as much as literature was one of Bakhtin’s main interests, it was not his only interest. He focused his attention on the relation between “literature” and “life” (a central issue in his 1928 monograph with Medvedev), or more extensively “art” and “life” (his earliest paper “Art and Answerability,” published in 1919, clearly testifies to this (Bakhtin, 1979, pp. 1-3); but he also focused on the human sciences in general, as emerges from the whole course of his production (Petrilli, 1995, 1996a).

Bakhtin’s multiple interests in relation to the human sciences, in particular his research method, ultimately refer to the problem of value. He was immediately interested in aesthetic value with a special focus on literary value. However, he identified artistic value in otherness and extralocality, therefore he necessarily dealt with other kinds of value as well (Petrilli, 2007a; Petrilli & Ponzio, 2000a, 2003a).

These include, in the first place, ethical value. And, in fact, he had already highlighted the importance of the connection between art and answerability in his 1919 paper, where these terms figure in the title. If, as Bakhtin maintains in a paper of 1920-23 (Bakhtin, 1979, 4-256), the source of artistic, of aesthetic value is the category of other and not I, it necessarily involves issues of an ethical order centering on the problem of the other. From this point of view, literature represents a sort of experiment, pushed to the extreme—beyond the limits of social convention—concerning how values function in interpersonal relationships (Levinas, 1961; Morris, 1938, 1948, 1964; Petrilli, 1998b, 2005a).

But this involves experimentation relative to the dialogical character of the word as well. In literature, especially in genres like the novel, the word’s dialogism can be examined beyond its limited reach in ordinary language. Bakhtin reconnects aesthetic value to linguistic value as well as to human value, that is, value that characterizes human beings as human, that is, considered not only in terms of identity but also of otherness. Bakhtin’s analysis of linguistic value is much more convincing than that offered by the linguists. Linguistic value in Bakhtin is not limited to the relation among the elements of language (among phonemes, between *signifiant* and *signifié*, between words on the syntagmatic and
paradigmatic axis), but extends beyond to concern the dialogical consistency of discourse (Ivanov, 1973; Ponzio, 2003, 2006a).

In Bakhtin’s writings, linguistic value coincides with dialogical value, which means it can be measured in terms of the word’s capacity for dialogism: not formal dialogism, of the surface order, as in the case of an exchange of rejoinders between two speakers in dialogue, but substantial dialogism which can even be traced in the voice of a single speaker, in a single utterance.

With such concepts Bakhtin overcame the conventional limits of linguistics in the direction of what he chose to call metalinguistics. He does not propose a quantitative extension on the boundaries of linguistics but a qualitative change, a shift in values: the value of sign identity is replaced by the value of sign otherness. This shift in focus means to search for linguistic value in dialogical relations internal to discourse, that connect different texts, historical languages, discourse genres, etc. Pushed to high degrees of dialogism, of extra-locality and displacement in the direction of otherness, linguistic value understood as dialogical value becomes aesthetic value (Ponzio, 2001).

The relation between aesthetic value and cognitive value must also be taken into account along these lines. This relation too can be reconducted to a scale in dialogism ranging from a maximum degree of dialogism to a maximum degree of monologism. However, cognitive discourse cannot reach the high levels of dialogism and otherness characteristic of artistic discourse, in spite of its potential for innovation and revolution (Bakhtin, 1993; Ponzio, 1997a). This is because cognitive discourse is grounded in the category of self, it identifies with the subject of discourse, and is oriented by a given thesis, project or conclusion.

All the same, as Bakhtin maintained in various stages of his research, cognitive processes still call for the category of otherness. For example, in Rabelais and His World he illustrates how the opening of official culture to non-official culture, to popular, carnivalized culture, and the grotesque body contributed to the rise of modern scientific knowledge during the Renaissance. Bakhtin continues working on such concepts in his later writings, especially his notebooks of 1970-71 (Bakhtin, 1971, 1979, pp. 132-158). Artistic experimentation pushes beyond the scientific, offering an understanding of humanity (as says Bakhtin commenting Dostoevsky’s “polyphonic novel”), of experience with the other and with nature that is altogether inaccessible from a monological perspective.

The problem of value is a constant concern throughout Bakhtin’s research from his early writings of the 1920s to his later writings of the 1970s. His perspective is interdisciplinary with a special focus on sense or value for the human person. This leads him to deal with value beyond the limits of a specific field or human science (linguistics, theory of art and literature, etc.). By contrast to linguistics of Saussurean derivation, Russian formalism and Lotman’s cultural semiotics, Bakhtin maintained that value could not be explained in terms of relations with a closed system, whether a linguistic code, langue, so-called “poetic language,” or a general cultural system. At the same time, however, Bakhtin
recognized the importance of the problem of specificity, of the problem of value in relation to verbal signs, literature and cultural texts. Bakhtin’s perspective is radically dialogical: interlingualism, intertextuality, and interculturalism are important implications of his dialogical principle. Rather than confine his research on values to the boundaries of a single human science, he searched for the unitary sense that precedes and subtends the division itself of the sciences.

This has consequences on Bakhtin’s method which he applied to all his research: a dialogical-dialectical method which consists in relating fields and objects of study that seemed distant from each other, in shifting and opening processes. This method is dialectical in a strong sense to the extent that it recovers the connection with dialogism, which is fundamental in obtaining dialectics; this is the dialogical-dialectical method, or “detotalizing method” (Ponzio, 2004).

Bakhtin first placed the prefix “meta” in front of the word “linguistics” in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics to describe his special approach to verbal language; but this prefix may in fact be appropriately extended to all fields that enter the range of his research. Bakhtin considered his research as properly philosophical to the extent that it is critical research, focused on conditions of possibility. As regards the problem of values and signs through which values are necessarily expressed (which leads to Bakhtin’s interest in the general science of signs or semiotics), his metalinguistic and detotalized approach on a theoretical level also had implications on a practical level. Rather than absolutize and reify signs and values, Bakhtin researched the dialectical-dialogical processes of their production and circulation.

The work of Bakhtin and his Circle is an important point of reference for “philosophy of language” understood as indicating studies on the inherently meta-linguistic dimension of language, therefore on the inter-subjective founding of language, rather than as a question of reducing philosophical problems to problems of (verbal) language. Bakhtin transcended the limits of traditional approaches to the study of language that focus on the centripetal forces operating in the verbal and nonverbal sign network and on the monological, fixed units of language. Instead, from Bakhtin’s perspective philosophy of language must focus on the live values of otherness, dialogism and extralocality, the founding principles and values that orient signifying processes and the sciences that study them. Consequently, contrary to trends that reduce philosophy of language to problems of language separated from the live context of social communication, from understanding, which is always “dialogical understanding,” from answerability to the other, Bakhtin conceived “philosophy of language” or “meta-linguistics” as theory of knowledge, praxis and ideology developed in the light of a theory of language that is both critical and dialogical.

A specific characteristic of Bakhtin’s linguistic theory is his interdisciplinary perspective. He considered language in relation to the language of other human sciences—anthropology, psychology, psychoanalysis, theory of ideology, the study of popular traditions, of different socio-cultural systems and practices, linguistics and theory
of literature, etc. (Vygotsky, 1925). These in turn are made of dialogical relations and converge in his theory of language, which is dialogical and critical. However, Bakhtin drew specially on literature for his understanding of language on the basis of his conviction that literary language is the place which most enhances and manifests the live characteristics of communication, the “word’s” plurivocality, its “dialogized plurilingualism” structural not only to the relation between different discourses but also to the discourse of a single voice.

Bakhtinian theory of literary language is constructed through dialogical confrontation with a host of different languages. Consequently, the practices, theories, values and orientations of other sciences connected to language, either because they deal with language or simply because they are made of language, all enter Bakhtinian theory of literature. All are viewed in light of the live material of literary language and of the centrifugal and contradictory forces operative in it, the place where the sign manifests its expressive potential to a maximum degree of dialogical answerability. For Bakhtin literary language furnishes appropriate models, materials and instruments for a critique of language theory that does not account for the dialogical, polyphonic and plurivocal constitution of language.

Bakhtin preferred the term “metalinguistics” to “linguistics” to describe the orientation of his research on language, but the expression “philosophy of language,” which recalls the title of his 1929 volume signed by Voloshinov, is also appropriate. Bakhtin’s research centers particularly on the problem of the specificity of the literary word, which he dealt with on the basis of his reflections on language and word, conducted along the margins of different disciplines, along their junctures and points of intersection where both verbal and nonverbal signs come into play. His basic unit of analysis is the utterance constructed in the context of internal and external dialogical relations forming speech acts, texts, discourse genres. Thus understood, the problem of understanding the utterance exceeds the traditional limits of linguistics as Bakhtin states in *Problema texta*:

The problem of understanding the utterance. In order to understand, it is first of all necessary to establish the principal and clear-cut boundaries of the utterance. The alternation of speech subjects. The ability to determine the response. The essential responsiveness of any understanding (“Kannitverstan”). (Bakhtin, 1959-61, p. 112)

Contrary to linguistic analyses which search for meaning in unitary, well-defined entities, forgetting the live nature of the processes of signification and communication, Bakhtin defines the “boundaries” of the utterance in terms of the relation among subjects, with reference to the response elicited by the utterance and to the responsive nature of understanding: in other words, the “boundaries” of the utterance coincide with the dialogical interrelationship with other utterances, with the text. According to this description, the utterance is an open, dialogical, intertextual unit whose signifying value is determined in contact with the other. Bakhtin gave first importance to the dynamical and creative forces of real linguistic life. This led him to conduct his linguistic analysis of the utterance in the
broad context of its relations with other human sciences. The boundaries of the utterance understood as a dialogical unit are open and in continual construction in the relation with the outside, the other (Petrilli, 2005b). The utterance finds its sense in this relation. Bakhtin had a special interest in verbal texts relatedly to nonverbal texts (Bakhtin, 1965), and qualified his research as philosophical:

…mainly because of what it is not: it is not a linguistic, philological, literary, or any other special kind of analysis (study). The advantages are these: our study will move in the liminal spheres, that is, on the borders of all the aforementioned disciplines; at their junctures and points of intersection. (Bakhtin, 1965, p. 103

These considerations by Bakhtin as reported in this paper dated 1959-61, can in fact be traced back to earlier writings. He had already formulated his critique of abstract objectivism characterizing certain approaches in philosophy of language, and of individualistic subjectivism in general linguistics, in his books with Voloshinov of 1927 and 1929. This critique is the starting point and premise for all Bakhtin’s research on the word and the sign in general. But consider the following passage from Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics as a possible example among the many that clearly illustrate Bakhtin’s metalinguistic, or if we prefer, “metasemiotical” approach:

…linguistics studies “language” itself and the logic specific to it in its capacity as a common ground, as that which makes possible dialogical interaction; consequently, linguistics distances itself from the actual dialogical relationships themselves. These relationships lie in the realm of discourse, for discourse is by its very nature dialogical; they must therefore be studied by metalinguistics, which exceeds the limits of linguistics and has its own independent subject matter and tasks.

Dialogical relationships are reducible neither to logical relationships nor to relationships oriented semantically toward their referential object, relationships in and of themselves devoid of any dialogical element. They must clothe themselves in discourse, become utterances, become the positions of various subjects expressed in discourse, in order that dialogical relationships might arise among them. (1984, p. 183)

To understand Bakhtin’s approach to studies on verbal language we must remember his insistence on the inexorable connection between literary language and life, which is direct and dialectical. Literary language is grounded in the heterogeneous material of life. It establishes relations between alterities, between the other of literature, or art in general, and the other of life. Otherness is pictured by literary language through distancing processes according to the principle of extralocality. Bakhtin theorizes dialogical understanding among alterities which encounter each other in the dialectical unity of responsibility/answerability understood in terms of listening to the other, of responsivity to the other. Art and life do not identify with each other: the irreducible otherness of life, its polyphony, resounds in the language of art, and art is made of the material of life which is enhanced by artistic discourse.

> But what guarantees the inner connection of the constituent elements of a person? Only the unity of answerability. I have to answer with my own life for what I have experienced and understood in art, so that everything I have experienced and understood would not remain ineffectual in my life...The poet must remember that it is his poetry which bears the guilt for the vulgar prose of life, whereas the man of everyday life ought to know that the fruitlessness of art is due to his willingness to be unexacting and to the unseriousness of the concerns in his life. (1919, pp. 1-2)

In a context of discourse focused on proposing a new approach to language and communication with reference to Bakhtin’s theory of literature, the relation evidenced between art and life (which must never be forgotten in philosophy) is fundamental. Bakhtin shows how Dostoevsky’s artistic world revolves around dialogue considered as an end and not as a means. In accordance with Dostoevsky, Bakhtin even goes as far as to identify in dialogue the material itself of human becoming:

> Dialogue here is not the threshold to action, it is the action itself. It is not a means for revealing, for bringing to the surface the already ready-made character of a person; no, in dialogue a person not only shows himself outwardly, but he becomes for the first time that which he is—and, we repeat, not only for others but for himself as well. To be means to communicate dialogically. (1984a, p. 252)

Bakhtin maintains that language, the subject, consciousness, values, orientations, ideologies are all dialogical and social constructs built on the borders and junctures uniting internal and external alterities:

> I am conscious of myself and become myself only while revealing myself for another, through another, and with the help of another...And everything internal gravitates not toward itself but is turned to the outside and dialogized, every internal experience ends up on the boundary, encounters another, and in this tension-filled encounter lies its entire essence...The very being of man (both external and internal) is the *deepest communion. To be means to communicate.* (1963, p. 287)

To develop language and communication theory from a Bakhtinian perspective means to grasp the otherness dimension of language through the experience of literature which, in turn, presupposes this dimension. The inter-subjective and dialogical dimension of language (but we may also add “ethical” dimension given that it is determined by the value of otherness and extralocality) is the immanent disposition of language itself to transcend its own limits (as well as the limits of life as expressed and produced in language), according to the logic of dialogized and plurilingualistic otherness (the condition for signifying and
communication processes), and not of identity and equal exchange. From the Bakhtinian perspective, literary language theories and philosophical language theories come together: both open to the ethical dimension, that is, to plurivocal and dialogical otherness structural to the universes of human discourse. Differently to the special languages of the sciences and in line with literary language (especially Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel), philosophical language has its specificity in plurilingualism, pluristylistism and pluridiscursivity (Petrilli, 1990b, 1990c, 1996b, 1998a).

Language and communication theory must not ignore the correlation between theory of literary language and philosophy of language for a philosophical grounding of language (beginning from the problem of the language of philosophy), rather than simply reduce philosophical problems to problems of language (Ponzio, 1994, p. 193). To place philosophy alongside literature, precisely the polyphonic novel, as does Bakhtin, may seem arbitrary. This procedure involves relating two different phenomena: on one side, a dimension, an attitude, an orientation, which as such cuts across all discourses, at least potentially, beyond the limits of genre, which means flowing into the novel as well; on the other, a specific discourse genre. However, this discrepancy disappears when we stop hypostatizing literary genres, and instead consider them as an “interpretative model of reality” (Bakhtin, 1975; Voloshinov, 1929, pp. 199-236; Medvedev, 1928, pp. 130-131), as a “modeling procedure” or “specific signifying procedure” (Ponzio, 1994, pp. 58-66).

The novel is the literary genre that reaches the highest degrees in pluridiscursivity and plurivocality; at a metalinguistic level it is the genre that best explains such orientations. As demonstrated by Bakhtin (Bakhtin, 1975, pp. 259-422), language and communication sciences do not dispose of sufficient instruments for an adequate understanding of communication when they fail to keep account of literary and philosophical language as we are describing them, that is, as manifested by the polyphonic novel and as theorized so well by Bakhtin. Traditionally, language and communication sciences refer to the logic of identity, to the centripetal forces operating in the system of language, monologism, the processes of identification that prevail over the processes of dialogical and responsive understanding, the historical processes of linguistico-ideological unification and centralization. All these polarize the complex life of language, reducing it to the relation between the unitary system of language and individual use of this system.

Bakhtin with other scholars of language, signifying and communication processes in general (such as Edmund Husserl, Charles S. Peirce, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, Roland Barthes, Maurice Blanchot, Emmanuel Lévinas) are the main “interlocutors” in a dialogue proposed by Augusto Ponzio in his 1994 book, Fondamenti di filosofia del linguaggio, a contribution to his project for a new approach to communication and language. It is not incidental that this book was preceded by a series of monographs by Ponzio on Rossi-Landi, Levinas and Bakhtin (Petrilli, 1996, pp. 229-242; Petrilli, 2007; Ponzio, 1988, 1996, 2002a, 2002b, 2006b, 2006c; Ponzio, A., Petrilli, Ponzio, J., 2006; Levinas, 1961, 1972, 1974; Peirce 1931-66, 1982-93, 1992; Rossi-Landi 1992a, 1992b). Ponzio identifies dialogism as a special
characteristic of the language of philosophy, similarly to Bakhtin as regards the word in the novel. The juncture between the word in the novel and the philosophical word can clearly be traced on a genetic level. Bakhtin shows how the “polyphonic novel” originates from “Socratic dialogue.” In turn, Socratic dialogue is grounded in the carnivalesque orientation of popular culture which contrasts the joyous relativity of a topsy turvy world to the monologism, univocality and dogmatism of hegemonic culture (Bakhtin, 1963, pp. 106-114). *Fondamenti* is a contribution to Bakhtin’s project for the development of a theory of language and communication based on the ethics of otherness and dialogism.

Thanks to its vocation for dialogized pluridiscursivity, philosophy cannot ignore those places of language where the dialogical life of the word is developed, where outside the philosophical sphere too, the word is experimented through provocation by another word, where speech resounds as pluristylistic, pluridiscursive and plurivocal. Among the places of dialogization special mention must be made of the parodic and “carnivalized” genres of the oral and written traditions, of all forms of literary writing where indirect speech and extralocality render the word self-critical, self-derisive, capable of not taking itself seriously, a word that is internally dialogical (Ponzio et al., 1994, p. 195).

Without making claims to totalization or semiotico-philosophical imperialism, to reflect in a philosophical key on verbal and nonverbal language means to contribute to developing a detotalizing approach to different fields of knowledge, praxis and human values considered from the perspective of their constitution in terms of sign material. Thanks above all to results obtained by experimenting the word’s dialogical potential in the laboratory of literary writing, the “detotalizing” method of inquiry evidences the ethical, or what we propose to call “semioethical” (Petrilli, 2007b; Petrilli & Ponzio, 2003a; 2005b; Welby, 1983, 2007) dimension of language and communication beyond the aesthetic.

**REFERENCES**


HYPERAUTHORSHIP IN MIKHAIL BAKHTIN: THE PRIMARY AUTHOR AND CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE

Mikhail Epstein

This article explores the phenomenon of hyperauthorship in intellectual writing: a primary author (hyperauthor) creates a number of secondary authors (hypoauthors), and develops possible conceptual systems on their behalf. The case under consideration is Mikhail Bakhtin and his complex relationship with his friends Pavel Medvedev and Valentin Voloshinov, members of the so called “Bakhtin’s circle” (in the 1920s) who are credited with authorship of several books which may have been actually written by Bakhtin himself. Still unclear from biographical and historical perspectives, this problem of authentic attribution of Medvedev’s and Voloshinov’s texts can be clarified in the theoretical framework of “hyperauthorship” and “possibilistic thinking.” This article applies Bakhtin’s own theory of the “primary author immersed in silence,” as well as Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “conceptual personae,” to explain this case of “shared,” or “transferred” authorship. The figures of Voloshinov and Medvedev, though historically real, may be viewed as Bakhtin’s projections of “ideal,” or “utopian” Marxism in linguistics and literary theory.

Key words: hyperauthorship, primary author, conceptual persona, Russian philosophy, literature and philosophy, Valentin Voloshinov, Pavel Medvedev, Alexei Losev

Before addressing the problem of hyperauthorship in Mikhail Bakhtin, I would like to introduce this relatively new theoretical concept. Hyperauthorship is fictional authorship in distinction from factual authorship; i.e., the creation of literary or philosophical works on behalf of different, sometimes virtual, personalities.2

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The death of the author and the erasure of the signature that made up the agenda of Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault, have become a cliché of poststructuralist theory. As a matter of fact, it signals not the end, but rather the beginning of a new epoch of hyperauthorship, multiplication of authorial personalities and conceptual persona that wander through virtual networks in increasingly oblique relationships to their biological parents.

Hyperauthorship is not merely a contemporary phenomenon. Some classical authors, such as Plato and Kierkegaard, Alexander Pushkin and Fernando Pessoa were overwhelmed by multiple authorial personalities that wished to be realized through their transpersonal creative endeavors. For example, Plato writes on behalf of all participants of his dialogues, primarily Socrates. Kierkegaard writes on behalf of Johannes Climacus, Victor Eremita, Johannes de Silentio and many others conceptual persona. The Portuguese poet Pessoa has divided himself into three poets: Alvaro Campos, an engineer, Ricardo Reis, a doctor, and Alberto Caeiro, a shepherd.

Thus, we find in philosophy and literature many examples of “excessive,” or “surplus” authorship whereby one biological author gives life to many ideational authors. Their two roles can accordingly be designated as hyperauthor (the creator; Greek hyper, over) and hypoauthor (the created; Greek hypo-, under). In a sense, “hyperauthor” is a concept analogous to that of “hypertext,” text with many different versions or sequels stacked on top of one another. Similarly, there are many authors, relatively independent “writing personalities,” within one hyperauthor. For instance, Alexander Pushkin as a hyperauthor created a number of hypoauthors who allegedly wrote some of his poems and little tragedies, such as the English poet William Shenstone, the hypoauthor of Pushkin’s “The Covetous Knight,” or the obscure Italian poet Ippolito Pindemonte to whom Pushkin attributed one of his latest lyrical masterpieces. The theologian Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and, according to anti-Stratfordians, the playwright William Shakespeare were hypoauthors, but so far we have failed to establish the identities of their hyperauthors.

Two varieties, or orders of the hyperauthorship, can be identified—ascending and descending—which depend on the relationship between hyperauthors and hypoauthors. When a less authoritative writer ascribes his or her work to a more authoritative one, the order is ascending. Such is the case of The Book of Zohar, the central piece of Jewish Kabbalah; most likely it was compiled by the Spanish writer Moses de Leon (c. 1240-1305), but to give it more authority he ascribed it to Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, who had lived in the era of the Tannaim in Israel, during the Roman period, after the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE. The same is true of the unknown hyperauthor of the 6th century who was the founder of negative theology, ascribing his treatises to Dionysius Areopagite of the 1st century (named in Acts 17:34 as one of those Athenians who had heard Paul preach on Mars Hill). James MacPherson of the 18th century claimed his epic poems to have been written in Gaelic by the ancient Scottish poet Ossian.

The descending order is in place when a hyperauthor attempts to conceal his or her social or professional identity by putting forward a figure of a less stature. This could be the
case with an aristocratic genius and erudite, such as Sir Francis Bacon or Edward de Vere, the 17th Earl of Oxford, who had adopted a semi-literate actor William Shakespeare as their hypoauthor. Alexander Pushkin ascribed his experiments in prose, deliberately simple, naïve and sentimental short stories, to someone by the name of Ivan Belkin, a member of provincial gentry.

The same writing can be potentially ascribed to various authors, which intensifies the play of its meanings and interpretations. Such is the concept of “fuzzy,” or “continuum-like” hyperauthorship, which refers not to a discrete authorial personality but rather to a wave of possible authorships spread across time, places and personalities. It is also worth mentioning here Jorge Luis Borges, the hyperauthor of Pierre Menard, who has enriched the art of reading by the techniques of erroneous attribution—for example, reading *The Imitation of Christ* as if it were written by Celine or Joyce. Recently the case of Araki Yasusada (1907-1972), a poet and a survivor of Hiroshima, raised a lot of controversy as his poems turned out to be potentially attributable to many hyperauthors—American (Kent Johnson), Japanese (Tosa Motokiyo), Russian (Andrei Bitov, Dmitry Prigov), and Mexican (Javier Alvarez). In fact, all these and other possible authors are just some of the observable locations of this hyperauthorial wave that can reach the shores of other epochs, countries, and most odd and eccentric personalities. Hyperauthorship is virtual authorship in which real personalities become almost illusionary, while fictional personalities become almost real; as a result, they co-exist in the same continuum of imagination.

Biological parenthood is now recognized as only one of many forms of parenthood. The same should be true of the reductive concept of authorship as only “biological” authorship limited by the input of the author as a living individual. There are many sorts and degrees of non-biological authorship, cf. psychological, intellectual, inspirational, or magical. There is a principal asymmetry and disproportion between living and writing individuals in the world. Obviously not all living individuals have either the inclination or the capacity to become authors. Some individuals cannot write or they write only on checks and holiday cards. This renders the complementary statement quite plausible, as well, i.e., not all authors have either the inclination or the capacity to become living individuals. There are many authors who, for certain reasons, have no potential for physical embodiment, as there are many individuals who for some related reasons have no propensity for becoming authors. This implies that some living individuals, who have a potential for writing, must shelter or adopt a number of potential authors within their biological individualities. What awaits actualization in the writing of one individual is the potentiality of many authors who have no need or taste for living, in the same way as many living individuals have no need or taste for writing.

Now I turn to the following three interconnected issues: 1) What is the role of hyperauthorship in philosophical writing? 2) What is the relationship of Bakhtin as a hyperauthor to his two hypoauthors Medvedev and Voloshinov? 3) How does Bakhtin’s theory help us to understand the nature of hyperauthorship and where does this theory come
short of explanation? It must be noted that my article serves only as a general outline of this broad circle of problems.

Philosophy embraces potentiality rather than actuality of thinking. Thinking as a philosopher, I do not present my personal thoughts, but possible thoughts, thinkables, with which I have no obligation to identify myself as an individual. It is somebody else who thinks and speaks through me. A philosopher needs a persona to whom he or she entrusts his or her thoughts, because he or she feels that they are not quite his or her own. For this purpose the philosopher finds convenient names and characters and appoints conditional speakers for his or her thought. From ancient times, and especially since Plato, philosophy has often presented itself as personified thinking. A philosophical persona, in distinction from a literary character, is not an acting, but a thinking personality; it is the other who dwells in me when I am thinking as a philosopher. My distance from this persona may be conveyed by quotation marks even though the majority of philosophers do not use this device.

It is the potentiality of philosophical thinking that produces the figures of fictive thinkers, hypo-authors. Since the author-philosopher demonstrates the potential of thinking, he or she needs a mediator to actualize a certain thought and at the same time prevent its identification with the author himself or herself. When people say that the philosopher holds “this or that view,” or “thinks this or that,” it is not an accurate statement. The philosopher does not “think this or that,” but thinks that it is possible to think this or that, to have these or some other views, which under certain conditions, from a certain standpoint, could be argued in this or that way. Such personae are Socrates and all other numerous characters in Plato’s dialogues; a simpleton in Nicolas of Cusa; Johannes Climacus and other pseudonymous thinkers (hetero-thinkers) for Kierkegaard; Zarathustra and Dionysus for Nietzsche; the Father Pansophius for Vladimir Solovyov (in “the Short History of the Antichrist”); Mr. Teste in Paul Valery; and semi-fictional hypoauthors Pavel Medvedev and Valentin Voloshinov for Mikhail Bakhtin.

As a rule, such philosophical personae are not presented as wholly, colorfully and palpably as characters in art and literature. Often it is sufficient only to give them a name and a few characteristic traits (e.g. social or professional ones) in order to separate the persona from the author and to crystallize in this new personality a system of ideas and concepts that the author wants to put to the test. To actualize thought in a persona while preserving its potentiality in an author is the optimal way to achieve the double effect of persuasion-dissuasion, intellectual sympathy and intellectual withdrawal.

In a certain sense we have no way of knowing what a certain thinker thinks. In fact he or she does not think anything, and in this respect he or she is similar to the most thoughtless, empty-headed individual. According to Bakhtin’s view of a literary author,
created by him. ... Nothing can be said in behalf of the writer. ... Therefore the primary author is cast in silence. ... It is conventional to talk about the authorial mask. But in which utterances (speech performances) is the face [of the author] present and the mask absent, i.e., there is no authorship? (Bakhtin, 1979, pp. 353, 357)

The same applies to the philosopher (including Bakhtin himself) who never exposes his or her “real” thought, like a novelist who never reveals his or her “true” face. The face of the author remains invisible, and his or her mouth remains shut. Judging by their philosophical works we cannot know what Plato or Kierkegaard “really thought.” Even this very question addressed to the thinker is irrelevant. The primary author cannot express himself or herself in words; he or she can only hope that behind the speech of his or her “others,” his or her doubles, we can hear his or her silence, the non-actualized potentiality of his thinking.

Similarly, language itself is always silent, though it constitutes the structural foundation of all possible utterances. Nobody ever heard the voice of the English or the Russian language. The writer and the thinker establish the order of their potentiality precisely at the level of language. In order to start speaking, to move to the level of speech, they need to diminish (sokratit’) themselves, to find their “socrates,” their figurehead who can produce actual utterances. The real author is as silent as language. Philosophical discourse, i.e., actualization of philosophical language, functions only as (self)-citation, as the voice of a persona, whether it is announced as such or not.

What Bakhtin says about the author being “cast in silence” helps to explain the enigma of his own doubles Pavel Medvedev and Valentin Voloshinov. There is sufficient evidence that the books published under their names, Medvedev’s The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship. A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics (1928) and Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1929) were written by Bakhtin or at least with his crucial participation. Presumably they could not have been wholly written by Medvedev and Voloshinov since their authentic works demonstrate different interests and are of inferior quality. Also, there are strong intellectual and stylistic affinities between these hyperauthorial texts and the main body of Bakhtin’s work.

However, Bakhtin never recognized his authorship, even in the later time (1960s-1970s) when it was politically safe to do so. On several occasions Bakhtin was directly asked about the authorship of these books, and the vagueness of his explanations was striking. It appears that he did write these books, but he did not consider himself to be their author. Bakhtin could not ascribe to himself these works written under the names and on behalf of his friends, but he also could not repudiate them. Why? Bakhtin as a theoretician of the “authorial silence” provides a better explanation for this enigma than Bakhtin as a memoirist.

The point is that Bakhtin has expressed in these books those thoughts that he could not recognize as properly his own; they reveal the potentials of a Marxist interpretation of language and literature that were rather alien to Bakhtin himself, though nobody else ever
actualized them as consistently and convincingly as he did in these hyperauthorial works. The situation is complicated by the fact that Medvedev and Voloshinov were real persons. Furthermore, they were the authors of their own scholarly works, though at the same time they served Bakhtin’s reincarnations, hypoauthors “Medvedev” and “Voloshinov.” Bakhtin “casts himself in silence” as the creative potentiality of the thinking that was actualized under the names of Medvedev and Voloshinov. Of course, Bakhtin is stylistically and intellectually recognizable in these writings, just as a famous actor can be recognized in his or her characters. In the discursive manifestations of Medvedev and Voloshinov, Bakhtin brilliantly played the roles of a Marxist literary critic and a Marxist linguist required by the ideological scene of the 1920s, giving the utmost force of persuasion to the voices of his conceptual personae. All these ideas were present in Bakhtin’s mind, but he himself was not completely within these ideas. Hence, attributing these works to Bakhtin would be complicated from the point of view of both formal and intellectual authorship. Bakhtin had authored “pseudo-Medvedev” and “pseudo-Voloshinov” who, in their turn, had authored the books rightfully attributed to them. In the same way, we cannot speak directly about “Pushkin’s tales,” we should properly name them “Ivan Belkin’s tales authored by Pushkin.”

Thus, it would be more appropriate to qualify Medvedev and Voloshinov as author-characters rather than author-authors and to include them in subtitles like “Thus Spake Medvedev” or “Thus Spake Voloshinov.” For the same reason, Nietzsche wrote “Thus Spake Zarathustra” not “Thus Spake Nietzsche.” But at the same time, Nietzsche did not present Zarathustra, a speaker of his thoughts, as the author of his book; he didn’t sign the book by the name of Zarathustra, but reserved it only for the title.

Bakhtin’s theory of polyphony as the interaction of many voices belonging to different individuals does not fully explain the phenomenon of divided and multiplied authorship in Bakhtin’s own work or in that of other thinkers. Bakhtin’s dialogical conception elaborated in his book on Dostoevsky presupposes the interaction of two or more separate, individual consciousnesses. More relevant for the problem of personified thinking is the fact that none of us can truly know any consciousness other than our own, which, paradoxically, does not fully know itself as it remains alien to itself. Those thoughts that wander through my mind seem to come from nowhere, definitely not from myself. I am the place of my thinking rather than its source; I am the scene for the acts of thinking that are performed by somebody else. Thus, the author’s consciousness expresses itself on behalf of multiple characters, putting their utterances in quotation marks as citations from different sources. My thinking permanently disqualifies my own speech and designates this renunciation by placing it within visible or invisible quotation marks.

This can be called a “non-dialogical” mode of otherness in speech. As Paul Valéry puts it on behalf of his hypoauthor Mr. Teste, a superior and universal intellect: “…all those [words] that I have myself spoken to others, I could always feel them become distinct from my thought—for they were becoming invariable” (Valery, 1964, p. 236). Thus the chain of hyper-hypoauthorship appears to be endless as Paul Valéry’s hypoauthor, Mr. Teste, finds...
otherness within himself, and the order of quotation marks around quotation marks is multiplying *ad infinitum*. Most importantly, Valery/Teste accentuates here not the otherness of others, but his own otherness to himself. Thus the personahood (personazhnost') of consciousness can be opposed to its personhood (personal'nost'), in the Bakhtinian sense. Each consciousness is more complex and impenetrable within itself than in its “dialogical” relationship to another consciousness. This self-alienating quality of consciousness accounts for its internal citational mode: each act of self-expression is an act of self-alienation and self-citation. Not that “a thought once uttered is a lie,” as Fyodor Tyutchev pronounced, but rather a thought once uttered is a citation, a thought of someone different from its primary author. Personified thinking—personified as related to personae, not personalities—dwells within my own consciousness; it does not come from the consciousness of the other.

In fact, what another person is thinking is more comprehensible to us than what we are thinking ourselves. The thought of another person is expressed in his or her speech while our own thinking remains in the gap between speech and the unspeakable, between the actuality and potentiality of thinking. Before we can even think about the consciousness of other persons we are bound to find this “otherness” in our own consciousness; my own consciousness is the “other” for myself.

Thus, in order to explain Bakhtin’s hyperauthorship we need some conceptual framework different from Bakhtin’s own dialogical and polyphonic theory. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari provide the best clue for such a framework in their book “What Is Philosophy?” Their argument goes as follows. What makes a Western philosopher different from an Eastern sage is his or her mediated relationship with truth and wisdom. He or she does not possess wisdom (Sophia) as such, but is only in love with it, or, to use another possible translation of Greek “philia,” he or she is a friend of wisdom. Thus he or she finds himself or herself at a distance from the place of wisdom and has to speak about it on behalf of somebody else who becomes his or her conceptual persona, e.g. a friend or a lover, an idiot or a dreamer.

The destiny of the philosopher is to become his conceptual persona or personae, at the same time that the personae themselves become something other than what they are historically, mythologically, or commonly (the Socrates of Plato, the Dionysus of Nietzsche, the Idiot of Nicholas of Cusa). The conceptual persona is the becoming or the subject of a philosophy, on a par with the philosopher, so that Nicholas of Cusa, or even Descartes, should have signed themselves ‘the Idiot,’ just as Nietzsche signed himself ‘the Antichrist’ or ‘Dionysus crucified.’ In everyday life speech-acts refer back to psychosocial types who actually attest to a subjacent third person: ‘I decree mobilization as President of the Republic,’ ‘I speak to you as father,’ and so on. In the same way, the philosophical shifter is a speech-act in the third person where it is always a conceptual person who says ‘I’: ‘I think as Idiot, ‘I will as Zarathustra,’ ‘I dance as Dionysus,’ ‘I claim as Lover.’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 64)
In the same sense Bakhtin could say: “I argue against Formalism as Medvedev,” or “I perform Marxist linguistics as Voloshinov.” This “as” may be an innocent, self-exposing play in case of Nietzsche-Zarathustra, but it becomes a much more dangerous device in case of Plato-Socrates or Bakhtin-Medvedev and Bakhtin-Voloshinov, when conceptual personae are historical personalities. In this case, the “isness” of history makes way for “ifness” (or “asness”) of thinking. This complicates the issue of authorial identity, because “as” means both “is” and “is not.” It is easy to understand the perplexity of Bakhtin in the face of the question whether he had authored Medvedev’s and Voloshinov’s books. He should have answered both “yes” and “no,” which he actually did do.

Although Deleuze and Guattari’s approach helps to explain the perplexity of Bakhtin in case of his hyperauthorship, it fails to explain why Bakhtin, as many other thinkers, still authored the majority of his books under his own name. The point is that Deleuze and Guattari simply reverse the traditional concept of authorship rather than demonstrate the possibilities of its expansion. In line with the poststructuralist dogma of “the death of the author,” they present a conceptual persona as a more important and “authentic” figure than the author himself or herself. For them, the author becomes simply a device for the self-exposition of the conceptual persona:

The conceptual persona is not the philosopher’s representative but, rather, the reverse: the philosopher is only the envelope of his principal conceptual persona and of all other personae who are the intercessors, the real subjects of his philosophy. Conceptual personae are the philosopher’s “heteronyms,” and the philosopher’s name is the simple pseudonym of his personae... The philosopher is the idiosyncrasy of his conceptual personae. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 64)

Unfortunately, the logic of reductionism is double-edged. Reversing the traditional outlook, Deleuze and Guattari are inclined to fully reduce the philosopher’s position to his or her conceptual personae. This, again, eliminates the potentiality of philosophical thinking, which in this case becomes entirely reduced to the worldviews of personae as “true subjects” whose mouthpiece or even corporeal appearance are equated with the author himself.

Such a reverse reductionism leads, in fact, to quite a traditional result: no matter whether it is Socrates who is appointed a mouthpiece of Plato, or vice versa, the mutual irreducibility of the author and the persona disappears. Philosophical thinking is thus identified with its actualizations, and its potentiality becomes eliminated. Instead of the traditional view that Medvedev and Voloshinov served only as Bakhtin’s pseudonyms, now, with Deleuze and Guattari, it should be stated that Bakhtin merely serves as a “pseudonym” or an “envelope” for Medvedev and Voloshinov as the “real subjects” of his works. Then, who is the real subject of the works signed by Bakhtin himself? A conceptual persona Bakhtin who presents himself as a historic personality called “Bakhtin”? Do we need such replication of Bakhtin and for which purpose?
It is very clear that Bakhtin’s thinking, as it appears in the entirety of his work, cannot be reduced to its actualization in any of its authorial figures, even that of Bakhtin himself. That’s why there are not only different actualizations of philosophical thinking, but also different degrees of actualizations: those that acquire the shape of another personality, a named persona, hypoauctor, and those which are not conductive to such personification. Nietzsche did write on behalf of Zarathustra or Dionysus, but still the main bulk of his work comes under the name of Nietzsche. The degrees of personification are different for each thinker: no explicit conceptual persona(e) in Hegel and Marx and almost no direct “authorial” statement from Plato and Kierkegaard. Each case needs an individual approach. However, in order to convey fully the potentiality of philosophical thinking, we have to admit that it can be represented neither in the actuality of its real author, nor in the actuality of its conceptual persona(e). This is why both ends of the actuality, that of the author and that of persona(e), need to be represented in the entirety of philosophical work, i.e., in order for them to cross each other out and thus to represent thinking in its pure potentiality. Different actualizations of thinking allow it to reveal its unactualizability (and unfinalizability as well, to use Bakhtin’s term). Neither Medvedev nor Voloshinov, as conceptual persona, nor even Bakhtin himself as an individual author, are representative of the potentiality of the Bakhtinian thought. The “Who” of philosophical thinking does not fit into any actual, authorial mode. It is hyperauthorial in its nature, and therefore even the “real,” biological author is a hypoauctor to a certain degree, a persona in relation to this ultimate “Who” of thinking.

This “Who” is not simply “the other,” it is “the otherly other” to such an extent that it cannot be even somebody else’s “own,” to coincide with the self of any other real being. It cannot be identified with any existing person in the world (past or present). There is nobody, including Nietzsche himself, who could accept the mask of Nietzschean Zarathustra as his own face; the last person who it could fit would be the historical Zarathustra. There are such forms of otherness that are doomed to remain masks without bearers. This is what Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony fails to account for because it was conceived within the framework of dialogical existentialism, with its primary concern for human identity, personality, and authenticity. Conceptual characters that we are discussing here are pure signs of otherness that cannot be appropriated by any living or fictional individual. And this is precisely because they are masks of philosophical thinking, in its radical distinction from any other type of thinking for which its living bearers take full commitment and responsibility.

Philosophical thinking is beyond any mode of individuation and personhood. This explains why even those thinkers who did not resort to masks and persona(e) were nonetheless anxious to demonstrate the “otherness” of their thinking. In different modes of writing, philosophers present themselves as “speakers on behalf”; for example, Hegel spoke on behalf of the Absolute Spirit; Marx on behalf of the exploited proletariat, the liberator of the world; Heidegger on behalf of Being itself. Of course, this “on behalf” relates only to their
pronouncements as philosophers, not unlike the Pope, who is considered to be infallible only when he speaks _ex cathedra_. To speak _ex cathedra_ of philosophy means to speak in a different voice, on behalf of a different entity than the philosopher’s own.

Every epoch generates its own forms of hyperauthorship and its own conceptual personae. “...I will never believe that the struggling voices within me were also me. Without a doubt they are some separate creatures, self-reliant and independent from myself, who by their own will settled in me and inflicted controversy and cacophony in my soul,” wrote Alexei Losev (1893-1988), a major Russian philosopher of the Soviet epoch. Though Losev’s own philosophical works don’t reveal any named personae, a careful analysis will find sharp shifts of intonation in his discourses. Particularly notable is the aggressive interposing of his double, a Marxist phrasemonger, whose voice slightly caricatures Losev’s later writings, such as multi-volumed _History of Classical Aesthetics_. Now and then an unnamed Marxist scholar, a rather sophisticated one though not as bright and creative as Medvedev and Voloshinov, crudely intrudes into Losev’s discourse that is otherwise mostly influenced by Hegelian idealist dialectics and Husserlian phenomenology and eidology.

In general, it is very instructive to study the philosophy of the Soviet epoch from the standpoint of hyperauthorship. Since the voice of official Soviet ideology had to penetrate through all published work, each thinker chose his or her own way of its representation. Some, the least original thinkers (their names are legions), simply identified themselves with this voice and sacrificed the potentiality of thinking to their self-actualization as orthodox Soviet Marxists. Some, more independent, such as Valentin Asmus, tried to get away with formal declarations of Marxist loyalty.

The most interesting is the case when a gifted thinker tried to preserve the full scope of philosophical potentiality by personifying it in a Marxist discourse as one possibility of thinking that should set off other possibilities and the play of potentiality as such. Both Losev and Bakhtin belong to this category of creative thinkers who heard “struggling voices,” including the Marxist one, within themselves and acknowledged them to be “separate creatures, self-reliant and independent.” But here the similarity between Losev and Bakhtin ends, which imposes different tasks on their interpreters. There are no explicit conceptual personae in Losev as he did not grant any personification to various actualizations of his thought; therefore the task of such persono-analysis from the very beginning falls to his investigators. Bakhtin, on the contrary, did objectify his “struggling voices” in the figures of his hypauthors, Medvedev and Voloshinov. This makes Bakhtin an ideal figure for the investigation of the phenomenon of philosophical hyperauthorship, both in its Soviet variety and in the world context.
NOTES

1. I want to express my cordial gratitude to Walter Reed, William R. Kenan University Professor at Emory University. As a friend, a colleague, a co-teacher of the graduate seminar “Mikhail Bakhtin and His Circles,” I owe him much intellectual encouragement and inspiration. Dr. Reed, the author of the book *Dialogues of the Word: The Bible as Literature According to Bakhtin* (Oxford UP, 1993), has read the draft of this article and provided me generously with many comments and suggestions that I have used in its rewriting.


3. I refer to the conversations of Mikhail Bakhtin with the literary scholar Viktor Duvakin in the last years of Bakhtin’s life. Recorded by Duvakin and published as a separate book, these conversations contain rich biographic material, including memoirs about Voloshinov, Medvedev and other members of Bakhtin’s circle. See M. M. Bakhtin. *Besedy s V. D. Duvakinym*. Moscow: Soglasie, 2002.

REFERENCES


COMMUNICATION WITH THE OTHER AND MORAL ANSWERABILITY IN MIKHAIL M. BAKHTIN

AUGUSTO PONZIO

(Translation by Susan Petrilli)

When Bakhtin must qualify himself he calls himself a ‘philosopher’ and when he must name his research he calls it ‘philosophy of language.’ Bakhtin practices what we may call ‘philosophy of otherness’ which produces a real and proper revolution—the Bakhtinian revolution as recites the title of one of my monographs on Bakhtin—which consists in placing the other instead of the I at the centre of his thought system. Bakhtin says that in aesthetic terms the I is entirely unproductive, just as it is unproductive when a question of constructing a philosophy of responsible action, a philosophy of language free from the “langue”-“parole” dichotomy and from subjectivistic interpretations of speech in terms of “expression;” philosophy of language according to Bakhtin turns its attention to the word of the other, and is delineated in terms of the “art of listening.”

Keywords: dialogue, otherness, listening, answerability

An author’s importance is obvious when his writings engender many and different readings. Mikhail M. Bakhtin is an example.

After a long silence, after “Bakhtin: za ili protiv”—for or against, it seems that the time has come for an o Bachtine—“about Bakhtin.” This is occurring throughout the whole world and in particular in Russia, judging simply from the quantity of publications of texts by Bakhtin and on Bakhtin. I believe the first to recognize the importance of the overall corpus of Bakhtin’s works as well as of his single texts, including those connected with the so-called Bakhtin Circle, was Vyacheslav V. Ivanov, author of the important essay “Znacenie idej M. M. Bachtina o znake, vyskazyvanii i dialoge dlja sovremennoj semiotiki”

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Communication with the Other and Moral Answerability in Mikhail M. Bakhtin


Bakhtin’s research came to light after years of silence and since then numerous readings have been dedicated to him from various perspectives. Moreover, different aspects of his work were discovered and published posthumously, gradually, and not even in the order of their original writing. Texts from the early 1920s have only recently been made available. Their importance is such that they throw new light over the whole corpus of his research. Bakhtin’s reflections range over different fields and have now been introduced to areas he had not dealt with himself, as researchers utilized his ideas to deal with new problems. I have myself dedicated numerous essays and several monographs to Bakhtin, but I always find it helpful to revisit my own interpretations and review them, rethink and develop them and sometimes even reorient them in different directions in the light of new documents as they gradually emerge.

From the outset Bakhtin was interested in moral problems with a special focus on the issue of responsibility. In fact, in his earliest paper of 1919 dedicated to artistic discourse (in line with the journal it was published in), he connected the problem of art to the problem of responsibility. Bakhtin was not concerned with limited responsibility as delineated in the context of identity. He was not interested in identity. When he analyzed artistic discourse, he was not concerned with the artist’s identity; nor when analyzing literary texts was he interested in the identity of a literary genre or a literary trend. By the same token, in his studies on problems relating to language he was not concerned with the identity of language. The “Bakhtinian revolution” consists in shifting attention from identity to alterity with reference to all these problems and disciplinary areas.

Bakhtin was concerned with responsibility understood as answering to and answering for the other without alibis. The properly philosophical orientation of Bakhtin’s research was determined by his shift in focus beyond the boundaries of identity.

An early text by Mikhail M. Bakhtin from the 1920s entitled K filosofii postupka (Toward a Philosophy of the Act) was only published in Russia in 1986 in the volume Filosofii i sotsiologii nauki i tekhniki: Ezhegodnik, edited by S. G. Bocharov (pp. 82-138). This text is of great interest not only because of its intrinsic theoretical value, but also because it yields an understanding of the overall sense of Bakhtin’s research which stretches into the first half of the 1970s. Also, it is closely related to the first chapter of another text
written during the early 1920s, “Avtor i geroj v esteticeskoj dejatel’nosti” (Author and hero in aesthetic activity), it too only published later in the volume Estetika slovesnogo tvorchestva (Bakhtin, 1979). However, this chapter was not published in a complete version; the first section was considered too fragmentary and was excluded, only to be published as late as 1986 with “K filosofii postupka,” in the same volume. The connection between these two texts, “K filosofii postupka” and “Avtor i geroj v esteticeskoj dejatel’nosti” (in particular the first section of the latter) is obvious: both are part of the same research project where “Avtor i geroj v esteticeskoj dejatel’nosti” is the continuation and development of “K filosofii postupka,” and both privilege the same literary text as their object of analysis, the poem Razluka (Parting), by Pushkin.

Toward a Philosophy of the Act was only the beginning of a bigger project designed to produce a volume on ethics, understood as the architectonics of responsibility in communication with the other. This text consists of two large fragments: what is probably an introduction to the project with a few initial pages missing; and a section titled I by Bakhtin himself.

In the introductory fragment, Bakhtin deals with the problem of capturing the moment of “transitiveness” and “event-ness” (sobytijnost’) (1922a, p. 1) of the act, its value and unity of actual becoming and self-determination. As soon as the sense of the act is determined in theoretical (scientific, philosophical, historiographical) or in aesthetic terms, it loses its character as a unique and self-determined event, a truly experienced act, and assumes a general value, an abstract meaning. A division is created between two mutually impervious worlds: the world of life and the world of culture; we exist in the first even when we cognize, contemplate and create, that is, when we build a world in which life is the object of a given domain of culture. These two worlds are united by the unique event of the act of our activity, of living experience. This is the unity of two-sided answerability: answerability with respect to objective meaning, that is, with respect to content relative to the objective unity of a domain of culture, what Bakhtin calls “special answerability,” and answerability with respect to the unique event-ness of the act, which he calls “moral answerability” (1922a, pp. 2-3). To unite these two types of answerability, special answerability must be related to unitary and unique moral answerability as a constituent component. That is the only way the pernicious non-fusion and non-interpenetration of culture and life can be surmounted (1922, p. 3).

This is the same problem dealt with in what is generally considered as Bakhtin’s first publication, “Art and Answerability,” published in 1919—the problem of the relation between art and life. The terms of the solution are similar:

The three domains of human culture science, art, and life—gain unity only in the individual person who integrates them into his own unity. This union, however, may become mechanical, external. And, But what ... unfortunately, that is exactly what most often happens guarantees the inner connection of the constituent elements of a person?
Only the unity of answerability. I have to answer with my own life for what I have experienced and understood in art, so that everything I have experienced and understood would not remain ineffectual in my life. But answerability entails guilt, or liability to blame. It is not only mutual answerability that art and the poet must remember ... life must assume, but also mutual liability to blame. That it is his poetry which bears the guilt for the vulgar prose of life, whereas the man of everyday life ought to know that the fruitlessness of art is due to his willingness to be unexacting and to the unseriousness of the concerns in his life. The individual must become answerable through and through: all of his constituent moments must not only fit next to each other in the temporal sequence of his life, but must also interpenetrate each other in. Art and life are not one, but the...the unity of guilt and answerability must become united in myself—in the unity of my answerability. (Bakhtin 1919, pp. 1-2)

Therefore, on one hand “special answerability” relative to a given domain of culture, a given content, a given role and function; delimited, defined, circumscribed answerability referred to the repeatable identity of the objective and interchangeable individual; on the other hand, “moral answerability,” “absolute answerability,” without limits, alibis, which alone renders individual action unique; answerability of the single individual that cannot be abdicated. The connection between these two kinds of answerability is that between objective, repetitive, identical meaning conferred by the domain of culture in which action is objectified, and the unrepeatable self-determination of being as a unique and unitary event, activity in its entirety and complexity though not decomposable or classifiable. Here Bakhtin anticipates the criteria used for the distinction between “meaning” and “theme,” particularly important in his conception of the sign to which he dedicates an entire chapter in the 1929 volume signed by Voloshinov.

The act of our activity, of actual experiencing, says Bakhtin, is “a two-faced Janus” (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 2), oriented in two different directions: never-repeatable uniqueness and objective, abstract unity. My answerable activity as a unique individual, wholly identified in a given moment and in given conditions is absolutely indifferent, “completely impervious” (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 4) to the latter. Unique event-ness in which judgment is an answerable act or deed is indifferent to theoretical meaning, and therefore remains outside thought as generally valid judgment. The theoretical vericality of judgment does not explain how that judgment is the ought, of thinking; vice versa the ought cannot ground the theoretical vericality of judgment; the moment of theoretical vericality is necessary but not sufficient to become an ought-to-be: this is why Bakhtin refuses Rickert’s conception of the ought as the highest formal category, and citing Husserl affirms that the assumption of theoretically valid judgment as the ought cannot be derived from it, but rather can only be brought in from the outside. With respect to the ought, to the concrete act of its assumption, theoretical vericality, says Bakhtin, only has technical value. This is true of all that is aesthetically, scientifically, morally significant: all such meanings have technical value, none include ought in their content. Instead, ought can be
traced in the unity of my unique answerable life as manifested in the uniqueness of answerable choice. The connection between objective, abstract, indifferent validity and the never-repeatable uniqueness of a standpoint, of a choice cannot be explained in terms of theoretical knowledge, of an abstract theoretical subject, gnoseological consciousness. Formal, technical validity is indifferent to the answerable act of the single individual. Bakhtin makes important considerations on the autonomy of what is technologically valid, governed by its own immanent laws, with a value of its own, with power and control over the life of the single individual once it has lost its connection to the live uniqueness of answerable activity. “All that which is technological,” says Bakhtin, “when divorced from the once-occurrent unity of life and surrendered to the will of the law immanent to its development, is frightening; it may from time to time irrupt into this once-occurrent unity as an irresponsibly destructive and terrifying force” (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 7).

Bakhtin evidences the alien character of the singularity of life as “answerable, risk-fraught, and open becoming” (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 9) in a world of theoretical constructions, where abstract being is relieved of historical existence, determined as unique and never-repeatable: absolute estrangement from the world as the object of knowledge in which everything finds justification, except the singularity of a place in the world and relative answering action. Insofar as theoretical being is on principle accomplished, finished, given, it is indifferent to “that which is absolutely arbitrary (answerably arbitrary)” (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 9), absolutely new and creative, the uniqueness life understood as continuous answerable activity; theoretical being “is indifferent to the central fact—central for me—of my unique and actual communion with Being” (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 9) and of my “moral answerability,” mine absolutely. And although the “unity-uniqueness” of my life-act is alien to indifferent theoretical consciousness, unity-uniqueness is the foundation of theoretical consciousness “insofar as the act of cognition as my deed is included, along with all its content, in the unity of its answerability, in which and by virtue of which I actually live—perform deeds” (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 12). Therefore, Bakhtin writes:

Once-occurent uniqueness or singularity cannot be thought of, it can only be participatively experienced or lived through. All of theoretical reason in its entirety is only a moment of practical reason, i.e., the reason of the unique subiectum’s moral orientation within the event of once-occurent Being. (p. 13)

Attempts at recovering the unity-uniqueness of action-life are useless, whether through the reductionism of theoreticism, nothing less than “the inclusion of the large theoretical world within a small, also theoretical, world,” (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 13), which reconducts unity-uniqueness to the biological, psychological, sociological, economical categories of a given cognitive field, etc.; or through philosophies of life, the tendency to aestheticize life as exemplified most importantly by Bergson. The Bergsonian notion of
“intuition” indicates empathy, participative cognition which in art is directed toward the individual. Through intuition one enters the interiority of an object and identifies with the unique in it. Bakhtin’s critique of intuition anticipates his critique of the concept of “empathy,” which plays a central role in his conception of the otherness relationship from “Author and Hero” through to his writings of the 1970s. The concept of identification is fundamentally theoretical. In spite of its aestheticism it leads to the delusive belief of being able to overcome the extraneousness, “transredient character” (expression used by Bakhtin in subsequent writings of the early 1920s, important for the concept of extralocality), uniqueness, otherness of a situation that leads to the act of identification. The concept of identification understood as identifying with the other, says Bakhtin, implies losing uniqueness of the unique place I occupy in the world. Therefore it presupposes asserting the inessential character of my uniqueness and of the uniqueness of my place. Bakhtin makes a point of distinguishing between pure identification as a theoretical-aesthetic notion and “answerable act/deed of self-abstracting or self-renunciation” (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 16). Pure empathizing is delusive, it is not possible; if it were, it would mean to “impoverish” communication, since “instead of two participants there would be one” (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 16). And given that unique being and therefore not-being is discontinuous, it would also imply annulling consciousness, rather than a cognitive modality. Instead, the uniqueness of one’s being in the world is achieved in self-sacrifice. The world in which the act of self sacrifice is chosen responsibly, from one’s own unique place, is not the indifferent world of theoretical consciousness or aesthetic intuition. Therefore aesthetic identification does not throw light on the uniqueness of being in the world as manifested when we take a stand, in answerable action. Rather, says Bakhtin, “the entire aesthetic world as a whole is but a moment of Being-as-event through an answerable consciousness—through an answerable deed by a participant (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 18).

If neither theoretical cognition nor the aesthetic understand the unique event-ness of answerable action in the context of the uniqueness of being in the world, this is because they both abstract from the place occupied by the observer, from uniqueness as interpreter, from otherness never-repeatability, from otherness of the observed. Contemporary human sciences have always drawn nearer to the ideal of scientificness. However, this had lead to a philosophy of domains of culture and their specific unity, incapable of accounting for unitary and unique Being-as-event in life-action. On this basis Bakhtin explains the attraction exerted by historical materialism in philosophy, through a contrast mechanism, in spite of shortcomings. Historical materialism takes its distances from an abstract theoretical world to build a world made of determinate, concretely historical, active and answerable deeds, and of philosophical conceptions that (evoking the Middle Ages or Oriental philosophies) place the question of wisdom at the center of their interests. As much as these philosophical orientations are different, even opposite to each other Bakhtin evidences a common
methodological limit in the fact that they both fail to discriminate between “what is given and what is set as a task, what is and what ought to be” (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 20).

That theoretical reason and aesthetic reason are both part of practical reason should not lead us to believe that Bakhtin was a follower of Kantianism, as Bakhtin himself declares. Moral philosophy or “first philosophy,” as he also called it, describes Being-as-event as answerable action. Therefore the question of answerable action can neither resort to Kant nor to the Neo-Kantian revival as much as they consider the moral problem to be important. Bakhtin accuses the formal ethics of Kant and the Kantians of theoreticism, that is, of “abstracting from my unique self:” there is no approach to a living act performed in the real world (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 27).

Bakhtin maintains that the philosophy of the answerable act can only be the phenomenology, participative description, of this world of action considered from the inside from the perspective of its answerability, and not contemplated or theoretically analyzed from the outside. Though connected with Husserl’s phenomenology, Bakhtin’s approach is substantially different given that communication with the other is centered on “moral answerability” as against the noesis-noema, subject-object relationship. From this point of view, Bakhtin’s attitude toward Husserl’s phenomenology is similar to Emmanuel Lévinas’s (Ponzio, 1992, 1994, 1996). The indifference of theoreticism is superseded by the unindifference of unique, never-repeatable and unreplaceable participation in the world, by “my non-alibi in being.” The condition of unindifference does not ensue from a theoretical admission, but is the condition of interest, desire, cognition, action. In the condition of unindifference uniqueness is already given and is at once active, the I is passive and at once active, determined and answerable. Dogmatism and generic hypotheticism, absolute determinism and abstract freedom, void possibility, objectivism and all forms of subjectivism and psychologism, void rationalism (where logical clarity and abstract consequentiality are separated from answerable consciousness and act understood as obscure and uncontrolled forces) and irrationalism complementary to it, are all superseded by the condition of unindifference. “Rationality,” says Bakhtin quoting Nietzsche, “is but a moment of answerability, a light that is ‘like the glimmer of a lamp before the sun’” (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 29). Language itself lives in relation to participative thought and action. The word which is not an abstract word from the dictionary, nor a subjective word, is a live and “answerably-significant” word. This is the character of any form of significant and signifying communication. Bakhtin’s considerations on language and communication in this early paper are developed in his subsequent books, and in the volumes and articles signed by Voloshinov dated 1927, 1929 and 1926-30. The word manifests itself fully in relation to the uniqueness of action, says Bakhtin, not only as content-sense, but also as expression-image, and from an emotional-volitional perspective as intonation.

Unindifference deriving from the connection with answerable action, orients words and makes understanding possible—or of objects, of lived experience. To speak about an object means to relate to it unindifferently, therefore the uttered word is necessarily intonated.
However, all experience is intonated, even the most abstract thought intonated as it is concretely thought is intonated, that is, has volitional-emotional intonation. In communication and understanding an essential tie is established between content and its emotional tone, which constitutes actual value. If this were not the case, it would not be possible to utter a given word, to think a given thought, to experience a given object.

In Bakhtin’s view, thanks to the unindifference of answerable action it is possible to establish a connection between culture and life, cultural consciousness and living consciousness. When such connection is not established, cultural, cognitive, scientific, aesthetic, political values rise to the status of values-in-themselves and lose all possibility of verification, functionality, transformation. Bakhtin observes that this is part of a Hobbesian conception with clear political implications: to absolute cultural values there corresponds the conception according to which the people choose one time only, renouncing their freedom, surrendering themselves to the State after which they become slaves to their own free choice (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 35).

In his subsequent research Bakhtin amply demonstrated how all this contradicts constitutive popular resistance to “State truth,” the irreducibility of “non official ideology” to “official ideology.” Popular culture with its capacity for innovation and regeneration in relation to dominant culture is the object of study by Bakhtin in his monograph on Rabelais. Insofar as it belongs to “class ideology,” State truth, says Bakhtin in one of his subsequent annotations From Notes Made in 1970-71, encounters the unsurmountable barrier of irony and degrading allegory, the carnivalesque spark of allegorical-ironical imprecation which destroys all gravity and seriousness and never dies in the heart of the people. In a passage from Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Bakhtin returns to the problem of the abdication of answerability, as political answerability. He refers to political representation which in the attempt at relieving itself of political answerability often loses—both in whoever attributes it and in whoever assumes it—the sense of unique, non-alibi participation, and consequently becomes void, specialized and formal answerability, with all the danger that this loss of sense involves (Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 52).

In Toward a Philosophy of the Act Bakhtin refuses the concept of truth inherited from rationalism and described as general, universal, repetitive, constant, separate and set against the individual and the subjective. On the contrary, says Bakhtin, the unity of real consciousness, answerable consciousness must not be conceived in terms of continuity, at the level of content, principles, rights, the law, and even less so of being. Bakhtin critiques all forms of dogmatic absolutism, including the ontological. No being or value is identical or autonomous, a constant principle, separate from the live action of its identification as that being or value.

The critique of ontology (which can be extended to Heidegger) is an important aspect in the Bakhtinian refounding of “first philosophy” as “moral philosophy.” From this perspective the following passage from Toward a Philosophy of the Act is most significant:
Participation in the being-event of the world in its entirety does not coincide, from our point of view, with irresponsible self-surrender to Being, with being-possessed by Being. What happens in the latter case is that the passive moment in my participation is moved to the fore, while my to-be-accomplished self-activity is reduced. The aspiration of Nietzsche’s philosophy is reduced to a considerable extent to this possessedness by Being (one-sided participation); its ultimate result is the absurdity of contemporary Dionysianism. (1922a, p. 49)

“Non-alibi in being” implies uniqueness and irreplaceability, it transforms empty possibility into answerable real action, it confers actual validity and sense to all meanings and values which would otherwise be abstract. Non-alibi in being gives a face to the event which is otherwise anonymous. Thanks to non-alibi in being there is no such thing as objective or subjective reason. Rather, each one of us has a right to a place, not only in subjective terms, but answerably, keeping account of the other, and without the possibility of interpretation as a “contradiction,” if not for a third, disembodied, non-participating consciousness and from the perspective of abstract, non-dialogic dialectics, which Bakhtin explicitly critiqued in From Notes Made in 1970-71. Non-alibi in being relates to the other, not indifferently to the generic other, but as concrete involvement, in a relation of unindifference with the life of one’s neighbor, one’s contemporary, with the past and future of real persons. An abstract truth referred to mankind in general, such as “man is mortal,” can acquire sense and value, says Bakhtin, from my unique place, as the death of my neighbor, my own death, as the death of an entire community, or as the possibility of elimination of the whole of real historical humanity.

And, of course, the emotional-volitional, valuative sense of my death, of the death of an other who is dear to me, and the fact of any actual person’s death are all profoundly different in each case, for all these are different moments in once-occurent Being-as-event. For a disembodied, detached (non-participating) subiectum, all deaths may be equal. No one, however, lives in a world in which all human beings are—with respect to value—equally mortal. (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 48)

Bakhtin insists that involvement with the other is inevitable (the concrete other and not an abstract other, conceived as abstract gnoseological consciousness), the consequence of being answerably participative in the world from the uniqueness of one’s place. To be answerably participative is also apprehension for the other, who compels me in terms of answerability. Answerability of the deed is above all answerability for the other. My uniqueness, not being replaceable, is the impossibility to abdicate such answerability, to the point of abnegation, of self-sacrifice. Therefore, “answerable centrality” becomes “sacrificed centrality.”

One can attempt to escape from this kind of non-alibi answerability, but they very attempt at unburdening oneself testifies to its weight and inevitable presence. All roles and
their special answerability do not abolish but simply specialize personal answerability, says Bakhtin, that is moral answerability without limits or guarantees, without alibis. Detached from absolute answerability, special answerability loses sense, becomes technical answerability, is mere representation of a role, action, technical performance, “technical activity.” As such it is de-realized and becomes illusion.

The crisis of contemporaneity is the crisis of contemporary action, says Bakhtin; this crisis consists in the separation of action, with its concrete motivation, from its product, which consequently is emptied of sense. This interpretation is similar to Husserl and his phenomenology, especially as developed in Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (published posthumously in 1954). But differently from Husserl where theoreticism persists, Bakhtin does not theorize sense as conferred by the intentional consciousness, by the transcendental subject, but by answerable action as expressed by the unquest of non-alibi in being in the world. For Bakhtin philosophy of life can only be moral philosophy. Bakhtin emphasizes that to separate the product from the answerable act, technological-scientific apparatus from concrete motivation, culture from life, does not only imply to weaken the product, to lose sense in the cultural world become autonomous dominion, knowledge emptied of sense, but also to degrade the act itself which isolated from the meanings of culture, emptied of its ideal aspects, descends to low levels of biological and economic motivation: outside objective culture, the act appears as mere biological subjectivity, an act-need. On considering this aspect, Bakhtin refers explicitly to Spengler, underlining his inability to reconduct theory and thought to action, as necessary aspects incorporated by action: on the contrary, the deed is opposed to theory and thought. Value theorized by Bakhtin is the value of unitary and unique answerable action distinct from technical action with its special answerability (Bakhtin, 1922a, p. 56).

Moral philosophy must describe the “concrete architectonics” of the actual world of the performed act in terms of a unitary and once-occurent act or deed, the basic emotional-volitional aspects of the this construction and mutual arrangement. All values, meanings and spatial-temporal relationships are constituted and arranged in the light of this architectonics, all aspects of which are characterized by Bakhtin in terms of otherness. These include: “I-for-myself, the other-for-me, and I-for-the-other.” (Bakhtin, 1922a, p. 54)

All the values of actual life and culture are arranged around the basic architectonic points of the actual world of the performed act or deed: scientific values; aesthetic values; political values (including both ethical and social values); and, finally, religious values. (Bakhtin, 1922a, p. 54)

In the section titled I following the introduction to Toward a Philosophy of the Act, and starting from the unique place each one of us occupies irreplaceably, Bakhtin develops an architectonics of the uniqueness and volitional-emotional unity of the world. This is described as a non systematic but concrete architectonic unity in axiological and spatial-temporal terms: unity is achieved around a unique participative and unindifferent center, the center of value represented by each one of us in our non-alibi answerability. This kind of
architectonics is incomprehensible if actualized by the same subject around whom it revolves, if it belongs to the same self, therefore to discourse of the “confession” genre, for example, or any other genre of direct discourse. Direct discourse is incapable of developing a global vision. Live communication and understanding are not possible if cognitive discourse is neither emotionally nor evaluatively participative. Cognitive discourse understood as objective and indifferent discourse is incapable of understanding what it describes and consequently impoverishes it as it loses sight of that which renders it living and unfinalizable. Empathy is also an impoverishment given that it reduces communication between two mutually external and non interchangeable positions to a single vision.

According to Bakhtin the architectonics of interpretation-understanding presupposes the other, in a relation with self of difference, unindifference, a relation that is reciprocally participative. Consequently, self and other emerge as two value-centers, two value-centers of life around which revolves the architectonics of answerable action. These two centers of value must remain reciprocally other, communication is between two others from a spatial-temporal and axiological viewpoint, the I must not dominate. As an example of this vision Bakhtin in Toward a Philosophy of the Act analyzes the architectonics of art, specifically verbal art, literature. The language of literature is organized around a center of value that is represented by the single human being in its uniqueness, irreplaceability, precariousness and mortality. In such a situation expressions like earlier, later, yet, when, never, late, already, necessarily, ought, beyond, farther, nearer, etc., lose their abstract meaning and are charged with concrete sense in emotional, volitional, axiological terms each time they are used as part of this participative center. Bakhtin develops and specifies such statements in “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”:

My own axiological relationship to myself is completely unproductive aesthetically. The organizing power in all...for myself, I am aesthetically unreal. aesthetic forms is the axiological category of the other, the relationship to the other, enriched by an axiological “excess” of seeing for the purpose of achieving a transgradient consummation. (Bakhtin, 1979, 188-189)

Bakhtin traced the architectonics he intended to analyze with his moral philosophy or first philosophy in literature: the relationship to the other forming the center of value in literary discourse is transgradient, extralocalized, unique. This is to say that in the sphere of literary discourse communication between author and hero is oriented by otherness logic and is transgradient, extralocalized, unique.

Every part of an artwork may be considered as a reaction of the author to a reaction of the hero toward an object, an event: reaction to a reaction. The relationship of the author, of art to life, is indirect, mediated by the hero. In life too we encounter situations formed of reactions to reactions: but in real life both the human reacted to and the reaction are assumed in their objectivity, and the reaction to the reaction is also objective, it expresses a standpoint
and relates to a given context, a given aim. On the contrary, in the artistic sphere the hero’s reaction is represented, it is not objective, but objectified, distanced from the author-man, his own reaction. Bakhtin distinguishes between “objective” and “objectified” and between “author man” and “author creator” (which related to the former), both of which play an important role in his overall thought system. In fact these distinctions are present throughout the whole course of his production, from his early writings of the 1920s to his later writings of the 1970s. The reaction to life, to the hero, is neither provisional nor functional to a practical or cognitive end insofar as it is an objectified reaction. In the artwork a unitary reaction to the totality of the hero’s world is essential. This reaction is distinct from cognitive and practical reactions, but it is not indifferent to the latter; it gathers all the single cognitive and emotional-volitional reactions and unites them in an architectonic whole. For the author’s unitary action to assume artistic value, it must evidence the resistance of reality, of life, which is expressed by the hero: resistance of the objective with respect to its rendering, to its objectification; the author’s unitary action must evidence the hero’s otherness and his extra-artistic values; therefore, it must set out from a position of extralocality—in space, time and sense—as regards the hero, specially if autobiographical. If this is not achieved, as in the case of autobiography, the author’s unitary action assumes confessional tones devoid of artistic value. In all this we clearly find traces of Bakhtin’s critique of Russian Formalism systematically developed in The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship, signed by Medvedev, published in 1928.

In the chapter titled I of Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Bakhtin analyzes a poem by Pushkin, Razluka (Parting) in his effort to clarify the architectonics of the aesthetic vision. Subsequently, he focused on communication between “author and hero in aesthetic activity” producing a long paper with the same title. The first chapter, as mentioned, begins with an analysis of the same poem, developing considerations which had already been made in the final part of the fragment now at our disposal. This is particularly interesting to the end of understanding the orientation of Bakhtin’s research. (Ponzio & Jachia, 1993). Here we simply wish to evidence that Bakhtin identified the architectonics he intended to analyze in the viewpoint of literature. In fact, what was originally intended as an example ended up holding his attention for the rest of his life to the extent that the viewpoint of literature became his main focus.

Bakhtin made his first approach to the aesthetic vision through the lyrical genre. In this genre he identified dialogic communication among different points of view—in the case of Pushkin’s poetry, dialogic communication between the author’s context and that of the two protagonists, between the author-hero and the heroine. This undermines the belief that Bakhtin did not sufficiently consider the lyric genre, which was obviously not true. Another misunderstanding concerns his conception of dialogicality: for Bakhtin dialogicality is a question of degree. Contrary to those critics who maintain that Bakhtin made a net distinction between absolutely monological genres, e.g. lyric poetry, on one hand, and dialogical genres, on the other, specially the “polyphonic” novel (as identified in
Dostoevsky), he believed that dialogicality is always present in the artistic word characterizing different genres to different degrees.

Bakhtin believed that “first philosophy” or “moral philosophy” (whose foundations he critiqued) is centered on the uniqueness and unreducible otherness of being. As such first philosophy or moral philosophy calls for the indirect and objectified view of the “I,” the subject, and not a direct, objective view. All this affords us an insight into Bakhtin’s understanding of “metalinguistics” (as used in Dostoevsky). The living dynamic reality of language cannot be conveyed by the direct word, nor by linguistics when it abstracts from the internal dialogicality of the concretely oriented and specifically intonated word. In Toward a Philosophy of the Act Bakhtin states the premises that were to guide the whole course of his research. In his essay The Problem of Speech Genres (1952-53), Bakhtin divides discourse genres into primary or simple genres, the genres of everyday dialogue, and secondary or complex genres, literary genres which objectify communication, that is, everyday, ordinary, objective dialogical exchange. Dialogue in primary genres is objectified, pictured by secondary genres, losing its immediate connection with the real context and with the goals of everyday life, and therefore its instrumentality and functionality. The word leaves the monological context in which it is determined in relation to its object and the other words forming its context, and enters the context of the word that pictures it. This is the complex context of verbal interaction with the author who objectifies and pictures the direct word in the form of indirect, direct and free indirect discourse and their variants (Voloshinov, 1929, part 3). Bakhtin maintains that the complexity of dialogue can be studied through the pictured word and its internal dialogization in the secondary discourse genres of literature (especially the novel). Secondary genres evidence aspects of dialogue that do not emerge in primary, simple, direct, objective discourse genres. Such a study is particularly interesting, as Bakhtin (1986) maintains, when the object of analysis is the utterance considered as the cell of dialogic exchange, and not the sentence or proposition, that is, the cell of the system of language. (Voloshinov, 1973, 1987, 2003, pp. 165-200).

A one-sided orientation toward primary genres inevitably leads to a vulgarization of the entire problem (behaviorist linguistics is an extreme example). The very interrelations between primary and secondary genres and the process of the historical formation of the latter shed light on the nature of the utterance (and above all on the complex problem of the interrelations among language, ideology, and worldview). (Bakhtin 1986, p. 62)

Bakhtin’s text on the philosophy of the answerable act sheds light on the itinerary that led him to his 1929 monograph on Dostoevsky. Dostoevsky’s “philosophy” must not be identified with the conceptions and standpoints of the heroes in his novels or with specific contents. On the contrary, Bakhtin finds traces of the architectonics theorized in his paper on moral philosophy in the overall structure of Dostoevsky’s works, which in fact he describes as organized according to the principle of dialogicality. This emerges, for example, when he says, “to affirm someone else’s ‘I’ not as an object but as another subject—this is the principle governing Dostoevsky’s worldview” (Bakhtin 1963, p. 11): this statement
becomes clearer in the light of a paper on Dostoevsky by Vyacheslav Ivanov (1973). In Dostoevsky’s “polyphonic novel” the character is no longer described by an “I” and assumed as an object. On the contrary, the character itself is a center of otherness and organizes its world from this perspective:

Dostoevsky carried out, as it were, a small-scale Copernican revolution when he took what had been a firm and finalizing authorial definition and turned it into an...aspect of the hero’s self-definition. Not without reason does Dostoevsky force Makar Devushkin to read Gogol’s “Overcoat” and to take it as a story ... about himself.

Devushkin had glimpsed himself in the image of the hero of “The Overcoat,” which is to say, as something totally quantified, measured, and defined to the last detail: all of you is here, there is nothing more in you, and nothing more to be said about you. He felt himself to be hopelessly predetermined and finished off, as if he were already quite...dead, yet at the same time he sensed the falseness of such an approach.

The serious and deeper meaning of this revolt might be expressed this way: a living human being cannot be turned into the voiceless object of some secondhand, finalizing cognitive process. **In a human being there is always something that only he himself can reveal in a free act of self-consciousness and discourse; something that does not submit to an externalizing secondhand definition ...**

... The genuine life of the personality is made available only through a dialogic penetration of that personality, during which it freely and reciprocally reveals itself. (Bakhtin 1963, p. 49-59)

We have described the general orientation of Bakhtin’s research from his very first writings to his 1929 monograph on Dostoevsky, and new edition of 1963: he delineates the principles of his prolegomena to a philosophy of responsible action for the refounding of philosophy and discovers the possibility of their full expression in literary writing. This is determined by the fact that literary writing transcends the dimension of identity and the limits of communication founded on the difference-indifference relationship. The degree to which the identity dimension is transcended depends on the literary genre or subgenre in question. Bakhtin develops an architectonics of otherness from a perspective that is participative and unindifferent. This orientation also characterizes the research of members of the Bakhtin Circle (as evidenced by the collection of writings published in *Bachtin e le sue maschere* (Bakhtin, et.al., 1995). On the basis of his early interest in the philosophy of responsible action, Bakhtin focuses on the philosophy of literature, where *of literature* is a subjective genetive: the philosophical worldview that is offered by literature, verbal art, and not the worldview to which literature must be subjected.
NOTES

1. Translated into English as Toward a Philosophy of the Act in 1993 this work was first presented with other writings by Bakhtin and his Circle, and subsequently completely revised and published as an independent volume in 1998.

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Ivanov, Vyacheslav V. (1973). Znachenie idej M. M. Bachtina o znake, vyskazyvanii i dialogue dlja sovremennoj semiotiki. Trudy po znakovym sistemam, VI.


This essay evaluates the early phenomenological work of Mikhail Bakhtin and makes the case that the rhetorical dimension of that work cannot be understood outside the context of ethics, and argues that the connection between rhetoric and ethics poses certain problems for scholars who have taken up his language philosophy as rhetorical in more or less orthodox terms. Because his ethics and rhetoric are founded on the idea of non-coincidence, the outcomes of Bakhtin’s rhetoric and ethics are rather less felicitous than most scholars have so far understood. It is also the case that this ethico-rhetorical language theory is particularly apt for a world after Auschwitz, because it is suggestive of a testimonial rhetoric. After surveying some of the ways Bakhtin’s work has been taken up as rhetoric and the problems attendant to the ways it has been taken up, we suggest how his work can and should be seen as rhetorical and ethical at the present conjuncture and explore the rhetorical and ethical dimensions of Bakhtin’s work in the context of his ethics. We conclude by suggesting how Bakhtin’s ethico-rhetorical theory and its testimonial dimension may be particularly well suited to a post-1945 world.

Keywords: answerability, engagement, ethics, excess, rhetoric, testimony

Since the Second World War, and especially in the last thirty years, literary studies have returned to questions of ethics. Given that this turn—or return—to ethics coincided with the aftermath of a war that was characterized by Theodor Adorno as the logical culmination of Enlightenment reason, it is not surprising that the ‘ethical turn’ doesn’t so much turn back to the imperatives of Kant or Hegel, but looks to articulate an ethics that doesn’t rely on ‘architectonics,’ systems of reason and sensibility whose rhythms are regular and whose reach is infinite. Chaim Perelman and Lucy Olbrecht-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric and The Realm of Rhetoric are manifestations of this ethical turn: those books attempt to rearticulate

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a rhetorical world in which all human activity is discursive through and through, but in which logic and systematicity are bracketed in favor of a radical contingency. That Perelman, a Belgian Jew who saw the invasion of his country and the destruction wrought by the Final Solution, was skeptical of reason should come as no surprise; this skepticism was inherited, also, by Adorno, along with thinkers like Emmanuel Levinas, Roland Barthes and, later, Jacques Derrida, most of whose antisytemic thinking was crystallized in the War’s wake by a sense that they had seen the ultimate perversion of the language of logic, put to the service of what Cynthia Ozick called the ‘aesthetic solution’ of the Final Solution: that which did not fit neatly within the ordering logic of the nation, the polis in rhetorical terms, was simply eliminated.

In its more recent formulations, ethics has eschewed the categorical imperative in favor of an investigation of individual human encounters, an ethics of situation, in which language is seen as the medium of the encounter as such. Ethics, in other words, has moved from the normative to the descriptive, and ethical investigations have focused attention on the epistemology of the moment of human engagement itself, with all of its contingencies, possibilities, and the myriad ways that intended consequences are diverted by the smallest details of the quotidian realm. It is in this context that the work of Mikhail Bakhtin—no stranger to the chaos and destruction of Europe in the middle of the last century—has been seen as particularly generative, because his language theory, if we can see it as rhetorical, suggests that we look at language’s intervention in individual acts of human engagement rather than as a ‘system’ that can or should be deployed in any and all circumstances, and it shows how those interventions can be seen to produce change at the level of the everyday (if not in larger historical terms).

This essay will evaluate the work of Mikhail Bakhtin—particularly the earlier phenomenological work in which his ethical theory is most clearly articulated—as rhetorical, and will make the case that the rhetorical dimension of that work cannot be understood outside the context of ethics. In fact, it is this connection—between rhetoric and ethics—that poses certain problems for scholars who have taken up his language philosophy as rhetorical in more or less orthodox terms. Because his ethics and rhetoric are founded on the idea of non-coincidence—and upon the notion that speech situations are unforeclosed and radically individual—the outcomes of Bakhtin’s rhetoric and ethics are rather less felicitous than most scholars have so far understood. But it is also the case that this ethico-rhetorical language theory is particularly apt for a world after Auschwitz, because it is suggestive of a testimonial rhetoric. Our larger argument is that any rhetorical theory, and any notion of writing, which we might formulate at the beginning of the 21st century will have to account for non-coincidence, the excessive nature of human agency, and the risk that even the most aptly formulated account or argument may have consequences that we’d rather not consider.

After surveying some of the ways Bakhtin’s work has been taken up as rhetoric and the problems attendant to the ways it has been taken up, we will suggest how his work can and should be seen as rhetorical and ethical at the present conjuncture and explore the
rhetorical and ethical dimensions of Bakhtin’s work in the context of his ethics. We will conclude by suggesting how Bakhtin’s ethico-rhetorical theory—with its focus on what might be called its testimonial dimension—may be particularly well suited to a post-1945 world.

Bakhtin and Rhetoric

The last 20 years have seen a number of very lucid attempts to view Bakhtin’s work as falling potentially, if not squarely, within a rhetorical tradition, a tradition that begins with Plato and Aristotle and that has been rearticulated more recently in the work of Perelman and Olbretch-Tyteca, Kenneth Burke, and—in the United States—formulations of writing in the field of composition studies. As many of those who have attempted to do so have acknowledged, such a move may seem counterintuitive, given that Bakhtin’s writings are often seen as more or less hostile to rhetoric as such, because rhetoric was—at least in its classical formulations—static, systemic, and more akin to monologic (as opposed to dialogic) understandings of language. As Kay Halasek has pointed out, rhetoric can be seen as a kind of combative game “whose participants are intent only upon winning advantage” (1992, p. 99). Bakhtin puts it this way in notes collected in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays: “In rhetoric there is the unconditionally innocent and the unconditionally guilty; there is complete victory and destruction of the opponent. [And] the destruction of the opponent also destroys that very dialogic sphere where the word lives” (1986, p. 150). But Halasek, like Don Bialostosky—in his influential essay “Dialogics as an Art of Discourse in Literary Criticism”—contends that Bakhtin himself may have been blind to what Bialostosky calls “the rich history of contending voices that [both dialectic and rhetoric involved]” (1986, p. 788) because “every topic [with which rhetoric contends] can be taken as a place where specific person-ideas address one another” (1986, p. 789), person-ideas that don’t begin and end with the rhetorical utterance but which are always taken as a response to previously-uttered statements and which anticipate a later response.

Bialostosky’s essay is a bold call to recuperate the dialogic nature of the rhetorical act, and to see the dialogic principle as an overarching one in which we might fit rhetoric, dialectic, and—in a much later essay (see “Architeconics, Rhetoric, and Poetics”)—poetics into a more supple and complex discursive art. In effect, Bialostosky troubles the appropriation of dialogics in contemporary rhetorical theory while attempting to legitimate dialogics as a potential art of discourse in its own right. To do so, he focuses on Bakhtin’s characterization of the inseparability of thesis (or idea) and person, arguing that Bakhtinian dialogics can be seen as an alternative art of discourse falling outside of the rigid Aristotelian rhetoric/dialectic dichotomy, a dichotomy that presumes and depends upon an essential separability of thesis and person. Dialectic, on the one hand, is concerned primarily with ideas or theses abstracted and wholly disconnected from their advocates. Rhetoric, on the other hand, concerns itself with the influencing of people considered independently from
their ideas. Dialogics breaks free from the dichotomy again because it is founded on the inseparability of the thesis (or idea) from the person. These separate arts of discourse—rhetoric, dialectic, and dialogics—can be seen as holding different discursive aims: rhetoric, Bialostosky argues, seeks to influence decision, dialectic seeks truth, and dialogics seeks meaning. The implications of the proposed addition of dialogics to the arts of discourse are many, especially considering the organizing force that the traditional rhetoric/dialectic schema has had on Western thought.

An earlier alignment of Bakhtin’s language theory with rhetoric can be seen in Charles Schuster’s 1985 essay, “Mikhail Bakhtin as Rhetorical Theorist,” in which he describes Bakhtin’s work as a re-casting of the Aristotelian “communications triangle,” replacing the traditional speaker-listener-subject triangulation with what Schuster describes as a circular schema of speaker-listener-hero. Not only does Bakhtin redefine the terms of this basic rhetorical schema, but he also redefines the kinds of possible interactions among the terms. That subject becomes hero in the revised schema enables an acting back upon the speaker by the “subject” of utterance itself—the hero—a key rhetorical determinant in its own right. The relationships are thus redefined by the introduction of the notion of utterance as the most basic unit of discourse. The utterance, since it is by definition a relational term—taking its form in relation to the utterances of others—situates language use from the very start within a relational paradigm.

Schuster also spells out some of the further rhetorical implications of this shift, particularly in terms of a reconception of style. He argues that style, rather than serving an ornamental function as it does in classical conceptions of the rhetorical, is actually an effect of the appropriation of language by a speaker in constructing an utterance. It is part and parcel of the dialogic enterprise of using language at all, given that language is always already the language of another, complete with a thick ideological residue of its prior uses. In this, style can be seen as indissociable from the language that a given speaker employs since, in taking up a word, a speaker must personalize it in order to use it at all. Style emerges as a function of this fusion of speaker and language, a bond that renders the speaker as inextricably linked to her speech.

In “Starting the Dialogue,” Halasek critically approaches contemporary rhetorical theory’s fascination with Bakhtin from another angle, taking up the thorny problem of Bakhtin’s explicit rejection of rhetoric as a legitimate mode of discourse. She cites his alignment of rhetoric with the monologic and authoritarian as evidence of his mistrust of rhetoric, accounting for some of this suspicion by historicizing Bakhtin’s compositional moment amid the oppressive Soviet regime whose refusal to recognize a plurality of voices in Russian politics had destructive consequences that Bakhtin experienced personally. Ultimately, however, Halasek argues for a dialogic rhetoric that would account both for the polemic and monologic rhetoric that Bakhtin eschews and the parodic rhetoric that we see at play in Bakhtin’s treatment of novelistic discourse. She shows that while a certain strand of rhetorical practice can accurately be characterized as monologic and authoritarian, there
exists an alternate strand, unacknowledged by Bakhtin explicitly, but implicit in his work on
the novel. The dialogic rhetoric that Halasek sees as salvageable from Bakhtin’s language
theory maps neatly onto his description of the dialogic tension between centripetal and
centrifugal tendencies in language. Polemic rhetoric resides in tension with parodic rhetoric
as an organizing principle of all discourse. Halasek’s later work in “Feminism and Bakhtin,”
as well as in her book-length study, A Pedagogy of Possibility: Bakhtinian Perspectives on
Composition Studies, sees this parodic dimension of Bakhtin’s work as a particularly useful
trope for a feminist discourse that seeks to undermine the monologic tendencies in
contemporary rhetorical theories, theories that tend to see argument as ultimately reasonable
and which tend to underplay the playful and affective dimension of all language and
particularly of argumentative discourse.

These essays are, to a significant extent, emblematic of much of the work that has
sought to recuperate Bakhtinian language theory in the name of rhetoric. Like work by Jon
Klancher (“Bakhtin’s Rhetoric”), Bernard-Donals (“Mikhail Bakhtin, Classical Rhetoric, and
Praxis”), and Comprone (“Textual Perspectives on Collaborative Learning”) in rhetoric and
composition studies, they are attempts to square what the authors take to be the rhetorical
tradition, from the classical tradition onward, and Bakhtin’s theory of language by noting
points of connection between the latter and the former, most often by noting the dialogic
nature of even the most systematically rhetorical utterance, seeing argument and rationality
as necessarily open-ended, multi-voiced, and involving the lived lives of both the speaker
and listener and their positions inside a polyvalent world of discourse. These authors so often
note the dialogic inflections of Bakhtin’s ‘rhetoric’ in significant part because of the
publication history of Bakhtin’s work in the English-speaking world: the earlier ‘ethical’
texts were translated much later than the work on Rabelais (in the 1960s) and the novel (the
eyear and middle 1980s), and the interest in Bakhtin’s work began to fall off at about the time
the earlier essays were published (the early and middle 1990s). Even those essays that
attempt to square Bakhtin’s early phenomenological work with the rhetorical
tradition—including Helen Ewald’s “Waiting for Answerability” and a number of Don
Bialostosky’s essays, most notably “Bakhtin’s ‘Rough Draft’”, in which he warns against
reading the early essays as an ethical ‘key’ to Bakhtin’s work on discourse—have seen the
later work on language in light of the earlier work on ethics, seeing (with the notable
exception of Bialostosky) the later work as a natural extension of the earlier work. Such an
extension tends to see Bakhtin’s ethics of unfinishedness, with its focus on the “eventness
of the event”, as bolstering a fecundity of discourse—what Michael Sprinker called a
“boundlessness of context”—that adds to the complexity of the rhetorical situation that must
be accounted for in any analysis of a speaking situation (or in one’s participation in any such
situation).

But what often gets left out of these accounts are the consequences of the notions of
discursive unfinishedness and of excess that are part and parcel of Bakhtin’s ethical theory
and which pose significant problems for any attempt to square Bakhtin and rhetoric. Sprinker
notes—without citing the earlier ethical texts—that “when I say that I performed such and such a deed at such and such a time, it is no longer the same ‘I’ who speaks as the one who performed the deed” (1986, p. 124), and as a result, there are no guarantees that the outcome of any utterance will be as the speaker (or listener, for that matter) intended. All of this is perfectly consistent with Bakhtin’s ethics—as we’ll lay out in some detail below—but significantly complicates any claim that what we might call his ‘rhetoric’ works on the same or even on similar principles as even a contemporary rhetorical theory might suggest.

One scholar working at the intersection of Bakhtin’s ethical theory and contemporary rhetorical theory does point usefully to the way Bakhtin’s ethical theory vexes, rather than complements, our contemporary notions of rhetoric and writing. Frank Farmer, in his book *Saying and Silence*, notes—as his title suggests—that while Bakhtin’s understanding of language was meant ultimately to map the highly complex process by which speakers and writers respond to individual moments of lived life, and that “it is impossible to recognize a voice [or an utterance, or an argument] in isolation, that is, without the dialogizing background of those other voices against which it may be heard” (2003, p. 61), there will always be circumstances in which utterance may in fact be impossible, and where the rhetorical project—making a claim, if only the highly individual claim whereby a speaking subject names, or speaks, herself—fails. Farmer points to Bakhtin’s ‘disputed’ texts, along with some of those in which his political claims were muted out of concern for the Stalinist censors, and notes that while “a certain kind of disguised writing can be understood as a strategy for creative resistance to powerful audiences that not only inhibit, but inhibit in ways that could prove injurious or even fatal to the writer” (2003, p. 33), it is not always possible to find and adopt these strategies. Speaking one’s position—making a claim—is, in Bakhtin’s oeuvre, “struggled for,” as in the more classical rhetorical project, because we constantly “appropriate and are appropriated by other people’s words” (Farmer, 2003, p. 33).

Farmer’s larger project is to understand Bakhtin’s early texts as establishing an ethical ground so that speakers—and he has in mind primarily teachers of writing, but he could also be referring to any speaker who has as his or her aim the establishing of a position (what Judith Butler has called, in a Levinasian context, “giving an account of oneself”)—acknowledge the position of the other and, importantly, Bakhtin’s ‘superaddressee,’ as we speak in order to avoid silencing our interlocutor. And yet Farmer also recognizes that there are no guarantees for Bakhtin because the speaking situation involves the territory between speaker and interlocutor, a space that as often as not cannot be traversed, and—in the attempt—may involve trespass. And inasmuch as Farmer is confident that attending to Bakhtin’s early ethical texts may guard against a dialogic rhetoric that is unaware of this perilous possibility—the possibility that we may do damage in speaking to another, or in establishing a position over against our interlocutor—he is also willing to concede that such a precarious position is, in his words, part of that territory, and that no rhetoric established upon Bakhtin’s theoretical texts can avoid such precariousness.
Farmer’s concern about the inherent precariousness of the speaker’s position relative to the other and the superaddressee is consistent with questions many post-1945 ethical theorists have about how to deal with the question of ‘others,’ of the risks inherent in ethical systems, and a concern that theories of language provide moments of ‘openness’ to human action that may not be contained by logic or rationality. As we suggested earlier on, Theodor Adorno’s immediate concern, in the aftermath of the War, was whether art or poetry that was principally mimetic could be considered ethical, and whether something more akin to Sartre’s committed art—art that meant to work against contemporary ideologies and the violence that inevitably resulted from them—would guard against depictions of cruelty, “the naked physical pain of those who were beaten down with rifle butts,” from which “pleasure can be squeezed” (1992, p. 88). But bound up in Adorno’s question of aesthetics and mimesis—how is it possible to write poetry after Auschwitz that is not barbaric, or must the writing of poetry after the Final Solution be a kind of barbarism?—is an ethical and rhetorical question. How, Adorno wonders, is it possible to take a position—to maintain a commitment to an idea or to establish oneself as a subject over against another—that doesn’t predetermine the outcome and that holds the moment of possibility open? At the end of a brief chapter in the Negative Dialectics entitled “After Auschwitz,” Adorno writes that “if thought is not measured by the extremity that eludes the concept, it is from the outset in the nature of the musical accompaniment with which the SS liked to drown out the screams of its victims” (1973, p. 365). Adorno provides something of an answer in Commitment, when he argues that to maintain a commitment, a writer or artist—the speaking subject, in rhetorical terms—must arouse a kind of “anxiety,” which results from the possibility that “crystallizes into a likeness of an Other that ought to exist” (1992, p. 93), the possibility, always, of some moment beyond the present.

Geoffrey Galt Harpham, more recently, has maintained that ethics has two competing functions: the first is the elaboration of the myriad possibilities engendered by the subject’s position at any given time and in any particular location, “an analysis of the free choices made by certain grounds in the constitution of a given norm,” and “the demonstration that a particular ethical system,” or a particular choice of action from among the myriad possibilities for acting, should be followed (1995, p. 399). The problem with the ethical ought—the Kantian imperative to act—is that it “actively discourages an inquiry into [the] prior choice” (Harpham, 1995, p. 396), the range of possibilities that are determined by one or another ethical system and those that lie outside of those systems, and so an ethics that follows the second function actively works against the first. Harpham calls the second moment, the moment of choice, **morality** and notes that it is “morality that realizes ethics, making it ethical. At the same time, however, morality negates ethics,” in which “all but one of the available alternatives is excluded, chosen against, regardless of their claims (1995, p. 397). Harpham’s concern is that any moment of choice, in which a speaker or writer makes
a claim, forecloses the moment of openness to which ethics’ first function points, and that those choices inevitably lead to a foreclosure of the “other,” not only one’s interlocutor—who has been determined as an audience by that moment of choice—but those other others who will undoubtedly be affected, though in ways we cannot ultimately determine. Like Adorno, who witnessed a form of ethical foreclosure in Europe in the middle of the last century that led to the destruction of the Other whose presence was seen as a threat to the state, and who saw the role of ethics (in the form of commitment) as resisting that foreclosure, Harpham urges the speaking subject—the rhetor—to find forms of language that work against that foreclosure, language that is “exotic, speculative” and that ultimately “deform[s] theory” (1995, p. 402). Like Adorno’s extremity that eludes the concept, Harpham sees ethics as the locus “where thought itself experiences an obligation to form a relation with its other—not only other thoughts, but other-than-thoughts” (1995, p. 404). And the ground on which this experience takes place is the ground of discourse.

It is in this context that Bakhtin’s early texts—the ethical texts Toward a Philosophy of the Act and Author and Hero—can be seen as establishing an ethical ground for discourse, albeit one that as often as not confounds the rhetorical aim of establishing a position, of giving an account, and gives no guarantees of a successful outcome. As we alluded at the outset, one reason why the vexed nature of the ethical groundwork of a rhetorical enterprise founded in Bakhtin’s work was all but ignored in the English-speaking world for so long was due to the publication history of that work. While Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist took notice of the ‘phenomenological’ dimension of the earliest writings in their critical biography of Bakhtin in 1984, and while others (see especially Bernard-Donals, Mikhail Bakhtin; Morson and Emerson) made reference to that earlier work either in the original Russian or in translations into other languages, Art and Answerability (in which the fragment “Art and Answerability” and the longer “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”) was not translated into English until 1990, and Toward a Philosophy of the Act was translated three years later. Up until that time, the most salient features of Bakhtin’s theoretical palette were his notions of dialogism (found in the Dostoevsky book, published in 1984 and in The Dialogic Imagination, published in 1981), carnival (found in Rabelais and His World, published in 1965), and speech genres (most coherently formulated in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, published in 1984). And while the ethical underpinnings of these works were visible, if not fully laid out, in these later works, there was some dispute as to just how integral they were to Bakhtin’s essays and longer treatises on discourse, just as for a long time the “materialist” texts—Marxism and the Philosophy of Language and The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship—were disputed as part of the Bakhtin canon.

But it is in these early texts that we can see Bakhtin struggle to formulate a post-enlightenment ethics that resists what he called “theoretism,” the establishment of modes of thought as systems that ignore the individual moments of lived life, moments that he saw as “answerable, risk-fraught, and open” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 9). And it is an ethics that is
discursive, if not rhetorical, through and through, an ethics that was made ‘actionable’ through one’s discursive encounter with others.

One can begin to see this in Bakhtin’s argument with the enlightenment notion of the subject, articulated most clearly in the work of Kant and Hegel. While acknowledging the ‘revolution’ that began with Kant and was extended by Hegel, he argues nonetheless that “the discovery of an a priori element in our cognition did not open a way out from within cognition, i.e., from within its content/sense aspect, into the historically individual, actual cognitional act” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 6). While the notion of a subjectum provided a way for philosophy and ethics to come to terms with a universal ought—a ground on which individual actions should be taken—“the theoretical subjectum [nonetheless] had to be embodied each time in some real, actual thinking human being, in order to enter … into communion with the actual, historical event of Being just as a moment within it” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 6). The philosophical subjectum allowed individuals to think, in an objective—and hence detached—way of the individual’s relation to the law, and to others under the law and in the context of national and other collective bodies, it stood in the way of what Bakhtin called ‘participative thinking’ (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 8). Vadim Liapunov, in his English translation, notes that participative thinking can be related to P. F. Strawson’s distinction between ‘participant’ and ‘detached’ standpoints from which human behavior can be understood. Participative thinking refers to:

the standpoint of participation and involvement … that we naturally occupy as social beings committed to participant relationships and acting under a sense of freedom, and it constitutes an understanding of objects or events that involves sharing or sympathizing with. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 86)

Worth emphasizing here is Bakhtin’s insistence that because we are social beings, inextricably engaged in one another’s lives, we need both an ethical theory that focuses on these moments of encounter, and a theory of language that sees these encounters as constituted by the medium of the encounter itself.

Traditional notions of ethics were unable to do so, because they rest not only on a static and objective notion of the human subject, but also an understanding of Being that is likewise objective and static. Philosophy tends to understand individual moments of lived life as instances of a transcendental whole, a Being that functions on its own terms ‘behind our backs,’ as it were. Bakhtin provides the example of Newtonian physics: “the validity of [the truth of the laws of motion] is sufficient unto itself, absolute, and eternal, and an answerable act or deed of cognition takes into account this peculiarity of it; that is what constitutes its essence” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 10). Whether or not we experience the laws of motion has no effect upon the existence of those laws. But Bakhtin reverses the orientation of theoretical to practical experience: “the temporality of the actual historicity of Being”—the moment in which we experience motion, let alone any other element of our
quotidian existence—“is but a moment of abstractly cognized historicity … [T]he extra-temporal validity of the whole theoretical world of truth fits, in its entirety, within the actual historicity of Being-as-event … , as a moment that enriches Being-as-event” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 10). We may make reference to the theoretical, the laws of physics, motion, or morality, but any action an individual takes against the backdrop of those laws doesn’t accord with those laws so much as it responds directly to the situation that presents itself in spite of those laws. The act itself, in other words, is taken with reference to the law, but it is once-occurrence, unique, and potentially in contravention of the law but valid—occurrence—nonetheless. In fact, the positing of the law is itself an answerable act, once-occurrence, and thus “is only a moment of practical reason” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 13). To act in accordance to the law—of nature or of morality and ethics—is to abdicate our agency in the face of a precept which is itself the product of human agency, as if that law were handed down by god (or, worse, the state-as-law).

Ethics founded upon this notion—either “content ethics” or “formal ethics”—are two forms of error. Content ethics assumes that we obey the injunction of the ‘ought’ by acting in accordance with “special moral norms that have a definite content” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 22), and so to act is to refer to the disciplines of thought—“logic, aesthetics, biology, medicine, one of the social sciences” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 22)—that hold across specific instances. But “no theoretical proposition can ground a performed act immediately”—the obligation to act is immediate, palpable, and urgent—and so any reference to discipline (to law) diverts the obligation to act. Formal ethics, on the other hand, starts out well enough—“from the perfectly correct insight that the ought is a category of consciousness, a form that cannot be derived from some particular ‘material’ content” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 25)—but the obligation to act, the ought, is itself the content of ethics; it is, in Bakhtin’s terms, “theoretical consciousness,” and so succumbs to the same problem: the ethical act doesn’t respond “to a living act performed in the real world” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 27), and instead casts the deed “out into the theoretical world with an empty demand for legality” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 26).

In response to the failures of traditional (theoretical) ethics, Bakhtin proposes an ethics of answerability, one that begins with individual moments of human contact, moments that are unique, non-recurrent, and that involve active physical and discursive engagement with a definable and material other, without whom we would have no agency at all. Ethics begins from the premise of human engagement, in which a single human being engages with another, oriented in space and time differently from one another. In the simplest terms, each can see different things—neither can see behind one’s own back—and so each understands her or his situation differently, by dint of their discrete locations. It is within these moments of contact that the subject ‘authors’ her or his circumstances—stakes a claim in the moment—and acts answerably. Bakhtin’s understanding of ‘answerability’ refers to the subject’s obligation to act in response—in answer—to the claim of the other in whose presence she or he stands. The moment of encounter is unique, and because of its location in time and space, cannot be repeated as the same. It is “the moment of what is absolutely
new, what has never existed before and can never be repeated,” and what makes the moment of encounter the starting point of ethics is “the fact of an actual acknowledgment of one’s own participation in unitary Being-as-event, and this fact cannot be adequately expressed in theoretical terms, but can only be described as participatively experienced” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 40).

In *Author and Hero*, Bakhtin makes plain the discursive and material nature of the relation between the individual and the other in the ethical moment of encounter. The subject “occupies an intently maintained position outside [the other] … with respect to space, time, value, and meaning” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 14). The ethical relation is exotopic in the sense that it always involves an “excess of seeing,” in which what the subject sees in the moment of encounter is always different from what the other sees, always exceeds the ‘vision’ of the other, and—as a result—the capacity of the other to speak or name her circumstances. Ethics is defined precisely by this excess: “If I am consummated”—if the other is able to understand the moment of encounter as I understand it, merging the two consciousnesses—“I am no longer capable of living and acting” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 13). In order to live, a person must, in the moment of encounter, be radically open to the material consequences of that encounter, must see himself as “axiologically yet-to-be, someone who does not coincide with his already existing makeup” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 13). Bakhtin would go so far as to argue that such self-coincidence is impossible, and here one sees the discursive and rhetorical implications of the ethics of encounter: to say that the pronoun “I” corresponds to the speaker of the utterance as if the pronoun and the person were coincident ignores the materiality of time and space, in which the moment the utterance is concluded is different from the moment it is begun, and so has ceased to coincide with the uttered word. Bakhtin makes clear that novelists may consummate their heroes in aesthetic verbal art, but that moments of lived life, in which time and space move irrevocably forward, refuse consummation, and it is this very refusal that founds human agency and language. It is non-coincidence that forces the moment of utterance—even the simplest of rhetorical declarations, “I am I”—open, and thus forward. Like Harpham, the ethical moment stands between the open possibilities for action and acting itself. Bakhtin writes that

> the world of content/sense is infinite and self-sufficient . . . This is a domain of endless questions, where one of the possible questions is also the question of who is my fellow-being. One cannot begin in this world, for any beginning would be fortuitous—it will sink in this world of sense or meaning. This world has no center, it provides no principle for choice: *everything that is could also not be, could be different*. . . . It is only the acknowledgment of my own unique place in Being that provides an actual center from which my act or deed can issue. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 43, emphasis added)

Each individual’s encounter with the “‘face’ of the event” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 45) calls up a discursive response. Our apprehension of ourselves, as our apprehension of our surroundings and those others who occupy them, has been formed “by the manifold acts of
other people in relation to me, acts performed intermittently throughout my life ... The words of a loving human being ... determine his personality from the outside, the words that come to meet his indistinct inner sensation of himself, giving it a form and a name” (Bakhtin, 1990, pp. 49-50). As the language of others becomes interiorized, the subject re-utters that language as she encounters other situations. The subject evaluates those situations, matching the interiorized language to the material of the event as it makes itself apparent. Or, to put it into the materialist language of Valentin Voloshinov—whose work has often been connected to Bakhtin’s because of their contact in what has come to be known as the ‘Bakhtin circle’—“consciousness ... can arise and become a viable fact only in the material embodiment of signs.” If signs in turn “emerge ... only in the process of interaction between one ... consciousness and another ... [c]onsciousness becomes consciousness ... only in the process of social interaction” (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 11).

What all of this suggests is that because Bakhtin’s ethics is other-oriented from the start—that is to say, because it eschews the universal ought in favor of a focus on the radically individual encounter between individuals as the foundation for any ethical theory (if it can be called a ‘theory’ at all)—and because the encounter is understood as discursively constituted—because the ‘excess of seeing’ is made palpable in the encounter through an exchange of words, an exchange that is founded in its turn on language that has been previously interiorized—any ‘rhetorical’ understanding of Bakhtin’s work must be tied inextricably to his ethics. It also suggests that the rhetorical dimension of Bakhtin’s work involves the ability of any subject to stake a claim for herself—to name herself and, in turn, the nature of the situation or event in which she finds herself—in relation to others. Rather than tying rhetoric to ethics by making a claim about the nature of ‘the good,’ or by appealing to disciplinary or a priori categories, Bakhtin’s language theory can be considered rhetorical because of its insistent focus on the immediate situation, because of its unwillingness to precondition human action in those situations upon the naming of the situation or the others in whose midsts one finds oneself as an actor (and its focus instead on the consequences of human activity), and because of its desire to see the moment of individual contact—the moment of utterance—as (potentially) radically open and so (in terms Richard Rorty might use) keep the conversation going or (in terms Alain Badiou might prefer) to maintain the openness of the event “right to the limit of the possible” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 15).

RHETORIC VEXED

As we’ve suggested, this is a volatile notion of both ethics and rhetoric, one that provides no guarantees that the consequences of discourse in the ethical encounter will yield order, the establishment of a viable polis, or in fact any reasonable outcome at all. The consequences of openness and non-coincidence are, in fact, quite open. The excess of seeing—and hence, the excess of language produced in the individual ethical
encounter—produces a kind of vulnerability. In the same way that I can’t ever be or understand that other individual, I also can’t produce an utterance that reflects my position with regard to that other individual. In this way, I can’t substitute myself for another, and so the language I use can’t rest on the principle of substitution. Utterance, then, is always the indication of an incommensurability, as the distinction between the pronominal “I” and the subject of the pronoun indicates an incommensurability between the uttered word and the person who utters it. The best one can do when making a claim is to note the problematic relation between what we’ve said and that which compelled us to speak in the first place. So the moment of utterance—the rhetorical moment—is one in which all possible options for action are as yet unforeclosed, the moment just prior to choosing what for better or worse might be called the proper course for acting. The moment is radically open, in which no name has been supplied for either one’s self or the other, and in which the question of how one ought to act has not been definitively decided.

What such radical openness also makes clear, though, is that the individual—not to mention her interlocutor—is exceptionally open to doubt in such an encounter. In *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, Bakhtin wonders, on the heels of laying out the excessive nature of the relation of self to other:

> where, then, is the one unique and unitary ‘face’? ... [T]he emotional-volitional picture of the world presents itself to me in one way, whereas to someone else in another way. Or perhaps we have to recognize doubt as constituting a quite distinct sort of value? Yes, we do recognize doubt as a distinctive value. It is precisely doubt that forms the basis of our life as effective deed-performing. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 45)

The ethical moment isn’t reciprocal—there are no guarantees that the other individual will respond with the same openness or willingness to engage—and with that non-reciprocity comes doubt: the other could respond by foreclosing the encounter in any number of ways, by falling back into what he already knows, the familiarity of names and of precedents.

Moreover, it’s not only the other—the interlocutor—in whose presence we act. There is also the presence of a third party, what Bakhtin at various places calls the “superaddressee.” As Michael Eskin puts it:

> [t]he co-existential architectonic of ‘I’ and ‘other,’ furthermore, inevitably involves the ‘third’: not only the witness, for whom this architectonic manifests itself and who ‘cannot [possibly] occupy a neutral position with regard to I and the other,’ and thus necessarily participates and co-constitutes the co-existential architectonic, but also any potential third, who will have always already informed my relation to the singular other at a singular moment in a singular place. (2000, p. 79)

Eskin’s reference to the ‘third’—the superaddressee—functioning as a witness is important. The third, *as* a witness, always informs the encounter with the Other: the third
either informs the dialogue “by virtue of the fact that any word or utterance will have always been already permeated and traced from within by the co-existentially determined words, voices, intonations, valuations, and accents of at times infinitely distant past or anticipated others” (2000, p. 94); or by placing that radically individual moment into history, in which past, present, and future come into contact with one another and which makes any claim which we might make at that moment irrevocably binding not just on us but on others we cannot see at the time (those other others). So not only is the speaker answerable to the other whom he or she confronts, but—because the act is witnessed—the speaker is forced to compare her individual, unique act with other acts, other utterances, that might be carried out by someone he or she does not know.

It is, finally, the testimonial force of the utterance—the utterance’s establishment of a position, its riskiness and address in the face of doubt, its creation of a discursive excess that cannot be made equivalent with the object of discourse or with the speaker’s self and that casts the utterance, and the speaker, irrevocably into the future—that renders it, and Bakhtin’s ethical rhetoric, as a particularly apt understanding of language for the early 21st century. Any utterance that purports to convey a sense of what happened—that seeks to establish a position—both makes present that position and undoes it through its excessive force (by what Bakhtin called the “excess of vision,” what can’t be seen behind the backs of either the speaker or the interlocutor, but which is witnessed by the superaddressee or third). Even the simplest utterance, in which we speak ourselves (as in the pronomial “I is I”) reveals a non-identity, and brings to the surface an element of the event, of the discursive situation, that falls out of the equation and returns to haunt it. This incommensurability has a disconcerting effect on both the speaker and the listener: it introduces, in Adorno’s terms, an anxiety or, in Bakhtin’s, doubt, which is a constitutive element of the ethical and rhetorical situation. The excess of seeing that is integrally bound up in the rhetorical situation is imprinted upon the speaker, in that the speaker is insinuated into the fabric of lived life, into the moment of the utterance in its full materiality, and in which the speaker’s co-existence with the other and in the presence of the third, in Michael Eskin’s words, “never coincides with itself” (2000, p. 93). The speaker finds himself “within a triadic nexus, in which past, present and future consciousnesses encounter each other” (Eskin, 2000, p. 94).

It’s in this way, we think, that the rhetorical act of speaking oneself, of taking a position, is a thoroughgoing ethical act in which the speaking self bears witness: she testifies. To utter the word “I” is to open oneself up to the other, answering for oneself but also for the other, the interlocutor as well as the other Other, the third. The ethics of answerability compels the individual to see, to participate in the quotidian materiality of lived life, and part of that compulsion is the compulsion to speak: to be involved in the world is to become responsible for speaking for yourself and for that participation; and to speak is to make yourself present to others. Saying what you’ve seen—requires an offering and the assumption of a risk and of doubt: that staking a claim is forcing oneself into an excessive position, in which the word is never the last word, in which the utterance exceeds (and is
exceeded by) the moment or event which is spoken, in which the event or moment to which you testify—the rhetorical act of staking a claim—is in error. It is to write something beyond what the speaker wanted to say, to write or stake a claim that both speaks to what you saw and indicates something that has been lost and which can’t be represented at all. To take a position is to make the speaking self non-coincident with its own language—with its testimony—and with the position from which it speaks (the event, its ‘here’).

It’s the excessive nature of utterance and of rhetoric—and utterance’s paradigmatic testimonial nature—that works against the pernicious effects of language-as-naming that, in the middle part of the last century, had such devastating effects. The moment of speaking, of staking a claim, takes precedence, in Bakhtin’s model, over the name—the content of the utterance—and it is that moment of speaking, in which the past, present, and future encounter one another (and in which, in Harpham’s sense of ethics, the range of possible courses of action are radically open) that disrupts the utterance’s tendency to refer to some point of origin and instead insists upon its present-ness as an indication of the position of the speaker in the midst of others. Testimony presents the observer with a moment that may not be temporally or causally (that is, reasonably) connected with the “event” or circumstance that may form its core, but that nonetheless provides that ‘nexus’ in which what Walter Benjamin called “the time of the now” contains a fullness of possibilities, and in which past, present and future reside.

Any utterance designed to reflect the event, its content, as if it were a Truth, will inevitably fail; nonetheless, utterance is all we have to make visible moments of lived life. The taking up of a position—the ethico-rhetorical utterance—makes present the discontinuity of the self with the language of the self, and of seeing with the utterance of what is seen. Every moment is a potential opening to future action, and every human action is taken in the presence of (and impinges upon and affects) others. It’s this incommensurability—the non-coincidence of the word and the moment that compels its utterance—that founds ethics. And it’s just this incommensurability that provides for the possibility that the extremity that eludes the concept will prevent the establishment of a law, and a Final word.

**REFERENCES**


"DIALOGUE OF AGREEMENT" AS MIKHAIL BAKHTIN’S NEO-RHETORIC PROJECT

VALERII TIUPA
(Translation by Elena McDonnell)

This article deals with dialogism in Mikhail Bakhtin’s philosophy and, specifically, the notion of dialogue of agreement. The author explores various communicative strategies and focuses on non-authoritarian, extra-hierarchical types of result-producing communication, which result in convergence of consciousness. The dialogic relationship of agreement is seen as the ultimate goal of any dialogue. The nature of dialogism, monologism, and “polyphonic agreement” is explored.

Keywords: dialogue, agreement, convergence, communicative strategy, dialogism, new rhetoric, metalinguistics

During the last decades of the 20th century, not only in Russia but abroad as well, Bakhtin came to be “in vogue.” However, fashion, as well as its irritated opposition, interferes with the true appreciation of this thinker’s contribution to the mental processes of our time. Meanwhile, the modern situation being such that, as Chester Karrass put it, we are forced to choose between negotiating and risking to destroy the very basis of our life, Bakhtin’s “dialogism” can be seen in a new light as an intention of the humanitarian thinking that is of current importance. Saying this, I agree with Mikhail Epstein, who believes that, in their positive perspective, the humanities “no longer speculate in what was in the beginning, but are able to create the beginnings ... do not finalize history, but unfold the abilities of mind which have not been observed in history” (Epstein, 2006, pp. 21-22).

The process of negotiation is the result-producing communication, which is supposed to structurally change a certain situation, position, state of affairs, social behavior, social institute, social politics, etc. Unsuccessful negotiations are, nevertheless, still useful, as the lack of the expected changes is also a result. Many communicative situations, such as

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protocol conversation, small rituals of interpersonal contact or free exchange of opinions, are not result-producing.

In the Russian culture there is a deeply rooted, centuries-old tradition (virtually insensitive to changes in the socio-political structure of life) according to which, in spheres of result-producing communication, the communicative strategy of submission is used in the form of a request or an order. The communicant’s position herewith is not a subjective position of I, but an objective, extra-personal functional role position. The perception of result-producing communication as authoritarian and hierarchical can be traced back to the Russian family structure (formed by Russian history) where the majority of parents do not know how to reach an agreement with their children, but routinely use lecturing and ordering, and if those fail to be effective, begging or indulging.

However, modern Russian conditions produce communicative situations in which there are no hierarchical relationships of subordination between the participants of the negotiation process. In such situations requesting and demanding are not effective, but many Russian communicants do not know any other strategies for reaching their desired result.

The non-authoritarian and extra-hierarchical ways of the result-producing communication are the ways of compromise (the tolerant strategy) and of dialogue of agreement (the convergent strategy). In the case of reaching a compromise, both sides give up part of their original claim, for example, when a buyer and a seller determine a mutually acceptable price for a product or service. However, in more complex communicative situations, with a non-alternative, conceptually diverse dialogical discord, the way of compromise is unfeasible. Meanwhile, these are the most frequent situations of social interaction, about which Goethe said: “between two opposite opinions you’ll find not the truth, but the problem.” It is impossible to overcome the dialogical discord of two (or more) suggested solutions of the problem by finding a compromise. A new solution, which will become the point of convergence, the result of mutual compatibility and not the mutual exclusivity of the non-identical interests in the situation of collective cogitativeness, needs to be found. Such is the starting position of the communicative project of “dialogic agreement,” one of the most prominent authors of which was Mikhail Bakhtin.

Bakhtin’s work on Speech Genres (1952) coincided with the efforts to reanimate rhetoric in Anglo and Francophone cultural areas: I.A. Richards’s The Philosophy of Rhetoric was published in 1950, and Chaim Perelman’s Rhetoric and Philosophy in 1958. Thus, Bakhtin was a pioneer of one of the most significant schools of thought in the humanities of the 20th century. The same year 1952 Benjamin Worf published his works on “metalinguistics” (Whorf, 1952). Having filled Worf’s term with his own scientific intentions, Bakhtin used it to address the problems of “dialogic relationships,” “authoritative discourse,” “the other’s discourse,” “silence,” etc. in his work Проблема текста or On the Problem of Text published in 1959-60, and later in the second edition of his book on Dostoevsky’s novel.
The principal attempts to approach the problem of metalinguistics were made in the works of the “Bakhtin circle” back in 1920s, where it was stated that “discourse is the expression and the product of the social interaction of the three—the speaker or author, the listener or reader, and the person or the thing being talked about or hero” (Voloshinov, 1995, p. 72). This triad can obviously be traced back to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, which identified the speaker, the subject and the audience as constituents of any communicative event. As Renata Lakhmann justly notes, Bakhtin’s intellectual search “is tightly interconnected with rhetorical tradition, moreover, it is imbued with it” (Lakhmann, 1996). However, if the classical rhetoric was of normative nature, dealing with the craft (*techné*) of mastering discourse, the 20th-century neo-rhetoric, along with Bakhtin’s metalinguistics, focused on the study of communicative strategies of positioning of subjects, objects and addressees of the utterance.

Although the term “strategy” is not used by Bakhtin, the strategic character of communication is implied, particularly, in his idea that “when we speak, we are always presented with the whole of the utterance. ... We do not string words together, do not move from one word to the next, but, as it were, fill the whole with appropriate words” (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 190). This whole is a “typical form of utterance,” which corresponds to “typical situations of verbal communication” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 191). The topical field of the diversity of such strategies was outlined in Bakhtin’s works. In this regard, the legacy of this Russian thinker—along with Michel Foucault’s, Michele Pechoux’s, and Teun A. van Dijk’s—is one of the original versions of the new rhetoric.

As an influential scientific tendency of the modern times, neo-rhetoric proceeds from Nietzsche’s thesis about the impossibility of a non-rhetorical language: any language is rhetorical in its nature, and any human utterance might be of interest to rhetoric. The new rhetoric played the role of the second wave of the so-called “linguistic turn” of the Western philosophy, which had forgone the Cartesian “cogito ergo sum” and declared, in line with Wittgenstein, that the scope of the world of human existence is identical to the scope of language.

Bakhtin explained his view of language that was essentially the same, slightly differently—from the point of view of philosophical dialogism. A “social individual,” being a “speaking individual,” deals with language not as an abstract regulative norm, but as a variety of discursive practices which form the dynamic verbal culture of a given society: “The language is historically real as a heteroglossal formation, teeming with future and past languages, the dying prim aristocrats of languages, languages-parvenu, countless claimants to being a language, some luckier than others, with broader or more narrow social coverage, with one or another ideological sphere of usage” (Bakhtin, 1975, pp. 168-169).

As the new rhetoric develops, it defines “the rhetorical as speech practice” (Lakhmann, 2001, p. 6), and as “the grammar of the secondary language code” (Lakhmann, 2001, p. 13) more and more confidently claims the status of the basis for a wide spectrum of research in all areas of the humanities. “Compared to the modern disciplines which focus only on certain
aspects, it offers a more panoptic conception.” (Lakhmann, 2001, p. 20). Neo-rhetorical conceptuality is directed toward the “semantic relations, the participants of which could only be whole utterances (or those that are perceived as a whole, or potentially whole), behind which there are ... real or potential speech subjects” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 335).

In modern culture, where the agonal, eristic, and destructionistic tendencies are dominant, the notion of dialogue is interconnected with the ideas of argument, polemic, and debates. However, according to Bakhtin, it is “agreement” that constitutes “the most important dialogic category” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 364). Putting aside his dislike for hierarchical relations, here the thinker builds a quite obvious hierarchical system. “Zero dialogic relations” are represented in this system by the comic dialogue of two deaf people, where “there is a real dialogic contact, but no semantic contact between the utterances (or imaginary contact)” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 336). The lowest level on the way toward the top of the dialogic relations is represented by “disagreement,” which is “poor and unproductive,” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 364) and “argument, polemic, and parody” as “the most obvious, but vulgar forms of dialogism” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 332). The next level is “the trust in the other’s word, the reverent acceptance,” and “apprenticeship” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 332). Above these extremes of acceptance/non-acceptance of the other’s word is “the difference of opinions; it essentially gravitates toward agreement, in which the difference and the non-fused nature of voices are always retained” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 364).

Finally, the highest level of dialogism presents “the abundance and variety of types and shades of agreement,” which “is free by nature,” for “behind it there is always a distance overcome and getting closer (but not a fusion)” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 364). Among the “countless gradations and shades” of dialogic agreement Bakhtin identifies “couching of different meanings,” “intensification by fusion (but not identification), combination of multiple voices (corridor of voices), and complementary understanding” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 332).

Notably, the above-quoted formula of convergence as “getting closer (but not a fusion)” is a better description than his “fusion (but not identification)” for as Bakhtin mentioned elsewhere, “a polyphonic agreement does not fuse voices; it is not identification, nor is it a mechanical echo” (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 302). For instance, “in Dostoevsky’s world even agreement retains its dialogic nature, it never results in a fusion of voices and truths into a single impersonal truth, the way it happens in a monologic novel” (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 108). The term “convergence” that we use seems to be an appropriate term to express Bakhtin’s ideas using the current scientific language. Although this term cannot be called Bakhtin’s per se, the thinker did use it in one of the key places for the understanding of the dialogism philosophy: “Two utterances, distanced from each other in time and space, knowing nothing of each other, will display dialogic relationship during semantic juxtaposition if there is even a slight semantic convergence between them.” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 335). Thus, the “dialogic relationship of agreement” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 336) is,
according to Bakhtin, “the ultimate goal of every dialog” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 364). Within the framework of Bakhtin’s philosophy, it could be motivated in three ways.

First, “a certain minimum of agreement” is seen as “a prerequisite to a dialogue (common language, a certain minimum of mutual understanding)” and therefore is de facto “the idea (regulative)” of any communication (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 364). As another dialogic thinker, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, wrote: “No part of any dialogue in the world makes sense unless it is perceived as a variation of something common, which the speaker shares with his audience” (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1994, p. 53).

Second, the perspective of the “free agreement on the sublime (“the Golden Age,” “the Kingdom of God,” etc.)” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 353), according to Bakhtin’s interpretation of Dostoevsky, is the perspective of “eternity” (Whorf, 1952, p. 156) whereas divisiveness is always situational and temporary.

Third, “the independence, freedom, and equality are harder to achieve in agreement than in disagreements and arguments.” That is why “the devil is as afraid of agreement ... as of losing his identity” (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 302).

To fully understand agreement as the highest form of dialogic relationship, one should really take a closer look at Bakhtinian understanding of “dialogism,” which is “broader than a dialogue” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 361), i.e., it also includes monologues (Broytman, 2003, pp. 46-48).

Monologic speech belongs to the sphere of dialogism, firstly, because “even between the deeply monologic utterances (products of speech) there is always a dialogic relationship present” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 336). And secondly, such relationships are present not only between utterances; they are “also threading through individual detached utterances” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 321). On the other hand, monologism, according to Bakhtin, can often manifest itself in compositional forms of dialogic speech.

The fact is that, contrary to the linguo-philological categories of monologue and dialogue, Bakhtin’s notions of “monologism” and “dialogism” belong to the sphere of metalinguistics, because “dialogic relationship ... is much broader than dialogic speech” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 336). Defining monologism as “the refusal for the other to have the last word” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 362) and also pointing out not phrases, but “voices as units of a dialogue” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 361) that sometimes take place within one word, (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 332) the thinker clearly indicates that he talks about an interpersonal, intersubjective relationship of consciousnesses that is manifested through their communicative behavior.

Viewed from this angle, “dialogism” is a characteristic of truly humane relationships between people. Bakhtin sees the unity of the humankind not as “the one and only natural agreement, but as a dialogic agreement of the non-fused two or several” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 346). Thus, “it is impossible to possess, see, or understand an inner personality by making it an object of a neutral, impassible analysis ... Only in communication, in interaction between two people, the “person-in-person” can be revealed to oneself, as well as to others” (Whorf, 1952, p.156).
Whereas “monologism,” being the assumption of the sole right to “the last word,” ignores the humanness of the Other and his or her spiritual depth; it deprives the object of its utterance of the status of the inner “person-in-person.” When monologism is presented in its dialogical form the addressee is deprived of such a status. But, the author of a monologue himself or herself, by estranging the other and making him or her a voiceless object of his or her thought is deprived of the purely human “ability to relate to oneself in a truly dialogic way” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 332).

Thus, according to Bakhtin, monologism is a perversion of genuine human relationship, the suppression of the personal content of communication and its functional role or form. For in live, genuine communication, the “discourse cannot be given to one speaker. The author (speaker) has his inalienable right to it, but so does the listener, and those whose voices are heard in the author’s discourse” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 332). Meanwhile, in the official roles and functions of the social subjects, “the rights and freedoms of expressions” are heavily regulated.

In light of everything mentioned above, Bakhtin’s critical attitude toward any negativism, argument, or disagreement can easily be explained. The situation of informal argument equalizes the interlocutors, which represents its dialogism (“a vulgar form of dialogism”), but the rejection of the other’s thought gravitates toward monologism because it refuses the other “freedom of expression.”

All this proves that “polyphonic agreement” (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 302) as a “regulative idea” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 364) is one of the basic concepts of Bakhtin’s philosophy. Let us try to determine where this concept fits within the modern context of the humanities.

In terms of neo-rhetoric, Bakhtin’s dialogue of agreement is a certain communicative strategy. Put in the most general way, the notion of communicative strategy, which defines the architectonics of the communicative event, includes the positioning of all three instances of an utterance: the object, the subject and the addressee (Tiupa, 2004).

For instance, the positioning of the communicative object means assigning it to a certain rhetorical view of the world. Such typical views of the world are the most generalized “topoi of agreement,” certain common denominators that ensure mental interaction between people who have very different individual outlooks. The dialogue of agreement strategically needs the communicating consciousnesses to use not the “role,” “imperative,” or “occasional” views of the worlds that Chaim Perelman discusses in his *The New Rhetoric* (Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958), but the probabilistic view of the world where the truth is present, but is such that “requires plurality of consciousnesses; it could not be fitted into just one consciousness ... and it is born at the point of contact of different consciousnesses” (Bakhtin, 1972, p. 135).

The positioning of the communicative subject could be explained as the speaker’s (writer’s) choice of one or another rhetorical figure of authorship. The dialogue of agreement, in this regard, requires from the initiator of the communicative event not a normative/role self-limitation of his or her subjectiveness and not a provocative self-
assertiveness, but self-actualization, i.e., the objectification of one’s own subjectiveness: “By objectifying myself (i.e. making myself outward) I am able to experience a truly dialogic relationship with myself” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 332).

Finally, the positioning of the addressee in a dialogue of agreement presupposes intercomplementarity of the receptive consciousness toward the creative, text-generating consciousness. The convergent positioning relies upon the strategic moment of mutual accountability of the communicating consciousnesses and requires “complementary understanding” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 332).

It is obvious that the convergent strategy of dialogic agreement cannot be realized through either regulative or provocative rhetorical behavior of the communicants. It is realized through the inspirative tactics of communicative behavior (in particular, through allusive, double-voiced discourse, and quasi-direct speech) that invokes the projective motivation of behavior as self-realization (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1994, p. 166) as well as the innate solidarity of the human subjects of life. Martin Buber thereupon speculated about the “innate You” that every human “I” possesses (Buber, 1995, p. 31).

Emmanuel Lévinas, like Bakhtin earlier, connects the fundamental ability of the subjectivity to be morally responsible to the other subjectivity and the inherent “interpellation,” i.e., the catechistic basis of human existence (Lévinas, 1961). If, according to Emile Benveniste’s well-known thought, the speaking “I” temporarily appropriates the whole language (this corresponds to the rhetoric of provocative discourse), then Lévinasian metasituation of the meeting of the Selfness and the Other “is the original and imperative conjuncture of the meaning of language: somebody, the speaking “I” directs itself to the other person” (Lévinas, 1988, p. 68). Herewith, dialogue, in a very Bakhtinian manner, is seen as an ontological reality that precedes verbal communication.

For many centuries preceding modern and contemporary history, choral unanimity or authoritarian-monologic agreement was maintained between people by ideological and cultural means. During the modern epoch, on the contrary, provocative disagreement prevails in social and interpersonal relationships. The natural reaction to this critical situation was the substitution of classical rhetoric with the “verbal compulsion” of the rhetoric of negotiation, the purpose of which Ivor Richards saw in “studying misunderstandings between people and searching for ways to ... prevent and avoid losses in the process of communication” (Richards, 1965, p. 3). This new rhetoric, which bases itself upon achievements of semiotics and their philosophical conceptualization, has developed a number of theories of communicative event (discourse)¹ and techniques of discourse analysis of different types of utterances². The conceptual foundations and analytical abilities of neo-rhetoric (metalinguistics) open a prospect of accomplishing Bakhtin’s project. The communicative project of dialogic agreement as the highest form of interpersonal relationships and as “the highest level of sociality (not external, objective, but internal)” (Lakhmann, 1996, p. 344) obviously becomes extremely relevant in the current historical context of globalization.
NOTES


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For Bakhtin, the evaluative aspect of utterances is crucial to the study of meaning in communication, which is impoverished in linguistically based approaches. Bakhtin’s dialogic view of evaluative meaning is manifested in the intricate tonal, gestural and other stylistic ways in which the evaluative stance of the reporting speech frames and permeates not only the referential content of the reported speech but also the evaluative stance toward referential content. This double-voiced character of speech, which ambiguates reference, suggests that evaluation does not reside in addressee intentionality alone, but metalinguistically in addressee orientation to messages whose senses vary indiosyncratically and extralinguistically. The task of critical analysis is to show how that judgment is structured and functions in discourse, as the authors in this essay do with a sample of colonial news discourse from the Times of Morocco—a British daily paper published in Tangier at the end of the 19th century. The Times served as one public instrument that helped to rationalize colonization. Recognition of the play of evaluative meaning is crucial for understanding and criticizing authoritative colonial characterizations of subjects that serve as a rationale for invasion, occupation and exploitation.

**Keywords:** dialogue, evaluative utterance, reported speech, colonial news discourse, discourse analysis, Times of Morocco

It is impossible to do justice to the work of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895-1975) in a single essay, due to the wide scope and interdisciplinary nature of his work. One can find Bakhtin’s ideas invoked in philosophy, literary studies, semiotics, discourse studies,
feminism, communication and cultural studies, among other disciplines. Bakhtin has been hailed as a pioneering theorist in establishing a Marxist approach to language and literary texts, but he is also known as a phenomenologist, a Neo-Kantian, and even a deconstructionist (Gurevitch, 2000; Garvey, 2000; Leps, 2004; Vargova, 2007; Bek, 1999). Perhaps what makes scholars in various disciplines sensitive to the work of Bakhtin is a common interest in language, which Bakhtin conceives as living, actual utterance rather than a static synchronic or monolithic structural phenomenon. One could perhaps argue that there are several Bakhtins given his incessant striving for plurality, variety, difference, novelty, non-finality, and ongoing process of becoming, as well as the peculiar history of Bakhtin’s publications both in the USSR and in the West (see Clark & Holquist, 1984; Morris, 1994)—the authorship of *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*1 being the most controversial.

No matter what subject Bakhtin deals with in his various works, his approach resists any attempt at systematization or canonization. Indeed, to impose any theoretical label on his work would be going against Bakhtin’s own spirit of thinking; it “would be to straightjacket the philosopher of variety, to ‘monologize’ the singer of ‘polyphony’” (Clark & Holquist, 1984, p. 4). Still, if one can speak of a thread that runs through Bakhtin’s works, it would be his unique conception of language that takes as its basic unit the utterance, ranging from the mundane everyday utterance to the most elaborate work of art. Bakhtin’s thinking about the utterance, and his approach to analyzing evaluative utterances, constitutes the philosophical locus of this essay. Epistemology is also of great concern to Bakhtin, as he spent considerable effort revealing the limits of a purely synchronic linguistics in the analysis of texts, particularly in Dostoyevsky’s work. A discussion of epistemology is beyond the scope of this essay, however. Suffice to say by way of introduction that Bakhtin’s critical engagement of individual subjectivist and abstract objectivist (formalist) strains of thought serves as a basis for his alternative conception of language as evaluative utterance. We focus here on Bakhtin’s distinction between two types of meaning (actual meaning or sense and potential meaning) and two types of understanding (passive understanding and active responsive understanding) as a way to gain some insight into how all utterances are intrinsically evaluative.

Evaluation is a constitutive element of context, but context for Bakhtin is marked less by stagnant, determinate and authoritative forms (abstract *a prioris*), and more by singularities of style, relationship, metalinguistic choices such as the language or dialect for communication, and immediate, concrete extralinguistic factors such as temporality, historicity, territoriality, political and economic realities, and so on. Given these intricacies of context as Bakhtin conceives them, the question is not simply how utterances mean, but how they convey evaluations even in the ostensibly factual or descriptive forms of reporting and reported speech. Most urgently, how do those who hold political, military and economic power and read or provide such accounts use them as partial warrants for intervention? Although the 20th and 21st centuries provide ample examples of such complicity between
governments and independent news agencies and corporations, most recently in the United States prior to the Iraq war, we draw on a text from the late 19th century to help illustrate a Bakhtinian approach to the critical analysis of orientalist news reports. The news report we analyze comes from the *Times of Morocco* published in Tangier. We wish to address how Bakhtin’s notion of evaluative utterance, grounded in his theory of meaning and understanding specifically, helps to understand the propaganda used to warrant colonial occupation, with attendant claims to objectivity, moral superiority, security for vital interests, economic development and political liberation.

**Dialogue, Meaning and Understanding**

According to Bakhtin/Voloshinov, the actual mode of the existence of language is verbal interaction, and the most important form of this verbal interaction is dialogue. It should be stressed here that dialogue is not to be understood simply as the immediate face-to-face verbal conversation between two people; indeed, “such an everyday occurrence provides an opening into the further reaches of dialogic possibility” (Clark & Holquist, 1984, p. 9; see also Baxter, 2004; Gurevitch, 2000; Smith, 2008; Stewart, 1985). Dialogue is to be understood in a more comprehensive way, as a fundamental feature of any type of verbal communication, ranging from the everyday spoken word to the written paragraph, and even to printed books of any kind. For what is a book, writes Voloshinov, but:

*a verbal performance in print ...* calculated for active perception, involving attentive reading and inner responsiveness. ... [it] inevitably orients itself with respect to previous performances in the same sphere, both those by the same author and those by other authors [...] it responds to something, objects to something, affirms something, anticipates possible responses and objections, seeks support, and so on. (1973, p. 95; original emphasis)

It follows from this that any form of verbal interaction, if it is to be adequately understood, must be founded upon the notion of dialogue in this wide comprehensive sense. One consequence of laying emphasis on the study of dialogue is that it forces one to take into account the social, political, economic and historical contexts of verbal communication—that is, the material conditions in which language exists and lives. There is no formal boundary to the Bakhtinian utterance. Whether an utterance is a word, a news-text, a novel or an epic, it is primarily characterized by a shift in the speaking subject. Given the appropriate context, a single word may sometimes acquire the force of a whole text or discourse (see Bakhtin, 1986).

Bakhtin’s dialogical account of language is premised on the crucial assumption that “the task of understanding does not basically amount to recognizing the form used, but rather to understanding it in a particular, concrete context, to understanding its meaning in a
particular utterance, i.e., it amounts to understanding its novelty and not to recognizing its identity” (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 68). For Bakhtin meanings are not given, but emergent. The production and understanding of meanings can be accounted for only if one takes into account the way linguistic forms, the creative intelligence of interlocutors, and context interact with one another. In this view, there are no meanings that lie outside the specific contexts in which they emerge. In short, any act of understanding language meaning necessarily presupposes active response or answering. The addressee’s active, responsive understanding may be immediate, as in the case of everyday speech situations, or delayed, as in more complex forms of cultural or intercultural communication, or, as we emphasize here, temporally and historically in textual reading and response: “The fact is that when the listener [or reader] perceives and understands the meaning (the language meaning of speech), he simultaneously takes an active, responsive attitude toward it. He either agrees or disagrees with it (completely or partially), augments it, applies it, prepares for its execution, and so on” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 68).

Understanding of expressed meaning (speech, writing, and gestures) is inherently actively responsive but not an exclusive attribute of the addressee. The speaker’s utterance “is oriented toward such an actively responsive understanding. He does not expect passive understanding that, so to speak, only duplicates his own idea in someone else’s mind. Rather, he expects response, agreement, sympathy, objection, execution and so forth” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 69). Any speaker is necessarily involved in this active responsiveness. The speaker’s utterances are themselves reactions, active responses, to the previous utterances of others as well as to his or her own preceding utterances. Speakers’ utterances in given specific situations always involve some degree of “otherness” as an intrinsic part of them: “World views, trends, viewpoints, and opinions, always have verbal expression. All this is others’ speech (in personal or impersonal form), and cannot but be reflected in the utterance. The utterance is addressed not only to its object, but also to others’ speech about it” (Bakhtin, 1986, pp. 93-94). The meaning of an utterance as articulated in a given socio-historical context cannot be reduced to the relations between the speaker, the word, and the object of the speaker’s word. Indeed, “no living word relates to its object in a singular way: between the word and its object, between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an elastic environment of other, alien words about the same objects” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 70). Thus any utterance of the speaker presupposes the preceding utterances of others as well as his/her own antecedent utterances: “Any utterance is a link in a very complexly organized chain of other utterances” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 69). This interconnectedness of the utterances of different speakers is what is known as intertextuality, a term that was first coined by Julia Kristeva when she was introducing Bakhtin to the French intellectual circles in the 1960s (Kristeva, 1980).

In Bakhtin’s view all language is dialogic. That is, all language has radically social and interpersonal dimensions. But these dimensions may be foregrounded or silenced, depending on the prevalent historical and political contingencies. The dialogic aspect tends to
foreground ideological conflicts between classes and social divisions and hierarchies. By contrast, State power, ruling classes and religious power strive to impose a monologic aspect on language. The ruling class seeks to silence the struggle between conflicting social value judgments which are registered in language in order to render the sign uni-accentual, which brings us to another concept used by Bakhtin to complement dialogism—polyphony (multivoicedness), which he develops in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Although widely used and understood, we wish to emphasize Bakhtin’s interest in describing the simultaneous combination and equal distribution of voices, or better still, consciousnesses in Dostoevsky’s novels. In Dostoevsky’s dialogic, polyphonic novels, every character has a specific personality, i.e., a specific world view, a particular mode of speech or discourse, a specific ideological and social consciousness. All of this is conveyed through the very words and tones of the character. The basic idea underlying polyphony is that in the polyphonic novel, no discourse stands superior to any other discourse, including that of the author. There is no omnipotent narrator that directs or controls meaning and interpretation. The polyphonic novel is a resistance to any view of the world which would promote one ‘official’ point of view, one ideological position, one discourse above all other discourses.

Further, each character’s discourse is internally double-voiced—that is, dialogism, or polyphony for that matter, is not only a clash between different characters’ discourses. Rather, in anticipating the responses of other speakers, a character’s speech is dependent on other characters’ utterances, the “interaction of consciousnesses. ... Every experience, every thought of a character is internally dialogic, adorned with polemic, filled with struggle. ... Dostoevsky’s heroes [sense themselves] to be from the very beginning [rejoinders] in an unfinished dialogue” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 32). Here Bakhtin emphasizes that thought about this unfinished nature of dialogue is never complete, but lives “a tense life on the borders of someone else’s thought, someone else’s consciousness” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 32). Double-voiced discourse, as artistically articulated in Dostoevsky’s novels, shows how powerful the theory of intertextuality is. All utterances are permeated and shot through with other voices. Bakhtin’s continual stress on otherness, polyphony, double-voiced discourse, dialogism, and so on, is an attempt to show that language is never completely one’s own, that no interpretation is complete in itself.

As such, Bakhtin’s account of the concept of meaning in language cannot be considered independently from his notion of understanding. Transparency of meaning and the possibility of understanding are problematical precisely because of competing contexts that impinge upon utterances. Contexts can and often do clash with one another, resulting in relative opacity of meaning (Garvey, 2000). As Voloshinov puts it: “Contexts do not stand side by side in a row, as if unaware of one another, but are in a state of constant tension, or incessant interaction and conflict” (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 80). The conception of meaning that Voloshinov attempts to work out is based on a fundamental distinction between two aspects of meaning: ‘meaning’ and ‘theme.’ The same distinction is maintained in Bakhtin’s essay on speech genres, but this time using a more precise terminology: ‘meaning’ and
‘sense.’ A brief review of these concepts suggests their importance for thinking of all utterances as intrinsically evaluative.

Meaning stands for the range of potential or “possible roles” a given sentence may take on in a particular utterance. Language meaning includes “all those aspects of the utterance that are reproducible and self-identical in all instances of repetition” (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 100; original emphasis). These aspects can be divided or broken down into the linguistic elements which make up the utterance. Sense, on the other hand, stands for the concrete meaning that is actualized in an utterance used at a particular time and place, in a particular form, in the presence of certain others, and so on. This aspect is unique and irreproducible since it is “the expression of the concrete, historical situation that engendered the utterance” (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 99). Sense is a property of the utterance functioning, or taken as a complete whole. As such, it cannot be broken down into further constitutive elements. This heuristic or analytical distinction should not be taken to mean that there is some kind of absolute distinction between sense and meaning, which are interdependent: “There is no theme without meaning and no meaning without theme;” in fact, “meaning is the technical apparatus for the implementation of theme. [...] theme [or sense] is the upper actual limit of linguistic significance [...]. Meaning is the lower limit of linguistic significance” (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 100-101; italics in original).

The distinction between sense and meaning is crucial for an adequate treatment of the problem of understanding. In the process of understanding another speaker’s utterance, “we, as it were, lay down a set of our own answering words. The greater their number and weight, the deeper and more substantial our understanding will be” (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 102). It is as if, in the process of understanding, we create a dialogue with the words of the other, or more precisely, we create a dialogic context against the background of which the other’s utterance acquires sense (cf. Austin, 1962; Grice, 1975; Lyons, 1977; Searle, 1969, 1975; Stewart, 1988; Wedberg, 1984). Normative meanings have no concrete existence as such; they are abstractions and cannot serve as the basis of communication if we understand the latter as the struggle for understanding the nuances of sense in utterances that take place intersubjectively and intertextually.

THE EVALUATIVE UTTERANCE

Although the utterance itself, as a basic Bakhtinian unit, can be generated originally in a specific social, historical context, it is characterized by its fluidity and openness for both intended and unintended addressees; it has no fixed, formal boundaries. Taken as whole performative events, utterances can only be actualized in “relatively stable” speech genres. Time and again in his work, Bakhtin lays emphasis on the heterogeneity of speech genres, which, he argues, “are boundless because the various possibilities of human activity are inexhaustible, and because each sphere of activity contains an entire repertoire of speech genres that differentiate and grow as the sphere becomes more complex” (Bakhtin, 1986, pp.
Bakhtin argues that learning a language does not amount to learning its repertoire of words and syntactic forms, but rather to learning how to use those words and forms in particular generic forms. In understanding someone else’s words or speech, we do so by developing hypotheses about and anticipating the particular speech genre in which his or her words are cast. It is the speech genre that bestows wholeness or finalization, although always only a partial finalization, onto the utterance. To overlook the nature of the utterance thus specified, argues Bakhtin, “leads to perfunctoriness and excessive abstractness, distorts the historicity of the research, and weakens the link between language and life. After all, language enters life through concrete utterances (which manifest life) and life enters language through concrete utterances as well” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 63).

Bakhtin’s critique of the abstraction tendency that holds sway in linguistics does not amount to an absolute rejection of system-based approaches to language. In other words, the target of Bakhtin’s critique is not the view of language as a system per se, but the attempt to generalize that abstract conception to actual communication. For an utterance, or text, to construct and convey a particular meaning, it must do so in accordance with the formal rules and structures of the language. But here we are dealing with language only in terms of forms (grammatical and syntactic forms, lexical forms, phonetic and phonological forms). Now in addition to these forms, there are also forms of combinations of these forms. It is the latter aspect that cannot be reduced to elements of the language system. If forms of the language system are characterized by repetition and identity, utterances or texts are characterized by uniqueness and unrepeatability. On one level, all texts are identical in as much as they must draw their material from the language system. On another level, every utterance is a unique communicative event, “each text (as an utterance) is individual, unique, and unrepeatable, and herein lies the entire significance (its plan, the purpose for which it was created). This is the aspect of it that pertains to honesty, truth, goodness, beauty, history” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 105). Bakhtin is attempting, “to bridge the age-old gap between system and performance [...]” (Clark & Hoquist, p. 11). Participants in any communicative context cannot be separated from the utterance. We have already underlined the crucial role of the other/addressee in active, responsive engagement of the utterance, a response that any speaker’s utterance anticipates and reckons with. Suffice it to mention here that, in addition to the addressee or “second party,” Bakhtin introduces a third addressee or “third party:”

The person who understands inevitably becomes a third party in the dialogue (of course, not in the literal, arithmetical sense, for there can be, in addition to a third, an unlimited number of participants [...]!), but the dialogic position of this third party is a quite special one. Any utterance always has an addressee (of various sorts, with varying degrees of proximity, concreteness, awareness, and so forth), whose responsive understanding the author of the speech work seeks and surpasses. This is the second party (again not in the arithmetical sense). But in addition to this addressee (the second party), the author of the utterance, with a greater or a lesser awareness, presupposes a higher superaddressee (third), whose absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed, either in some metaphysical
distance or in distant historical time (the loophole addressee). In various ages and with various understandings of the world, this superaddressee and his ideally true responsive understanding assume various ideological expressions (God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of history, science and so forth). (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 126)

Through the introduction of this “third,” Bakhtin lays stress on the value-laden aspect of utterances. *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* is the most elaborate account of the nature of expressive evaluation and of Bakhtin’s “translinguistics” or “metalinguistics.” One of the important, critical reviews of this book is the one provided by John Stewart’s *Language as Articulate Contact: Toward a Post-Semiotic Philosophy of Communication* (1995). Stewart moves from a critique of Bakhtin’s “semitic” theory of language, and signs in general, to a more positive attitude in reviewing the second, and particularly, the third and final part of the *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. This is where, according to Stewart, the book develops a post-semiotic approach to communication. The point we want to make here is that Stewart’s fairly comprehensive account of the book fails to do justice to the crucial role that expressive intonation or evaluation plays in Bakhtin’s overall theory of language. Surprisingly enough, only a single paragraph, out of a thirty page long review, is devoted to this aspect. He simply notes that evaluation permeates language and that “intonation contributes significantly to evaluation and other important nuances of meaning, and that linguists who focus their attention on the abstract system of language miss these features entirely” (Stewart, 1994, p. 187; cf. Baxter, 2004; Evans, 2002; Vargova, 2007).

Value, evaluation, accent, tone, tonality, intonation, and expressivity are terms that we constantly come across in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, as well as in Bakhtin’s writings in general. Utterances are said to carry not just meanings, or referential content, but also, and more importantly, value judgments: “Any word used in actual speech possesses not only theme and meaning in the referential, or content, sense of these words, but also value judgment: i.e., all referential contents produced in living speech are said or written with a specific evaluative accent. There is no such thing as word without evaluative accent” (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 103). Two pages later Voloshinov writes, “No utterance can be put together without value judgment. Every utterance is above all an evaluative orientation. Therefore, each element in a living utterance not only has meaning but also has a value” (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 105). In other words, the referential meaning or semantic content of an utterance is always produced with a particular evaluative attitude on the part of the speaker toward the content of his/her utterance. There is no such thing as a ‘neutral’ utterance that carries a neutral referential content. Rather, the referential content of the speaker’s utterance is itself molded and largely determined by the speaker’s evaluative attitude. In stylistics the speaker’s attitude toward the content of his or her speech is called the expressive or emotive function, which is somewhat similar to Bakhtin’s view of the speaker’s evaluative attitude. Roman Jakobson defines it as “... a direct expression of the speaker’s attitude toward what he is speaking about” (Jakobson, 1969, p. 354). Jakobson
cites what an actor of Stanislavsky’s Moscow theater told him about an audition in which a director asked him to produce a plurality of messages from the phrase ‘this evening’ by varying the expressive tones that could be made with that phrase. The actor was able to produce forty different expressive tones that correspond to different emotional situations framing that same phrase, and thereby producing forty different messages.

Words exist for speakers on three levels: “as a neutral word of a language, belonging to nobody; as an other’s word [...] filled with echoes of the other’s utterance; and, finally, as my word, for, since I am dealing with it in a particular situation, with a particular speech plan, it is already imbued with my expression” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 88). Only on the second and third levels can expressive intonation be located. In their utterances, then, speakers constantly draw upon the words of others, words that have their own expressive evaluation. Our utterances are shot through with “varying degrees of otherness or varying degrees of ‘our-own-ness,’ varying degrees of awareness and detachment” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 89). Moreover, the speaker’s evaluative attitude toward the content of his or her speech, together with his or her judgment about the actual or potential addressee, determines not only the referential content of the utterance, but also the choice of the particular language forms to be used as well as the speech genre in which the utterance is cast. “Expressive intonation,” Bakhtin writes, “is a constitutive marker of the utterance” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 85); it may express humor or irony, “surprise, incomprehension, inquiry, doubt, affirmation, refutation, indignation, admiration and so forth” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 110). In any daily conversational exchange, words are always subject to being “re-accentuated.” This is a rather simple and straightforward level of double-voicedness. In general terms, any utterance involves a dialogic relation between the “given” and the “created.” An utterance is not simply a reflection of that which is ‘given’ or ‘final.’ Rather, it brings into existence something absolutely new and unrepeatable, and, moreover, it always has some relation to value (the true, good, beautiful, right or just).

Even a simple everyday dialogue (“What time is it?”—“Seven o’clock”) can reveal complexity, different layers in any instance of its actualization depending on “the more or less complex situation of the question. One must look at the clock. The answer can be true or false, it can be significant, and so forth. In which time zone? The same question asked in outer space, and so forth” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 120). In oral speech it is somewhat easier to detect the speaker’s evaluative attitude toward the content of his/her speech as there are outspoken, expressive intonation cues that aid in the detection of the explicit or implied attitude of the speaker. In written texts, these tones are more difficult to detect but they are always there. To say that an utterance is evaluative is not to say that utterances construct objects and then values are conferred onto these objects. Rather, the evaluative stance is intrinsic to, or inherent in, the utterance itself. In other words, it originates in or with the utterance.

This is one of the reasons why the third and final part of *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* focuses on the analysis of various forms of reported speech. The phenomenon
of reported speech is an instantiation of a border zone, an in-between space, in which words of the self, the reporting speech, and words of the other, the reported speech, interact upon one another in intricate ways. Voloshinov argues that linguistics, particularly in the area of syntax, is unable to account for this extremely significant syntactic phenomenon. Focusing on the complete, isolated monologic utterance, syntactic studies cannot have as their unit of analysis the inherently dialogic phenomenon of reported speech. The problem of reported speech is defined as a syntactic problem. If this phenomenon has been overlooked in syntax then that is due to the prominence of phonetic and morphological categories in linguistics, and this has resulted in “the morphologization of syntactic problems” (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 115). Reported speech is “speech within speech, utterance within utterance, and at the same time also speech about speech, utterance about utterance” (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 109).

**Critical Analysis of Colonial News Discourse**

We have found that Bakhtin’s unique conception of “evaluativness” as discussed in the preceding pages extremely useful and informative in the analysis of the news discourse produced by the *Times of Morocco* in Tangier at the end of the 19th century. An overview of Great Britain’s historical relation with Morocco is of some importance in situating the analysis. Because of its key strategic geographical location so close to Europe and a gateway into the Mediterranean and Africa, Morocco has always attracted foreign attention. Remarkably, at the end of the nineteenth century Morocco was still an independent country, even though its neighboring North African Muslim countries had been effectively colonized early on. Morocco’s resistance to colonization was due, to a large extent, to the intense rivalries and competition among the European powers over the strategic location of Morocco. France, Great Britain, Spain, Italy and eventually Germany all argued, in one way or another, that they had some kind of legitimate claims over the Moroccan territory, and each power felt that if Morocco was taken by any one single power, its vital interests would be seriously threatened and jeopardized (Parsons, 1976). This was particularly true of Great Britain whose relations with Morocco have a long history (Ben Sghir, 1997). Anglo-Moroccan relations have been significantly shaped by two historical incidents: the British possession of Tangier (1662-1684) and the British occupation of Gibraltar (1704). Great Britain seems to have been desperate to have a footing on the Mediterranean coast that would ensure its control over the western straight of the Mediterranean to secure its Maritime activities. Britain was eventually forced to abandon Tangier under the reign of Moulay Ismail and this loss must have left a scar in Britain’s consciousness of itself as an imperial and colonial power. It did not take Britain long to return to the Mediterranean and occupy Gibraltar.

Despite the significance of the subject of Anglo-Moroccan relations, the aim of this essay is not a mapping out of Moroccan history in relation to Britain or to other European powers (Miège, 1989; Laroui, 1992). Suffice to say that the embarrassing loss of Tangier in
the late 17th century fashioned British policy toward Morocco for two centuries. Britain adopted what came to be known as the *status-quo* policy, which amounted to preserving the territorial integrity of Morocco lest it might fall into the hands of another European power, which would be a serious threat to Britain’s Maritime interests. This state of affairs applies particularly to the city of Tangier for its location on the Southern side of the Mediterranean that faces Gibraltar, which explains why Tangier retained an international status even after the French and Spanish occupation of Morocco. Due to these historical circumstances, the situation of Morocco toward the end of the nineteenth century was referred to in international diplomatic circles as the *Morocco Question* (Parsons, 1976). All the major European powers had representatives in Tangier in order to supervise closely the schemes and maneuvers of their rival powers in Morocco. The Sultan Mulay Hassan the First seemed to have been acutely aware of this factor in dealing with the various foreign representatives.

There are many texts available from the *Times of Morocco* for analysis that show how negative evaluation is embedded in the news story utterance implicitly, albeit under the guise of neutrality or objectivity (El Ayadi, 2007). Given the constraints of this essay we will focus on reported and reporting speech from only one text where evaluation is a bit more explicit. The following text, then, presents an interview between a British journalist and the Italian Minister then residing in Tangier. The theme of the interview is the *status quo* of Morocco in the 1880s. The analysis focuses on the intricate ways in which the reporting discourse (that of the journalist) interacts with the reported discourse (that of the Italian Minister). The analysis depicts how the reporting discourse frames the referential content of the Minister’s reported speech.

**THE ITALIAN MINISTER AND THE SLEEPING EMPIRE**

Accompanied by the oldest Minister here… the representative of the Portugeese Government, I lately called upon the Minister Plenipotentiary for Italy, who has resided here for about 16 years […]. I inquired what he thought of the present position of affairs. He replied, my dear sir, have you read the poems of Dante?—Yes. Well, do you remember the words “All hopes abandon ye who enter here.”—Yes. Well, then you will find these words above every entrance to this unfortunate Empire. Were you not struck with the people lounging and sleeping about the Custom House when you landed?—Yes, I saw one sleeping. Well, then, that represents the state of the country. […] If, said he, you want anything done, and you approach any official door, you’ll probably find the man outside sleeping. You rouse him. He rises, rubs his eyes, puts his finger to his mouth, and says in a whisper, Hush! Walk gently or you will wake everybody inside. When you see his master, he repeats the same caution, and refers you to another sleepy individual elsewhere, and so you proceed from one official to another, and from city to city, till you come to the seat of Government, where you will find Morpheus reigns supreme. And here you will be presented with velvet slippers to deaden the sound of your unwelcome footsteps. At last, you become desperate, and you wake
up somebody by continual knocking, and after many delays and much rubbing of eyes and many hints that your visit is untimely, unnecessary, etc., you will reach the palace of Morpheus, “alias” the Sultan, and you knock gently at first, then louder and louder, until you gain admission to the presence of the sleeping ruler of a sleeping empire. You rouse him. He rubs his eyes and receives you graciously, and you say, your neighbours, dear Sir, your neighbours are all astir, improving, progressing, and enlarging their houses and possessions, and yours is going to decay. It must not remain so; it cannot remain so. Your neighbours near and far are complaining. Oh, thank you gratefully, says the sleepy monarch. But, do you happen to want anything particular on your own account? If so, you’re welcome to take it, but only please make as little noise as possible, and go away as soon as you can, in order that I may finish my present nap. God be with you and take you safely home. (June 9, 1884)

This text is a straightforward example of the interaction of two discourses: that which does the reporting (the journalist’s discourse or the authorial context) and the discourse that is being reported in the reporting discourse which belongs to another author’s speech (the Italian Minister’s speech). In a sense, what is reported is not a news event, but another speech. This is an instance of speech about speech or speech within speech. The reported speech has a dual evaluative stance: (1) its own, or that of the speaker whose speech is being reported toward the referential content of his speech, and (2) that of the reporting authorial context that encloses and frames the content of the other’s reported speech.

In what follows, we examine the reported evaluative utterance on its own and then focus on how the reporting speech of the journalist incorporates and evaluates the content of the reported speech. It should be noted first that the boundaries between the two discourses are weakened. For one thing, there is the absence of quotation marks which formally indicate the beginning and end of the reported speech. Despite the absence of this marker, the boundaries between the two discourses are not difficult to detect. Nevertheless, the absence of quotation marks may mean that we are dealing not with direct reported speech, but indirect reported speech. One consequence of this is that we are not sure whether the words attributed to the Italian Minister are all his own words or whether those words have been paraphrased.

The only explicit instance of direct reported discourse is the one taken from Dante’s poems which is seen by the Italian Minister as representing the state of affairs in Morocco. There are three things of significance here. First, there is the implication that Scovasso is well-read and a knowledgeable person. Knowledge confers authority on the knower, which supplements the official political authority of being a minister. We are presented with someone whose authority and knowledge bestow some kind of reliability on what he has to say about the subject. Second, it is interesting how Dante’s quotation is extracted from its original context and transposed into a context that Dante himself never intended his description to apply (cf. Said, 1978, pp. 68-70). The quoted statement is a categorical assertion about its own meaning. The minister is equally categorical in his application of the
quote about the status quo in Morocco at the time: “You will find these words over every entrance to this unfortunate Empire.” Finally, the allusion to Dante as a way to represent the state of affairs in Morocco at the end of the nineteenth century may also be taken to have an additional implication—that the entrance to the country is tantamount to the gateway to hell.

Moreover, the negative import of the reported evaluative utterance of the Italian minister is quite explicit. Sleep reigns everywhere and over everyone, from the Custom House officials to officials working in the palace, including the Sultan himself. Whether we take sleep in a metaphorical or literal sense, the effect is the same. The choice of these two sites (Custom house and the palace) is not insignificant. They both require constant vigilance and wakefulness, not sleep or slumber. Indeed, sleep is the dominant metaphor used in the Minister’s reported discourse. It never occurs as an abstract noun, but always as a predicate attributed to an official authority. In fact, sleep is coded as embodied in the officials. The predicate sleepy or sleeping occurs six times in the text, and the term sleep is iterated through synonyms, near-synonyms and even antonyms. There are ten occurrences of these iterations (rouse, rising, rubbing his eyes, wake, nap and so on). The irony of this depiction of a whole country in a deep state of sleep reaches its peak in the description of the Sultan who is referred to as “Morpheus” who “reigns supreme and the sleepy ruler of a sleepy empire.” The irony here is based on the semantic opposition between Morpheus and reign or rule. Morpheus in Greek mythology is the God of sleep, who of course being the perfect embodiment of eternal sleep cannot be said to rule over anything, apart from ruling over sleep and the sleepy.

The full significance of the Italian minister’s discourse is to be sought within a larger discourse, namely colonial discourse in general. One of the constant features of this discourse is its homogenizing, totalizing description of native populations. The natives are coded as an unspecific, undifferentiated mass. It is within this context that we can better understand the evaluative nature of the minister’s reported discourse. His description is presented as timeless truth. We find similar descriptions in colonial discourse of natives who are criticized, if not condemned, for their “backwardness,” “indolence,” “idleness,” “laziness,” etc. It is not difficult to see here the rhetoric of the civilizing mission, the white man’s burden with which the West produced the rest of the world. Morocco, like other colonized countries, must be transformed into a scene of efficiency and industrialization; its population must likewise be transformed from an indolent, undifferentiated mass into wage labor and a market for metropolitan consumer goods. This is clear in the minister’s words “Your neighbours are all astir, improving, progressing [...] it [Morocco] must not remain so; it cannot remain so.” The ideological project of this discourse is, of course, to construct Morocco as backward and as manifestly in need of the rationalized intervention the Europeans bring. Clearly the criticism is paradoxical: it is the country’s purported backwardness that “legitimizes” the European intervention in the first place.

One might argue that by explicitly attributing the reported discourse to an independent source, a source other than the journalist, the latter may be viewed as faithfully and reliably
reporting what went on in the interview with the Italian minister. After all, the journalist is not directly responsible for the content reported. The ostensible source of the negative evaluative attitude is the Italian minister, not the journalist. However, there are at least two crucial elements in the text which indicate the journalist’s implicit framing evaluative attitude toward the content of the reported speech. First, there is the nature of the linguistic reference, or form of address, used to characterize the source of the news item. The source of the evaluative reported utterance is identified by the full name of the source (Scovasso) and his title(s) (Excellency Signor) and also the distinction of his political function. Further, the reader is also informed that the minister has lived in Morocco for sixteen years. The function of these elements is not so much to inform the reader about such details, as to emphasize the prominence of the source, thereby conferring a sense of authority and even reliability, distance and “neutrality” on the content of the reported speech. The journalist’s framing device here works in two ways: it frames the content of the reported speech and the reader’s positive interpretation of that content.

The second element used to frame the reported discourse is the particular reporting verb “say,” which is most neutral of the set of speech act reporting verbs. This selection, out of a large set of possibilities, is another device whereby the journalist frames the content of the negative evaluative reported utterance. By this selection, the reporter expresses no reservation whatsoever over the content of the reported speech. Combined together, both the elements that underline the prominence of the source and the speech act reporting verb express a positive evaluative attitude on the part of the journalist toward the content of the reported discourse. There is a kind of split both in the nature of the evaluation and the target of that evaluation. Thus, while the reported negative utterance is targeted to the Sultan and to Moroccans, the reporting discourse expresses, albeit implicitly, a positive evaluative attitude toward the content of the reported speech, thereby adding force to the reported negative evaluative utterance. There is another element that adds to the force of the negative evaluation. The reader may react in one of two ways: he/she may either accept or reject the negative evaluative utterance. In either case, the reader’s pragmatic interpretation will add force to the evaluation proper.

The analysis reveals, among other things, that though boundaries between the reporting speech (the authorial context) and the reported speech may be formally indicated in a given text, they are constantly subject to weakening and erasure. A complex set of factors is brought into play when utterances made in the context of the reported speech are transposed into the context of the reporting speech. Any of these two contexts may permeate and intrude into one another in significant ways. Modifications and variations that arise in a communication situation between the context of the reporting speech and that of the reported speech is that the former frames the latter in subtle and intricate ways.
CONCLUSION

In this essay we have argued that evaluative attitudes and judgments are integral to the meanings of all utterances. That is to say, wherever sense(s) of utterances manifest, value judgments are also evident and should be accounted for reflexively, analytically and critically if one is interested in gaining or advancing human understanding. Following Voloshinov’s, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, any attempt to study meaning independently of evaluative judgments, a common practice in semantics, “inevitably deprives meaning of its place in the living social process (where meaning is always permeated with value judgment) to its being ontologized and transformed into ideal Being divorced from the historical process of Becoming” (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 105).

Bakhtin’s conception of language, as outlined in the preceding pages, enables a novel avenue for embarking on a close examination of the way language as discourse works in specific contexts. By foregrounding the dynamic, dialogic nature of language, and the evaluative aspect of utterances, Bakhtin enables a nuanced and sensitive engagement of how language works in a given context of use. It should be stressed here that Bakhtin does not provide the analyst with a ready-made theory, but with a way that informs and guides critical textual analysis. In this sense it is imperative to recognize the importance of interpretation and criticism as an intertextual exercise, one that accommodates multiple perspectives historically and synchronically. One should be attuned to the most minute and concrete signifying unit, wherein voice(s) might be heard that would otherwise be overlooked from a strictly logical point of view. Dialogic relationships are marked indexically by such minute units of signification, and if they are overlooked, one not only misses a contextual whole that circumscribes all other aspects of a text or utterance, one might also miss the insidious workings of tyranny.

Communication research that favors a linguistic approach to analysis, whether through ethnographic studies, conversational or discourse analysis, intercultural investigations, or otherwise, limits the possibility for understanding both the metalinguistic and extralinguistic nature of dialogic relationships. This is not to say that language as discourse is ancillary, but as a concrete phenomenon, it “lives only in the dialogic interaction of those who make use of it” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 183). A Bakhtinian approach to communication research valorizes the singularity of texts and events, and as such their historical, social, political and economic dimensions as manifest in the integral moments of their actualization. The complexities of research on communication phenomena are thus never fully explicated. There is always some excess or remainder, something more to the text than what can be synthesized conceptually, some debt to the event that cannot adequately be put into words at particular times. As such, closure in analysis is an insufficient goal; the best one can hope for, as we hope for here, is to advance a philosophical approach to the analysis of texts that recognizes value in utterances less as a matter of oppositional coding, and more as evaluating that resonates and resists.
NOTES

1. *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* was published in Russian in 1929 under the name of Valentin Nichlaevich Voloshinov (1884-1935). The Harvard University Press translation of the book, both in the 1973 and 1986 English translations, also appeared under the name of Voloshinov. The authorship of this book has been accepted in the West as being an original work of Bakhtin. The fact that it bears the name of Voloshinov, it has been argued, is due to the political conditions in Russia at the time. This is the position adopted by Clark and Holquist (1984). Bakhtin himself never confirmed or disconfirmed the authorship of that work. When referring to this disputed text, we will use the name that appears in the English translation of that book—that is, Voloshinov, though we concur, given the evidence, that Voloshinov and Bakhtin were the same person. Other disputed works are Voloshinov (1987) and Medvedev (1978).

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After Bakhtin, it is already impossible to understand language as something organismal, alive. Language for Bakhtin is something dead, it is rules of the game. On the contrary, speech for him is always alive. It is the game itself. It unites the imaginary and the language. Abstract identity, invariability of its elements dominates in the language whereas in an utterance the dominator is the novelty, variability. Following Bakhtin, it is difficult to imagine a foreign word without any zest, without a secret.

A foreign word is a mystery, a riddle. A native word is without mystery. We take no notice of it as we take no notice of the air that we breathe. It is warm and comfortable being inside your own language. Native language for us is like pants for a polar explorer. Near a foreign language it is cold and uncomfortable.

As linguistics appeared as a result of studies of dead foreign languages extant in written monuments so the cold of putrefaction, as Bakhtin says, comes from linguistics. He writes: “linguistic thinking developed and ripened over the corpses of written languages” (Voloshinov, 1993, p. 78).

Bakhtin considers what a linguist studies: firstly, a dead language, secondly, a foreign one, and, thirdly, a written one. At first a linguist kills the language, then codifies it and only then teaches it at school. A linguist is a teacher, a priest. “If—as Bakhtin writes—some people knew only their own native language … if their horizon didn’t include a mysterious foreign word … then such people would never create the philosophy of the language” (Voloshinov, 1993, p. 81).

Saussure related utterance to an individual act, to something which can’t be a subject for a science. The individual for it is a fortuity, language rubbish which can be neglected. For Potebnya, on the contrary, fortuity of speech flow, its variability, individuality is important. Language self-identity, which Saussure liked, Potebnya considered as waste, a dead layer which could be disregarded.

Bakhtin places himself in the gap between Saussure and Potebnya. Like Potebnya he chooses the utterance, not language. But he sees the utterance in the same way as Saussure

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sees language, that is, socially (Voloshinov, 1993, p. 90). Speech for Bakhtin is a door to come in and go out. The Other brings its mind through it.

If Bakhtin considered the utterance individually, he would have to accept the idea of “already-understanding” and also the idea of a soul. It means that according to Bakhtin it would be necessary to agree that we understand not as a result of a communicative act, but as a result of already understanding, of which we are not the cause. Monologues and dialogues merely uncover communicative opportunities, not create them. Thus “already-understanding” precedes any sign understanding. Florensky agreed with this term. Bakhtin was against it. And his disagreement needed some basis. This basis in its turn constituted the paradigm of development of Soviet psychology as well as other humanities.

The matter of the word “utterance” worked for Florensky. Bakhtin had to start a fight with this matter. Generally, the utterance resembles production. It needs to bring something out, make the underlying public. Only personal, non-public, internal can be expressed. Without this internal there will be no need for the utterance. To express the expressed is impossible. It can be communicated, taken into account. It has to be taken into consideration. But then a moment comes when speech does not need any utterance. And speech without an utterance is a message which is not understood, but remembered, repeated silently, constituting that which will be called “inner speech” (endophasia). For instance, you are hungry. What’s the use of expressing the feeling of hunger, stating it. You need to communicate that you are hungry.

To state means to say what is in your heart, to open yourself to the world, to utter the unuttered. The utterance comes from inside toward outside, i.e., it itself is between the external and the internal sides of the world. Therefore, the utterance needs a double-sided world structure. And it does not need the Other. It’s possible to utter for yourself as well. However, the infinity of utterances will not be enough to exhaust the mind of the utterer.

If the utterance is individual, it should have two planes: internal and external, the expressed and the expressing. The expressed can live without the expressing, and the expressing without the expressed. Then, the relations between them would be similar to the relations between the represented and the representing, i.e., the representing would never result in the represented and the represented would never be represented.

Bakhtin believes that the expressed can be expressed. He is bothered neither by Tyutchev with his conviction that the thought that is uttered is a lie, nor Fet, in whose words “Oh, if only it were possible to speak with the heart without any words” Bakhtin finds idealistic romance.

Then why does Bakhtin speak against Florensky’s theory of already understanding and Potebnya’s utterance theory?

Here is Bakhtin’s main argument: “experience—the expressed and its external objectification—are made, as we know, from the same material” (Voloshinov, 1993, p. 93). But the unknown needs to be proven. To be more exact, there are reasons to believe that they are made from different material. The expressed is emotional. The ideality of the imaginary
is given in it. Objectification is material. And this difference necessitates the expression of what is inexpressible. What is the use of expressing the inexpressible?

Bakhtin changes the meaning of the word “utterance.” The utterance doesn’t express but, as he thinks, communicates, sends a signal. Bakhtin gives up the idea of the two sides of the world, of the external and the internal. There is nothing internal, personal, nor individual. There is no inexpressible soul. And the man has nothing to express. The Other is necessary for the utterance to appear. Therefore, the utterance locks not the internal and the external, but the two unmergible Others. Admittedly, it is not clear what differs you from the Other. Bakhtin thinks that this difference has a space-time character. Because both you and the Other are named points of society joined by speech without utterance and, therefore, by speech without understanding. In other words, to speak, according to Bakhtin, means to exchange words.

As there is the Other, so the center of the person is not in the person but in the Other, in society. Therefore a communication, a dialogue is entered by the person with the off-center I. If the center were in the person, the soul would be in it. And it would be non-social, i.e., it could not be specified with a finite set of social relations. The soul is monologous, or, rather it chooses itself as its own accomplice. According to Bakhtin, there can be no unexpressed thoughts in a dialogue. If they were there, they would destroy the dialogue, and the expressed would be beyond the connection with the uttered. Bakhtin’s dialogue makes the person know as much as he or she has said or, rather, as his or her interlocutor could hear. According to Bakhtin, the Other defines the abilities of your mind.

Bakhtin decided to save philosophy from internal and external dualisms. For that he announces both the internal and the external to be made of sign matter. Bakhtin has signs everywhere. Everything is signed. There is nothing non-signed. Signs are social, i.e., for them to be a society is already necessary. And society, at the least, is a dialogue, in which the word is directed at the Other, not at the depths of the non-signed. Inward life of the person is seen by Bakhtin as a social audience, in the atmosphere of which arguments, assessments and reasons are built. In other words, the person is understood by Bakhtin as a product of social relations. And it means that there is nothing in him from himself, that the person is the person’s environment. Even weeping of a baby, as Bakhtin considers, is social, i.e., it is directed at the mother.

Take, for instance, hunger. In the idea of hunger itself there is no indication at how it will be assuaged: with the help of a fork and a knife or with nails and teeth. If you are, Bakhtin says, a peasant, you endure hunger in a closed world of you household. You are alone. You are responsible for yourself and you can not shift everything on the Other. Therefore you have two options: either a monk’s ascesis or a tramp’s protest.

But a worker’s hunger is different. His environment is different. He is a mass element. He is taught to act in a group. He has a mind and has no obedience. He is class for himself. Hope of the world. One must not be on his own here. At least this is what Bakhtin thought. A worker lives in a complicated social world. That is why his inward life is complicated. But
a peasant lives in a simple social world. That is why his inward life is poorer. An antique Greek has an undeveloped inward life but a Ford plant worker has a developed inward life. At the same time Bakhtin sees the inward life as well as the outward one, it is just projected on the conceptual level.

As the word is a social intersection, Bakhtin refuses to admit a mind for himself believing that there is only speech for the Other (Voloshinov, 1993, p. 98). Thus Bakhtin loses “I-experience,” “pre-understanding” and the possibility of understanding itself as well as the idea of a creative personality.

Here is the example of Bakhtin’s description of inner speech. It is unregulated, not fixed, changeable, vague, underdeveloped, flushing and idle. They are unfit for life abortions of social orientations in it. These are novels without a hero, performances without audience in it. It has no logic and unity. Strange as it may seem, but it was the 20th century when novels without a hero and performances without audience appeared. That is, all that Bakhtin had called “inner speech” turned out to be an outer speech of a postmodernist. And inner speech started to be understood as the soul speech or as a dumb speech of things.

Groundlessness of Bakhtin’s theory of inner speech is noticed because it forbids one to think the unexpressed more fully than it has already been expressed. In other words, if the expression of graphic scheme of inner speech requires infinite utterances, then Bakhtin gives up these infinities as, in his opinion, the utterance is by no means connected with the inward life of the person. The utterance center is beyond, in society, and not in the inner speech. And though Bakhtin called external utterance an island, rising from the ocean of inner speech, this ocean of his had dried up, evaporated long ago.

In Bakhtin’s theory of speech the meaning of the word is positioned not in the mind, not in the soul and not in the thing itself. It is placed between the word and anti-word of verbal communication. The meaning for Bakhtin is the effect of mutual activity of the speaker and the listener. It is an electric sparkle appearing when two different poles are joined. In other words, Bakhtin puts an arrest on the existence of “already-understanding” speech. That is why he does not know what to do with meanings. Because the meaning must wait until it is expressed and written down, staying in the space of inner speech. But Bakhtin does not leave it this space. That is why such words, substituting for the meaning as topic and accentuation, appear with him. Bakhtin justifies sign expansion to the sphere of self-relation, zero communication. Allowing obviousness and intuition, we restrict the field of application of signs. That is, sign expansion is prevented by the perception of what exists. Bakhtin, as Derrida later, reduces presence and replaces it with the traces of the absent, which, in its turn, can be introduced, represented. Whereas perception is always presentational, the word for Bakhtin gets the meaning not in a sentence, but in a dialogue.

After Bakhtin the world changed radically. The person was no longer considered as a mostly social creature. Examination of autistic nature of the person was brought to the foreground. But Bakhtin could say nothing about the autist, e.g. Dostoevsky’s character from The Notes from the Underground. “We have literally nothing to say, Bakhtin wrote in
Problems of Poetic of Dostoevsky, “what he himself does not know”. Thus the limitations of Bakhtin’s ideas of polyphonicity and dialogue discovered themselves.

REFERENCES


**Reviewed by Deborah Eicher-Catt**
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Through a tightly-woven, theoretical reading of popular culture texts, Esther Peeren insightfully takes the writings of well-known philosopher and literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin “beyond” their typical usefulness by philosophers, sociologists, literary theorists, and communicologists. Considering herself a cultural analyst (following the work of Mieke Bal and the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis), she is opposed to the familiar cultural studies approach, an approach which assumes a strong-hold on critiques of popular culture, especially in the United States. Because of her different methodological orientation, her overall objective in this book is to “test” Bakhtin’s most familiar concepts by pairing them with popular culture texts and practices, the apposition of the two meant to engage both more fully as “dialogic interlocutors.” Recognizing the inadequacies of cultural studies (that merely applies a theoretical eclecticism to cultural objects, leaving both relatively stable and unchanged), Peeren’s analysis of popular culture serves as “…an active interaction or confrontation with the cultural object where this object is understood as open to question and as questioning in turn the theories the cultural analyst brings to bear on it” (p. 3). In this way, the objects of popular culture she interrogates can actually speak back to theory; thus moving Bakhtin’s concepts “beyond” his own thought and into the realm of intersubjective knowledge and understanding. As such, she hopes to “enhance” Bakhtin’s work within a postmodern culture of critique.

Peeren also desires to contribute to postmodern theorizing concerning identity construction and transformation, hence she addresses the issues of agency and efficacy in the socio-cultural realm. Indebted to Bakhtin, she theorizes that while identities are certainly chronotopic, i.e., situated and constrained within particular space-time relations, they are also up for renegotiation—particularly if we accept Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism and the grounds of intersubjectivity upon which it rests. She thus advances her theory of “identities-as-intersubjectivities” to expose this dialogic dynamic and uses particular artifacts from
popular television, film, and cultural events to discuss its contours and functions. While she rightly admits that treatments of popular culture are counter to Bakhtin’s own sphere of interest, she offers a compelling argument for how the particular popular culture texts she works with offer a “provocation to one or more of Bakhtin’s concepts [such as dialogism, the utterance, carnival, and the chronotope], exposing where they need to be rethought—taken into their own beyond” (p. 2). She also readily admits that Bakhtin gave little treatment to the subject of identity or its transformation, per se. Yet, by bringing Bakhtin into dialogue with issues surrounding identity formation, she lends insight and substance to our developing understanding of each. As she points out, Bakhtin’s concepts are best viewed as “deictic signs” and thus susceptible to evolution and transformation. She names her overall method of cultural analysis, “versioning,” and this concept plays a key role as her close reading or versioning of theory and its engagement with popular culture progresses throughout the book.

Her project is essentially divided into two parts with each part offering a theoretical engagement with particular popular culture texts and practices while they also attempt to fulfill her promise of moving particular theories (of Bakhtin’s as well as others) into their beyond. In Chapters 1-4, Peeren takes up the central problematic concerning her theory of how identities should be viewed as intersubjective processes lived within particular space-time relations. She argues that identity constructions (and reconstructions) are “differentiated, situated, and circumscribed by specific chronotopic and performative contexts, which produce particular regimes of vision and speech” (p. 27). To flesh out her developing theoretical argument, she offers analyses from popular television and film: *Sex and the City* (a novel written by Candace Bushnell in 1996 and aired on the HBO cable network in the U.S. beginning in 1998), *Nell* (Michael Apted’s 1994 film starring Jodie Foster), and *Flawless* (a 1999 film by Joel Schumacher starring Robert De Niro and Philip Seymour Hoffman). Her overall objective in these first chapters is to expose how identities are subject to dominant cultural modes of interpellation and, in turn, how these examples of lived experience can shift or transform the various theories she uses. Here, in addition to Bakhtin’s concepts, she engages Judith Butler’s notion of performativity, Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas concerning social fields, Derrida’s *differance*, Lacan’s work on the gaze, Kaja Silverman’s elaboration of “identity-at-a-distance,” Voloshinov’s notion of the potential addressee, and the psychoanalytic theories of Jessica Benjamin and Jean Laplanche, to name but a few. While some of these theories are “tested” more than others, Peeren’s engagement with them does provide the reader with new insights about their relevance to contemporary treatments concerning the postmodern subject. After addressing issues such as chronotopic belonging, the intersubjective eye: the look versus the gaze, and the intersubjective voice: dialogism and the cultural addressee, Peeren claims that, while identities in process are certainly subject to dominant modes of seeing and speaking, there are certain “points of weakness” where agential qualities can be initiated. She ends this part of the book by specifying how marginalized subjects (and groups) can find potential semiotic (discursive)
freedom by recognizing the impact of what she calls the “cultural addressee” on their modes of being and relating. While not directly engaging with any phenomenological literature (which, I believe, would enhance her discussion of agency and intersubjectivity—for example Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work), Peeren does raise issues concerning the body, especially through her discussions of voice and vision as they play out within her popular culture artifacts. Left implicit rather than made explicit, her argument concerning the lived-body’s integral role in any “response” to the world could be theoretically stronger.

In the second part of the book, Chapters 5-8, Peeren addresses the topics of resignifications (by way of theorizing accents and speech genres), identities in translation, territories of identity, and versioning identities. At this point in her theoretical discussion, Peeren is primarily concerned with how subjects can articulate themselves differently—given the constraints imposed by the chronotope, the cultural gaze, and the cultural addressee. She begins by cleverly offering readers an explication of both the 1999 British television drama series *Queer as Folk*, with its focus on gay men in Manchester, and the 2000 U.S. remake of the same title that appeared on Showtime to demonstrate “the strength and constraints of resignification, both in relation to dominant heterosexual identities and in terms of queer identity’s own difference across cultures, nations, and chronotopes” (p. 127). She then addresses the issue of repositioning black identities through an analysis of the British Notting Hill Carnival (as live event and in its textual and visual representations). Concerned as she is to flesh out the intersubjective mechanisms by which subjects rearticulate themselves within particular chronotopes, Peeren appeals to the concepts of speech genres, translation, territory, and versioning to articulate her developing theoretical position. By bringing such theorists as Hamid Naficy, Jacques Derrida, Gayatri Spivak, Peter Hitchcock, Roman Jakobson, Deleuze and Guattari, and Walter Benjamin into the conversation as primary interlocutors with Bakhtin, she successfully weaves a convincing argument about how alternative chronotopes (which are sites of political agency) can be intersubjectively established. As she claims, “the Carnival frees the ground of Notting Hill, stripping it of its existing chronotopic determinations and enabling the Carnival revelers to de- and reterritorialize it into a vehicle of positive self-expression and identity” (p. 189). At the same time, she theoretically extends aspects of her working concepts. For example, in her discussion on translation (and its inherent relation to an original), Peeren is quick to dispel its commensurability with what Andrew Benjamin calls the “reign of the same.” Instead, she desires to remake the concept of translation in order to expose it as a “form of agency situated between identity and alterity, self and other, transparency and opacity, domestic and foreign, authentic and false, original and copy” (p. 151). In the end however, for Peeren, the concept of versioning signifies a semiotic freedom unlike its literary and/or technological counterparts: dubbing, translation, or hybridity. Versioning, as she indicates, denotes transformation and it is here that Peeren locates a form of agency that keeps identity constitution (and reconstitution) in motion. As the ability “to turn” and offer one’s particular account of life’s events from a particular spatiotemporal context (thus instantiating a tropic
logic), “versions mark agency without claiming truth or totality” (p. 208). For Peeren, versioning, as a theoretical and methodological concept, thus initiates a “logic of the turn” that eliminates hierarchy and allows for a both/and logic of socio-cultural inclusion and political potency.

This book offers a dense, theoretical read that is highly worth the effort. In her explication, Peeren provides a comprehensive analysis of not only her chosen popular culture artifacts but also the postmodern ideas about identity construction and transformation from which we currently draw. Signaling the need for us to maintain an alterity within our understanding of ourselves and others in dialogue, Peeren successfully enhances our understanding of Bakhtin and his central notions of chronotopes, dialogism, and the carnival. Her analysis is intelligent, provocative, and insightful. Using semiotic theory to frame her overall project, Peeren offers readers an engaging treatment of how identity resignification is possible within particular spatio-temporal parameters that, above all, are best understood as semiotic, hence cultural, constructions. By providing her readers a new “versioning” of Bakhtin and identities-as-intersubjectivities, I believe she accomplishes her theoretical goal. As she rightly indicates, “it is not enough to expose identities as social constructions or to argue that these constructions should be deconstructed; identities need to be situated in the specificity of their constitution in order to find the precise locales where their most productive versionings might take place” (p. 230). Through analyses of such topics as sexuality (and its normative gendered markings), the potential transformations of voice (hearing) and vision (seeing), race relations, and cultural markings of class distinctions, Peeren challenges us to move beyond our theoretical comfort zones and engage postmodern theories more directly as objects of analysis in their own right. By doing so, we will recognize them as the artifacts of culture they are and extend and possibly move beyond them. Peeren’s project does not represent a good application of theory to popular culture, but a thorough engagement of theory with popular culture in true dialogic fashion. This book will appeal to anyone interested in the on-going dialogue surrounding subjectivity constitution, agency, popular culture, and, of course, Bakhtin’s most central concepts. Contrary to a certain “Bakhtin-fatigue” that may plague current postmodern theorizing, Peeren does, in fact, “breathe new life” into his work. I highly recommend the read.

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Tim Beasley-Murray’s comparative study of the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and Walter Benjamin offers a detailed investigation into the intersections of their work on the question of experience and form—the question, that is, of the relation between individual, subjective experience and the forms afforded by modernity for the understanding and expression of that experience. By identifying and elaborating upon key points of connection between the two thinkers’ work, Beasley-Murray makes a compelling case for their very similar engagement with the European philosophical tradition on this question, even as he justifies the utility of the comparative approach for the illumination of each thinker’s work on broader questions of discursive ethics and the politics of language.

In establishing an exigency for the comparative approach, Beasley-Murray lays out the connections that can be drawn between Bakhtin and Benjamin. First, he notes their common intellectual background in the European philosophical tradition, specifically with respect to their engagement with the dialectic of Kantian idealism and *Lebensphilosophie.* Second, he notes the oblique connection afforded by their respective contact with particular intermediary figures, such as Georg Lukács, and indicates a set of common concerns with aesthetic attempts to disrupt the relation between experience and form, such as Benjamin notes in Brecht’s work and as Bakhtin notes in the case of Russian Formalism. Third, he notes posthumous congruities among the ways in which the work of each thinker has been taken up, specifically with respect to poststructuralist thought. Finally, and most importantly for his argument, Beasley-Murray points up their different but analogous engagements with modernity, specifically on the question of experience and form. By the end of the introduction, Beasley-Murray has laid a solid foundation for the comparative study and has opened the way to a productive consideration of the conceptual congruities between the two thinkers’ work on the question that defines much of their mature philosophical writing.

After laying out these points of connection, Beasley-Murray begins the substance of his argument in the first chapter, “Habit and Tradition,” by attending first to the ways in which each thinker engages with notions of habit and tradition as social mechanisms through which experience “receives form” (p. 19). Their shared concern with the potentially deforming power of authoritarian ritual marks the beginning of their attempt to negotiate between the terms of subjective experience and objective, or externally determined, form. Beasley-Murray is quick to point out, however, that neither writer seeks the wholesale rejection of habit and tradition as legitimate means of giving form to experience. Each
thinker, in his own way, critiques authoritarian tradition as reductive and homogenizing while working to articulate a counter-tradition that preserves rather than annihilates difference. The key connection drawn here is between Benjamin’s notion of transmissibility as the essential feature of a non-authoritarian tradition and Bakhtin’s notion of the “internally persuasive word” (p. 37) as contrasted with authoritarian discourse. The counter-traditions offered by each, while posited in opposition to authoritarian tradition, are neither relativistic nor nihilistic. Rather, they seek the proliferation of critical experiential perspectives in the formation of the collective experience that is tradition.

This shared concern for the promotion of openness to multiplicity of perspective gathers weight in the second chapter, “Experience,” where Beasley-Murray very clearly lays out the key terms of the philosophical polemic in which the work of Bakhtin and Benjamin is situated. In this remarkably lucid and concise summary of the movement from Kantian idealism through neo-Kantianism and Lebensphilosophie, Beasley-Murray traces the development of Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s thought on the question of experience and form in terms of the two modes of experience described within this tradition—Erlebnis, the subjective, inner, lived experience, and Erfahrung, the more objective, communicable, and socially regulated experience. It is here that the question of experience and form, the central concern of this book, finds its fullest articulation. It is indeed arguably the most fundamental question of philosophy, the relation of the particular to the general, or the subjective to the objective. Bakhtin and Benjamin take up the question of the rupture between experience and form in terms of a “tragedy of culture” and a “crisis of experience” respectively, and both interpret the predicament as a kind of tyranny of Erfahrung. Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s respective engagement with the thought of Georg Simmel can be read in their separate but highly congruent accounts of what might serve as a resolution to the tragedy and a solution to the crisis. Bakhtin’s notion of “responsible participation” is very closely akin to Benjamin’s “new and higher form of experience” in the commitment both to the integrity of the subjective experience and to the communicability of that experience to other subjects. Retaining hope in the transmissibility of experience by advocating an intersubjective approach to the question of experience and form, both thinkers supply a much-needed corrective to the radical relativism that is the great pitfall of Lebensphilosophie, some variants of which prize radically subjective experience to the exclusion of any possible common ground among subjects. Some readers may find Chapter Two a better beginning point than Chapter One because the second chapter provides a helpful philosophical context for the book’s larger argument. However, Chapter Two does build nicely on the discussion in Chapter One of the power of tradition to shape experience for good or for ill.

In the third chapter, “Language,” Beasley-Murray takes up Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s theories of language as they appear in each thinker’s direct engagement with the question of experience and form as a distinctly discursive problem. The most salient connection drawn here is between Bakhtin’s theory of heteroglossia and Benjamin’s conception of translation. Beasley-Murray deftly shows a common concern for multivoicedness in their separate
conceptions of the nature of discursive interactions. Bakhtin’s novelistic heteroglossia, as a creative amplification of social dynamism inherent within language, can be seen as a complement to Benjamin’s notion of translation, which serves to revitalize both the source and the target languages by virtue of something akin to dialogic interaction.

Beasley-Murray’s argument achieves its greatest purchase in the fourth and final chapter, “Totalities,” in which he moves the discussion more squarely into the realm of aesthetics, the arguable home territory of both of these two thinkers. His concern here is primarily with the question of completion and how it bears both on aesthetic production and reception and on the broader experience of dwelling in modern society. Both Bakhtin and Benjamin argue for a resistance to totalizing discursive and aesthetic forms that seek to finalize human experience for the purposes of maintaining authoritarian forms of social organization. As in the earlier discussion of tradition, however, the critique of totalities is not absolute. Rather, each thinker articulates a fuller conception of totality than is afforded by the current social order. Opposing the authoritarian drive to totality in language and other formal mechanisms, Bakhtin and Benjamin seek a wholeness that emerges only from a careful consideration of the very fractured nature of modern experience. Wholeness, it seems, is achievable only via a direct engagement with its opposite.

Beasley-Murray concludes that both Bakhtin and Benjamin view as “closed” the forms available to the modern subject for the understanding and expression of experience. That is, modern forms are incapable of accommodating the dynamic and spontaneous nature of individual, subjective experience. This closure of forms results in the deformation of the subjective identity. Both thinkers, Beasley-Murray argues, theorize more “open” forms that “promote the preservation of (inter)subjectivity, the dismantling of authoritarian hierarchies and a responsible relationship between the conferring of form and the integrity of experience” (p. 18). Each does so in ways peculiar to his own methodology, but both advocate a proliferation of voices and perspectives in the discursive relations that condition the relation between experience and form.

Though at times the comparative approach in this book displays signs of strain, these moments are never without the author’s acknowledgement of the perils of sketching an oversimplified symmetry. Rather, Beasley-Murray’s entire approach appears to be premised upon the very Bakhtinian notion of the illuminative potential of the refraction of voices brought into dialogue with one another, in all of their similarity and difference. Perhaps in this regard, this study is better described as dialogic than as merely comparative, as the deftness of Beasley-Murray’s analysis truly accomplishes the aim stated at the outset to bring the two thinkers into proximity in order to “highlight aspects of both thinkers that otherwise remain in the shadows” (p. 4). Scholars who work intensively with the thought of either Bakhtin or Benjamin would do well to consider the work of the other, and Beasley-Murray’s study provides a firm ground from which to advance further comparative inquiry. This is true not only with respect to the book’s central question of experience and form, but also in reference to broader questions concerning ethics, politics, and aesthetics, which Beasley-
Murray identifies as lying at the heart of the work of both Bakhtin and Benjamin. As the first, and to my knowledge, the only comparative study of the work of these two influential thinkers, Beasley-Murray’s book has made an impressive start down a path that promises to yield a good deal of valuable insight into the thought of both Bakhtin and Benjamin.
CALL FOR PAPERS

RUSSIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION
SUMMER 2009 SPECIAL ISSUE

“THE RUSSIAN ANEKDOT TODAY: SPEECH GENRES, PERFORMANCES AND INTERTEXTUALITY”

Please send your submissions electronically to the issue’s co-editors Marina Kulinich [marina-kulinich@yandex.ru], Vladimir Karasik [vkarasik@yandex.ru] and William Graves III [wgraves@bryant.edu]

Deadline for submission – March 31, 2009

As a “primary genre” in Bakhtin’s sense of this term, that great instrument of Russian ironic humor, the “anekdot,” has played a key cultural and social role throughout Russian and Soviet history (cf. Seth Graham). In spite of the fact that it has long exhibited a very stable, if not completely formulaic, narrative structure, the “anekdot” has also been a speech genre exhibiting a very broad range of social uses across a great number of different contexts, settings, topics and participant structures in “daily life” (byt). Furthermore, it is well known that the emergence and elaboration of new series of “anekdot” does more than index important cultural and social moments, events and figures; the emergence of new series of “anekdot” also quite often serves to index social and cultural change and, thus, to trace relationships between the “past” and the “present” via intertextual connections to historical representations in literature, film and mass media.

Reviews of the literature suggest that many contemporary scholars have viewed content, structure and social meanings of “anekdot” from a much more specific perspective than the one we have outlined above. Many scholars today, in fact, see the “anekdot” as virtually synonymous with Soviet-era political satire and counterdiscourses to authoritative discourse. And in the passing of the Soviet-era, many have seen in the “anekdot” little more than a sign of that very passing (cf. Alexei Yurchak’s analysis of the fate of “anekdot” as “dead irony.”).

We believe that it is time to reexamine the structures and functions of “anekdot” in Russian life today, moving beyond traditional discussions and analyses of this speech genre as contextually embedded in political discourses of the late socialist period. Instead, we are looking for new perspectives on “anekdot” as genre and as performance. We especially welcome submissions that address the following types of questions from a discourse, performance, rhetorical and/or ethnographic perspectives:
1. What characterizes the role of “anekdot” today compared to its iconic political role in the late socialist period?

2. What specific cultural translation challenges does the “anekdot” pose? How has the character and scope of these translation challenges changed in the most recent series of “anekdot”?

3. Has the intertextual space of the “anekdot” changed or expanded to include linguistic forms, cultural meanings and/or narrative structures from other languages or from other speech communities? If so, how has this affected the cultural meanings, narrative structures and/or social functions of the Russian “anekdot” today?

4. How has the explosion of “new media” (note, for example, www.anekdot-film.ru) affected the cultural meanings, narrative structures and/or social functions of “anekdot” today?

5. In what ways does “anekdot” today index ongoing discourses about identity and economic, political and social change?

6. How do the structures, contexts and performances of “anekdot” orient participants to the past, the present and the future of Russia?

**Sources**


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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

IGOR E. KLYUKANOV

This issue of Russian Journal of Communication is what they’d call a no-special-theme issue. Indeed, it is not dedicated to a famous communication scholar, a controversial concept, or a momentous, revolutionary event (yet another one). It is dedicated to communication, as such, communication that escapes any measure or, rather, is its own measure; communication that simply is — everywhere and “everywhen.” Ethnomethodologists, conversations with our friends and colleagues, the sunrise and the sunset — they all remind us that communication is an everyday and “everynight” process.

There really is nothing special about communication — except that it is always successful. Success here is not to be equated with the so-called mutual understanding or reaching common ground. Communication, as such, always succeeds, because, like history, it is one experience succeeding another. For example, people in various cultures create and interpret signs, and signs, in their turn, create and interpret people; people attempt to bridge a gap between themselves and their experiences — and, in the process, turn this gap into a meaningful interval that continues on and on; people move and change places, trying to adjust to new surroundings; people are affected by “new media” as they form images of one another.

Communication is always successful because there is something that communication follows or goes after, calling for our participation and exploration. Communication is our attempt to explain and understand our experiences, to give them names. And, those experiences that can’t be named, are perhaps the most common and sacred; we all know, albeit tacitly, this rupture because words fail us (or we them), and communication is interrupted precisely when there is still so much to be said. Such experiences are beyond any current academic denomination — intrapersonal, interpersonal, small group, organizational, etc. Or, rather, such experiences take the form of the deepest and most invigorating currents that are common to all. Communication is what we all experience together, what we have in common — what is special about that?
LOTMAN’S SEMIOSPHERE, PEIRCE’S SIGNS, AND CULTURAL PROCESSES

floyd merrell

This paper brings Lotman’s semiotic space to bear on Peirce’s concept of the sign with respect to broad cultural processes. Consideration of cultural processes in the Peircean mode calls for an extension of Lotman’s pair of terms, primary and secondary modeling systems, in view of Peirce’s notion of the sign as triadic. As a consequence of this extension, the premise in this inquiry has it that: (1) triadic signs within complex cultural processes are interdependent, interrelated and interactive, (2) triadic signs make up an interconnected, contradictory complementary convergent whole, which is inconsistent and/or incomplete, depending upon the cultural context, (3) inconsistency and incompleteness are of the nature of Peirce’s vagueness and generality respectively, the first being chiefly of the nature of the category of Firstness and the second chiefly of the nature of Thirdness, (4) the role of Secondness unfolds through acts of selection from the possibilities of Firstness, such acts of selection involving a separation of signs, their semiotic objects and their interpretants, (5) Thirdness renders signs general, yet generalities are almost invariably incomplete, given human fallibilism, hence the ‘final sign’ or ‘final interpretant’ is always out of reach, and (6) fallibilism breeds a tendency, within broad cultural processes, toward either (a) successive differentiation (or heterogeny) of signs, or (b) hegemony, dominance and subservience, and superordination and subordination.

Keywords: categories, generality, heterogeny, homogeny, incompleteness, inconsistency, vagueness

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Before there are signs, there is pure possibility; that is, the range of all possible possibilities. Then signs begin emerging, from Firstness to Secondness to Thirdness. Firstness is what it is, without any relationship whatsoever with any other. It is self-contained, self-reflexive, and self-sufficient. Secondness is what it is, insofar as it enters into relationship with some other, interacting with it in the sense of something here and something else there, the first something possibly acting as a sign and the second something acting as the object of the sign. Thirdness is what it is, in the respect that it brings Firstness and Secondness together by mediating between them, and at the same time it brings itself into interaction with them in the same way they are brought into interaction with each other (CP 2.227-390).

We have the categories’ interrelatedness in Figure 1. Notice how these categories are ‘democratic’, since each one is interrelated with the other two in the same way they are interrelated with each other. Notice that the model is not ‘triangular’, but rather, there are three lines meeting at a point in the form of a ‘tripod’ such that there cannot be merely a binary relation between one category and another, for the interrelations between any two categories are possible solely by means of interrelations between all three categories. Notice also that the swirling lines illustrating the processual character of these interrelations essentially make up a ‘Borromean knot’ (the dotted lines). The Borromean knot exercises a move from the two-dimensional sheet toward three-dimensionality with the overlapping lines. This is significant, I would respectfully submit. For, the three lines making up the categorical interrelations are not simply two-dimensional. They are more properly conceived as the tripod as seen from either above or below, that, as a result of the swiveling lines of the Borromean knot, oscillates forward and backward as the lines swirl and gyrate. Thus the three-dimensionality of ‘semiotic space’, which, along with a temporal dimension, makes up a nonlinear timespace composite.

If we place Peirce’s tripartite components making up the sign in their appropriate diagrammatical form, we will have a ‘tripod’ as depicted in Figure 2. The representamen—otherwise commonly dubbed a ‘sign’ in parlance—is self-contained unless and until it comes into interdependent interaction and interrelation with its respective semiotic object—the object with which it interacts. And the interpretant—a composite of the ‘interpretation’ and ‘meaning’ developed through interdependent, interrelated interaction between the sign
and some interpreter—mediates the *representamen* and *semiotic object* in the same way that it mediates between itself and them. If we qualify Peirce’s basic trio of sign types—*icons, indices* and *symbols*—according to their proper place in the ‘tripod’, we will have the same ‘tripod’, as depicted in Figure 3.

In regard to the Peircean notion of categories and signs, let us briefly turn to Jurij Lotman.

**The Nature of the Biosemiosphere**

Lotman writes that all signs are ‘immersed in a semiotic space’, and they ‘can only function by interaction with that space’.¹ He calls this combination of signs and semiotic space the ‘semiosphere’. Lotman has defined ‘semiotic space’ in terms of mythology not as a ‘sign continuum’, but as a ‘totality of separate objects bearing proper names. It is as if space had been interrupted by the intervals between objects and thus lacks from our viewpoint such a basic trait as continuity’ (Lotman 1977b: 237). It is this discontinuous aspect of ‘semiotic space’ that will be under the spotlight in the pages that follow.

The semiosphere ‘is the result and the condition for the development of culture; we justify our term by analogy with the biosphere, which includes the totality of all living matter and also the condition for the continuation of life’ (Lotman 1990: 124-25). Lotman refers to V. I. Vernadsky, for whom all living organisms are intimately bound to one another and cannot exist as autonomous entities. The biosphere encompasses everything that happens within it with respect to interactions between the living organisms of all communities therein contained. In other words, if we bring Peirce’s categories to bear on Vernadsky’s biosphere and Lotman’s semiosphere, we have the makings of multiple Peircean Borromean knots of interrelations that are themselves in perpetual flowing movement in and out of each other while entering into and breaking from triadic interrelations. In other words, we have what we might call a triadically flowing *biosemiosphere*.² Lotman usually keeps the terms in separation, but I include them in one all-encompassing term.

We read from Lotman that what I have dubbed the *biosemiosphere* is marked by ‘heterogeneity’. This is because the languages that ‘fill up the semiotic space are various, and they relate to each other along the spectrum which runs from complete mutual translatability to just as complete mutual untranslatability. Heterogeneity is defined both by the diversity of elements and by their different functions’. In this sense, if we imagine a model of a semiotic space where all the languages emerge into existence at one and the same moment, we ‘still would not have a single coding structure but a set of connected but different systems’ (Lotman 1990: 125).
Lotman goes on to write that in order to develop a model, say, of European Romanticism, we run into problems if we expect to map out homogeneous interrelationships between various expressions of Romanticism from one area to another and from one time period to another. There will be differences not of kind, such as there would be between Romanticism and Neoclassicism, but of degree, of iconic variations or variations of Peirce’s Firstness emerging into Secondness and Thirdness, such that there can be no mutually complete translation between one expression of Romanticism and another. This is to say that the biosemiosphere is in processual development: it is always nonlinearly becoming something other than what it was previously becoming. Thus the development is ‘asymmetrical’ with respect to its heterogeneity. Signs become signs within the biosemiosphere as it nonlinearly becomes other than what it was in semiospace along diverging and converging semiotemporal lines.

Given the element of heterogeneity in language, Lotman alludes to literary texts as ‘secondary modeling systems’, the ‘primary modeling system’ being that of language itself, the medium for literary texts. This ‘dual modeling’ nature of language was by and large adopted by the Tartu school of semiotics (Lotman and Uspenskij 1984, Nakhimovsky and Nakhimovsky 1985). However, Thomas Sebeok (1991) convincingly argues that language is already a ‘secondary modeling system’. Language consists of symbolic signs—predominantly of Thirdness.

In keeping with Sebeok’s argument, Peirce pointed out at length in his writings that symbolic signs depend on iconic signs—predominantly of Firstness—and indexical signs—predominantly of Secondness—in order that they might play out their proper semiotic role. This is to say that symbolic or linguistic signs contain, within themselves, iconic and indexical signs. They presuppose iconic and indexical signs functions, and hence they cannot remain autonomous of their other two partners in Peirce’s signs triad: the trio of signs—icons, indices and symbols—are interdependent, interrelated, and interactive.

**Taking the Next Step**

In view of Peirce’s triadic concept of signs, I would venture to take an additional step beyond Sebeok with the suggestion that language is already a ‘tertiary’ rather than a ‘secondary modeling system’. Language depends on a ‘primary modeling system’—iconicity, insofar as it contains the possibility for interdependent interrelations with some other—and a ‘secondary modeling system’—indexicality, interaction with the other forming the necessary process for the emergence of symbolicity, the ‘tertiary modeling system’, mediating between iconicity and indexicality in the same manner in which it mediates between itself and them.

What are the implications of this notion? That ‘modeling systems’ also fall in line with the trio of interdependent, interactive interrelations as illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3. So would literary texts fall into another pigeon hole qualified as ‘quaternary modeling systems’?
That might appear as a viable assumption. Then would the hierarchy continue, including ‘pentadic’, ‘hexadic’, ‘heptadic’, and so on, ‘modeling systems’? Commensurate with the spirit of Peirce, that might also be a reasonable conclusion. So much for speculations on such complexity, however. Let us stick to the first three ‘modeling systems’ for the time being.

Peirce’s three sign types engender, and are engendered by, nine sign types, which can combine to engender Peirce’s basic decalogue of signs (Table 1). I will not enter into detail regarding the nature of each of these sign types according to the examples offered in the right-hand column. What is of importance at the moment is the structure of the ten signs given in the left-hand column. Notice that each sign type is qualified by the representamen (R), the semiotic object (O) and the interpretant (I), and that these sign components are qualified by three numerals specifying the Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness of R, O and I respectfully. It would appear reasonable to infer that iconicity is the chief feature of signs 1, 2 and 5, given that the object and interpretant are limited to category Firstness, which is to say that they are at this stage of the sign’s processual development no more than possibilities—the ‘primary modeling system’. Indexicality pervades signs 3, 4, 6 and 7, since the object and the interpretant are chiefly in the process of their development into Secondness, which entails the actualization of the other of the sign—the ‘secondary modeling system’. Symbolicity becomes predominant regarding signs 8, 9 and 10, the latter of which represents the culmination of the sign decalogue, having developed some aspect of Thirdness regarding its representamen, object and interpretant—the ‘tertiary modeling system’.

What is the importance of the subscripted sign components regarding R-O-I? Notice that from the simplest sign, R_O_I to the most complex sign of the decalogue, R_O_I, there is a general progression. But it isn’t exactly linear. The sequence from the first sign to the fourth sign is linear, but the fifth sign digresses with respect to the O and the I. Then from the sixth sign the linear progression resumes up to the tenth sign. Thus the fifth sign plays a pivotal role, and it is the main actor in the process of signs becoming other signs, as I have argued in merrell (1995, 1997). This nonlinear aspect of sign development falls in line with the biosemiosphere’s ‘assymetry’, as mentioned above. Notice also that each of the signs is categorically distinct from the other nine signs. One would tend to assume, then, that each of the ten signs is capable of standing alone, that it is virtually autonomous, and that there is no necessary connection between each sign and any of the others. Not so, however. In light of the above suggestions, all ten signs remain indelibly interdependent, interrelated and interactive, depending on the context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGN TYPE</th>
<th>COMMON EXAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R_1O_1I_1</td>
<td>FEELING OF BLUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_1O_1I_1</td>
<td>VAGUE SENSE OF A FORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_1O_1I_1</td>
<td>RECOGNITION OF SOMETHING STILL INDEFINITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_1O_1I_1</td>
<td>AWARENESS OF INDICATION OF SOMETHING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_1O_1I_1</td>
<td>CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOMETHING INTERRELATED WITH SOMETHING ELSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_1O_1I_1</td>
<td>PERSONAL PRONOUN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_1O_1I_1</td>
<td>COMMONPLACE EXPRESSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_1O_1I_1</td>
<td>WORD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_1O_1I_1</td>
<td>SENTENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_1O_1I_1</td>
<td>ARGUMENT, TEXT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1
For example, when an apparently solitary image, sign $R_1O_1I_1$, enters the attention of an interpreting agent, it becomes the object of some feeling of something on the part of that agent, and then in a split second the agent sees it as something or other with respect to something else within a particular context. Which is to say that the sign has already progressed beyond the Firstness of itself, its possible object, and its possible interpretant. It is a sign that has passed on into some other sign which is in this moment no more than a vague form, or sign $R_2O_1I_1$. Then in another split second the agent recognizes the form as so-and-so, sign $R_2O_1I_1$, and identifies it as something other, that is so-and-so because it is of a certain nature and certain characteristics, the transition $R_2O_2I_2 \rightarrow R_2O_1I_1$. Now the sign can pass on to become a pronoun, a common expression, or a name labeling the sign ($R_3O_2I_1$, $R_4O_2I_2$ or $R_3O_1I_1$). Subsequently, the word can pass on and become incorporated into a sentence ($R_3O_2I_2$) and an argument or text ($R_3O_3I_2$). This 'passing on', this process of relatively simple signs becoming complex signs, can occur in the mere blink of an eye. In other words, 'passing on' can entail: (1) raw sensing, primarily of Firstness, (2) sensing and perceiving the sign as so-and-so, primarily of Secondness, and (3) conceiving that the sign as so-and-so because it has been endowed by the semiotic agent with such-and-such a set of characteristics, primarily of Thirdness.

Sensing, sensing as, and perceiving and conceiving that, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, or sign, object and interpretant, one might wish to assume, involve three perceptual and conceptual acts separated by distinct lines of demarcation. Not so, once again. The process is just that: process. It takes place in what would seem to be a flash, and, given the semiotic agent’s persistence of feeling and sensation, it is taken in as if it was processual, and for all intent and purposes it is processual. In other words, according to persistence of sensation, perception and conception appear to the semiotic agent as a process. And when perception and conceptual are the result of ‘habits of mind’ (Boler 1964), they do what they do, and the semiotic agent is often taken along for the ride, whether she knows it or not and whether she likes it or not (see relevant work by Goodman 1978, Hanson 1958, 1969). This is the way of implicit or ‘tacit knowing’, which need not be entirely conscious, and which invariably plays a role in the semiotic agent’s feeling, sensing, perceiving and conceiving (Polanyi 1958).

**The Next Step Qualified**

In order to give fuller account of the importance of ‘tacit knowing’ and ‘habits of mind’, consider Peirce’s often overlooked notion of sign ‘degeneracy’.

Just as signs become other signs of increasing complexity, from icons to indices to symbols, and from words to sentences to texts, so also signs can become ‘degenerate’ in terms of decreasing complexity. By ‘degenerate’, Peirce meant the mathematical use of the term, and it has nothing to do with the ordinary implications of the word as ‘deteriorated’, ‘decayed’, ‘corrupted’, or ‘perverted’. ‘Degenerate’ signs involve the process of signs going
from greater complexity to lesser complexity or relative simplicity. This can occur as signs made and taken by semiotic agents, whether human or some other form of sign making and taking organism, become ‘habituated’, that is, ‘sedimented’ and ‘entrenched’, through repeated use such that they are made and taken ‘tacitly’ as if they were signs of greater complexity.

But they are not. The complexity is only implied; it is tacit, embedded, sedimented, entrenched. Through ‘implied complexity’, ‘McDonald’s’ as a symbol is tacitly assumed in an iconic sign, the image of the franchise’s Golden Arches, and in the indexical function of the image’s interaction with the building housing the product. The sign, when fleshed out, is symbolic, but the symbol and its accompanying index remain embedded within the image as a relatively simple ‘degenerate’ sign carrying a hidden satchel of complexity.

Diagrammatically, schematically, and topologically put, sign ‘degeneracy’ can be illustrated thusly: just as a point, by multiplying itself an infinite number of times in linear succession, can become a line, so also a line can become a plane, a plane a solid, and a solid a hypersolid. In other words, it is a matter of zero-dimensionality becoming one-dimensionality, one becoming two, two becoming three, and three becoming four-dimensionality, as in Figure 4. De-engenderment, or degeneracy, then, would reverse the process. In this respect, just as a point has the potentiality to become a line, a line a plane, a plane a solid, and a solid a hypersolid, so also dimensionalities can, topologically speaking, be compacted or compressed to a point.

Put yet another way in terms of Figure 5, ‘degenerate’ implies that symbolic signs are made and taken as if they were signs of indexicality or iconicity. A symbolic sign having become sedimented to the first level of degeneracy is tantamount to an indexical sign, and a symbolic sign having become sedimented to the second level of degeneracy is tantamount to an iconic sign (Peirce CP 2.246-72). First level mediation takes signs from Firstness to Secondness, iconicity to indexicality, and from feeling-sensitivity to sensation-perception, and second level mediation takes signs from Secondness to Thirdness, indexicality to symbolicity, and sensation-perception to conception-articulation. Degeneracy, then, would reverse the arrows, from Thirdness to Firstness.

A more practical illustration would seem to be in order.
THE CUBOLATOR

Playing around with dimensionalities inevitably takes one’s mind to the realm of cubist art. What is it that the cubist is doing? In essence, presenting a three-dimensional object on a two-dimensional plane from varying perspectives of the three-dimensional object as if the artist were looking at the object now from the front, now from the back, now from one side or the other, now from an upper angle, now from a lower angle, and so on (for further, Shlain 1991, Merrell 2007).

Of course during the process of mentally or physically walking around the object in order to attain a diversity of perspectival grasps, the artist is required a series of time lapses. But where is time in the finished painting? It’s there, in an instant, crystallized, as in the hypersolid of figure 4. This is metaphorically tantamount to the point becoming a line and the line a plane and so on during successive increments of time, and then it’s all there all at once, in the four-dimensional hypersolid. The hypersolid, then, is a visual metaphor comparable to what we see when we gaze at a work by Pablo Picasso.

A simplified illustration of the cubist method is available by considering a Necker cube from its two possible incarnations, then blending them, as in Figure 6, where the letters, R, O and I, or ‘Representamen’ (sign), ‘Object’ and ‘Interpretant’ are superimposed in order to give the impression of their being so sensed, perceived, conceived and interpreted in all their variations in an instant. It is as if one were viewing the sign from one angle within one context and interpreting it, then viewing it from another angle and context and interpreting it as differentiated with respect to what it was. Within the blended cubes, what we have is a combination of all possible interpretations. Figure 6, in this respect, suggests that within the lowermost image, we have the Firstness or possibility of the two interpretations of the ambiguous image, within the middle images we have an actualization, as Secondness, of the alternative ambiguous interpretations, and in the uppermost image we have the two interpretations combined a potentially revealing, as Thirdness, the cubes’ ambiguity.

CUBOTOLOGY-DEGENERATOLOGY AND THE PEIRCEAN SIGN

What does this ‘cubotological’ talk have to do with degeneracy? Much, I would suggest. The standard Saussurean concept of the sign, derived from Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory of language, and especially the practice of Saussure-inspired ‘structuralism’, is indelibly binary in nature; that is, it holds true to bivalent logic. It allows a choice between...
one alternative and another: truth or falsity, good or bad, male or female, black or white, and so on.

What I attempt coming to grips with in this essay is an ‘logic’ for processing cultural meaning consisting of basically three values, namely: (1) imaginary (giving rise to viable new possibilities that can emerge and take their respective place in our perceived and conceived world in terms of how we distinguish it into our familiar bivalently ordered eithers and ors—chiefly of the nature of Firstness), (2) either one alternative or the other one—tantamount to bivalent logic chiefly from within the sphere of Secondness, and (3) emergent and at the outset often virtually nonsensical (that is, within our given timespace context, but within some other possible context, what emerged and appeared nonsensical could become a viable and meaningful alternative to our mode of sensing, perceiving and conceiving signs—chiefly of the nature of Thirdness). In another manner of putting these three values in view of Figure 7: (1) the lower level depicts viable possibilities (Firstness) emerging from the virtually infinite range of all possible possibilities (or 0), (2) a pair of these possibilities can be actualized or realized as either the one or the other (Secondness), each within a separate temporal moment, and (3) these actualities can be given composite interpretative implication as a potentiality (Thirdness) within its respective context.

But when everything is taken into consideration is this not reducible to just another form of bivalency? Well, in a certain sense, yes. The Necker cube is doubly ambiguous, for sure. But all one need do is contemplate a Picasso painting and one will become aware of the multiply ambiguous nature of the work, and by extension, of the physical world, of mental worlds, and of semiosis.

So, how can this be given an ‘alternative logical’ formulation? Consider the following.

**The Nondual, Contradictory Complementary Lattice**

**Intralinguistic Practices**

Figure 7 entices us with the notion of the range of all possible possibilities, 0, a first level representamen or sign, R₁, its respective semiotic object, O₁, and mediation, M₁, giving rise to the emergence of an interpretant, or interpretation, I₁. At the second level we have the doubly mediated offspring of the first level in R₂, O₂, and M₂-I₂. At the uppermost point of the lattice we have S (counterpart to the upper level of Figure 6), which is a contradictory complementary convergent fusion, a hybrid or alloy, of ROI, which includes everything in the lattice that has been engendered from the lowermost point, 0.
What is going on here? There is no direct path from $M_1-I_1$ to $M_2-I_2$, from $O_1$ to $O_2$, or from first level mediation to second level mediation. So how can it be that everything is \textit{inter-dependent}, \textit{inter-related} and \textit{inter-active}, according to the premises I’ve put forth in this essay? The paucity of direct, linear pathways is precisely of the nature of the \textit{nonlinear}, \textit{context-dependent} lattice.\footnote{We cannot go directly from any one of the first level sign components to its counterpart at the second level because there is no classical linearity. Everything is \textit{inter-connected}, but through mediation by way of \textit{contradictory complementary convergence}. Now what do I mean by that?}

I mean that the lattice is not exclusively bivalently ordered but ordered by an ‘alternative logic’. This alternative is defined by the following processes—and I write ‘processes’, because what is becoming by virtue of the lattice is always becoming something other than what it was previously becoming. That is to say, everything is incessantly changing; nothing is fixed. The lattice operates in terms of a departure from Boolean principles according to the following:

1. \begin{align*}
R_1 \times O_1 &= 0 \\
O_2 \times R_2 &= M_1-I_1 \\
M_1-I_1 \times O_1 &= 0 \\
M_2-I_2 \times R_2 &= 0
\end{align*}

(In other words, the ‘disjunction’, or product of any two signs within the lattice calls for a move downward until a common point is reached. The ultimate product, or the range of all \textit{possible possibilities}, 0, entails inclusion of everything that might emerge from within an unlimited range of timespace contexts; it includes \textit{both} ‘this’ as possibility … \textit{and} ‘that’ … and ‘that’ … \textit{n}.)

2. \begin{align*}
R_1 + O_1 &= M_2-I_2 \\
O_2 + R_2 &= S \\
M_1-I_1 + O_1 &= S \\
M_2-I_2 + R_2 &= S
\end{align*}

(In other words, the convergence, ‘conjunction’, or sum of any two signs within the lattice calls for a move upward, and movement upward creates more inclusive contexts.\footnote{Thus, converging signs entail alternate contexts capable of including the range of all signs involved; such contexts embody \textit{neither} ‘this’ previously existing context … \textit{nor} ‘that’ one … \textit{nor} ‘that’ one … \textit{n}, but something else.)}

Let us proceed with the observation that 0 is the range of all possible possibilities, and $S$ is the contradictory complementary convergence of all disjunctive or common elements between the terms of the lattice. Notice that: (1) the uppermost level of the lattice is nothing without the lowermost level, which allows for the \textit{emergence} of actual signs from within the
range of all possible possibilities, (2) inter-dependency regarding the uppermost level and the lowermost level is impossible without inter-action at the middle levels, and (3) the middle levels give rise to the possibility of emerging inter-relations regarding the annealed, hybrid elements making up the uppermost level.

Notice also, in this light, that: (1) R, O and I are no longer separate elements, but rather, they have merged or converged into one another to yield a hybrid or alloyed signifying process, (2) R, O and I at all levels of the lattice can be of the same language, which is to say that each sign within a given language, during successive instantiations of its use within different contexts, is always becoming something other than what it was becoming in the previous instant, which is to say that intralinguistic translation is germane to everyday language use, and (3) R, O and I can be interlinguistic or intersemiotic, or a mixture thereof, but in whichever case there can be no translation without inter-dependent, inter-related inter-action of iconicity and indexicality as well as symbolicity; in other words, no translation can be exclusively linguistic (symbolic).

The process of signs becoming something other than what they were becoming might seem contradictory in nature, since R (the sign), is what O (the semiotic object) is not, and both R and O are what I (the interpretant) is not. However, the contradiction is the appearance that hides the underlying convergent nature of the semiotic process, whose processual character is actually that of complementarity. There is complementarity in the semiotic process, since, as intimated repeatedly in the above paragraphs, R, O, and I are thoroughly interdependent, interrelated and interactive, such that there is a tinge of O and I in R, of R and I in O, and of O and R in I.

With the lattice in mind, let us turn to interlinguistic and intersemiotic transformations during sign translation.

**CONTRADICTORY COMPLEMENTARY CONVERGENCE VIEWED THROUGH CULTURAL PROCESSES**

*Interlinguistic translation always includes some form of intersemiotic translation*

Let us first consider the metaphorization process. We begin with an image (iconicity, Firstness), which is then interrelated interactively with a particular object it motivates in the physical world and/or the mind (indexicality, Secondness), and then a word is evoked (symbolicity, Thirdness). This makes up the first tripartite tier of the Figure 8 lattice.

The second tier incorporates the process of metaphorization wherein the original image is endowed with a particular subspecies of the sign in question, which is then figuratively interrelated and interacted with something the first tier sign, object and interpretant are not, to yield the metaphorical equation at the lattice’s uppermost level: ‘Winston Churchill (is a bulldog)’. The man is not the animal, but the man evinces some aspect or other of what the
animal is, hence the metaphorical homology. Tier one entails literal interpretation and tier two figurative interpretation; mediation one gives the customary symbol or word while mediation two entails the creation of a variation of the image, the interconnection and the metaphor from 0, the range of all possible possibilities within an indefinite number of possible contexts. The final symbolic evocation, ‘Winston Churchill (is a bulldog)’, contains neither Winston Churchill as ordinarily perceived and conceived nor a bulldog as ordinarily perceived and conceived; rather, it contains our now familiar fused, blended, hybrid mix, a contradictory complementary convergence of signs, objects, and interpretations in a slightly to radically distinct manner.

Let us try another figurative device: a portmanteau word. At tier one of Figure 9 we have (1) the sign-word, ‘chocolate’, (2) the object, which is ordinarily what ‘chocolate’ is not, ‘alcohol’, and (3) the first mediation, mediation. The format for this lattice is somewhat at variance with that of the Figure 8 lattice since we begin with sign-words, or symbols, rather than images. At tier two we have one of the consequences of alcohol when consumed by humans, consumption acting as the mediator between alcohol and chocolate at Mediation. Mediation (= S), at the lattice’s apex, gives us the contradictory complementary converging blend, ‘chocoholic’, a portmanteau word. I would respectfully submit that by this procedure it is possible to give a diagrammatic illustration of any and all rhetorical devices.

At this juncture I should reiterate the assumptions I put forth at the outset of this essay, namely, all signs, in the Peircean sense, involve translation: (1) of signs of the same language within different contexts, (2) of signs from one language to another language, and (3) of signs of distinct semiotic types. And yet, translation of the first and second sort is embraced by intersemiotic translation of the third sort given that, as suggested above, all intralinguistic and interlinguistic translation involves iconicity and indexicality as well as symbolicity. In other words, all intralinguistic and interlinguistic translation involves signs as pre-linguistic images, diagrams and metaphors, whether visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory or gustatory (second degree degeneracy), and signs in interrelated interactivity with respect to their objects (first degree degeneracy).

The very notion of degeneracy is in this manner germane to the process of signs incessantly becoming something other than what they were becoming, that is, to the process
of sign translation. As a further example of degeneracy, if one alludes to one of the four appendages holding up the nearest table as ‘leg’, one is using a doubly generate sign. One uses the image (Firstness, icon, image) of a ‘leg’, and the function of the appendage (Secondness, index, connection) in one’s allusion to the ‘leg’ (Thirdness, symbol, word). And one comes forth with the verbal evocation, ‘table leg’, as if the ‘dead metaphor’, along with its iconic and indexical nature, were a word used in literal fashion. But it is not. Use of the word ‘leg’ involves implicit, tacit, sedimented imagery or iconicity, and indexicality or allusion, in addition to symbolic articulation: a ‘habit of mind’.

INTERNATIONAL-INTERSEMIOTIC TRANSLATION:
BRAZIL, THE FOOTBALL COUNTRY

Now comes the moment to begin pondering over the intricacies of interlinguistic translation through illustration of the actual complexity involved in what might at the outset appear as a simple one-to-one correspondence between a word from one language and its sibling from another language: ‘futebol’ (in Portuguese, of the specifically Brazilian variety) and ‘soccer’ (in English).

What should be apparently simpler than translating ‘futebol’ into ‘soccer’? The game is obviously the same: rules, number of players, strategies on the playing field, screaming fans in the stands, and so on. As the saying goes by those apparent onlookers who are not true-blood fans, if you’ve seen one game you’ve seen them all. Yes, quite obviously, translation of ‘soccer’ within an English language context is ‘futebol’ within a Portuguese language context. Case closed.

But not so fast. The apparently obvious conceals fluctuating, scintillating, effervescent sign processes incessantly becoming something other than what they were becoming. Anthropologist António Risério (2007) presents the convincing case that Brazilian ‘futebol’ is unique within the Brazilian cultural milieu. It is not just ‘soccer’, nor is it the name of the game in any other of the world’s languages. It is thoroughly Brazilian. Originally from England and transported to Brazilian soil by upper middle and upper class Brazilians obsessed with ‘macaqueando’ (‘parroting’, ‘imitating’) things foreign, ‘futebol’ was initially embraced as the product of an ‘advanced society’ that would surely render Brazil ‘more respectable’ in the eyes of foreigners. And so ‘futebol’ became one of the chief sources of Brazil’s emerging national identity.

But is ‘futebol’ really ‘soccer’ as it is ordinarily conceived outside Brazil? Risério’s argument suggests a negative response. Candomblé and other Brazilian hybrid contradictory complementary convergent Afro-Brazilian religions, along with Capoeira, an Afro-Brazilian form of fighting-playing-singing-dancing which is a hybrid blend in its own right, and Samba, an equally blended form of song and dance for which Brazil has become famous, compose a set of repositories for identity making within the country’s cultural flux and flow.
Futebol-Candomblé-Capoeira-Samba: like the sign components discussed above, together they converge and blend into one meaningful whole. If separated, they suffer a loss of meaning and their absence threatens to severely diminish the meaning of the whole. United they stand tall, divided they fall. United, they reveal Brazil’s rich ‘mestiço’ (‘variegatedly mixed’, ‘fused’, ‘hybrid’) culture, a mind-boggling fusion and confusion of races and ethnicities and linguistic variations and cultural practices. Separate any one of the cultural tendencies from the whole, and Brazil is no longer what it was. Futebol-Candomblé-Capoeira-Samba is interdependent, interrelated, and interactive to the core.\(^8\)

But once more, what has this to do with the lattice as developed above? It provides further demonstration of the radically nonlinear, multivalent, flowing and fluctuating nature of cultural processes in general. Figure 10 affords an expanded version of the lattice to illustrate how ‘futebol’ cannot be considered in isolation, and much less translated as a context-free word. ‘Futebol’ is part of Brazil’s rich cultural heritage, and as such it is certainly not the same as ‘futebol’ in England, Germany, Italy, France, Spain, or wherever. It is Brazilian and Brazilian alone. Consequently, translation of ‘futebol’ into the English language as ‘soccer’ simply doesn’t do the trick. If one strives to offer a precise translation, one would be compelled to incorporate the convergent phrase, ‘Futebol-Candomblé-Capoeira-Samba’, into some sort of English counterpart to ‘SamCapCanFut’ (that is, a counterpart to the uppermost point in Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10). But how, really, can we understand Brazilian ‘futebol’ if there is no Capoeira, Candomblé or Samba, Brazilian style, in any English speaking country?\(^9\)

Of course, Brazil has influenced cultures the world over. Capoeira schools abound in the Americas, Europe, Asia and Africa. Candomblé and other Afro-Brazilian hybrids are practiced in many areas of the globe. And who isn’t familiar with Samba and Brazilian Carnaval? But knowing a few detached bits of information about each of these cultural practices is not enough, for there is no collusion of all these cultural tendencies into one, Brazilian style. So to remain true to the cherished idea of translation, in order to attain maximum precision (clear and distinct translation as the ideal), one must resort to vagueness (ambiguity as the actual consequence).

Strange as it might seem, in light of the notion of contradictory complementary convergence as presented, we might be reminded of Niels Bohr’s ‘Complementarity Principle’ and Werner Heisenberg’s ‘Uncertainty Principle’ in their interpretation of
quantum theory according to which a particular manifestation of a quantum event (as ‘wave amplitude’) can be precisely described, but when that manifestation is combined with the event’s other manifestation (as ‘particle’), uncertainty pervades. And we are now at the crux of the issue at hand. The lattice presented in previous sections is none other than a variation of what is termed ‘quantum logic’, which was invented by John von Neumann in an attempt to come to grips with the nonclassical (hence nonbivalent) nature quantum phenomena (Suppes 1971).

Time and space limitations do not allow for expatiation on his topic. However, I would ask you to notice that if we connect Fut₂ to Sam₁ and Sam₂ to Fut₁, and Can₂ to Cap₁ and Cap₂ to Can₁ in Figure 10, we will have a strange juxtaposed image of two Necker cubes. This is not mere coincidence. The juxtaposed image presents an alteration of what is termed a ‘Tessaract’, as depicted in Figure 11. The ‘Tessaract’ is an alternate method for patterning four dimensionality on a two-dimensional plane. The ‘hypersolid’ in Figure 12 is another alternate manifestation of four-dimensionality. Notice also that if you rotate the ‘Tessaract’ of Figure 11 ninety degrees, and stretch it out horizontally, you will end up with an image comparable to the ‘hypersolid’ portrayed in Figure 12.

Whereas the generation of one-, two-, and three-dimensionality from an original point requires an increment of time, the ‘Tessaract’, like the point, exists atemporally. In other words, metaphorically speaking, and commensurate with contemporary physics, the four-dimensional timespace continuum contains three dimensions of space and one-dimensional time compacted into an instant: a timespace singularity. The importance of this act of mental gymnastics is to suggest that the lattice doesn’t model ‘reality’ or ‘objective semiotic reality’, but rather, it is the result of a visual attempt to explain semiotic flux and flow within broad cultural practices.

In sum, we have three general types of interdependent, interrelated interaction and translations within and among them: (1) intralinguistic, (2) interlinguistic, and (3) intersemiotic. All three types incorporate signs: (1) chiefly, though not exclusively, of Firstness (icons), (2) chiefly, though not exclusively, of Secondness (indices), and (3) chiefly, though not exclusively, of Thirdness (symbols). These are the three domains making up Lotman’s general semiosphere. By extension, we have, then, our three ‘modeling systems’: (1) Primary, by and large of signification by way of Firstness, (2) Secondary, by and large of signification by way of Secondness, and (3) Tertiary, by and large of signification by way of Thirdness.

So, what about Lotman’s artistic texts as ‘secondary modeling systems’, and Sebeok’s critique of Lotman armed with the assertion that language is already a ‘secondary modeling
system’? It would appear reasonable to assume that rhetorical, figurative, and imaginary and illusory language use of the sort found in literary texts and elsewhere, mediates, complements, and enhances all three modeling systems herein enumerated.

Would it be prudent, therefore, to assume literary texts belong to a ‘quaternary modeling system’, as tentatively suggested above? Perhaps. However, literary language, mediates, complements, and enhances the stylistic and rhetorical devices already present in language as possibilities. In this sense, all forms of creative and figurative language use would also be expected to fall in line with such a ‘quaternary system’, which would include poetic and literary devices as a subset.

In order to illustrate this point, let us revisit Lotman’s pair of terms homogeneity-heterogeneity.

THE BIOSEMIOSPHERE COMPLEXIFIED

In Figure 13, notice that I have used the terms ‘heterogeny’ and ‘homogeny’ in place of ‘heterogeneity’ and ‘homogeneity’. I do so, above all, in order to set these two terms off from ‘hierogeny’, or ‘hegemony’, the Gramscian term having to do with conflict and negotiation between social groups and ideologies. ‘Hegemony’ bears most particularly on a struggle of opposites.12 This is chiefly the domain of Peirce’s Secondness. If ‘hegemony’ phases largely into category Secondness, then ‘heterogeny’ phases into Thirdness and ‘homogeny’ into Firstness.13

How so? In order to qualify myself, I should further qualify Peirce’s concept of the sign. A sign is something that interrelates with something for someone in some respect or capacity. The first something, as illustrated in Figure 2, is the representamen, the second something is the sign’s object, and someone, some semiotic agent, must be around to make or take the sign in order that it may develop as a genuine sign in some respect or capacity—the role of the interpretant. If there is no maker or taker, the sign is no more than possibly genuine. It lacks the Thirdness of the representamen, the object, and/or the interpretant. The representamen provides initial Firstness, the representamen’s object, its other, introduces Secondness, and the interpretant provides the first stage of Thirdness. A sign that is similar to its object is an Icon (for example, a portrait). A sign with some natural or necessary connection to its object is an Index (a mercury column indicating temperature). A sign whose interrelation with its object is by way of social convention is a Symbol (the word ‘book’ as a sign of the physical entity, book).
Notice, in this regard, the relative positions of Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness and iconicity-indexicality-symbolicity in Figures 1 and 3, and homogeny-‘hierogeny’-heterogeny, among other terms, in Figure 13. Firstness takes on the characteristic of the sign, or representamen. The Firstness of the sign involves our world of feelings and sensations before there is any conscious awareness of some other, something other ‘out there’ and other than the experiencing subject. Since Firstness is inextricably vague by nature, there is invariably a tinge of ambiguity, and as a consequence some form of inconsistency. Secondness plays the role of the object of the representamen—its other, the object with which it interdependently interrelates. This is the world of our culture-dependent and context-dependent classificatory schemes, with which we qualify and quantify the particularities of our everyday living, chiefly in terms of bivalence in accord with classical logical Principles of Identity, Non-Contradiction and Excluded-Middle. ‘Socio-cultural necessity’ constitutes the makings of the sign’s Thirdness, the interpretant, the other of the other. Thirdness thus sets the stage for generalities, though, in our finite fallible world, any and all generalities are subject to incompleteness (we must keep in mind, of course, that the thin, permeable membrane between these terms is hardly more than the dynamic frontier delineating a small, temporary whirlpool from the entire semiotic movement from within which it arose).

Now, consider the sign and the semiotic maker and taker or the subject as also a sign to be (1) in a swimming embrace with all its possible others as a matter of contingent happenings; (2) in apparent opposition to some actualized other as a matter of intransigent combat, dynamic struggle, rough-and-tumble agonistics; and (3) in intermediate, interdependent interrelation with its other other as a matter of dialogic exchange, renegotiation, and at times of happy consensus. Consider, in addition, the more general picture in Figure 13 in light of Figures 1 through 3, which includes (1) homogeny, (2) hierogeny, and (3) heterogeny. Homo- in Figure 13 qualifies the sphere of Firstness in Figure 2 as a blending of complementary contradictories into a harmonious package in terms of sheer possibilities without any pair of opposite terms having emerged to begin their mortal combat. Hetero- qualifies the sphere of Thirdness as sets of actualized terms that have either become bored or exhaust as a result of their incessant warfare and are now beginning a potential reconciliation of their differences. The suffix, -geny, indicates a manner of emergence, origin, organic becoming, from 0 to the tiers in Figures 7-10 without reaching the stage of already having become.

All this might appear as a trivial taxonomic game. So I really must more adequately specify what I have briefly mapped out before going on. But first, if I may be so allowed, I would like to indulge a bit more by illustrating the Peircean importance of my scheme.
If we consider a standard, entrenched practice, ‘A,’ dictated by those who rule as a code to be honored, come what may, we have Peirce’s subject who places credibility in anything handed down by authority (as briefly described in his paper on ‘fixing of belief’). Peirce’s anti-Cartesian posture discards knowledge by way of authority, or the tradition, as providing no guarantee whatsoever that it will put us on the straight and narrow path toward knowing. If we unquestioningly accept what has been handed down by authority, and we assume our customary practices have their origin on the basis of those who have been, are, and will be in authority, whether in the hallowed halls of academic, the halls of legislature, or the workplace, then we will strive to follow this knowledge-by-authority to the letter, no questions asked. In other words, our behavior will evince ‘hegemonic’ affirmation.

In contrast to ‘A’, that we would tend to follow rather blindly, we might engage in our own private rebellion by denying our standard practice based on authority. This is tantamount to saying: ‘Not-A’. It is ‘hegemonic’ denial. We may now be exercising Peirce’s tenacity, the method of the rebellious upstart who goes her own way without any regard for authority or the helpful suggestions of anyone else in her community. This posture, for obvious reasons, will rarely lead to any legitimate answers, since our own idiosyncratic ways have little chance of becoming general community practice, hence we remain isolated, and we are usually ostracized in one form or another. On the other hand, if we take on unwarranted self-importance we may go so far as to espouse the Cartesian a priori method of introspection like some privileged individual who spreads the word about his having plumbed the depths of his consciousness, survived, and returned with the founding block of knowledge in hand. Peirce’s anti-Cartesianism simply will not let this concept fly, however. There is no knowing, ultimately knowing, who is to be trusted and who not. Why should we blindly trust anyone and abide by his counsel without question and without enjoying the opportunity for a good counterargument?

In contrast to these three methods of knowing, Peirce’s prescribed road to the best of all possible worlds of knowing rests in amicable conversation, banter, debate, kibitzing, and even agonistics when it becomes necessary. This is the dialogical way toward knowing. It entails neither necessarily ‘A’ nor necessarily ‘Not-A’, neither one posture nor another, but something else, something new, some ‘heterogenic’ practice that has emerged from the erstwhile excluded-middle between ‘A’ and ‘Not-A’. This ‘something else’ is what emerges within the community out of dialogic give-and-take. During the dialogue, what is accepted becomes caught between the horns of some dilemma or other, and something must give. But upon giving, something else often manages to emerge, which is then put to the dialogical or practical test, and hopefully some general opinion will ensue. And where did this ‘something else, something new’ come from? From the range of possibilities, within Firstness, or the sphere of ‘homogeny’, from which all the ‘heterogenic’ alternatives between ‘A’ and ‘Not-A’ can emerge.
Now, I would invite you to take a wild flight of the imagination with me, a sort of ‘thought-experiment’, if you will. Thought experiments can at the outset be considered either consistent or inconsistent, depending on the reigning theory, the perceptual and conceptual mode of the audience concerned, and the general temper of the times. According to an Aristotelian thought experiment, a quarter should fall faster than a dime since it is heavier. Fine. The common sense of Aristotle’s time would in all likelihood tell most respectable citizens so much. So what if we attach a dime to a quarter by a fine thread using superglue, and then we drop them, along with a solitary quarter, from some rooftop. Will the attached coins fall faster than the solitary quarter since they make up a heavier package? The true-blue Aristotelian runs into a dilemma here. On the one hand, since the unattached dime should fall more slowly than the quarter, when the two are connected, the dime should act as a drag on its partner and slow its ordinary progress down somewhat. So the combination of the two coins should fall slower than the isolated quarter. But they don’t. On the other hand, the combined pair of objects is actually heavier than the quarter, so they should fall faster. But they don’t.

Needless to say, Galileo demolished the Aristotelian theory of falling bodies with an alternative series of untested thought experiments (of course it is doubtful he ever actually carried out that legendary experiment from the top of the Tower of Pisa). As a consequence of Galileo’s work, and after prolonged dialogic interaction between individuals within Peirce’s scientific community, in our day we believe we have a relatively consistent theory, unlike those naive Greeks. So far, so good. An inconsistent theory was properly discarded and replaced by a more logically and rationally respectable alternative, and sober-minds managed to prevail. In another way of putting the matter, Galileo said ‘No!’ to authority, to ‘A’. He said: ‘Not-A!’ But this was not his own private war against Aristotle: his method was not that of tenacity, nor was it the product of sheer introspection. He proceeded to go about finding an alternative between the ‘A’ and the ‘Not-A’. After Galileo’s and others’ arguments came to fruition, finally, the Peircean sense of a scientific community embraced Galilean physics. Eventually, something other, something new, emerged from the semiosic soup of possibilities, Firstness, ‘homogeny’, and the entire scientific edifice become increasingly more ‘heterogenous’ rather than merely Manicheistic, dualistic, and ‘hierogenic’ or ‘hegemonic’ (take another look at Figure 13 regarding this process).

Another example. In our century, physics in the form of quantum theory, especially when carrying the labels of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and Bohr’s complementary, became brazenly, and apparently without remorse or regrets, ambiguous, and even inconsistent, depending upon the perspective (Smith 1995). At a given moment is a quantum ‘event’ a ‘particle’ or is it a ‘wave’? To put the matter quite baldly, the only possible responses to such questions is ‘Yes, but no’, ‘No, but yes’, ‘Yes and no’, and ‘Neither yes nor no’. This is perplexing, to say the least. In Galileo’s ‘dialogue’, Simplicio the Aristotelian disrespectfully asks Salviati: ‘So you have not made a hundred tests, or even one? And yet you so freely declare it to be certain?’ Salviati responds: ‘Without experiment,
I am sure that the effect will happen as I tell you, because it must happen that way’ (Galileo 1967: 145; in Brown 1991: 2-3).

This recalls Einstein’s remark regarding physicist-astronomer Arthur Eddington’s experiment designed either to verify or falsify Einstein’s general theory of relativity. When asked his opinion about the possible outcome of the event, Einstein responded that if it appeared to refute his theory, then he was sorry for the dear Lord, because the theory was correct (Eddington 1958, Einstein 1949). A marvel of arrogance vis-à-vis authority? Unfettered tenacity? A study in overconfident introspection or intuition? The answer to these questions is none other than: Yes but no, No but yes, Yes ... and no, and Neither yes ... nor no. Declarations of the Einstein sort bear witness to the power of the mind and the confidence of she who dwells within it. It also testifies to the inextricable union of Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness, representamen-object-interpretant, iconicity-indexicality-symbolicity, and feeling-sensing-interpreting. This union of triads can hardly be put to the test as conveniently as Aristotle’s or Galileo’s thought experiments could have been had their authors been so disposed. But arguments can be made, they can be debated, and the community, through dialogue, can come to some conclusion, however tentative and however ephemeral. In this sense, Peirce would tell us that by dialogue his triadic thinking could stand the test of dialogic process. Time will tell.

All told, it seems that, with respect to this mutual embrace of Peirce’s intriguing triads, and in light of his anti-Cartesian posture as outlined above, the counsel might be: never bow to authority unless it is deserving of your respect, do not blindly push forth come what may with paranoid tenacity, and beware of those false prophets bearing tidings of their having been to the wilderness of their a priori, introspective mind where they saw the light of Truth, but pay your dues to the community of your choice, keep the dialogue open, and do the best you can. With respect to the triads themselves, we would have it that the imaginary thought-sign is the possibility of ‘A’, a might be from the ‘homogenic’ sphere of ‘Both A and Not-A’. In this regard, the object of the sign would be an ‘anti-hegemonic’ ‘Not-A’. And the interpretant would be a ‘heterogenic’ ‘Neither A nor Not-A’, but since it brings ‘A’ and its respective other into a three-way mediation, it potentially gives rise to the emergence of something different, something even possibly new.16

Following this line of thought, we can construct Figure 14, with the ‘point’ or ‘vortex’ connecting each of the ‘sign’ components, such that it can be mapped onto Figures 1, 2 and 3. The ‘vortex’ is the composite of all unactualized signs. It is, so to speak, the ‘emptiness’, the sheer possibility of anything and everything. It is as if we had ‘Both A and Not-A’ and ‘Neither A nor Not-A’ written on the two sides of a strip of paper and then we make of the two-dimensional sheet a Möbius-band in three-dimensional

Figure 14

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space to yield ‘Both of the propositions’, and ‘Neither of the propositions’. Moreover, the choice is not a choice between Aristotelian truth and falsity, between what is on no uncertain terms true and what is not true, between what exists and what does not exist, but rather, between what from some context or other might be possibly true and what might be possibly false, and what might possibly be neither true nor false because it not yet is: there is only something like what Peirce (CP 6.512) calls a ‘cut’ or G. Spencer-Brown (1972) a ‘mark of distinction’. There is no more than our ‘tripod’ plus the ‘vortex’ the combination of which suggests the mere possibility of a sign.

This ‘cut’ or ‘mark of distinction’ makes up what Gregory Bateson (1972) terms a ‘difference that makes a difference’. In the beginning, a demarcating line is set down separating ‘this’ from ‘that’, ‘inside’ from ‘outside’. Then other distinctions are made, and then still others, and so on, toward ever increasing complexity. Lotman writes that every culture “begins by dividing the world into ‘its own’ internal space and ‘their’ external space … The boundary may separate the living from the dead, settled peoples from nomadic ones, the town from the plains; it may be a state frontier, or a social, national, confessional, or any other kind of frontier” (Lotman 1990: 131). Lotman refers to this division as binary. I would beg to differ with him in this respect. It is, more appropriately, trinary or triadic, following the Peircean model of the sign depicted in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 14.

How can triadicity come about as a result of a binary division between ‘this’ and ‘that’? As in Figure 15, I would suggest. In light of our observations regarding Figures 4, 5 and 6, the sign tripod, through degeneracy, can collapse virtually to a point, to the original ‘vortex’ giving rise to the emergence of the sign, of all signs, of all that is becoming. Then the point, by repeating itself over and over again, becomes a line, the line a plane, the plane a solid, and the solid a hypersolid, and a ‘cut’, a ‘mark of distinction’, is made in the timespace continuum. That is to say, four-dimensionality collapses into zero-dimensionality that becomes one-dimensionality that separates two semiotic spaces of two-dimensionality, and so on.

Lotman writes further that:

The asymmetry of the human body is the anthropological basis for its semioticization: the semiotics of right and left are found just as universal in all human cultures as the opposition top and bottom. And the fundamental asymmetries of male and female, living and dead, are just as widespread. The living/dead opposition involves the opposition of something moving, warm, breathing, to something immobile, cold, not breathing (the belief that cold and death are synonyms is supported by an enormous number of texts from different cultures, and just as common is the identification of death with turning to stone/ see the numerous legends about the origins of mountains and rocks). (Lotman 1990: 133)

Lotman’s words might strike one as pure and adulterated binarism, and out of line with Peircean thinking. Actually, in every case the binary brings with it the implication of the
‘vortex’, that is, the point at the center of Peirce’s semiotic tripod (that which contains the possibility for all semiotization) and the interpretant (meaning). Right and left imply existence of the body and a line of demarcation giving rise to the body’s mirror symmetry, male and female imply the notion of gender which embodies a cut between the two elements of the dichotomy, living and dead imply a universal principle transcending life, that principle being neither life nor death. And so on. Lotman’s quote, and indeed, many propositions apparently emerging out of binarity, often imply a third, an included middle from within which something fresh and new can emerge.

The ‘vortex’ in the first circle of Figure 15 there will always be, for if not, there can be no signs. And the third leg of the tripod, the interpretant, there will always be, for if not, if there are no sign makers and takers, then there is no genuine semiosis. The emerging line of demarcation in the second circle suggests the possibility of a Third, a division between ‘this’ and ‘that’, which is realized in the third circle. In a manner of speaking, this line is both in the one hemicircle and the other one and at the same time it is neither of the one nor the other but something else: a Third space. Indeed, semiotic space “is transected by numerous boundaries, each message that moves across it must be many times translated and transformed, and the process of generating new information thereby snowballs” (Lotman 1990: 140).

There is no Cartesian clarity to be had at this ‘nonlogocentric’, ‘nonlinguicentric’ sphere of vague possible signs where nothing is absolutely clear and distinct and where there are no sharp lines of demarcation. In this respect, Lotman is definitely in line with Peirce’s thinking.

**FURTHER QUALIFYING THE STRANGENESS IN THE SIGN**

Not only is science perpetually at war with itself (Agassi 1975), so also are many of our most cherished inductively derived beliefs. The real problem is that not only are these beliefs more often than not binary based, they also engage in either-or binary warfare among themselves.

Perhaps the most succinct way to put the issue is by evoking what is known as the ‘paradox of induction’, developed by Carl Hempel (1945). In a nutshell, the tale goes like this. We could assume ‘All swans are white’ and attend to our daily affairs quite effectively without ever becoming aware of any anomalies or alternatives. It is simply true to say ‘All swans are white’ and false to say that ‘Some swans are nonwhite’, and that’s that: case closed. It is ideally an either/or binary matter. We have an ingrained feeling (Firstness) for the whiteness of swans, and we could hardly feel otherwise, unless in some imaginary fairy-tale world.
However, a certain explorer down under, namely, Captain Cook, once found—that is, sensed and perceived (via Secondness) and conceived and interpreted (via Thirdness)—some swans as black. Henceforth the categorical border, the line of demarcation as in Figure 15, suffered a change. Community knowledge eventually had it that ‘Most swans, but not all, are white; those nonwhite, that is, black, swans can be found in a remote region of the globe, namely, Australia’. Instances like these led Karl Popper (1972) to declare that if you look for positive evidence for a general proposition you will almost always be able to beat the world into submission and ‘discover’ your evidence. So looking for positive evidence is no big deal. What is important is looking for negative evidence that will change customary ways of thinking and of looking. In other words, you should expect to be surprised by the unexpected, and then you can give a nod of acknowledgment that you are not surprised that you are surprised when an expected unexpected event turns up. Consequently, you alter your expectations somewhat, and continue on your way expecting another surprise somewhere along the road that will thwart those newfound expectations. If you want to learn something, don’t just see everything and say everything as repeats of what presumably was, is, and will be, but look for mistakes, differences, events that weren’t supposed to happen.\(^{17}\)

In this manner, it should not be shocking that ‘All swans are white’ did not withstand the test of time. In fact, it was to be expected. This goes to show that in the sphere of possibilities for all events, seeing and saying must imply the statement: ‘Swans are white and they are nonwhite’. One pole of this contradiction was held true during one period of human history, the other pole during another period. So if ‘Swans are white and they are nonwhite’ is taken to be atemporal, then ‘Either swans are white or they are nonwhite’ is atemporal in another more limited sense, for, logically speaking—that is, in terms of classical logic—either one or the other is viewed as immutable, depending on the time and the place and the folks involved. However, we also have the implicit statement: ‘It is neither the case that all swans are white nor is it the case that no swans are nonwhite, for there is another more viable swan qualifier’. That is to say, previously ‘All swans are white’ was the case, but it is now the case that ‘Most swans are white’. And it was previously the case that ‘No swans are nonwhite’ but it is now the case that ‘Some swans are nonwhite, specifically, those that are black’. From this rather unkempt sphere where events, seeing, and saying, is neither timelessly one thing nor the other but potentially something else, something different, we have temporality. Given our temporality, we have one thing at one time and another thing at another time, with both things thrown into the same bag as part of a vast ocean in constant self-organizing movement wherein it is perpetually becoming something other than what it is.\(^{18}\)

So we have, at one extreme, (1) ‘Both white swans and nonwhite swans’, at the other extreme, (3) ‘Neither exclusively all white swans nor no nonwhite swans’, and by virtue of the line of demarcation, (2) ‘Either white swans or nonwhite swans’. Proposition (1) is the sphere of unactualized possibilities in harmonious intermeshing, no matter how contradictory, (2) is the sphere of classical logic, and (3) is the sphere of emerging novelties
between the *either* and the *or*. Proposition (1) is qualified as exceeding vagueness; it is fraught with contradictions any number of which can over time be actualized, while (3) is marked by generalities arising from the particulars actualized from (1) and passing through (2); hence (3) is invariably incomplete, since there is no knowing when and where something new and different will emerge to take is place between two already actualized general conceptualizations.

Moreover, given the suggestions from previous sections in this essay and especially in light of Figure 13, (2) is under most circumstances the dwelling place of binary practices as they are customarily articulated; hence it is *hierogenic* (or *hegemonic*), and as such it embodies the possibility of dialogic interaction and possible change. It follows, in this regard, that (1) may be labeled *homogeneity*, and that (3) would most appropriately fall in line with *heterogeneity*, since between any two general terms or statements there always exists the probability somewhere and somewhen of something else emerging, hence the system is perpetually moving toward the completion of its own continuity without ever realizing that goal.  

### The Virtually Inconceivable Big Picture

Bringing about a happy emergence of propositions (1) and (3), and of *homogeneity*, *hierogeneity*, and *heterogeneity*, we have either *inconsistency* or *incompleteness*, or perhaps both, by the good grace of Kurt Gödel’s proof that spelled the limitations of logic and mathematics, and by extension of the sciences, the humanities, and in general all human communication. The upshot is that at some time or other we cannot help but spout out unexpected contradictions and occasional paradoxes, and no matter how much we manage to say about some particular aspect of our world, our saying will always be incomplete.

Sign processing within these limitations is a dialogical community affair. Peirce writes that whenever a sign is vague (inconsistent) it is up to the maker of the sign to render it a bit more precise and in the best of all worlds hopefully to clear up the inconsistencies. On the other hand, in order that the sign’s nature as a generality may become properly acknowledged, the sign’s taker must enter into the game, interacting with the sign, with its maker, and with the entire ambient, in order to bring the sign’s meaning a tad closer to its completion—but, as pointed out above, the sign’s meaning never stands a chance of completion in the genuine sense (*CP* 5.505). *Hierogeneity* (or *hegemony*) as a dualist practice of the sort we might expect to find in proposition (2) above, could well culminate in the empowerment, the enfranchisement, of those who have the proper pull and know how to engage in the most advantageous but ruthlessly aggressive practices. Within this sphere we might encounter the makings for paternalism, patriarchy, patronage, and such practices in this stark desert of dualistic cultural values.

This is a limited view, however. Vagueness and generality from a broad cultural perspective paints another picture entirely. In order to put this picture in focus, consider,
once again, Figure 14. In the first place, I use reversible arrows of various sorts to emphasize the fluid character of all the categories involved. This is no indication of linearity or isotropic timeless time, however. The categories, usually coming in threes rather than twos, are placed at various levels to depict their fuzzy codependent interrelationships and their nonlinear, time-bound, self-organizing nature, though, I must hasten to emphasize, no hierarchy of dichotomous terms is implied here. The general movement is from signs of vagueness toward acknowledgment of classical logic and ‘styles of reasoning’ and then to the construction of perpetually incomplete generalities, universals, taxonomies, and hierarchies. Inconsistency below might be hopefully abandoned, and progression upward might hopefully be toward the fulfillment of those fond and familiar dreams of the good life, social justice, emancipation for all, and complete and consistent knowledge.

However, there is no utopia to be had. In other words, the plenitude of all things is a pipe-dream, for there is no royal highway to the land of milk and honey. Vagueness—generality, inconsistency—incompleteness, and homogeneity—heterogeneity are here to stay, whether we know it or not and whether we like or not. There is security to be had, however, in the assurance that cultural processes will continue into the unforeseeable horizon.

ENDNOTES

1. In a few brief pages I can hardly hope to do justice to the rich thought either of Lotman or of Peirce. Consequently, I limit myself to a few remarks on Peirce’s categories and their import to some notions of cultural ‘logics’ I have in mind, and I take up what I consider Lotman’s chief contribution to the semiotics of culture, his concept of the ‘semiosphere’.

2. Lotman usually keeps the terms in separation, but I include them in one all-encompassing term.

3. The term ‘blending’ bears on the notion of ‘conceptual blending’ as developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (2003), as I develop the term in merrell (2007).

4. Regarding the nonlinearity of signs, recall the nonlinear development of Peirce’s sign Decalogue as illustrated in Table 1.

5. Movement upward along the lines of the lattice involves the Boolean notion of ‘implication’, though unlike Boolean principles, nonlinearity is the norm. Thus O implies M, I implies S, such that each successive stage increases the context. Signs at the lower tiers of the lattice have their own unique context, but when these signs move up the lattice their context merges and blends into another context.


7. This contradictory complementary convergent process is comparable to the process evinced by the Yin-Yang image, [, as I have suggested in merrell (2002).


9. For a series of anthropological studies that bear on a comparable process of ethnic and culture mixture (mestigagem), see the work of Roberto DaMatta 1991a, 1991b, 1994, 1995.


11. I by no means wish to imply that the topological model of semiosis I am developing here is tantamount to the notion of the four-dimensional continuum. Rather, that the continuum, and the absolute
absence of everything, that is, nothingness, or ‘emptiness’ in the Buddhist sense—to which Peirce occasionally alluded—are precisely that: absolute, timeless. We finite fallible humans cannot but exist in time. In this sense, and metaphorically speaking, just as a point becomes a line, a line a plane, a plane a solid and a solid a hypersolid, the latter a four-dimensional mental, hypostatical construct including three dimensions of space and one dimension of time, so also a three-dimensional object portrayed on a two-dimensional plane is timelessly there, as two-dimensions of space and one temporal dimension crystallized—which, once again, is essentially the cubist technique as presented in Figure 12. I repeat, we are in time and time is in us; hence the fourth dimension, as well as ‘emptiness’, or 0, are beyond the concrete world of our experience.

12. For further detail regarding the interrelated terms in Figure 13, see merrell (2007).

13. I end these terms with the suffix ‘-geny’, since, of the same root as gene, it elicits the image of genesis, organicity, and process, and it falls in line with the processual nature of learning-knowing. I use the trio of prefixes, ‘homo-‘, ‘hiero-‘, and ‘hetero-‘, respectively, as: (1) ‘same’, ‘like’, or ‘analogous to’, (2) ‘positioned or ranked’, with priority usually given to one term over the other one, and (3) ‘different’, ‘dissimilar’, ‘diverse’ (for a more detailed discussion, see merrell 2003, 2005a, 2005b).

14. For a detailed discussion of vagueness and generality and inconsistency and incompleteness, see merrell (2000, 2003).

15. I refer to Peirce’s three articles on cognition in presenting his anti-Cartesian argument, where he outlines the pitfalls of knowledge by way of authority, tenacity, and apriorism or introspection, and opts for knowledge by way of general agreement on the part of the entire community (CP 5.213-357).

16. Here, the manner in which ‘homogeny’ and ‘heterogeny’, or in Peirce’s terms Firstness and Secondness, and iconicity and symbolicity, take their leave of the classical logical principles described above—Identity, Non-Contradiction and Excluded-Middle—comes through loud and clear (for further discussion with respect to the Figure 13 scheme, merrell 2005b).

17. Popper, I should mention, would have nothing to do with what I have alluded to as ‘tacit’ knowing, ‘degenerate’ signs, and subjective feeling and sensation within the sphere of Firstness; yet Popper’s ‘falsification’ thesis bears striking similarity with certain aspects of Peirce’s ‘objectivism’, though there was that other side of his thought, his ‘idealism’, which he incorporated into his own ‘blended’ philosophical posture as ‘objective idealism’ (Hookway 1985).

18. The goal can never be reached, for, as Peirce had it, it is an infinitely receding horizon that, in the best of all possible worlds, can be no more than approximated by asymptotic movement comparable to Zeno’s Achilles moving in on the tortoise in the race in an infinite series of successively smaller increments (however see Hesse [1980] for a critique of this view).

19. However, it bears mentioning that Gödel’s proof by no means put limitations on human creativity regarding mathematics, logic, the sciences and the humanities, but rather, it encouraged the search for new modes of interpretation (Goldstein 2005, Nagel and Newman 1964).

20. It bears mentioning at this juncture that I have availed myself of the inconsistency-incompleteness and vagueness-generality scheme in various previous studies with respect to Peirce’s basic sign types, our sensory modes for perceiving signs, and our sign interpretation (merrell 1995).

21. The idea of “styles of reasoning” is from Hacking (1985).
REFERENCES


Lotman’s Semiosphere, Peirce’s Signs, and Cultural Processes


The article considers the nonclassical paradigm of subjectivity and its implications for communication theory. It is shown that neither what is communicated is “given in advance” bound material for communication, nor the one who communicates is equal to oneself. The individual experience cannot be divided (shared) with others, but, paradoxically, it exists only in-division and for the sake of it. Saying that communication happens behind the back of consciousness, we stress the necessity to understand the difference between the existence and the object-matter — the difference which itself can be only a matter of abstraction, but makes up the essence of human experience and human communication.

Keywords: communication, nonclassical paradigm of subjectivity, I and the other, consciousness, stream of events, sociality

1. The main idea we wish to discuss in this work is the idea of non-identity of the communicant. This idea is closely related to so-called nonclassical ontology of subjectivity developed in a number of philosophical and scientific schools (trends) in the 20th century, e.g. dialogical concepts of consciousness (Bakhtin), cultural-historical psychology and psychology of activity (Vygotsky, Leontiev), structural anthropology (Lévy-Strauss), structural psychoanalysis (Lacan), philosophy of deconstruction (Derrida), philosophy of radical empiricism (Deleuze), etc. However, the abovementioned schools (trends) were different, they are knit together by denegation of the classical opposition “subject—object”. We shall speak only about the consequences of this denegation which are directly related to the theory of communication. Starting this way, we immediately face some difficulties and strange situations which now will be discussed.
The first is a problem of transition from “under-objectual continuity,” or “intrinsic” connectivity of communicants, to the experience of communication which continuity during such transition appears irreversibly lost. Another problem is decentration of the subject (expressed, in particular, in the known formulation “I am the other”) — decentration, which turns invariably, due to the subject’s loss of transparency, into disclosure of a unique and individual matter which essentially cannot be communicated, since it exists only once, “here and now.” After all, there are a number of problem situations connected with the mentioned problems: understanding the other (a thing which may seem impossible by virtue of the “fact” that we can understand only ourselves); addressing the other (a process which should be “incorporated” in any act of communication “in advance,” i.e., before that act initially finds out the addressee); primary (or “intrinsic”) sociality of communicants (sociality which should then “run” ahead of itself), and so on.

As a prelude to discussing these problems we shall consider the nonclassical paradigm of subjectivity and some of its implications — mainly, the distinction between the existence (the level of events taking place “here and now”) and the object-matter (the level of objectual experience, or of “fixation” of the stream of events). While the classical paradigm of subjectivity implicated a point of “universal supervision”, allowing to capture the whole human experience at a moment and thus not having its own “density,” the nonclassical paradigm made this point non-transparent. It became impossible to think for (instead of) the other; the idea of monological translation of knowledge was replaced with the idea of dialogical knowledge; the subject, being decentrated, acquired “density” instead of lost “transparency.” It became clear that neither the cognizable object nor the cognizing subject could be equal to itself.

The objects we deal with, certainly, should be identical: otherwise our experience and, particularly, our communication would be impossible. We deal only with the objects equal to themselves. But, the object to which there come no changes, ceases inevitably to be perceived by us. The object I see does not disappear only because in the act of vision I cooperate constantly with it and constantly adapt to its changes. This is a paradox of our objectual perception: while forming the world in the act of perception, we “kill” it in order to provide communication, but we can never see the “killed” (static) object. Similarly, to be a subject, I should be added on constantly to myself, but in any act like this I never come back to myself: I am always “in others,” and everything “infelt” by me here and now, as the famous Soviet philosopher Mamardashvili noted, at the same moment undergoes reduction by inclusion into a circuit of the message (Mamardashvili, 2004).

From here follows the necessity to distinguish knowledge as an event from knowledge as an object-matter, or to distinguish the “happened” knowledge from knowledge of the happened. Now Mamardashvili’s distinction between the phenomenon in classical sense (“appearance”) and the phenomenon in nonclassical sense (“phenomenon”) becomes clear. The phenomenon is “that formation of consciousness…which exists in an objectifying gap within the mental bind of understanding and from being in which we cannot shift ourselves.
to a representation (as a mental object) contained in that bind and correlated with referent objects which are visible for the external (or absolute) observer” (2004, p. 39). Hence, not everything infelt can become apparent: only that becomes apparent what can be modeled. If we want to find the “actually infelt,” i.e., to find “own empirical reality of activity and consciousness,” we have to undertake phenomenological reduction, or to “shift” from substance to existence, “detaching” this reality from mental states which recognize it. To undertake such reduction means “to find the immediate, but by cutting off or by stopping relations, associations and already laid paths which lay in higher or built on layer of mind and with which the bottom layer automatically, habitually comes to movement” (2004, p. 51). To put it differently, a problem of reduction “is just a problem of restoration of the experience reduced by inclusion into a circuit of the message at the same moment when it occurred: everything occurring in a human reality, occurs being reflected in itself and communicated throughout the whole circuit of conscious creatures as those” (Mamardashvili, 2004, p. 34).

Mamardashvili’s idea corresponds to Hegel’s concept of “appearing knowledge.” Hegel shows how an object originates in consciousness:

Consciousness knows something; this something is the essence or is per se. This object, however, is also the per se, the inherent reality, for consciousness. Hence comes ambiguity of this truth. Consciousness, as we see, has now two objects: one is the first per se, the second is the existence for consciousness of this per se. The last object appears at first sight to be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself, i.e., an idea not of an object, but solely of its knowledge of that first object. But, as was already indicated, by that very process the first object is altered; it ceases to be what is per se, and becomes consciously something which is per se only for consciousness. Consequently, then, what this real per se is for consciousness is truth: which, however, means that this is the essential reality, or the object which consciousness has. <…> the new object is seen to have come about by a transformation or conversion of consciousness itself. <…> It is only this necessity, this origination of the new object — which offers itself to consciousness without consciousness knowing how it comes by it — that to us, who watch the process, is to be seen going on, so to say, behind its back. (Hegel, 1967, p. 142-145)

Now we won’t speak about the differences between Hegel’s dialectic of identity and the nonclassical philosophy of distinction: these differences are described well by French philosopher Descombes whose book we recommend to the interested reader (Descombes, 1980). We shall emphasize only a number of important points implicitly present in Hegel’s philosophy, but explicated only in the 20th century.

2. We shall start with the question which, probably, sounds in this context a little strange: How can one see an object? However, from the fact “I see an object” we can deduce very much.
As shown in psychology of activity, to see an object one should not merely open one’s eyes: the act of vision needs interaction between the subject and the visible object, and this includes “drawing” an image from the object and, simultaneously, “drawing” this image upon the object. This “drawing,” if stretched in time, can be assimilated to the mental “movement” around the object, or placing it in the center of possible ways of activity, and this means viewing an object in different ways, i.e., looking at an object simultaneously with “individual eyes” and with “public eyes.” This is the mechanism of “generalization”, which allows us to see “general” (i.e. socially valid) in any individual thing. It is this mechanism that allows us “to keep” the perceived things in objective space (“on the crossing of sights”) and makes things substantial, i.e., identical to themselves, constant in space and in time and conceivable as being independent of our consciousness. Only such socialized, general things appearing to us as presented by us to others, can be “exchanged” by us in our communicative activity. The rest are things-phantoms which cannot be put into words and cannot become a matter for communication.

So, we can be aware only of what we can share with the others. This idea (which goes back to the philosophy of Hegel and Marx as well as to W. von Humboldt’s theoretical linguistics) was formulated most precisely by Soviet philosopher Ilyenkov: “All that I cannot express in the form of speech, state in the form clear to the other, I do not realize myself as a social being, as a person” (Ilyenkov, 1997, p. 43). A similar idea was suggested by Russian philologist Potebnya: “Our psychical states become clear to us only as we find them out or give them a kind of independent existence, for example, finding them in others or putting them into words. The features of our psychical life which we cannot express anyhow and which we cannot see in anyone but us remain dark for us everlastingly” (Potebnya, 1989, p. 96). All of that one can call “phantoms”. But, the phantoms disappearing behind a limit of consciousness, of realization as a statement (for, being stated, they cease to be themselves), — they, as it was shown, for example, in the Freudian psychoanalysis, organize in our existence much or even practically everything. To make a statement (no matter in the form of verbal or objectual meanings), then, means to make the stream of events static, to shift from the existence to the object-matter.

As we can see, the general nonclassical tendency — the tendency of decetration — has led to disindividuation and (simultaneously) to individuation of consciousnesses: indeed, both in modern psychology and in modern philosophy of consciousness one can descry two mutually exclusive and thus complementing each other processes — “cutting off” an individual (we can take as an example Wittgenstein’s argument about the impossibility of “private language”) and “cutting off” public, disclosure of individual, unique, personal, which cannot itself be reproduced anyhow. The individual experience cannot be divided (shared) with others, but, paradoxically, it exists only in-division and for the sake of it — this is the main thesis we advocate here.

For example, when I see a thing, I see it with “the other’s eyes” — otherwise the act of vision would not be a human (conscious) act. But, in this act I “pull out” from public eyes...
and “find out” that my point of view is only one of all possible points. In other words, we are able to see a thing as existing objectively (as shared by us with the others) only inasmuch as we cannot look at it from different points at once. Only a unique experience undergoes communication (or “inclusion into a circuit of the message”), as there is no need to communicate universal (public) things. Eco notes that one communicates something just because one cannot grasp the whole world at once. “What makes me a person is that I am not God, mine separation from being, my non-endowment with the completeness of being” (Eco, 2004, p. 20). But this “non-endowment with the completeness of being” cannot be overwhelmed in the act of communication: essentially it cannot be overwhelmed in any act like that (which is carried out, apparently, only for the sake of such completeness), as that “unique” which one aims to transfer in such an act to another person (and to himself as to the other), actually exists only once, and, when becoming a matter of message, ceases to exist as itself. Between one’s “extraction” of any knowledge of the world (or the experience taking place here and now) and representation, or communication of the taken experience to the other (and to oneself as the other) there exists an insurmountable interval which Mamardashvili once aptly called “a gap in the irreversibility of facts” (Mamardashvili, 2004, p. 59).

Hence, neither what is communicated is “given in advance” bound material for communication, nor the one who communicates is equal to oneself: any conscious act is an act of us “not coming back” to ourselves. “Not coming back,” we are destined to search infinitely for self-coincidence which, however, can never be reached by us. This search, this movement of “converting consciousness” (using Hegel’s words) is nothing but our continuous act of finding ourselves in others.

In Rilke’s poem “Morgue” there is a strange phrase about the deceased: “Die Augen haben hinter ihren Lidern / sich umgewandt und schauen jetzt hinein” — “Beneath the lids, their sight has been replaced / with rolled-back eyes that dwell on things within” (transl. by L. Cottrell, RLINK http://www.planck.com/Rilkerhymed/rilkemorgue.htm). If we turn over this idea, as it were, the following turns out: while I am alive, while my eyes are open, I cannot coincide with myself. All personal, individual, unique matter, everything that exists in me only “here and now” — all of this is initially dedicated to others and only in such dedication it can become my property.

Thus, abstracting the existence from the object-matter, we disclose a level of events which, paradoxically, one cannot find in consciousness (in its “models,” in its structures of categorization, in its forms of statement) — because the matter is movement of consciousness always happening — using Hegel’s words one more time — behind its back. This idea can be rephrased as follows: one cannot return from the constructions of culture back to a unique act of their creation (Bibikhin, 2001, p. 94). The movement of consciousness constantly changes its own frame of reference. It means the impossibility to return from any subsequent point back to a previous one which always appears “removed.” Thus, consciousness always burns bridges behind. It cannot be equal to itself; this is its great riddle and great drama.
Let us recall Rilke once more. In the 8th Duino Elegy he says that only a beast can see “the open” (“Das Offene”) while a human being sees only the formed: a beast exists in reality, and a human being always finds himself opposite to it (Rilke, 1975, p. 714-715). So we have an idea of the level of events which we disclose only by abstraction. But, it is this level of our intrinsic sociality or “under-objectual continuity” that connects us to each other.

3. One can represent the described act of (not)self-coincidence as an act of subjectivity constitution carried out within two kinds of relations, which we shall call horizontal (relations “I — the other”) and vertical (relations “individual — social”). The horizontal relationship is characterized by mutual specification of its participants (I cannot exist without the other, and vice versa, the other cannot exist without I); the vertical relationship makes up an antinomy, i.e., any individuation is simultaneously socialization. In dialogical concepts of consciousness and self-consciousness the “meeting” of I and the other is considered as self-detection; in Lacanian psychoanalysis I and the other are considered as the same matter, i.e., they make up peculiar images of each other. But, to state the constitutive character of this “meeting” is senseless until the relationship “I — the other” is conceived as conditioned by the relationship “individual — social.” Though any act of subjectivity constitution occurs “between” I and the other (for example, my speech is “retrieved” by the other), it occurs only as the act of embedding of an individual into the form which one finds external in relation to oneself.

According to Lacan, the subject, beginning to speak, “exists in advance” in the place prearranged for his/her self-detection in the symbolic order, i.e., in the network of signifiers. Lacan illustrated it with a story about a boy and a girl sitting in a compartment of a train one opposite the other and seeing different inscriptions on toilet rooms at the platform. “Oh look, — the boy speaks, — we have arrived to Ladies!” “You bonehead, — the little sister answers, — don’t you see, that we have arrived to Gentlemen?” (Lacan, 1997, p. 60). The speaking subject keeps in with the law of signification, so the sense of spoken words does not start with preverbal experience, being made out in a word, but appears together with the signifier. A speech act is being motivated by constant insufficiency “pushing” preverbal, narcissistic ego towards its imaginary identification with the other. This principle is concluded in dialectics of desire and recognition: “Ego” of a desire is defined through its relation to the other and its recognition by the other (Kojève, 1947). Therefore, speech is always addressed to the other, and vice versa, the subject receives his/her message from the other in the inverted form (Lacan, 1977).

Constant insufficiency creating a floor for speech deployment is similar to what is described by Hegel as self-consciousness’ necessity of satisfaction and of recognition “in a life-and-death struggle” with another self-consciousness:

The relation of both self-consciousnesses is in this way so constituted that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle. They must enter into this struggle, for they must bring their certainty of themselves, the certainty of being for
themselves, to the level of objective truth, and make this a fact both in the case of the other and in their own case, as well. (Hegel, 1967, p. 232-233)

Competition in the struggle for a desirable object (interesting only as desirable for the other), accompanying the process of primary identification, undergoes sublation in speech which is like contract or agreement. The most important point here is this: to maintain “specular” unity of I and the other there should exist a law of signification, a mechanism of symbolic identification. With it we can clear up the relations between the Imaginary and the Symbolic: the Imaginary is an escaping unity (like in a mirror) of I and the other, and the Symbolic is a function which supports this imagined unity. “A word signifying a word — that is the essence of identity” (Lacan, 1999, p. 242).

Behind the terms used here the reader will see Hegel’s idea of “converting consciousness.” This idea is “inscribed” in different nonclassical conceptions of subjectivity, e.g. psychoanalysis, phenomenology, structuralism, existentialism, etc.: all of them try to get into “a gap in the irreversibility of facts,” a gap by which consciousness is split inside. Let us emphasize once again the fact that the conversion of consciousness takes place behind its back, and the object originating in consciousness, as it has been shown above, is a generalized object divided between I and the other (and thus between individual and social). Then, “the meeting” of I and the other, which takes place in the discrete, objectual world, requires not only “the law of signification”, but also the “under-objectual continuity of consciousness”, mentioned above, or that continuity inside of consciousness which always remains behind its back. I can “meet” the other only if communication is the essence of myself.

4. Let us now turn to psychopathology. We tried to show that consciousness is always split inside, that between “infelt” (or immediate) and “communicated” (or in-formed, mediated) there is a gap which is continuously being filled (but can never be filled). It is the “refusal” of such a continuous effort that makes mental illness as a possible condition, which “snatches out” a person from social relations. We shall quote statements made by German psychiatrist-phenomenologist E. Wulff in his article with the eloquent title “Self-refused intentionality: delusion as an attempt of the subject to withdraw from public relations and history” (1994).

In this article Wulff defines intentionality as correlation between private sense of Dasein and public (generalizable) meanings. Private sense here is “matter which happens for someone here and now,” or, in other words, it is a subjective-situative sense, “out of which Dasein addresses its intentional acts to the world of generalizable meanings” (Wulff, 1994, p. 5). The linkage of sense and meaning, according to Wulff, is “an act which should be produced constantly as an autonomous act by Dasein as a subject, hence Dasein this way — and only this way — produces itself as a subject.” This linkage “provides recognition of generality and of generalization of meanings as allowing to be filled in with subjective-situative sense; but at the same time it provides recognition of subjective sense of some
situation as allowing to be generalized.” Thus, it becomes possible to speak of “mutual susceptibility of generalizable meanings and subjective-situative sense” (1994, p. 7-8).

Many aspects of delusion, Wulff argues, “indicate something like certain — dislegitimizing — repeal of backgrounds and by that also key rules based on them which are the precondition of all forms of human communication” (1994, p. 6). In case of delusion the acceptance of immixture of subjective-situative sense in generalizable meaning (and vice versa) is lost. Any act of understanding produces cancellation of the sense understood, and any act of subjective actualization of sense produces devaluation of the meaning. Therefore, the function of semantic acts becomes dialytic in relation to meanings, and the function of significiation acts becomes dialytic in relation to sense. To quote Wulff,

Thus, in case of absence of the recognizing constitution of mutual susceptibility of subjective-situative sense and generalizable meanings, any attempt to take some subjective-situative sense from generalizable meanings, or vice versa, to generalize subjective-situational sense in meanings, finally would cancel itself. This deletion of own intention to generalize subjective-situative sense and, accordingly, to correlate generalizable meanings with subjective-situative sense is, however, at the same time a self-deletion of an intentional subject. (Wulff, 1994, p. 10)

This resembles the well-known “double bind” effect, described by Bateson (1972). According to Bateson, a psychotic always finds himself/herself in a situation of ineluctable, but unsolvable contradiction, making his/her communication impossible, and psychosis (such as schizophrenia) does not merely manifest itself in communication troubles, but exists at the level of basic inter-human communication. In our turn, we stress here the psychotic’s inability to make a step from I to the other, which should turn into linkage of individual with social, or of “sense” with “meaning.” Whoever seeks to keep his life will lose it — said Jesus (Luke, 17:33). Thus, life itself provides arguments against solipsism. When I close the window, I kill my soul — for it cannot exist otherwise than shared with others.

A psychotic speaks, but ceases to be a speaking subject. Now let us consider a situation which at first sight seems opposite to it. Let us think of people with whom we communicate every day. Why are you sure that they are human beings and not machines, which skilfully imitate human behavior? This question is known as the problem of “other minds” — one of the most interesting and serious problems of philosophy. We can also imagine a person who simulates speaking Chinese while repeating a well-memorized text. Such situations demonstrate the presence of a speaking subject who, however, does not speak. But, is there a real difference between this and psychosis?

All we do is balance between a psychotic and a speaking machine, and we will do it as long as we are alive.

5. Here we face the problem whether the “under-objectual continuity” can guarantee the continuity of our experience, i.e., reproducibility and objectivity of our knowledge of the world. We objectify the world objectively — by virtue of apriority (i.e., necessity and
validity) of our forms of cognition (the idea formulated by Kant). It means, then, that we can exchange the revealed objects with each other, i.e., we can communicate not being at risk of incorrect understanding. But herein we find an obstacle.

The building of the classical rationality went collapsed when it became clear that each act of cognition stretched in time and space of studied objects, i.e. it included itself into the examined world; so any supervision and description could not be concentrated in an absolutely transparent point above a limit of what was under investigation, description, observation. The subject “has lost” self-identity, i.e. the ability “to join” a point of view of the universal observer, which presence could provide the reproducibility of experience. The continuity of experience now appeared essentially unattainable. From here follows, by the way, that the time necessary for the act of communication appears to be lost “in advance”… One can easily say that the relativity of experience results in its unpredictability and, so, in impossibility of communication — for to communicate means to deal with something objective and constant in time and space. The irreversibility of facts seems to make communication impossible.

But, if we remember the idea of “converting consciousness,” if we remember the idea of “under-objectual continuity” (or our intrinsic connectivity), the problem disappears. For all unique, individual, intimately personal is what does not separate us from others, but connects us with them (and exists only in this connection). The problem arises only when we oppose social and individual - a step often made by representatives of many philosophical and psychological schools. A human being is a social being. It does not mean that, on the one hand, we have “innate” (biological) ability to communicate, and, on the other hand, we have objective (social) conditions of communication. Speaking of “intrinsic” sociality, we mean that the one who communicates is a social subject, but not a biological organism. Our sociality is being formed by force of “psychological instruments” (signs) and their meanings which “keep objectified” forms of social activity. Only this way can we develop our individual consciousness, so we are individuals only inasmuch as social subjects. What makes me a social being is the use of “psychological instruments”, which are “external” inasmuch as “internal” (they recast even my physiology!). Using them, I am “introduced” in society while the latter becomes a medium in my relations with the whole world. Hence, there is no need of anything like “the third world,” or “innate ideas,” etc., for there is no intrinsic opposition between individual and social.

Many philosophical problems, such as the problem of communication, remain “alive” despite any attempts to resolve them. It is no wonder, then, that, as Chang argues (1996), modern communication theories fail to provide an adequate explanation of how communication is possible. Actually, it is an old thesis, which was admitted by many scientists (e.g. De Mauro, 1965). This fact seems to affirm Kant’s idea that human reason tries to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend its faculties.
Now let us address once again the basic contradiction, which we tried to resolve in this paper, i.e., one between sense and being (Descombes, 1980), or between the event and the object-matter (Mamardashvili, 2004). An event cannot *take place* if it cannot be *objectified*, but the objectified event is not what has really happened. Many thinkers encountered this problem. Bakhtin spoke of the uniqueness of human experience (“my non-alibi in being”), but he also considered everything spoken by us as penetrated by the words of others. The original is already a copy — argued Derrida (1967). Cartesians and adherents of evolutionism bypassed the problem, speaking about interaction between biological and social (Chomsky), or between three worlds (Popper). I do not reject Chomsky’s or Popper’s ideas; indeed, if we distinguish between different worlds, we are compelled to defend interaction (Popper, 1994). I do suggest a different point of view, though, trying to offer a different conceptual system, proceeding not from the opposition between biological and social, but from the “intrinsic” sociality of a human being. Many questions brought up in this paper and many that are not mentioned here are discussed in more detail in my book “How can we make sure that we are not in the Matrix? Consciousness, communication and mental disorders” (Zhuravlyov, 2006).

Social is inside us: here we have the sublation of the antimony of the vertical relationship mentioned above. But, the most important point here is the necessity to think of consciousness as a mobile (living) essence: only in its continuous conversion can there exist social as well as individual, and only in our continuous efforts to bridge the gap between the stream of events and the space of objects can there exist our thought and our objectual activity. If we stop this movement of consciousness we will find out incognizable subject and incognizable object separated from each other with a presumed “space” of interaction, neither subjective nor objective (preestablished harmony). But, there is no need for communication in the world of preestablished harmony. So, saying that communication happens behind the back of consciousness, we stress only the necessity to understand the difference between the existence and the object-matter — the difference which itself can be only a matter of abstraction, but makes up the essence of human experience and human communication.

Trying to make a step from “the realm of necessity” to “the realm of freedom”, Kant formulated his famous categorical imperative. With the same end in view, we formulated the idea of “under-objectual continuity”. The great Russian poet Blok once wrote: “Нам в темные ночи / легко умереть / и в мертвые очи / друг другу глядеть” — “At dark nights / We can easily die / And look at each other / straight in the eyes” (Blok, 1989, p. 112). To die, looking into the other’s eyes, or, to put it differently, to find oneself in the other — that means to be a human being.
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THE ROLE OF PERCEIVED ETHNIC VITALITY IN ACCULTURATION AMONG RUSSIAN EMIGRANTS TO FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE NETHERLANDS

IRINA SUANET-GALCHENKO AND FONS J. R. VAN DE VIJVER

This study addressed the role of perceived ethnic vitality in acculturation among Russian emigrants to France (N = 229), Germany (N = 240), and the Netherlands (N = 182). Support was found for the hypothesis that Russian emigrants to France whose community has a high perceived ethnic vitality showed more psychological adjustment and more interactions with co-nationals and host nationals (sociocultural adjustment) than do emigrants in the two other countries whose communities have lower levels of perceived ethnical vitality. Regression demonstrated that a higher level of perceived ethnic vitality and a lower level of perceived cultural distance were associated with more psychological adjustment. Moreover, emigrants who reported more perceived ethnic vitality interacted more frequently with both co-nationals and host nationals. Extraverted emigrants showed more psychological adjustment and interacted more frequently with host nationals. Acculturation orientations and coping were found to mediate antecedent conditions and outcomes. Attitudes towards host domain and seeking social support were positively associated with psychological adjustment and interactions with host nationals. Emigrants of the second generation were more oriented and better adjusted to the host country.

Keywords: acculturation, emigrants, russia, perceived ethnic vitality, psychological and sociocultural outcomes, coping skills

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The current study addresses the role of perceived ethnic vitality in acculturation among Russian emigrants in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. These three countries were chosen because they have different histories of Russian immigration (which is much longer in France than in the two other countries) and constitute different acculturation contexts for Russian emigrants, despite their geographical closeness and important cultural similarities, because all countries are affluent, individualistic countries in Western Europe with fairly large streams of labor and refugee immigration from various countries in the last decades. The size of the immigration in the last decades varies considerably across the three countries. The number of Russians emigrants to Germany increased from 39,967 in 1996 to 155,583 in 2003; currently there are over 300,000 Russian emigrants (including refugees) in Germany (Библиотечный сервис русскоязычных эмигрантов в Германии, 2003). Over 6,000 Russians from the former Soviet Union migrated to the Netherlands in the last 10 years (Van de Kruisbes, 2003), which is a large increase compared to the preceding decade. The number of Russians who migrated to France decreased from 50,934 in 1946, to 26,210 in 1962, and to 7,452 in 1982 (Русская эмиграция во Франции, 2000). Furthermore, different kinds of groups of emigrants have settled in the three countries; we also found these differences in our study. Russian emigrants in Germany often come from rural areas in various provinces of Russia; many of them have relatively low levels of education and went to Germany to find a job. Russians in the Netherlands tend to be better educated and originally come from Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Russians emigrants went to the Netherlands to work or study. The group of Russian emigrants in the Netherlands is much smaller than the group of Russian emigrants in Germany. Russian emigrants in France are a more heterogeneous group in terms of age and time spent in the host country. France was the first country of destination for Russian emigrants; as a consequence, the country has more than one generation of adult emigrants. There are very well organized ethnic communities, Russian schools for children, Russian shops, newspapers and Orthodox churches in France. These resources are informative and useful for Russian people in France. In contrast, the few national communities that exist in a few German big cities provide only commercial services (translating and real estate). There is only one ethnic community in the Netherlands which provides mostly tickets for a concert of Russian musicians in Amsterdam or some other cultural event with Russian artists. These differences in ethnic vitality of one emigrant group in three host countries that are culturally fairly similar are unique and the present study is the first where the role of ethnic vitality in acculturation of Russian emigrants in these three different countries was examined.

Main Theoretical Concepts

Psychological acculturation (Graves, 1967) involves the usually complex set of psychological consequences (maintenance, adjustment, or their combination) of prolonged
exposure to a different culture in norms, values, attitudes, behavior, and habits (e.g., food patterns). In line with current models, we view acculturation orientations as intervening variables, which link acculturation conditions (such as characteristics of the main and host culture) to outcomes (psychological and sociocultural adjustment) (see Figure 1; cf. Berry & Sam, 1997; Ward, Bochner, & Furnham, 2001). Acculturation conditions define the contextual limits and demands which influence acculturation processes. At group level, acculturation conditions involve characteristics of the society of origin, of the immigrant group (e.g., perceived ethnic vitality and social attachment), of the host society (e.g., cultural openness, discrimination, immigration policy, and relationships of mainstreamers with emigrants), and intergroup relations (e.g., social inequality and social distance). Individual-level context variables refer to changes over time (e.g., age and length of settlement), position in the society, and situational or social context (e.g., social support and stressful situations) (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2004). Acculturation outcomes (also labeled adjustment) indicate the degree of success of the acculturative process. Ward and Kennedy (1994) divided outcomes of the acculturative process into psychological adjustment (or psychological outcomes; e.g., self-reports of mental health) and sociocultural adjustment (or sociocultural outcomes; e.g., often measured as self-reported or observed behaviors related to school and work success). Acculturation orientations, also called acculturation strategies and acculturation styles, refer to ways in which emigrants want to deal with the cultures involved (e.g., Berry, 1997; Ward, Bochner, & Furnham, 2001). The most frequently used model of acculturation strategies is Berry’s (1992) bidimensional model. This model sees identification with the host country and the country of origin as two independent dimensions, which constitute four acculturation strategies: integration, assimilation, separation (or segregation), and marginalization. Integration refers to a preference to maintain the culture
of the country of origin while also adopting the new culture. Assimilation represents a loss of the original culture and complete absorption in the new culture. Separation involves a desire to maintain key features of the original culture while rejecting the new culture. Finally, marginalization relates to the rejection of both cultures.

**Theoretical Model of the Study**

The remainder of the introduction provides an overview of presumably relevant antecedent conditions (perceived ethnic vitality, perceived cultural distance, and personality) and intervening conditions (coping and acculturation strategies) that were examined in the current study.

Vitality (Giles, Bourhis, & Taylor, 1977) refers to the presence of institutions from the culture of origin in the country of settlement, such as places of worship, schools, and restaurants. Perceived ethnic vitality refers to the perceived availability of support networks and institutions of the heritage culture (e.g., Adelman, 1988; Ait Ouarasse & Van de Vijver, 2008; Berno & Ward, 2000). Minority networks are often mentioned as an important source of support (Berry, Kim, Power, Young, & Bujaki, 1989; Ward & Kennedy, 1994). The relevance of perceived ethnic vitality was studied in a group of young adult Moroccan emigrants in the Netherlands by Ait Ouarasse and Van de Vijver (2004). More perceived ethnic vitality was associated with less stress and more sociocultural (school and work) adjustment. The study found support for the view that more ethnic vitality was associated with more sociocultural adjustment (and not with stronger tendencies to isolate the ethnic community from the mainstream). Various authors have argued that a larger cultural distance between the countries of origin and settlement leads to more adaptation problems (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2006; Babiker, Cox, & Miller, 1980; Evans, Tradgold, & Mavondo, 2000; Galchenko & Van de Vijver, 2007, 2008; O’Grady & Lane, 1996; Ward, Leong, & Low, 2004; Zagefka, Brown, Broquard, & Martin, 2006). A large perceived cultural distance encourages emigrants to remain psychologically isolated within their ethnic group (Phalet & Hagendoorn, 1996). Dimitrov (2005) examined perceived cultural distance in a group of Russian emigrants in the U.S. in three life domains: friendships, workplace, and male-female interaction. The largest perceived cultural distance was found in friendships, the smallest in male-female interactions.

The relationship between personality (more specifically the so-called Big Five) and cross-cultural adjustment was examined by Ward, Leong, and Low (2004) in a study of sojourners in Australia and Singapore. Extraversion was positively and neuroticism negatively related to psychological and sociocultural adaptation in both sojourning samples. Agreeableness and conscientiousness were positively linked to psychological well-being in both samples and to sociocultural adaptation in the Singaporean group. Mol, Born, Willemsen, and Van der Molen (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of expatriate performance. Using 30 primary studies (total N = 4,046), they found that predictive validities of the Big
Five were similar to those reported for domestic employees. Extraversion, emotional stability, agreeableness, and conscientiousness predicted expatriate job performance, but openness did not. Other predictors that were found to relate to expatriate job performance were cultural sensitivity and local language proficiency. The present study employs a related model of personality (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975; Psychological Measurements, 1996) in which personality is taken to consist of three traits: Extraversion (being outgoing, talkative, high on positive affect, feeling good, and need for external stimulation), neuroticism (being anxious, depressed, and moody), and psychoticism (being aggressive, assertive, and manipulative).

Intervening variables in the present study were acculturation orientations and coping. Coping has been studied in acculturation research as a variable that mediates the relation between antecedent variables and acculturation outcomes. An example can be found in a study by Kosic (2004) among Croatian and Polish emigrants in Rome. Coping strategies mediated the relation between the need for cognitive closure and decisiveness (the antecedent variables) and acculturative stress (the outcome variable). Social support is a significant factor in predicting psychological adjustment (Ward et al., 2001). Social support is positively related to psychological well-being, both in sojourners and emigrants (Searle & Ward, 1990; Ward & Kennedy, 1993).

Acculturation orientations, psychological adjustment, and sociocultural competence during cross-cultural transitions were studied by Ward and Kennedy (1994). Expatriates with a stronger host national identification experienced fewer sociocultural adjustment difficulties. The most social difficulties were experienced by sojourners who endorsed separation, and the least by those who favored assimilation and integration; the participants who favored marginalization showed an intermediate level. Sojourners with a preference for integration experienced less depression than sojourners with a preference for assimilation; there were no other significant differences among the four groups. The favorable adaptation outcomes of integration have been found in various studies (Berry & Sam, 1997).

According to Ward and Kennedy (1994), homesickness relates to psychological adjustment (often associated with mental health indicators such as stress, depression, and homesickness). In a sample of international and U.S. students, Poyrazli and Lopez (2007) found that international students experienced higher levels of discrimination and homesickness than did U.S. students. Age, English proficiency, and perceived discrimination predicted homesickness among the international students. In another research students in the Netherlands and in the U.K. were compared (Stroebe, Van Vliet, Hewstone, & Willis, 2002). It was demonstrated that both personality and family situation factors had influence on homesickness. Students with higher levels of homesickness experienced more difficulties in adjustment.
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF ACCULTURATION

Most acculturation studies examine one immigrant group in one country. These studies usually show very little variation in contextual conditions of acculturation such as mainstreamers’ expectations of acculturation by immigrants, ethnic vitality, and discrimination. As a consequence, such studies have a limited value in determining the role of cultural context in acculturation. There is an obvious need for conducting studies that compare acculturation of emigrants from a single country of origin in different countries of settlement or that compare several immigrant groups in one country (Sam & Berry, 2006). Piontkowski, Florack, Hoelker, and Obdrzálek (2000) examined to what extent the acculturation attitudes of dominant (Germans, Swiss, and Slovaks) and non-dominant groups (Turks, former Yugoslavians, and Hungarians) could be predicted on the basis of various characteristics: perceived similarity, contact, identification, self-efficacy, perceived outcome, permeability (openness for societal participation by immigrants), vitality, and intergroup bias. The authors concluded that the acculturation preference of each cultural group is predicted by a group-specific combination of variables.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ETHNOCULTURAL YOUTH (THE ICSEY PROJECT)

Using the sample of youth from over thirty different immigrants groups in thirteen countries with data of non-immigrant peers, Berry and colleagues tested patterns of similarities and differences in acculturation, identity and adaptation and compared it across groups and societies (Berry et al., 2006). This project was based on Berry’s study of acculturative stress and Phinney’s work on ethnic identity (Berry, 1990, 1997; Phinney, 1990). In a first report, psychological adaptation of Turkish adolescents was studied in Norway and Sweden (Virta, Sam, & Westin, 2004). The results indicated that Turks in Norway had poorer psychological adaptation (lower self-esteem and more mental health problems) than Turks in Sweden. Moreover, Turks in Norway reported a less pronounced Turkish identity, more marginalization, and more perceived discrimination than Turks in Sweden. Results on a larger data set involving Turkish and Vietnamese immigrant youth in Finland, France, Norway, and Sweden were reported by Vedder, Sam, Van de Vijver, and Phinney (2006). Differences between host countries tended to be larger than differences between ethnic groups. Both immigrant groups showed the lowest scores on integration and the highest scores on discrimination in Norway. Moreover, Turkish immigrants showed a stronger ethnic orientation whereas Vietnamese immigrants showed a stronger mainstream orientation.
THE PRESENT STUDY AND HYPOTHESES

The study of immigrant groups in different countries from a single heritage country can yield valuable insights in the influence of characteristics of the host country and the community of co-nationals on acculturation outcomes. The current study is the first comparative study of acculturation among Russian emigrants; we examined participants in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. We were interested in the role of ethnic vitality in these three countries. The Russian community in France presumably shows more ethnic vitality than the Russian communities in the other countries; there are more Russian institutions and more extensive social networks among Russian emigrants in France than in the Netherlands and Germany. We tested the following hypotheses:

1. Russian emigrants in France show a higher perceived ethnic vitality than emigrants in Germany and the Netherlands.

2. Country differences in ethnic vitality and perceived cultural distance are associated with country differences in acculturation orientations and outcomes. More specifically, a statistical correction for either ethnic vitality or perceived cultural distance reduces the size of the cross-cultural differences in orientations and outcomes.

3. Extraversion is related to less depression and homesickness (psychological adjustment) and more frequent interactions with host nationals and with co-nationals (sociocultural adjustment); psychoticism and neuroticism are positively related to depression and homesickness (psychological adjustment) and negatively to frequency of interactions with co-nationals and host nationals (sociocultural adjustment).

4. Perceived ethnic vitality is associated with less depression and homesickness and more interactions with co-nationals and host nationals.

5. Host domain resources are associated with less depression and homesickness and more interactions with host nationals.

6. Acculturation orientations and coping are mediators between antecedent variables and outcomes.

The differences between the countries (except the first hypothesis), the first and the second generation emigrants and between the two genders were examined on an exploratory basis.

Because of recent emigration history in Germany and the Netherlands, these countries have very few adult second-generation Russian immigrants. Therefore, generation differences could only be studied in France.
METHOD

Participants

A total of 651 Russian emigrants (395 men and 256 women) from France (\(N = 229\); mean age = 38.12, \(SD = 9.92\), 130 men and 99 women), Germany (\(N = 240\); mean age = 37.66, \(SD = 8.33\), 137 men and 103 women), and the Netherlands (\(N = 182\); mean age = 34.31, \(SD = 6.59\), 110 men and 72 women) were involved in the study. An analysis of variance revealed that the age differences were significant, \(F(2, 649) = 11.68, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .11\) (partial eta square). Additional analyses revealed that age differences were not systematically related to acculturation variables and that generation differences were more important. Therefore, we considered the role of generation in the remaining analyses. All participants in Germany and the Netherlands were first-generation emigrants, the French sample consisted of first- and second-generation emigrants (\(N = 103\) and 127, respectively). The mean age of the second-generation emigrants is 32.57, \(SD = 7.03\). No formal registers of Russian emigrants are available which would allow for probability sampling; hence, we cannot examine the representativeness of our sample. Still, the demographic data do not suggest that our sample is much different from the (adult) Russian emigrant population in the three countries.

All participants of the first-generation came to the country of residence between two and eight years ago. Russians of the second-generation of the French sample were born in France. All participants were Russian native speakers and lived in Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, Eindhoven in the Netherlands, Dusseldorf, Cologne, Essen, Aachen, Hamburg, Munich in Germany, and Paris, Lyon, and Marseille in France. All participants have a legal immigrant status: the participants of the first generation have a residence permit and Russians of the second generation are citizens of the host country. All Russians in the Dutch sample have a university degree and a job in the host country, most participants in Germany have a relatively low educational level and some of them are not employed. The first generation of the French sample contained mostly highly educated people with a job (70%), participants of the second generation were mostly students (76% of the second-generation sample) and not employed; the rest of the sample (24%) are Russians, typically 35-57 years old, highly-educated with a good job. Participants were recruited for this study by using internet sites of Russian communities, Russian newspapers, clubs, Orthodox church, schools for Russian children and personal contacts. No financial compensation for participation was offered.
Instruments

Unless indicated otherwise, measures were developed by the authors and were adaptations of instruments used in a study on Moroccan emigrants that supported the reliability and validity of the scales (Ait Ouarasse & Van de Vijver, 2004). Responses were given on a seven-point Likert scale, with answer options ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The same answer options were used in the other scales (unless specified otherwise). All (sub)scales of all instruments were found to be unifactorial.

The measurement of the perceived cultural distance comprised of 22 items and responses were given on a 7-point bipolar scale, with answer options ranging from 1 (very similar) to 7 (very different). An example of an item is: “How similar or different do you find the religion in France/Germany/the Netherlands and in Russia?” The internal consistency of the scale (Cronbach’s alpha) was .78.

The scale to measure perceived ethnic vitality (home domain resources) comprised of questions about the community domain (e.g., availability of ethnic institutions and support networks). The questionnaire consisted of 18 items, such as “I find it easy to find friends from my own country”, “I attend activities organized by people from Russia”, “When I am in real trouble it is to Russians that I go for help”, and “Associations of Russian people have played an important role in facilitating their lives in France”. The responses were given on a 7-point Likert-scale, with answer options ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The same answer options were used in the other scales (unless specified otherwise). Cronbach’s alpha was .91.

The Host Domain Resources Scale dealt with questions about the host country. The questionnaire consisted of 19 items, such as “I find it easy to find Dutch/French/German friends”, “I attend activities organized by Dutch/French/German people”, “When I am in real trouble, it is to the Dutch/French/Germans that I go for help”, and “I think the Dutch/French/Germans try to help us” (alpha = .83).

The full version of Eysenck Personality Scale which consists of 101 items such as “I am a talkative person” (Extraversion scale), “I think of myself as a carefree person” (Psychoticism scale), “Sometimes I feel unhappy for no obvious reason” (Neuroticism scale) was used in this study (Психологические измерения, 1996). The questionnaire comprises of three subscales: Psychoticism, Neuroticism, and Extraversion (the values of alpha of the three scales were .71, .92, and .89, respectively).

Coping skills were measured by means of the Coping Strategy Indicator (Amirkhan, 1990). The scale measures three types of coping strategies: problem solving, seeking social support, and avoidance. Participants are asked to describe a problem they have encountered in the last six months and keeping that stressful event in mind, to indicate how they dealt with it. This measurement comprises 33 items such as “Brainstormed all possible solutions before deciding what to do?” (problem solving), “Accepted sympathy and understanding from someone?” (seeking social support), and “Spent more time than usual alone?”
(avoidance); the scale uses a 3-point response scale, with answer options ranging from 1 (not at all) to 3 (a lot) (alpha of Problem Solving = .71, of Social Support = .83, and of Avoidance = .69).

Acculturation orientations were assessed, using the two-item measurement method (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2004), which means that questions were asked about relevant acculturation domains for both the country of origin and the country of settlement. We examined acculturation attitudes toward home and host country (Russia and France/Germany/the Netherlands, respectively). In keeping with previous research (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2004), we asked questions related to both personal and public domains. The questionnaire consisted of 24 items measuring attitudes such as “I like Dutch/French/German food” and “I like Russian food” (private domain) and “I like to have Dutch/French/German friends” and “I like to have Russian friends” (public domain) (alpha of Attitude toward Home Country = .79, and of Attitude toward Host Country = .80).

Psychological outcomes were measured with a depression scale of 10 items (with items such as “Sometimes I am so depressed that I feel like staying in bed for the whole day”). Responses could range from 1 (never) to 7 (most of the time) (alpha of Depression = .76). In order to measure homesickness, a questionnaire with 10 items (e.g. “I often dream about my future visits to my country”) was used (alpha = .86).

Sociocultural outcomes were examined by measuring self-reported behavior in public and private domains, such as food and family (private domains) and social contacts and language (public domains). The questionnaire comprised of 28 items, again using the two-item method. Fourteen items referred to the culture of origin (e.g., “How often do you eat Russian food?”); another set of 14 items asked the same questions with regard to country of settlement (e.g., “How often do you eat Dutch/French/German food”). The response alternatives ranged from 1 (never) to 7 (daily or almost daily) (alpha of Behavior in Home Domain = .81 and of Behavior in Host Domain = .79).

Procedure

The questionnaire was originally developed in English. A Russian version was made using a translation back translation procedure. All participants were sufficiently skilled in Russian to fill out the Russian version. The questionnaire was given after some public function in the community (e.g., a celebration in a club or in the Orthodox Church); other participants were approached via internet sites or individually. The average time needed to answer the questionnaire was one hour. In addition, participants were free to add their personal comments about ethnic vitality. Some of these comments are described in the discussion section as illustration of participants’ experiences.
Data Analysis

Multivariate analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was used to determine whether the samples showed different scale means; a multivariate analysis was chosen as the dependent variables of interest could be expected to be correlated. The size of the cross-cultural differences was expressed in terms of proportion of variance accounted for by cultural group in the MANOVA (partial eta square). We adopted Cohen’s proposal and used .01, .06, and .14 as cutoff values for small, moderate, and large effects. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc tests were employed to adjust the selected alpha level to control for overall Type 1 error rate in determining which cultural groups showed different means. Covariance analysis was used to examine the statistical influence of perceived ethnic vitality on the cross-cultural differences on all scales (cf. Poortinga & Van de Vijver, 1987). Country was the independent variable, perceived cultural distance the covariate, and the scale scores were the dependent variables. We compared the size of the cross-cultural differences in the original scores with the size of these differences after correction for perceived ethnic vitality and perceived cultural distance in order to test whether perceived ethnic vitality showed stronger associations with acculturation orientations and outcomes than did perceived cultural distance. Multiple regression analysis was used to evaluate the association of predictors with all outcome variables; step-wise regression analyses were conducted to determine the viability of the mediation model of acculturation. A stepwise regression was chosen because it allowed us to examine the associations between the antecedent and intervening variables on the one hand and the dependent variables on the other hand in a way that is consistent with our theoretical framework described in Figure 1. These analyses tested whether the relations between antecedent and outcome variables were partly or fully mediated by the mediating variables (acculturation orientations).

RESULTS

The presentation of the results is divided into two sections; the first describes the examination of the patterning of the group differences in mean scores, and the second tests the relations between antecedent, intervening, and outcome variables.

Group Differences in Mean Scores

Group differences in mean scores were addressed in two analyses: the first was a multivariate analysis of variance, involving the first-generation emigrants in the three countries; the dependent variables are the scores on each of the psychological scales. The second tested generation differences in the French sample (this sample was the only one with emigrants from two generations). This analysis tested the first two hypotheses.
Analysis of host-country differences

The first analysis had host country (3 levels: France, Germany, and the Netherlands) and gender (2 levels) as independent variables and all psychological scales as dependent variables (i.e., perceived ethnic vitality, perceived cultural distance, host domain resources, personality traits (psychoticism, extraversion, neuroticism), coping styles (problem solving, seeking social support, and avoidance), attitudes toward Russia, attitudes toward host country, homesickness, depression, behavior in home domain, and behavior in host domain). Only first-generation migrants were included in the analysis. The interaction of country by gender was significant, Wilks’ Lambda = .85, F(30, 1020) = 2.77, p < .01, η²p = .07. Gender differences in host domain resources were smaller in France than in the Netherlands and Germany. The other variables tended to show smaller gender differences in the Netherlands than in France and Germany. Gender showed a significant and moderate multivariate effect, Wilks’ Lambda = .90, F(15, 510) = 3.44, p < .01, η²p = .09 (partial eta square). Males scored higher on host domain resources, avoidance, and behavior in home domain, and lower on problem solving. Host country demonstrated a significant and large effect, Wilks’ Lambda = .30, F(30, 1020) = 27.75, p < .01, η²p = .45. The country means for each scale are reported in Table 1. The means are standardized across the three groups of participants so that the tabulated scores can be interpreted as deviations (z scores) from the global mean of zero. A post hoc procedure (Bonferroni test) showed that the French mean was significantly different from the means of the two other countries for all variables except depression. Participants from the Netherlands and Germany reported a larger perceived cultural distance to their countries of residence than did the participants from France. Compared to the latter group, the Dutch and German immigrant samples showed lower scores on perceived ethnic vitality and host domain resources, psychoticism, extraversion, attitudes toward home and host country) and behavior in home and host domain, and higher scores on neuroticism and homesickness. Finally, Russian-Dutch and Russian-Germans were more focused on problem solving, sought less social support, were less avoidant, and reported less psychological and sociocultural adjustment. The largest cross-cultural effect sizes were found for perceived ethnic vitality, closely followed by cultural distance. The first hypothesis which stated that Russian emigrants in France would show a higher perceived ethnic vitality than emigrants in Germany and the Netherlands was confirmed. Moreover, emigrants in France showed less depression and homesickness (psychological adjustment) and more interactions with host nationals (sociocultural adjustment) than emigrants in Germany and the Netherlands. These differences support the second hypothesis.

The two antecedent conditions that showed the largest cross-cultural differences were perceived ethnic vitality and perceived cultural difference. The large figure for perceived cultural distance is interesting, because the cultural differences between the host countries are not substantial, as described in the introduction. Furthermore, we found that perceived ethnic vitality and perceived cultural distance were unrelated, r(652) = -.04, ns.
The second hypothesis addressed the influence of perceived ethnic vitality and perceived cultural distance on the cross-cultural differences on all scales. We compared the size of the cross-cultural differences in the original scores with the size of these differences after correction (cf. Poortinga & Van de Vijver, 1987). The correction was done in a covariance analysis in which country was the independent variable, perceived ethnic vitality, perceived cultural distance and their interaction the covariate (for each covariate a separate analysis was carried out), and the scale scores were the dependent variables (Table 1). We
found that in line with the second hypothesis, the size of the country differences was reduced considerably after correction for the covariates. More specifically, controlling for perceived ethnic vitality led to a larger reduction in variance than for perceived cultural distance (with averages after correction of .03 and .13, respectively). Their combination reduced the average effect size to .09. These findings indicate that perceived ethnic vitality and perceived cultural distance reduced the variation in the other variables by about 50%.

**Predicting Acculturation Outcomes**

Regression analyses were used to address the remaining four hypotheses that dealt with the statistical influence of antecedent and intervening variables on acculturation outcomes. Stepwise multiple regression analyses were carried out in which psychological and sociocultural adjustment were the dependent variables. Perceived cultural distance, cultural resources (both perceived ethnic vitality and host domain resources), and personality traits (psychoticism, extraversion, and neuroticism) were predictors in the first step; acculturation variables (home and host attitude) and coping styles (seeking social support, problem solving, and avoidance) were added as independent variables in the second step. The data analyses involved only the first-generation immigrants from the three countries in order to avoid the confounding of generation and country effects. The results are presented in Table 2 (psychological adjustment) and Table 3 (sociocultural adjustment).

We begin with the description of psychological adjustment (depression and homesickness). The first regression analysis examined depression. The antecedent variables showed a significant effect, $R^2 = .33$, $p < .01$. Significant predictors ($p < .05$) were psychoticism (positive regression coefficient), extraversion (negative), neuroticism (positive), and perceived cultural distance (positive). Adding the intervening variables significantly increased the value of $R^2$ to .48, $DR^2 = .15$, $p < .01$. The predictors that were significant in the first step remained significant in the second step. First-generation Russian emigrants showed more depression when they reported less ethnic vitality, higher scores on psychoticism and lower scores on extraversion, neuroticism, seeking social support, and avoidance; moreover, they reported more depression when they had a stronger attitude toward home country and a weaker attitude toward the host country. The second regression analysis examined homesickness; the squared multiple correlation was high ($R^2 = .41$, $p < .01$) and increased significantly in the second step, $R^2 = .14$, $p < .01$. All predictors were significant in the first step: psychoticism, neuroticism, and perceived cultural distance were positive predictors and ethnic vitality, host domain resources, and extraversion were negative predictors. In the second step neuroticism, perceived cultural distance, and attitude toward home country were positive predictors; negative regression coefficients were found for ethnic vitality, host domain resources, extraversion, seeking social support, avoidance, and attitude toward home country.
It is interesting to compare the results of the two regression analyses. Perceived cultural distance and ethnic vitality were related to the outcomes in both analyses in a consistent and predictable manner. A lower perceived cultural distance and more perceived ethnic vitality are associated with less depression and homesickness. The introduction of acculturation orientations and coping led to a large increase of the proportion of variance
explained. A stronger orientation on Russia and a weaker orientation on the host country were associated with more depression and homesickness. Moreover, emotionally stable, extraverted emigrants who used social support seeking and avoidance as coping strategy showed also less depression and homesickness, more psychological adjustment. The sign of avoidance is unexpected.

The regression analyses of the sociocultural adjustment (behavior in home and in host domain) are documented in Table 3. The antecedent conditions were significantly related to

Table 3
Results of Stepwise Regression Analysis (Beta Weights) with Sociocultural Adjustment as Dependent Variables (First-Generation Immigrants in Three Countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Behavior in Home Domain</th>
<th>Behavior in Host Domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antecedent²</td>
<td>All²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antecedent conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived cultural distance</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ethnic vitality</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host domain resources</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychoticism</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>-.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraversion</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuroticism</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervening variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward host country</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.04*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem solving</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking social support</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoidance</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: "The label “Antecedent” refers to the antecedent variables (perceived cultural distance, resources, and personality) that were the predictors of the first set. The label “All” refers to the combination of antecedent variables and intervening variables (coping and acculturation variables) that were the predictors in the second step. *p < .05. **p < .01."
behavior in the home domain, $R^2 = .32$; the introduction of the intervening variables in the second step led to a significant increase of .11 ($p < .05$). Significant variables in the first subset were ethnic vitality, host domain resources, psychoticism, and neuroticism. In the second subset, the following variables were significant: perceived ethnic vitality (positive), host domain resources (negative), extraversion (positive), neuroticism (positive), perceived cultural distance (positive), attitude toward Russia (positive), and attitude toward host country (negative).

The final analysis involved the prediction of host domain behavior. The analysis showed a significant effect of antecedent variables, $R^2 = .44$; there was a significant increase of .06 in the second subset. Perceived ethnic vitality and host domain resources were positive predictors and psychoticism and neuroticism were negative predictors. When the intervening variables were added, the following predictors were significant: perceived ethnic vitality (positive), host domain resources (positive), psychoticism (negative), extraversion (positive), neuroticism (negative), attitudes towards home country (negative), attitudes towards host country (positive), seeking social support (positive), and avoidance (negative).

It can be concluded that the antecedent conditions were significantly associated with both sociocultural adjustment variables; the introduction of the intervening variables led to a significant and moderate increase of the proportion of variance explained. Perceived ethnic vitality was the most powerful predictor in both domains of behavior. More perceived ethnic vitality was associated with more interactions with both co-nationals and host nationals. More extraverted emigrants with a low level of psychoticism and neuroticism, who prefer seeking social support as coping strategy, showed more sociocultural adjustment. Russians emigrants with stronger attitudes towards Russia interacted more with co-nationals; participants with stronger attitudes toward the host country socialized more with host nationals. Emigrants who prefer avoidance as a coping strategy interacted less with host nationals.

The regression analyses largely support the last four hypotheses. Extraverted emigrants, who have low levels of neuroticism and psychoticism, show less depression and homesickness (psychological adjustment) and interact more frequently with host nationals (behavior in host domain, sociocultural adjustment) (third hypothesis). More perceived ethnic vitality is associated with less depression and homesickness and more frequent interactions with co-nationals and host nationals (fourth hypothesis). More host domain resources are associated with less depression and homesickness and more interactions with host nationals (fifth hypothesis). Acculturation orientation and coping were found to be a mediator between antecedent and outcome variables (sixth hypothesis).

Analysis of first- and second-generation emigrants to France. In order to examine generation differences, we split the French sample in first- and second-generation emigrants. A multivariate analysis of variance with generation as the independent variable and the psychological scales as the dependent variables found significant generation differences, Wilks’ Lambda = .55, $F(15, 233) = 12.70, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .45$. The univariate analyses showed
that members of the first generation showed significantly higher scores on perceived ethnic vitality (Cohen’s $d = 0.88$), host domain resources ($d = 0.70$), attitude toward Russia ($d = 0.79$), and behavior in the home domain ($d = 0.82$), and significantly lower scores on attitudes toward the host country ($d = -0.40$). This score pattern points to more adjustment to the French culture and less orientation on the Russian culture in the second generation. Finally, we found higher scores on homesickness among second-generation generation emigrants ($d = -0.37$), which may seem unexpected. Members of the second generation with higher scores on homesickness tended to have more negative attitudes toward France and to show less behavior in the host domain, whereas the opposite relation was found in the first generation.

**DISCUSSION**

We were interested in differences in acculturation-related variables among Russian emigrants to France, Germany, and the Netherlands. These three countries have a different history of immigration from Russia. France was the first country that accepted Russian emigrants (back in the 19th century) and it was the first country in which many facilities for the immigrant community were realized; the community is well organized and has established, among other things, Orthodox churches and weekend schools to teach the Russian language. Germany and the Netherlands have a much more recent immigration history of Russians. Many Russians emigrated to Germany in the 1990s and smaller numbers went to the Netherlands. Despite their geographical proximity and cultural similarities as being Western, individualistic, and affluent, different conditions for acculturation of Russian emigrants prevail in these three countries. The major differences in ethnic vitality of the communities in the three countries provided a good study context to examine the role of perceived ethnic vitality in acculturation.

In line with our expectations, we found that the ethnic vitality of the Russian community was higher in France than in the two other countries (the first hypothesis). This finding was confirmed in conversations with the participants which the principal author had during the data collection. The Russian community in France is active in organizing informative resources and Russian public celebrations, has a rich cultural life and is aimed at helping emigrants and at stimulating the integration of Russians in France. There are three well organized Russian communities in Paris alone, various Russian Orthodox churches in France, numerous Russian restaurants, and several weekend schools for Russian children. These facilities have been started by the first generation and are still maintained by the current generation. During informal interviews Russian-Dutch indicated to experience various adaptation problems. They noticed that it is very hard to learn the Dutch language and to adapt to the completely different style of life and relationships between people in the Netherlands. There is only one Russian community, one weekend school for Russian
children, and one Orthodox church in Amsterdam; remarkably, only 15% of participants know about it.

We got the impression during the data collection that Russians in Germany tend to speak the host language better than do Russians in the Netherlands. This difference may have historical reasons. Because of the strong political and economical relations with Germany, the second language in Russian schools and universities used to be German. There are some weekend schools for Russian children and some Russian communities in big German cities. However, participants indicated that the activities of the Russian community are focused on organizing cultural events which does not help most Russian emigrants to adjust to the German society. The main problem for Russians in Germany is to find a job, whereas Russian emigrants in the Netherlands, who tend to be well-educated, often have fewer problems with finding jobs but face difficulties with the way of life in the Netherlands. Although most Russians in Germany are less educated and have more economical problems than the Russians in the Netherlands, both groups tend to feel uncomfortable abroad and are less well adapted than Russians in France.

The second generation, mainly consisting of younger people of about 18-30 years old, is well integrated, or as one of the young Russian emigrants said:

I consider myself as French. I was born in France and here is my homeland. My mother is Russian; so, I can speak Russian and participate in celebrations of the Russian community occasionally. And this is it about my Russian background.

Another participant felt more related to Russia, although he combined it with a strong French identity:

I was born in France and I feel here at home. But my parents are both Russian and they tried to maintain the Russian language, culture and history of Russia. So, I speak Russian fluently, I know Russian history, literature and culture.

The first-generation Russians in France were more focused on Russia whereas the second generation was more focused on France and was better adjusted to the host country. Second-generation members with higher levels of homesickness reported fewer resources in both the home and the host domain. At first sight, these results seem to suggest that second-generation emigrants with higher levels of homesickness have more problems to adjust to the French society; the opposite holds in the first generation. In our view, the results have to be interpreted in a different manner. There seems to be a difference in the object of homesickness across the generations. Members of the first generation miss their family and friends who stayed behind in Russia, whereas for second-generation members homesickness is more oriented toward Russia as a country. Quite often, their picture of Russia is idealized.
One of the second-generation participants said that he knows Russia only before the revolution, although his parents immigrated to France after the Second World War:

According to stories of my parents, it’s a country with rich cultural traditions of the aristocracy and Orthodox Church, with a variety of beautiful nature of forests, rivers, mountains and Crimea at the Black Sea. (Note by authors: Crimea was a popular resort at the Black Sea which is no longer Russian territory).

In particular for second-generation members Russia has become the unattainable ideal.

Because all participants of the first generation emigrants had approximately the same length of stay in their respective countries of settlement, we argue that differences in perceived ethnic vitality and perceived cultural distance in the three countries are associated with acculturation outcomes. The participants from France reported higher perceived ethnic vitality and higher level of sociocultural adjustment and lower level of psychological maladjustment. Russians from the Netherlands and Germany demonstrated lower level of perceived ethnic vitality and lower level of sociocultural adjustment and higher level of psychological maladjustment. These findings supported our second and fourth hypothesis.

The confirmation of these results that emigrants in country with a longer immigration history and well-organized community of co-nationals, have higher levels of psychological and sociocultural adjustment is in line with previous studies (e.g., Babiker, Cox, & Miller, 1980; Nesdale & Mak, 2003; Waxin, 2004). Our findings are also in line with previous studies in which perceived ethnic vitality proved to be a valuable resource against acculturative stress (Ait Ouarasse & Van de Vijver, 2004; Berry et al., 1989; Ward & Kennedy, 1994).

The third hypothesis, which stated that more extraverted participants have less depression and homesickness and interact more with co- and host nationals was corroborated. In addition we found that Russians who prefer seeking social support as coping strategy, report less depression and homesickness. The same combination of extraversion and support seeking was also a good predictor of adaptation in groups of expatriates and exchange students from various countries in Moscow (Galchenko & Van de Vijver, 2007, 2008). The importance of extensive social networks and psychological characteristics that foster the development of these networks, such as extraversion and support seeking, has also been demonstrated elsewhere (Selmer & Leung, 2003; Van Oudenhoven et al., 2001; Ward et al., 2004). We found that problem solving (as a coping strategy) was unrelated to both psychological and sociocultural adjustment.

A high level of perceived ethnic vitality associated with behavior both in the home and in host domain. All kinds of ethnic resources can be used to establish and maintain contact with co-nationals. Interestingly, the existence of a well developed ethnic community helps emigrants to feel more comfortable in the host country and to establish more interactions with host nationals. This strong association between ethnic vitality and both wellbeing and
contacts with both co-nationals and host nationals points to the vital importance of national resources for a successful acculturation process. A stronger attitude toward Russia and a weaker attitude toward the host country are associated with more depression and homesickness (less psychological adjustment). It can be concluded that a stronger orientation on the Russian culture is associated with more depression and homesickness, whereas a stronger host country orientation is associated with less depression and homesickness. Ward and Kennedy (1994) reported a negative relationship between assimilation and psychological adjustment; moreover, immigrants tended to be less depressed when they were more oriented on others (i.e., when they are more extraverted, support seeking, and agreeable; in the literature on the five-factor model of personality agreeableness is sometimes assumed to be the opposite of psychoticism; Digman, 1997). These immigrants tend to rely more on their social networks, which have been shown to constitute important resources for immigrants (e.g., Selmer & Leung, 2003; Van Oudenhoven, Van der Zee, & Van Kooten, 2001; Ward et al., 2004).

Our fifth hypothesis according to which host domain resources were associated with less depression and homesickness and more interactions host nationals, was confirmed. Russian emigrants who report more host domain resources (e.g., by attending activities organized by host nationals) feel less depressed, experience less homesickness and socialize more with host nationals.

Acculturation orientations and coping were mediators between ethnic vitality, host domain resources, perceived cultural distance and personality (antecedent) and depression, homesickness, psychological adjustment, and behavior, sociocultural adjustment (outcomes variables) (sixth hypothesis). The outputs of the step-wise regression analysis demonstrated the mediation role of these variables. These results are in line with our other studies where acculturation orientations and coping were found to be mediators. (Galchenko & Van de Vijver, 2007, 2008).

The present study is the first where the role of ethnic vitality in acculturation of Russian emigrants in France, Germany, and the Netherlands was examined. The results of the current study make a meaningful contribution in the area of acculturation. Our findings indicate that it is important to provide emigrants with information about the community of co-nationals in the country of settlement and to view the ethnic community in the host country as an important resource for emigrants, in some groups even for the social cultural adaptation. Our research is useful for emigrants because it can give them some ideas to organize the co-national community in the host country or to improve the present one. The level of organization of the national community (e.g., presence of clubs, schools or other places where the ethnic culture is transmitted, and places of worships) can reduce psychological problems of emigrants and improve the quality of their life abroad. Insight in the main determinants of acculturation outcomes may increase the quality of life of the migrants. More in-depth analyses of the specific problems encountered by the groups would be required to identify fruitful domains of counseling.
Limitations

The major limitation of the current study is related to its sample characteristics. Because there is no official registers of Russian emigrants, we cannot examine the representativeness of our sample to the Russian communities in the three countries, let alone Russian communities in other countries. Another sample-related characteristic that limits the generalizability is the relative homogeneity of the samples particularly in the Netherlands and Germany with regard to their educational background, socioeconomic status, and kind of neighborhood of the residence, and living alone or with family. These background variables may impact on process of acculturation, but the homogeneity of our samples in terms of these variables made it impossible to statistically correct for their influences in a regression or covariance analysis. Still, we would like to argue that the influence of these background variables is unlikely to invalidate the main conclusion of our study about the importance of ethnic vitality. The socioeconomic status of the Russian emigrants is higher in the Netherlands than in Germany; yet, we did not find that Russian emigrants in the Netherlands are better adjusted. In sum, the immigrant communities in the three countries were not entirely comparable and it was impossible to use statistical modeling to match the samples on all acculturation-related background variables. Future studies could compare Russian emigrants in other countries, different generations of Russians in several countries in order to overcome the limitations of the present study and to examine the external validity of our findings.

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MEDIA EFFECTS ON RUSSIAN STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ANASTASIA KONO NOVA

Russian students were surveyed to compare media consumption and attitudes toward the United States of America and find relationships between the use of media and the image of the United States. Television and the Internet were the most popular sources of the information about the United States. To get news, students who had never been to the United States used Russian media, mostly television, while those who visited the USA used primarily Web sites from American and international media. Russian students studying in America were more likely to believe that Americans were depicted accurately by American television than Russian students studying in Russia. “Americanized Russians” had more favorable overall attitude toward the United States than “Russian Russians.” Standard regressions showed that the use of Internet affected the overall attitude.

Keywords: image of the United States, attitudes, survey, media effects, media relations between Russia and the USA

A Russian housewife who had never been in the U.S. was asked:
“Where would you like to go if you were invited to America?”
“To Santa Barbara, of course!” the woman answered.
“Why?”
“I know everybody there!”
Russian humor

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In the beginning of 1990s, the American soap opera *Santa Barbara* was extremely popular among Russian television viewers. Many Russians sympathized with characters of the famous TV show and created their images of a faraway country based on the information received from television. This study will examine how Russians who have never been to the United States of America perceive this country, what affects their attitudes toward the United States, and how their attitudes change after they visit the United States.

The purpose of this research was to measure the extent of media use, examine Russian students’ attitudes toward the United States of America and determine whether there was an association between the two phenomena. The study compared attitudes and the extent of media use by Russians who had been or lived in America with Russians who had never traveled to or lived in the United States. The study offers a new look at a young generation of Russian people, who grew up after the Cold War and were exposed to American media much more than their Soviet parents.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

**Russians and the United States**

The first articles about the United States appeared in Russian media in the second half of the eighteenth century and were devoted to “the life of American natives, whereas later writings focused on the American Revolution” (Zassoursky, 1990, p. 11). Representatives of the Russian Enlightenment viewed America as a country of contradictions. “On the one hand, America stood for models of political organization and technological diffusion that Russia should emulate; on the other, it represented practices to be avoided” (Mickiewicz, 1990, p. 21). In his *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow* (1790), Alexander Radishchev admired the fact that the American Constitution allowed freedom of the press. At the same time, however, the writer condemned slavery existing in the United States (Radishchev, 1790; cited by Mickiewicz, 1990).

In the middle of the nineteenth century, America was viewed by Russians both as a part of the Russian Empire (Russia had colonies in Alaska, the Aleutians, and California) and a great economic competitor of the Russian Empire (*Russian Discovery of America*, 2002).

After the Great October Revolution in 1917, Lenin determined future relations between the two powers: Russia needed sophisticated American technologies, but it did not accept the ideology of capitalism (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 1965, pp. 62-63; cited by Zassursky, 1990, p. 15). A similar ambivalent attitude was reflected by famous Soviet journalists, writers, and poets such as Ilf and Petrov (1935-1936), Marshak (1933) and Mayakovsky (1925). These authors got their first impression of the United States when they visited New York, *a city of contrasts*. It was the city of luxury and technological progress with streets lit by electricity, expensive stores, shiny hotels and fashionable people. At the
same time, it was the city of hidden poverty and unemployed working class *exploited by capitalism.*

Although the Second World War strengthened the alliance between the two superpowers, “the Soviet press reported that American conservatives and businesses were still suspicious of, if not hostile toward, the Soviet Union” (Zassoursky, 1990, p. 16). When the Cold War started, the image of the United States created by the Soviet national press changed from the ally that helped Russia with land lease during the Second World War to an international enemy and aggressive opponent (Zassoursky, 1990).

The first empirical research on the image of the United States created by the Soviet press was conducted between 1967 and 1969 by Professor Boris Grushin, who found that Soviet people did not know much about the United States and would like to know more about American life, economics, and teenagers. Nearly 99 percent of the Soviet people were sure that America “created a situation of war tension,” and 81 percent of them believed “the USA treated USSR with hostility” (Grushin, 1969, cited in Fedotova, 1990).

Soviet authors described a positive shift in the Soviet media coverage of the United States during the years of *perestroika* (Mickievicz, 1990; Kolesnik, 1990; Fedotova, 1990; Richter, 1990; Lukosiunas, 1990). Soviet people learned about American farmers, computer technologies, highways, and telecommunications (Mickievicz, 1990), they got the opportunity to use television to communicate with each other in real time (Kolesnik, 1990), and the information presented about the United States became more balanced by 1986 (Fedotova, 1990). Richter (1990) and Lukosiunas (1990) conducted newspaper content analyses and noticed the same positive attitudinal shift toward the United States by the end of *perestroika*, a set of reforms restructuring the Soviet economy in the 1980s.

The world — including Russia — was sympathetic toward the United States of America after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Vladimir Putin, the former President of the Russian Federation, sent condolences to the American people after the tragedy took place; Russia officially supported the global war against terrorism. But after America invaded Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002-2003, the positive attitude of Russians toward the United States decreased; the percentage of Russian people having favorable opinion about the U.S. decreased from 61 percent in 2002 to 43 percent in 2006, and the percentage of respondents holding favorite attitudes toward American people fell from 67 percent to 57 percent (Pew Research Center, 2007).

Although polls regularly measure Russian public opinion about the United States such as the annual poll by the Pew Research Center, little academic investigation has been conducted to find out how modern post-Soviet Russia views America after the September 11 attacks and how media may affect this perception. The study focusing on a young generation of Russian people who grew up in the post Cold War world is to contribute to this area, which is ripe for further investigation.
IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD

The concept of the image of a country is connected to the concept of an attitude. An attitude is “a configuration of related evaluative beliefs about some attitude object” (DeFleur & DeFleur, 2003, p. 36). According to different attitudinal models, attitudes are influenced by an individual’s beliefs, feelings, emotions, and past behaviors regarding an attitude object (Handbook of Social Psychology, pp. 288-289).

Jeannet and Hennessey (2004) and Thakor and Katsanis (1997) viewed a nation’s image as a collection of brands exported to foreign countries. The United States is known for its jeans; France for high-fashion shoes and perfume; Germany for beer. Anholt (2005) stressed six attitudinal objects to measure images of countries: attitudes toward tourism, export, people, governance, culture and heritage, investment and immigration formed the Nation Brand Index or the image of a country. “The nation brand is the sum of people’s perceptions of a country across six areas of national competence. Together, these areas make the Nation Brand Hexagon” (p. 2). Anholt ranked countries by the NBI factor; the United States was rated fourth behind Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

In 2004, Harris Interactive, a worldwide market research and consulting firm, conducted a study clarifying the attitude of residents of five European countries (France, Germany, Spain, Great Britain, and Italy) and Canada toward American people, American lifestyle, American systems of government and justice, President George W. Bush, and his foreign policy. The attitudes of Canadians toward the U.S. were similar to Europeans, but Canadians expressed more positive opinions about American people, American movies and TV, and American food.

A six-nation survey titled Impressions of America: How Arabs view America. How Arabs learn about America was commissioned by the Arab American Institute and conducted by Zogby International in 2004. A total of 3,300 Arabs living in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt participated in the study. In addition to American values, people and products, Zogby analyzed sources of information about the United States that were Arab commentaries, American movies, television, books, and other. The researchers found that the positive attitudes of Arabs toward the United States declined between 2002 and 2004. Arabs who learned about America by visiting it, socializing with Americans or watching American TV programs had more favorable views of American values, people and products. Arabs who received information mostly from Arab commentary or Arab media, excluding the Saudi Arabians, had less favorable attitudes toward American values, people and products.

The question DeFleur and DeFleur (2003) tried to answer was whether American media shaped negative attitudes toward the United States in teenagers. The researchers focused on the influence of American popular culture on youth around the world. DeFleur and DeFleur (2003) found a correlation between negative attitude of respondents towards America and “the influences of images derived from their depictions in media entertainment.
products and media culture, such as movies and television programming” (p. 68). Teenagers who were surveyed mostly thought that ordinary Americans were violent and involved in crimes, and American women were immoral, as frequently portrayed in American movies.

Kendrick and Fullerton (2004) studied international students’ response to the *Shared Values Initiative (SVI)*, an advertising campaign started by the U.S. Department of State under the direction of Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and former advertising executive Charlotte Beers. The campaign consisted of five television commercials about how Muslims were treated in the United States and focused on countries with large Muslim populations. It failed after some Middle Eastern TV stations refused to run the SVI videos. Kendrick and Fullerton (2004) surveyed 105 international students from different countries studying at Regents College in London in July 2003. The researchers showed five commercials to the students and found that their first impressions were mostly negative (44.8 percent). Sixty-four percent of people called the videos “one-sided” and not believable. The Muslims showed a positive attitude toward the United States after they viewed the commercials while the Christians and students who were not identified as religious maintained their negative attitudes. In general, respondents agreed that Muslims were treated fairly in the United States after viewing the videos.


**Method**

Unlike the Pew Research Center, which surveyed mostly adults, this study focused on a younger population of Russian people and their image of the United States of America. A total of 87 Russian students participated in the study. The type of sampling was nonrandom; subjects were chosen for the study without special statistical procedures.

Two groups of Russian students were involved. The first group of participants was coded as “Russian Russians,” while the second group was coded as “Americanized Russians.” “Russian Russians” consisted of 65 Russian students from the Local Government Administration Department of the Institute of International Business in Rostov-on-Don, Russia. “Russian Russians” were those who had never visited the United States. The first group of participants was invited into a study room, where they were offered a paper-based questionnaire.
The second group of respondents ("Americanized Russians") consisted of 22 Russian students who were studying in the United States of America. The majority of "Americanized Russians" were J-1 visa exchange students. These students filled out a Web-based questionnaire. Questionnaires for both groups of students participating in this study were translated into Russian as some respondents were not fluent in English.

Women dominated in the study as 62.1 percent of the respondents were female and 37.9 percent were male. Students ranging in age from 16 to 22 years old composed 78.6 percent of participants; 17.8 percent were between the age of 23 to 29; and 3.6 percent were over the age of 31. All participants but one were enrolled as full-time students in different universities.

The questionnaire for this research was modeled after one used in a global advertising survey conducted by Kendrick and Fullerton (2004). Attitudes toward American government and foreign policy, American people, education, products, brands, and media were measured using 7-point semantic differential and Likert scales. The use of media was measured by multiple-choice questions. The respondents were asked to report an approximate number of hours per week they spend watching television, cinema films or videos/DVDs, using the Internet, and reading newspapers or magazines.

**RESULTS**

**The Use of Media**

As Tables I and II show, television and the Internet were the most popular sources of information about the United States among the survey participants: 85.1 percent used television to learn about America, and 42.5 percent used the Internet for the same purpose. "Russian Russians" utilized more TV than the Internet to get information about America (87.7 percent vs. 27.7 percent), while "Americanized Russians" used the Internet (86.4 percent) more than television (77.3 percent).

According to Table III, almost 50 percent of "Russian Russians" reported that Russian media were the principal source of information about America, and 15.4 percent used international media for the same purpose. "Americanized Russians" used mostly American media (42.9 percent) and international media (38.1 percent) to get news about America. Only 19 percent of "Americanized Russians" used Russian media for this purpose.

T-tests were conducted to determine whether there were differences in the use of television, cinema, DVDs, Internet, newspapers and magazines between respondents in the two groups.

There was a significant difference in the use of TV by "Russian Russians" and "Americanized Russians" (t(84)=3.74, p=.0005). Russian students studying in America watched less television (M=7) than Russian students studying in Russia (M=13). There were also significant differences in the use of videos/DVDs (t(85)=3.0, p=.004), the Internet
### TABLE I

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<th>Medium</th>
<th>Russian issues (%)</th>
<th>American issues (%)</th>
<th>International issues (%)</th>
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<td>Radio</td>
<td>52.3</td>
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<td>30.8</td>
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<td>49.2</td>
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<td>30.8</td>
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<td>Internet</td>
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<td>38.5</td>
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<td>Friends/relatives</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
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### TABLE II

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<td>Radio</td>
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<td>Magazines</td>
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### TABLE III

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<th>Americanized Russians (%)</th>
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<td>International media</td>
<td>15.4</td>
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<td>American media</td>
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<td>Russian media</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
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### TABLE IV

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<tr>
<th>Media consumption: t-tests</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Russian Mean</th>
<th>American Mean</th>
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<th>Eta-Eq.</th>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>4.77</td>
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<td>12.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<td>.095</td>
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<td>7.4</td>
<td>20.3</td>
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<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-.19</td>
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<td>Magazines</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.8*</td>
<td>.083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p = <.05  ** p = <.001
Russian students studying in America watched fewer videos/DVDs (M=8.2) than Russian students studying in Russia (M=12.1). Russian students studying in America utilized the Internet more (M=20.3) than Russian students studying in Russia (M=7.4). Also, “Russian Russians” used almost twice as much information from magazines (M=6.5) as “Americanized Russians” (M=3.4). No significant difference was found between the groups in their use of cinema (t(85)=.144, p=.886) and newspapers (t(85)=-.19, p=.849).

**Attitudes**

Russian students studying in Russia (M=1.75) were less prone to accept that Americans were portrayed accurately by American television programs than Russian students studying in the United States (M=2.36) (t(84)=3.5, p=.001). “Americanized Russians” (M=2.8) considered the quality of American education as more valuable than “Russian Russians” did (M=3.05) (t(84)=4.1, p=.0005). Russian students who had been in the United States had a more positive overall attitude (M=3.3) toward America than Russian students studying in Russia (M=2.8) (t(85)=-3.1, p=.003). The index of the overall attitude toward America has been found by computing fourteen 7-point semantic differentials (Cronbach’s alpha = .86).

“Americanized Russians” considered Americans to be less violent (t(85)=-2.9, p=.005), more religious (t(85)=-2.04, p=.045), more tolerant (t(85)=-3.22, p=.002) and more law-abiding (t(85)=-3.39, p=.001) than “Russian Russians” did. “Russian Russians” (M=3.6) perceived American women to be more sexually immoral than “Americanized Russians” did (M=2.7) (t(85)=-3.7, p=.0005). Russian students studying in Russia (M=2.55) had lesser desire to live in the United States than Russian students studying in the United States (M=3.27) (t(85)=-2.0, p=.046). In addition, Russian students studying in America (M=3.68) thought that Americans treated Muslims more fairly than Russian students studying in Russia did (M=2.57) (t(82)=-4.7, p=.0005).

The attitudes of respondents toward the United States government (t(85)=-.567, p=.572) and American foreign policy (t(85)=.775, p=.441) did not differ by group. Russian students studying in Russia had similar attitudes as Russian students studying in the United States. Descriptive statistics indicated that 32.2 percent of all participants had somewhat favorable attitude toward the United States government; 23 percent had a very unfavorable attitude; 17.2 percent had somewhat unfavorable attitude; and only 7 percent reported liking the American government very much. Also 32.2 percent of all participants had somewhat favorable attitude toward American foreign policy; 25.3 percent had a very unfavorable attitude; and 21.8 percent had somewhat unfavorable attitude.

Russian students studying in Russia had similar attitudes toward American brand products (M=4.2) as Russians studying in the United States of America (M=4.0) (t(84)=.522, p=.603). More than 70 percent of participants did not care if products they
purchased had been produced in the United States or not; they chose products that they liked the most, regardless of the brand’s national origin. 10.5% of respondents reported that they preferred American brands. 16.5% of respondents reported they did not buy American products often or sometimes. The most popular American brands were McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, and Ford. Some brands such as Adidas, Sony, and Nokia were also considered American brands even though they were not. Some of “Russian Russian” students seemed not to differentiate between American and other foreign brands.

Although Russian students studying in Russia considered a degree from an American university to be less valuable (M=2.66) than Russian students studying in America (M=3.05), the difference between their attitudes was not significant (t(83)=1.7, p=.092).

There was no statistically significant difference in the perception of Americans as generous (t(84)=-1.8, p=.083), materialistic (t(85)=2.48, p=.43), dominating (t(85)=-.037, p=.97), charitable (t(85)=-1.33, p=.186), and having family values (t(85)=-.9, p=.37).

In addition, both “Russian Russians” and “Americanized Russians” (M1=2.3; M2=2.6) reported they would like to maintain their own cultural values and appeared reluctant to accept American values (t(85)=-1.2, p=.243). Finally, a t-test analysis indicated that the majority of respondents, regardless of the group, reported a slight liking of American media products (M1=3.57; M2=3.27).

The results of t-tests conducted to examine differences in attitudes are reported in Table V.

Relationships Between the Use of Media and Attitudes

Standard regressions were conducted to determine relationships between the respondents’ attitudes toward the United States and independent variables: respondents total “consumption” of television, cinema, videos/DVDs, Internet, newspapers and magazines. Only one independent variable, the total use of the Internet, had a strong correlation with the following dependent variables: the overall attitude, the view of Americans as violent/peaceful, tolerant/intolerant, religious/not religious, and law-abiding/law-breaking people. Other variables were excluded from the analysis since no correlation had been found.

The results of an F-test (F(1, 83)=5.23, p=.025) shown in Table VI indicated that the independent variable was significantly related to the overall attitude toward the United States. A hypothesis stated that the use of the Internet would affect the overall attitude of participants toward America was supported. The greater “consumption” of the Internet predicted a positive overall attitude toward America (b=.012*). The independent variable contributed to the prediction of the overall attitude (Beta=.243). It accounted for 5.9 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. The model explained 5.9 percent of the variation in the overall attitude (R² = .059).

The results of an F-test indicated (F(1, 83)=7.0, p=.010) that the perception of Americans as violent vs. peaceful people was significantly related to the use of the Internet,
### TABLE V

**Attitudes: t-tests**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean Russian</th>
<th>Mean American</th>
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<td>A</td>
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*p=<.05  **p=<.001*

The list of attitudinal objects for Table V:

- a. Depiction of American people on television
- b. American government
- c. American foreign policy
- d. American people
- e. American brands
- f. American education
- g. Degree from an American university
- h. Americans as violent vs. peaceful people
- i. Americans as greedy vs. generous people
- j. American women as promiscuous vs. sexually moral
- k. Americans as tolerant vs. intolerant people
- l. Americans as materialistic vs. not materialistic people
- m. Americans as religious vs. not religious people
- n. Americans as domineering vs. not domineering people
- o. Americans as law abiding vs. law breaking people
- p. Americans as carrying for the poor vs. not carrying for the poor people
- q. Americans as having weak vs. strong family values
- r. Living in the United States of America
- s. American values adopted in Russia
- t. American media products
- u. Treatment of Muslims in the USA
- v. Overall attitude toward America (Cronbach's alpha = .86)
as illustrated in Table VII. The more Russian students used the Internet, the more positive their perception of Americans as peaceful people was (b=.02**). The use of the Internet contributed to the prediction of the attitude toward Americans as peaceful vs. violent people (Beta=.279). It accounted for 7.8 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Overall, the model explained 7.8 percent of the variation (R² = .078).

The results of an F-test indicated (F(1, 83)=5.6, p=.02) that the use of the Internet predicted the perception of Americans as tolerant vs. intolerant people. As illustrated in Table VIII, the use of the Internet had an impact on the respondents’ perception of Americans as tolerant vs. intolerant people. The greater the Internet use by Russian students was, the more positive their perception of Americans as tolerant people appeared to be (b=.018*). This variable contributed to the prediction of the attitude toward Americans as tolerant vs. intolerant people (Beta=.251). It accounted for 6.3 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Overall, the model explained 6.3 percent of the variation (R² = .063).

The results of an F-test indicated (F(1, 83)=5.6, p=.02) that the use of the Internet explained the view of Americans as religious vs. not religious people. As illustrated in Table IX, the Internet usage predicted the respondents’ perception of Americans as religious vs. not religious people. The greater the Internet consumption by Russian students was, the more they perceived Americans as religious people (b=.022*). The independent variable contributed to the prediction of the attitude toward Americans as religious or not religious
people (Beta=.251). It accounted for 6.3 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Overall, the model explained 6.3 percent of the variation ($R^2 = .063$).

The results of an F-test indicated ($F(1, 83)=7.73, p=.007$) that the consumption of the Internet was significantly related to the perception of Americans as law-abiding vs. law-breaking people. As illustrated in Table X, the hypothesis that the use of the Internet would influence the respondents’ perception of Americans as law-abiding vs. law-breaking was supported. The greater the Internet use by Russian students was, the more they perceived Americans as law-abiding people ($b=.02**$). This independent variable contributed to the prediction of the attitude toward Americans as law-abiding or law breaking (Beta=.292). It accounted for 8.5 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Overall, the model explained 8.5 percent of the variation ($R^2 = .085$).

Additionally, the use of the Internet had a strong correlation with the respondents’ perception of the way Americans treated Muslims living in the U.S. The results of an F-test indicated ($F(1, 80)=5.27, p=.024$) that the independent variable was significantly related to the dependent variable. As illustrated in Table XI, the hypothesis that the use of the Internet would influence the respondents’ perception of the way Americans treated Muslims was supported. The greater the Internet use by Russian students was, the more they believed that Americans treated Muslims fairly ($b=.021**$). This variable contributed to the prediction of the attitude toward the way Americans treated Muslims in the United States (Beta=.249). It

TABLE VI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Internet Consumption</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Sr2 (unique)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internet consumption</td>
<td>.231*</td>
<td>.012*</td>
<td>.243</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intercept = 2.807</td>
<td>R^2 = .059</td>
<td>Adjusted R^2 = .048</td>
<td>R = .243</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<=.05  **p<=.001
Two of the semantic variables, the use of cinema products and the use of the Internet, were significantly related to the perception of American women as sexually moral vs. promiscuous. Other semantic variables were excluded from the analysis as not significant. The results of an F-test indicated that at least one of the two independent variables was significantly related to the perception of American women as sexually moral (F(2,82)=7.6, p=.001). As the regression coefficients in Table VIII indicate, both variables contributed significantly to the prediction of respondents’ perception of American women. Beta weight indicated that watching cinema films (Beta=-.1) was the strongest predictor. The negative value of Beta indicated that the more cinema movies were seen by Russian students, the more negative image of American women they had (b=-.1**). The “consumption” of the Internet also predicted the dependent variable (Beta=.026). The positive value of Beta indicated that the more the respondents utilized the Internet, the more positive image of American women they developed (b=.026**). The use of cinema accounts for 8.7 percent of the unique variance ($sr^2=.087$), while the use of the Internet explains 9 percent of the unique variation in the perception of American women ($sr^2=.09$). Overall, the model ($R^2=.156$) explained 15.6 percent of the variation. The hypothesis that the use of cinema and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Internet Consumption</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>$Sr^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>.251*</td>
<td></td>
<td>.018*</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consumption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p=<.05$ ** $p=<.001$

accounted for 6.2 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Overall, the model explained 6.2 percent of the variation ($R^2=.062$).
The Internet would influence respondents’ perception of American women as sexually moral vs. promiscuous was supported.

The independent variable American media had a strong correlation with the overall attitude of respondents toward the United States. The results of a t-test illustrated in Table XIII indicated that there was a significant difference between the attitudes of those who did not use American media to learn about America and those who did ($t(84)=3.4, p=.001$). Russian students who used American media to learn about America had a more positive overall attitude toward the United States ($M=3.56$) than Russian student who did not use American media ($M=2.87$). An analysis of association ($n^2=.122$) indicated that the use of America media explained 12.2 percent of the variation in students’ attitudes.

**DISCUSSION**

It was found that television and the Internet were the most popular sources of information about America among participants. “Russian Russians” used television more than the Internet to get information about America while “Americanized Russians” used the Internet more than television. To get news about America, “Russian Russians” used mostly Russian media while “Americanized Russians” used mostly American and international media.
Russian students studying in America were more likely to believe that Americans were portrayed accurately by American television than Russian students studying in Russia. At the same time, “Russian Russians” had less favorable attitude toward Americans than “Americanized Russians.” Russian students studying in America considered the quality of American education to be more valuable than Russian students studying in Russia. Additionally, attitudes toward America differed between those who did not use American media to learn about American issues and those who did. “Americanized Russians” used less TV, video, DVDs and magazines than “Russian Russians.” However, their use of the Internet was greater than that of “Russian Russians.” Standard regressions showed that there was a relationship between the use of the Internet by participants and their overall attitude toward America. Finally, positive relationships between the use of the Internet and respondents’ attitudes toward American people were found.

Russian students who used the Internet a lot (mostly “Americanized Russians”) had a more positive image of America than Russian students who did not have a habit to use the Internet regularly (mostly “Russian Russians”). The fact that the Internet provides users with different types of information from different sources could partially balance the beliefs and feelings about the United States in Russian students, who primarily used the Internet to learn about America.

Half of Russian students who had never been to the U.S. reported they did not believe they would ever study in or travel to the country (some of the participants explained that the

---

**TABLE X**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Internet Consumption</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Sr²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internet consumption</td>
<td>.292**</td>
<td></td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.292</td>
<td>.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept = 3.083</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .085 \]

Adjusted \[ R^2 = .074 \]

\[ R = .292 \]

* \( p < .05 \)  ** \( p < .001 \)
### TABLE XI

*Standard Regression of Semantic Variables for the respondents’ perception of the way Americans treat Muslims*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Internet Consumption</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Sr&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>.249*</td>
<td></td>
<td>.021*</td>
<td>.249</td>
<td>.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consumption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>.249</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* <i>p</i> < .05 ** <i>p</i> < .001

### TABLE XII

*Standard Regression of Semantic Variables for the respondents’ perception of American women as sexually moral*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Perceptio</th>
<th>Cinema</th>
<th>Internet</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Sr&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cinema</td>
<td>-.231</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.1*</td>
<td>-.3</td>
<td>.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>.263</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.026**</td>
<td>.307</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>12.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>.395**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* <i>p</i> < .05 ** <i>p</i> < .001
expenses to travel to America were very high for them). More than half of the respondents did not have relatives or friends (interpersonal source of information) who had visited or lived in the United States. The only way these people received most of their information about America was mass media, such as TV news, American movies and situation comedies translated into Russian, and rarely, the Internet. The results of this study, however, indicated that the consumption of different types of media used by the respondents did not have a significant impact on the attitudes and beliefs of “Russian Russians.”

At the same time, “Russian Russians” lacked information about the United States. All respondents were asked about American government, foreign policy, people, and brands that implied some superficial knowledge of American life. Approximately 20 percent of “Russian Russians” did not know or did not want to answer questions about American government, foreign policy and people. Some explained that they did not have enough knowledge of American policies or an opportunity to talk to Americans. Only 10 percent of “Americanized Russians” did not know or did not want to answer the same questions. In addition, there was confusion among “Russian Russians” regarding some American brands. Several respondents considered European and Japanese brands to be American. Finally, some “Russian Russians” could not recall or identify sources of information about the United States.

The findings of this study suggest that more research on the topic is needed. First, the principle of proximity of news can be applied to understand the interest of Russian people in news about national vs. international (for example, American) issues. Second, the interest in news about the United States may serve as an additional variable to study between the use of media and knowledge of American life. Furthermore, the knowledge of the United States should be included in the model to understand the relationship between the use of media and the image of America among Russians. Finally, the study of relationships between the development of communication technologies such as the Internet in Russia and the awareness of American and — wider — world issues in Russian people may contribute to the popular mass communication theory of knowledge gap.

Buddenbaum and Novak (2001) stressed a number of disadvantages and limitations that are common for surveys such as self-reporting and the motivation to answer in a certain way. Wimmer and Dominic (1994) emphasized that independent variables could not be manipulated in surveys, and it was difficult for a researcher to verify causal relationships
between variables. Ambiguous words and questions in a questionnaire might also provide faulty information or inadequate responses.

The small sample size was a particular limitation of this study. Only 87 students were surveyed and only 22 of them were “Americanized Russians.” Russian students who studied in American universities in different states could be involved in the research only through a Web survey that lowered the response rate. Furthermore, nonrandom sample made the generalization of the results difficult. Finally, the country of residence was a strong confound variable and could cause attitudinal differences between the two groups of surveyed Russian students.

REFERENCES


Forum

THOUGHTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNICATION DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

MICHAEL DAVID HAZEN

An earlier version of this paper was prepared as a response to the Russian Communication Association’s panel on “The Study of Communication in Russia: State and Perspectives,” at the International Communication Association Convention in Montréal, Canada, May 2008. Papers on the panel included: Galina V. Sinekopova, The Discipline of Communication in the U.S. and Russia: Field Notes; Olga Leontovich, Controversial Issues in Russian Communication Study; Irina Privalova, Communicating Worldviews: Linguistic, Cultural and Social Interaction; and Irina Nickolaevna Rozina & Victoria I. Tuzlukova, Social and Cultural Contexts of Internet-Based Research Communities.

This forum examines the development of the communication discipline in the United States over the past fifty years as a comparative backdrop for thinking about its development in Russia. In the preamble, an approach to comparative research is proposed and in the main analysis, the developments in the communication discipline in the United States are analyzed through the eyes of two influential scholars, and potential parallels in Russia are highlighted. Because of the limitations of a forum piece, my comments must be selective.

Michael David Hazen is professor of communication in the Department of Communication at Wake Forest University (hazen@wfu.edu).
PREAMBLE

The Processing of Making Comparisons Across Cultures

The process of making comparisons across cultures, while essential, has at least two potential pitfalls that have plagued international scholars: 1) the failure to recognize and acknowledge the degree of conceptualization about communication as it exists in another culture; and 2) the tendency to invalidly assume the generalizability of certain historical processes from one culture to another.

There is ample evidence of previous failures to acknowledge thinking about communication in other societies. For example, it was long thought that scholarship about communication did not exist in China until Oliver’s (1971) ground breaking examination of ancient China and India. Even then, there was a tendency until recently to believe that the Chinese did not treat communication systematically (Garrett, 1993; Lu, 1998).

A similar process exists with the study of Russian communication; most Western scholars, if they had any knowledge of Russian theorists, do not go beyond Bakhtin or Vygotsky. Dance (2004) integrated some of Pavlov and Vygotsky’s ideas into his theoretical work in the 1960s and 1970s and Bakhtin influenced Baxter’s relational dialectics theory of interpersonal communication and the work of a number of rhetorical critics. However, there are a number of other Russian scholars whose insights can enrich the thinking of American theorists (Sinekopova, 2008; Leontovich 2008).

The second problem is more difficult because it deals with questions of what is considered universal and what is relative or cultural in the human communication process. The danger is that an international scholar may unknowingly mistake relative elements in one’s own culture for universal ones. This problem is exemplified by American scholar’s economic advice in the 1990s, which presumed to tell Russians what changes needed to be made in their society instead of dialoguing with them about it. Therefore, it is prudent when making comparisons to start from the position that there are both universal and cultural elements present and proceed to try to sort them out with tentativeness.

An Approach to Comparative Analysis

The key question in comparative analysis is to determine what is different (cultural) and what is similar (universal) between cultures. The problem can be illustrated by work on cultural ethos, and national character analysis.

Sinekopova (2008) suggests that communication is related to the Russian ethos “with its communal spirit, soul talk, and its complex attitude to the Other, which combines fascination and fear,” whereas communication in the United States is related to the American ethos of “pragmatism, reflecting, first of all, Dewey’s ideas of social reform, education and
Thoughts on the Development of the Communication Discipline

Michael David Hazen

progressivism” (p. 2). Grounding comparative analysis in a culture’s ethos has parallels to an early approach to defining cultural values for a particular country known as the national character approach. These studies treated cultures as analogous to individual personalities and thus sought to describe the “national character” of a given culture. For example, Kluckhohn (1955) summarizes the Russian national character as involving a struggle between: “1) warm, expressive expansiveness versus formality, control, and orderliness, 2) personal loyalty, sincerity and responsiveness versus distrust and conspiratorial mentality, 3) strong identification with the face-to-face groups of which the individual is a member versus a single tolerated loyalty (upward to people not known personally), and 4) being versus doing or dependent passivity versus ceaseless instrumental ‘conscious activity’” (pp. 241-242). Upon close scrutiny, Kluckhohn’s list identifies a number of interpersonal, social, and public communication elements that appear to coincide with some of Sinekopova’s ideas.

Unfortunately, the national character approach has been criticized for its stereotypes and overgeneralizations. As Ries (1996) states:

they all make rather accurate observations about “Russianness”. . . . The problems with these studies. . . are two: first, of course, that they are totalizing and generalizing. . . . Secondly . . . they posit "mentality" as something just THERE . . . . What are the specific mechanisms by which a certain way of thinking/perceiving the world are transmitted across generations and throughout populations? . . . My own work stresses discourse broadly conceived. . . . I would argue . . . that people learn to think in particularly patterned ways because they learn to talk in particular ways.

The problem in the national character approaches is the tendency to overgeneralize, which has been compounded by research that shows that there is often more variability in cultural values within a culture than between cultures (Matsumoto, 2006).

If elements of national character are tied to communicative practices as Ries argues, what can be said about the differences and similarities across cultures? This question poses a vexing problem for all comparative research. For example, those of us who are familiar with Russia, know that there is something about душа that seems to be integral to the Russian culture, but is it unique? If we consider Sinekopova’s idea of “communal spirit,” which Kluckhohn’s expresses as strong identification with face-to-face groups, this sounds a lot like what cross-cultural scholars have called collectivism and linked to communicative practices such as politeness and indirectness (Kim, Hunter, Miyahara, Horvath, Bresnahan & Yoon, 1996). Also, since we now know that collectivism is not a unidimensional concept but may have up to eight different ways of defining and measuring it (Oysermann, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2002), which one is reflected in Russia?

If communicative practices and cultural values may have similarities across cultures, a strong argument can be made that no one aspect of human communication is unique to any culture (i.e. the particular characteristic will always be present in some culture) even though

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two particular cultures may differ in their practices. Uniqueness may lie instead in the composite package of communication characteristics practiced by any one culture (Hazen, 2006).

Similarities and differences between cultures also can be judged in comparative terms on a literal basis or on a structural/dimensional basis (Hazen, 2006). On one hand, we can talk about literal similarities between cultures such as in the way that all people are able to perceive certain facial expressions of emotion such as anger and fear (Ekman, 2003). On the other hand, we can also talk about dimensions or structures as similar such as when we say that all cultures use trustworthiness to make judgments about the credibility of communicators, but that the components of trustworthiness may vary across cultures, e.g. age or similarity (McGinnies & Ward, 1980).

**An Analogical Approach to Comparing Communication**

This essay employs an analogical approach to compare the institutional development of the communication discipline in Russia and the United States. The approach is meant to emphasize the fact that the comparisons involve both similarities and differences, that they are tentative, and that there should be dialogue about them. The nature of an analogy presumes that the analyst sees some essential similarity between two entities, but also understands that differences exist. While the recognition of such is important, the essential tenet of this approach is that the commentator tentatively proposes a particular analogy and the audience dialogically participates in discussing whether the analogy makes sense.

**Analysis**

**The Context**

Disciplinary developments in both countries occurred within the historical context of higher education’s development in Europe. The first European Universities, to which both U.S. and Russian higher education owe their origins (Tolz, 2008), were established in the late Middle Ages: Bologna in 1088, Paris in 1160, and Oxford in 1167. By the early 1800s, the academic world and the study of rhetoric were rigidified in forms developed in the Middle Ages from Greek and Roman roots. The liberal arts were taught as the *trivium* (grammar, logic, and rhetoric) and the *quadrivium* (arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy) (Scott, 2006). Rhetoric was further narrowed during the Enlightenment era when logic was separated from rhetoric, yielding a narrow and static view of communication (Pearce & Foss, 1990; Kienpointer, 1995).

During the nineteenth century, major changes occurred in the West that restructured the academic world. While there is much debate about how these changes occurred, it is evident that they coincided with and were related to events such as the Industrial Revolution,
the rise of scientific study, and democratic interests in greater educational opportunities. As a result, a number of subsequent changes occurred in higher education: 1) the number of students increased, 2) old academic subjects were reformulated, 3) new academic areas arose, and 4) the scientific search for new knowledge came to permeate academia (Jarausch, 1985; Scott, 2006).

During this period, rhetoric moved to the study of written forms and literature. The study of logic was formalized in the analytic traditions of philosophy and the study of grammar gave way to study of linguistics. The upheavals of the nineteenth century left the classical study of communication fragmented and struggling for an identity. However, these changes also permitted scholars to conceptualize communication more broadly allowing the seed that would come to be called communication in the twentieth century to be planted.

The Transition Years in the United States

During the period from the late 1950s to the early 1980s, profound changes occurred in American higher education. It also was a period of confusion, angst and competing visions. Two seminal American scholars reflected upon these changes in the early 1980s: Miller (1981) in “’Tis the season to be jolly’: A yuletide 1980 assessment of communication research,” and Schram (1983) in “The unique perspective of communication: A retrospective review.”

Miller’s scholarship embodied many of the changes that occurred within the field during the last half of the twentieth century. While he began with debate and speech, he later championed behavioral and then cognitive approaches to the study of communication. Schramm’s work had its roots in journalism and he later came to embody social scientific approaches to the field. He created the first doctoral program in mass communication at the University of Iowa, created institutes of communication research at the University of Illinois and Stanford University and founded the East-West Center in Hawai‘i. Miller and Schramm’s career paths and subsequent work are illustrative of possible intersections between the development of the discipline in the United States and Russia.

Based on his years as a graduate student and young Ph.D., Miller developed a number of themes about the field’s transition phase. First, he claimed that researchers in the speech communication field “tended to suffer from a disciplinary inferiority complex and to use their field as a negative reference group.” Second, he argued that this led them to look for “exemplary role models” in other fields. Some went so far as to say that communication researchers were really social psychologists, linguists, sociologists etc. Third, the feelings of inferiority were exemplified by their publications in that “journals in speech and communication were ranked low on the scholarly pecking order, with most communication scholars yearning to publish their works in the journals of other, more prestigious fields.” Fourth, “…researchers in related fields were largely unaware of, or unimpressed with, the studies conducted by their contemporaries in speech and communication” (p. 373).
Schramm began his 1983 article by referring to similar worries that were expressed by Berelson in a 1959 article, which Schramm disagreed with both in 1959 and in 1983. Both were part of a group of social scientists who developed an interest in the study of communication in the first half of the twentieth century, including Lasswell from political science, Lazarfeld from sociology and mathematics, Lewin from psychology and Hovland from psychology. Berelson began his article by declaring that: “My theme is that, as for communication research, the state is withering away” (p. 1). He went on to state that: “Lewin is dead. Lasswell and Lazarsfeld have moved on to other interests. . . ” (p. 4) and concluded that “the great ideas’ that gave the field of communication research so much vitality. . . have to a substantial extent worn out. No new ideas of comparable magnitude have appeared to take their place” (p. 6).

Reflections on the U. S. Experience and Possible Analogies to Russia

As the twentieth century edged past its halfway point, the state of the communication field in the United States was clearly introspective with a heavy emphasis on self-questioning and pessimism. Those of us who came of scholarly age in the 1970s remember the debates well since they helped shape our academic outlook. Five concerns about the field can be isolated from Miller and Schramm’s reflections: 1) angst and a lack of self-esteem about the discipline, 2) the lack of interdisciplinary respect, 3) the nature of the field in terms of academic traditions, 4) the conceptual definitions of communication and the field and 5) the field’s research and theory approaches, foci and quality. While the development of communication as a field in Russia or any other country has its own path, the concerns expressed during this transition period in the United States may be analogous in some ways to Russia.

Angst and Self-questioning

The angst felt by American scholars may have similarities to that presently experienced by Russian scholars (Leontovich, 2008; Beebe & Matyash, 2004). Even today, such feelings have not completely disappeared in the United States, but they are not unknown in other disciplines also (Gibson, 1993).

Lack of Respect from Other Fields

Concerns about the lack of interdisciplinary respect have intertwined subjective and objective components. The subjective aspect has to do with the emotional responses that we feel toward others who comment on our field and with whom we interact. So when Miller subjectively referred to low status and lack of awareness, he also talked about objective features related to journals such as who publishes where, citation figures, and rejection rates.
Since its inception, the National Communication Association (the largest communication related professional organization in the United States) has promoted discussions about the field’s self-image and other’s lack of respect (Cohen, 1994). During the time of transition, organized conferences about the nature of the field, its central concepts, and its theory and research, e.g., the Wingspread Colloquium in 1967; the New Orleans Conference on Research and Instructional Development in 1968; and the National Development Conference on Rhetoric in 1970. These discussions and many others focused on shaping the field to fit the American academic culture, and on creating conceptual distinctions that defined the field and its subjects so as to develop theories, generate research and forge the discipline’s identity. A similar phenomenon is evident in Russia with discussions of similar topics in the papers at the conferences of the Russian Communication Association.

Academic Traditions and Disciplinary Fragmentation

Why disciplines develop is a complex subject with a number of different viewpoints that go beyond the scope of this essay (Jarausch, 1985). In conjunction with the analogical approach to comparative analysis taken in this essay, a metaphoric approach will be used to describe the development of the discipline in the United States. Any number of metaphors could be used to discuss the disciplinary development of communication in the United States, but the stream metaphor will be used. While its ultimate applicability can only be judged in light of this essay’s analysis, the metaphor has the advantages of emphasizing the multiplicity of traditions, the merging and dividing of administrative organizations, and dynamic change in theory, research and practice.

We may be able to take the stream metaphor a step further by adopting Mitchell’s suggestion (personal communication, June 18, 2008) that it can be looked at in terms of disciplinary goals or needs. For example, the emphases on mass persuasion in a society might be tied to the perceived need for national survival (as by the U.S. during the Cold War), or the perceived need for national identity (as by the Soviet Union in building the new Soviet Man). Several theorists have suggested such links. Craig, (1999) in the U. S. linked communication to theoretical developments such as pragmatism, as a tool for developing democracy in American society. In a similar but reverse vein, Matyash (personal communication, October 24, 2008) argues that the failure to develop the study of communication is a result of the Russian national cultural mentality of non-agency.

Three streams of American academic traditions emerged early in the twentieth century that would eventually merge under the broader term of communication in the later part of the twentieth century: 1) the speech movement, 2) the journalism movement, and 3) the social scientific movement. The first stream, the speech movement, arose among those who emphasized oral approaches to rhetoric and who felt disenfranchised in English departments by the transformation of rhetoric to a literary approach. In 1914, several teachers established
a new organization and gathered a disparate group of scholars together under the banner of “speech” (Cohen, 1994; Pearce & Foss, 1990).

The second stream involved the study of journalism which also split from the English field with the founding the Association for Journalism and Mass Communication in 1912. The teachers of journalism were focused more on the practical aspects of writing than literature, which subsequently established their identity separate from English (Bryant and Miron, 2006). While the first courses in journalism emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century, it was not until the start of the twentieth century that the first schools of journalism were established: Wisconsin in 1904; Missouri in 1907; and Columbia in 1912.

The third stream consisted of the various scholars who emerged from the newly constituted social sciences of the nineteenth century to explore various aspects of communication from an empirical perspective. This approach was foreshadowed by a number of nineteenth century European scholars including Darwin, Freud, Marx, Wundt, Weber, and Durkheim (Rogers, 1994). The first American group of such scholars was made up of thinkers like Mead, Dewey and Cooley who could roughly be labeled pragmatists and later on as symbolic interactionism. In the twentieth century, scholars such as Lasswell, Lazarsfeld, Lewin, Hovland, Wiener, Shannon, Osgood, and Berelson expanded the group (Delia, 1987; Rogers, 1994).

In Russia, it can easily be argued that there is a stream analogous to the American journalism stream. Journalism courses were first offered in Russian universities in the early part of the twentieth century. Two journalism programs were founded after the War: Leningrad State University in 1946 and Moscow State University in 1947. While differences in pedagogy between Soviet and American schools of journalism existed, they were both pragmatically oriented and represented visible manifestations of communication in academe. By the late twentieth century, the study of communication in Russia was chiefly associated with journalism (Beebe, Kharcheva & Kharcheva, 1998).

Furthermore, there also seems to be a rich analogous Russian stream to the American social scientific stream. In one sense, this stream is evinced in the twentieth century works of scholars such as Bakhtin, Luria and Vygotsky as well as lesser known scholars like Lotman and Likhachov. In another sense, there are a large number of the scholars today shaping the communication discipline in Russia who have emerged from the social science tradition.

An interesting question suggested by the stream metaphor is whether there is a Russian element analogous to the speech stream? At first glance, the answer appears no, at least not in the educational system as attested to by Nikandorov of the Russian Academy of Education (Beebe & Matyash, 2004). While the speech stream in the United States was for practical purposes “an ‘umbrella’ discipline for all the oral arts” (Cohen, 1994, p. 58), however central to its concerns was “the teaching of speech as a means of providing students with the tools for democracy” (1994, p. xi). Among those tools for democracy were the ability to persuade and convince others in dissimilar settings like public speech, group discussions,
argumentative forums and the fledging media of radio and film. Thus, the communicative function of influencing others in public and private discourse, especially from an oral perspective, lay at the heart of the American speech stream, and, as the century progressed, to some degree in the social scientific study of mass media influence.

Clearly, such communicative functions were not taught in Russian universities or to the general population. However, were the persuasive functions claimed and exercised by the Communist Party analogous in some fashion? Did the party, at its highest levels, exerted control over and develop mechanisms for influencing people at the interpersonal, group and mass media levels so as to build the “new Soviet man?”

In 1950, Harvard anthropologist Alex Inkeles argued that the “… study of public opinion in the U.S.S.R. . . . focuses its attention on the role of persuasion, on the efforts of the Soviet regime to facilitate the tasks of leadership and to mobilize the minds and efforts of the population by means of propaganda and agitation (p. 5). In addition, he contends that Leninist “theory clearly requires that responsibility for and control of the media of communication must be concentrated in the hands of the party” (p. 22). Inkeles’ work explored the role of oral agitation, opinion leaders, the Soviet press, domestic broadcasting and film for achieving Party goals. While Inkeles’ work is descriptive of the Soviet Union during the time of Lenin and Stalin, subsequent writers (Butler, 1964; Remington, 1988) continue to outline such a system in subsequent years. Butler (1964) investigated the presence of speech activity and the use of rhetorical principles in the Soviet Union and discovered that they were practiced and taught by the Party. Remington (1988) described the “mighty complex’ of institutions conducting ideological work including the media, the agitation-propaganda establishment, education, science, culture and the corps of professional ideological cadres. . ..” (p. 6). And when the NCA’s Committee on International Discussion and Debate created a debate exchange with the Soviet Union, it was with the Student Government Association of the Komsomol because that was where young people with training in public discourse could be found (Hazen & Keele, 1991).

While the effectiveness of this persuasive machine was reinforced during Stalin’s time by coercion (Inkeles, 1950), the persuasive function of public discourse remained a major Party concern even as its effectiveness declined during the stagnation of the Brezhnev years. The Party still used its powers to combat alternative persuasive messages such as those coming from dissident figures such as Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, or through methods like samizdat. Even as late as 1978, the Party harshly criticized ideological persuasion as having deficiencies such as superficiality, formalism, pompous language and idle chatter while demanding change in the behavior of the Party’s Agitation and Propaganda Department (Remington, 1988). Thus, there is a parallel between the influence functions taught and championed by the speech stream in the United States and those co-opted by the Party in the Soviet Union.

There are other streams of thinking and scholarship in Russian society that are contributing to an emerging field of communication. For example, the long tradition of
philological study can be viewed as a stream enhancing the understanding of communication in Russia. While philology as a disciplinary term is rarely encountered in the United States, its elements relating to linguistics and semiotics are better known (Koerner, 1997) and it provided a home for Russian considerations of classical rhetoric (Krause, 2001). In addition, linguistic traditions, especially as they relate to translation and the study of foreign languages frame Leontovich’s (2002; 2008) and Privalova’s (2006; 2008) approaches to intercultural communication theory.

Conceptual questions about communication and the nature of the discipline

There were a number of conceptual questions that captured the field’s attention during the transition period. First, significant attention was focused on the question of “What is communication?” In the 1960s, a number of new definitions of communication were introduced starting with Shannon and Weaver’s (1963) information view, followed by Berlo’s (1960) view of communication as a process (as opposed to product) and Barnlund’s (1968) view of communication as meanings within people (as opposed to messages). By 1970, Dance’s review of definitions revealed 126 published definitions.

The second conceptual question was: “What is a discipline and is communication one?” In many ways, attempts to define the nature of a discipline are ex-post facto in nature (see studies of the natural sciences by philosophy of science) but the angst felt during the transition period led to a number of attempts to define the criteria for an academic discipline and then demonstrate how communication fit the criteria (Knower, 1966; Kibler & Barker, 1969). However, an important turning point in this debate came when Bochner and Eisenberg (1985) argued that: “The assumption that legitimate disciplines are or must be coherent is unfounded and chimerical” (p. 314). For example, in psychology, Gibson’s 1993 address to the American Psychological Society argued that at the middle of the century something “went wrong” with psychology and “a wariness about the grand general theories grew” (p. 12) leaving it lacking coherence. A similar view about sociology was expressed by Smelser’s (1988) introductory remarks to the second edition of the Handbook of Sociology: “Even though we may be tempted to look back—whether wistfully or in anger—to earlier historical periods and find moments of consensus, in fact there never have existed such moments in the brief history of sociology” (p. 10). In addition, if one looks at the structure of any of the other major national organizations of other “established” disciplines, they are as fragmented, if not more, than communication.

The third conceptual question asks: “Is communication a discipline and if so, what is its structure?” Some scholars cite the 1968 New Orleans Developmental Conference on conceptual frontiers in speech-communication as a pivotal point in defining the discipline in terms of communication (Pearce and Foss, 1990). Two fundamental questions debated at the conference centered on what name to call the field and whether to limit the definition of communication.
These conceptual questions demonstrated that in the transition period, American scholars were asking many of the same questions raised by Russian scholars today. As will be seen, not all of these questions were answered by Americans. In fact, in some cases they avoided the questions by moving onto other issues. The questions are fundamental, disciplinary ones that can benefit from fresh perspectives on the part of Russians and other scholars in cultures where the communication discipline is evolving.

Questions about Research and Theory Foci

Research and theory have an important role in any field, but even more so in times of self-doubt and crisis, as can be seen in Miller and Schramm’s comments. As a result, publications and conferences on these topics multiplied. A number of anthologies explaining the field were published and the developmental conferences spent much time discussing directions for theory and research. In 1973, the field’s first handbook (Sola Pool & Schramm) was published but it primarily focused on mass communication. In addition, books started to appear on communication “theory” such as Dance’s 1967 book but most of the chapters were written by people from outside the discipline. A closer look at these volumes reveals that the range of topics was limited, and that most articles were contextual or topic based in nature.

In Russia, theory and research foci have benefited from global changes in the communication field over the past fifty years, not only in the U. S., but also in Europe and Asia as well. As such, most of the subjects mentioned by scholars such as Sinekopova (2008) and Leontovich (2008) would not have appeared in any U. S. publication during the transition period.

Explanations for Changes in the Communication Discipline in the United States

From Miller and Schramm’s viewpoint in the early 1980s, the transition years were a prelude to the discipline’s maturation. Their vantage point represented a twenty-five year period of change; our viewpoint today represents another twenty-five years. So, what happened to the communication discipline in the United States between 1959 and 1981, or even 2009? Both Miller and Schramm saw major changes in the discipline’s evolution. Miller (1981) referred to the “metamorphosis that has occurred in the past two decades” (p. 372), which has resulted in the “current status of affairs in communication research [that] justifies my rosy feelings” (p. 371). Schramm (1983) argues that what Berelson saw as a withering away of communication research was “rather that it was growing out of its britches” (p. 6) and that one era was ending and a new era was beginning. He concluded that: “Communication will continue to be a challenging workplace, and will be ready to make its contribution to a science of man and society” (p. 17). What led Miller and Schramm to these conclusions?
Miller (1981) attributes the changes to several factors. First, he highlighted two structural changes within the discipline: a) “a greater percentage of the total scholarly population is composed of people who are trained in and committed to, the empirical study of communication” and b) “there is a wider awareness and understanding of communication research methods and goals” (p. 374). Second, he saw changes in research approaches in that a) studies were now grounded in an identifiable theoretical perspective, and b) research was more programmatic and cumulative. These changes led to a third factor, a shift in the focus of the field, or as Miller put it, scholars spending “less time justifying their scholarly existence and more time on issues of theory, method and research” (pp. 373-374). All of these changes led to his conclusion that “the quality of research has progressed substantially” (p. 374).

I believe that what Miller was trying to say can be illustrated by a story from early in my academic career. At that time, our program was very small and some of us feared for its future, so we decided to talk to our dean about what we needed to do to be viewed more positively. He wisely said that we should not worry about that issue but should spend our time doing a good job with our teaching and research. Today we have the second largest number of students in the University and have four times the number of faculty members.

Schramm’s analysis comes in the form of a story that he calls the “Parable of the Oasis.”

A few years ago, the Smithsonian Institution added to its exhibits window panoramas of a Bronze Age village called Bab elh-Dhra, which flourished five thousand years ago around an oasis just east of the Dead Sea. For centuries, Bab elh-Dhra, because it was noted for its good water, was a stopping place for caravans and travelers in the Jordanian desert. Then, shortly before 3,000 B.C., when farmers began to replace nomads, some families moved into Bab elh-Dhra and established a village. . . .

This is at least analogous to the kind of change that must have been underway when Berelson wrote his 1959 article. For many years, scholars, traveling with their own disciplinary maps, had stopped to look at communication problems, as travelers stopped to refresh themselves at the Jordanian oasis, and then moved on. . . . But a new type of scholar had already begun to appear in communication. This new scholar came to stay, not merely to visit. The emphasis passed from disciplines to problems, and universities began to create departments to deal with the problems and the related needs for training. In fact, many of the new settlers came equipped with brand-new Ph.D.s in communication and gave every indication that they intended to spend their careers in the new academic oasis. (Schramm, 1983, pp. 8-9)

In terms of the American discipline of communication, Schramm was clearly talking about the maturation of the field in terms of the preparation and training of graduate students from a disciplinary perspective and the security and respect that comes from the permanence of a disciplinary home.
Reflections on the U. S. Experience and Possible Analogies to Russia

Reflecting on Miller and Schramm’s analysis, they attribute disciplinary maturation to: 1) changes in the makeup of the field, 2) a dynamic relationship between research, theory and practice, 3) the growth of research quality, 4) the development of theories, 5) contributions to societal problems, and 6) changes in the focus of the field. It is also clear that these structural changes had important effects on the field’s feelings of self-respect and legitimacy.

The Discipline’s Inhabitants

Both Schramm and Miller reference changes in the academic training and background of the field’s scholars. Schramm’s story implies that there are three groups who have contributed to the communication discipline’s formation in the United States. First, there are those who came to the oasis, stayed for a while and then left. Taken literally, this type of person is someone like Lazarsfeld who was trained in sociology and mathematics, worked in communication for a while and then returned to mathematics. Taken metaphorically, a person’s theory (e.g. Wiener’s theory of cybernetics) could capture the field’s attention for a while, but in the end, leave only a few ideas (e.g. feedback) that are absorbed into the field’s conceptual framework.

The second group are ones who came to the oasis after being trained in another discipline, but stayed, contributed and became part of the field. On a literal level, Schramm represents such a person as do others such as Everett Rogers and Marshall McLuhan. On the metaphoric level, the theories of scholars such as George Herbert Mead (symbolic interactionism) and Kenneth Burke (dramatism) have become part of the conceptual structure of the discipline.

The third group are those who are born to the settlers in the oasis and thus are natives of the village whose world is shaped and structured by that environment. These individuals were educated and trained in the communication discipline. They reflect the discipline’s basic focus on the world and explore the discipline’s phenomenon. This should not imply that they are all alike because numerous differences exist in any discipline (e.g. sub-fields of any discipline) but they usually have a common focus (“humans as communicators”), familiar conceptual structures, accepted methodologies, and common problems for study.

Changes in a field’s makeup occur gradually and there is still a high degree of interdisciplinary influence in American communication. Scholars still join the field from other disciplines, scholarship draws on interdisciplinary findings, and as the communication discipline has become globalized, many scholars from other countries still have an interdisciplinary background. The result is a situation where the centrality of a disciplinary focus is enriched by interdisciplinary cross-fertilization and stimulation.
Schramm’s analogy clearly fits the Russian situation today. Scholars are still visiting the oasis and others are trying to establish a village. As several scholars have noted (Leontovich, 2008; Sinekopova, 2008; Beebe & Matyash, 2004), the communication discipline is not well established and the necessary degree granting programs are just starting to be created. People from a wide background are trying to define and establish a discipline of communication and while the natives of the village are still to come, there are people who are ready to call the oasis home and to create a discipline of communication in Russia. Part of this process is described in Rozina and Tuzlukova’s (2008) study about the organizational and mediated processes that occurred in 2001 that helped establish the Russian Communication Association.

The Relationship Between Research, Theory and Practice

Implicit in Miller’s reflections are a set of assumptions about the dynamic inter-relationship of theory, research and practice that have implications for a discipline’s legitimation. While Miller emphasized improved research productivity, he also demonstrated how research interfaced with theory, and ultimately with communicative practice. In the United States, the production of clear, replicable and valid research legitimates a discipline in the eyes of other scholars, the development of robust theories legitimates a discipline for its own members, and the practical implications of a discipline legitimates it in the eyes of the public. All of this is necessary for the growth and establishment of a discipline as each element reinforces the others and is prominent at differing historical points.

Growth in Quality and Recognition of Research

There is no question that Miller saw research as one of the keys to improved disciplinary status. Schramm also emphasized it when, in rebutting Berelson’s pessimism, he cited the new directions and exciting results from the field’s research. There has been a clear progression in scholars’ and students’ knowledge about research method. This increased knowledge involves both the breadth and the sophistication of methods employed in the testing, extending and generating of theories. Examples include the founding of the journal *Communication Methods and Measures* in 2007 and the output of research methods volumes edited by communication scholars (e.g. Manusov, 2005; Hayes, Slater & Snyder, 2008).

The founding of journals has also grown in the past fifty years. While professional associations have usually made it one of their first tasks, as the field has matured during the second half of the twentieth century, the number of journals has grown (NCA from 3 to 10 and ICA from 1 to 5). At the same time, there have been at least twenty interdisciplinary (not published by the professional associations) communication journals added to the field.
But what about the quality of communication research? Miller clearly cited an increase in research quality as one of the factors related to the growth of the field. In his article, he offered anecdotal evidence about invitations to publish in other discipline’s publications and argued that “scholars in related disciplines are not only aware of the communication researcher’s work, they are actually citing it in their own books and journals” (p. 375). A systematic look at journals and publishing patterns provides more concrete evidence. A look at the citation pattern of articles published 10 years ago in two journals (Communication Research and Human Communication Research) that have been cited as central to the circulation of knowledge in the communication discipline (Feeley, 2008) illustrate the changes that have occurred. In Communication Research, the 27 articles in that volume have been cited 65 times in Communication Research, 1 time in a communication journal published by a professional association (disciplinary communication journal), 56 times in interdisciplinary communication journals and 42 times in non-communication journals. In Human Communication Research, the 29 articles have been cited 36 times in HCR, 42 times in disciplinary communication journals, 22 times in interdisciplinary communication journals, and 46 times in non-communication journals. In addition, out of the 56 total articles, 9 had authors from outside the communication field. Clearly, there has been a growing visibility of communication scholar’s research and increased recognition of communication journals by those from other disciplines.

Growth in the Development and Recognition of Theory

In Miller’s analysis, the development, refinement and systematization of theories is also an important consideration. A rapid proliferation of new theories, which were created by scholars trained in the communication field, occurred in the 1970s. It was noted earlier that in Dance’s 1967 compendium of theories, only four out of the twelve articles were written by communication scholars. In contrast, his 1982 edited book contained ten articles, all written by people trained in or residing in communication. Additional evidence for a growing emphasis on theories were the publication of the field’s first comprehensive handbooks (Arnold & Bowers in 1984 and Berger & Chaffee in 1987) and its first encyclopedia (Barnouw, Gerbner, Schramm, Worth & Gross; 1989). While the first encyclopedia covered the field in only four volumes, a second one, published in 2008 (Donsbach), took twelve volumes to cover the subject.

In addition, introductory textbooks are increasingly theory focused and anthologies of the field include more and more topics. Over time, anthologies have shifted from a contextual focus (e.g. interpersonal, mass media, intercultural, etc) to more emphasis on theories and research topics. The books have also shown a growing interest in issues of technology, particularly new communication media. Finally, while as late as the 1980s, there was a clear distinction between interpersonal and mediated theories, it is now starting to blur as new communication technologies invade all parts of the field. This has led to efforts to
create theories that integrate all aspects of communication as illustrated by Beck, in her editor’s introduction to the 2006 issue of Communication Yearbook 30 where she challenged authors to “articulate the ways in which their respective reviews could impact (and be informed by) other areas of communication research” (p. xi). These changes in the field indicate that theory has become a central part of the discipline and is fueling our understandings of communication.

An international scholar should be hesitant to try to describe the extent of theory building in Russia since theory has always been important (Sinekopova, 2008; Beebe & Matyash, 2004) and its depth and breadth is not clear to non-Russian scholars. The tip of the iceberg is illustrated by earlier Russian scholars such as Bakhtin, Luria, and Vygotsky, but there also appears to be new theoretical work growing out of traditional areas of thinking in Russia such as linguistics, semiotics and journalism that can contribute to our understanding of communication. For example, Leontovich (2008) discusses conceptology and linguistic personality and Privalova (2008) looks at culturalogy. While an argument can be made that there is probably some overlap with recent international treatments of communication, it is also likely that Russian theorists are developing treatments out of their cultural traditions that will provide new perspectives and enrich our understanding of communication.

Recognition of the Practical Implications of Communication

The one factor implied but not fully considered by Miller, was communication’s practical aspect. While, the field has always stressed the practical importance of communication, it has only been recently that the public has recognized the importance of communication in society. In recent years, the proliferation of new communication technologies has played a major role in the explosion of student and public interest in communication, as has the increasingly acceptance of a speech code that emphasizes the vital role of communication in interpersonal relationships (Carbaugh, 2005). The society’s acceptance of the practical importance of communication has manifest itself in the growing application of communication theory and research to applied fields such as health, law, organizational behavior, and conflict resolution. Fortunately, as the public interest in the practical aspects of communication took off in the 1990s, the theoretical and research infrastructure was in place to provide knowledge about the role and functions of communication in American society.

In Russia, there are also signs that the practical is driving much of the public interest in communication. This can also be seen in the development of programs in public relations and in intercultural communication. The question is whether the rich theoretical background of Russian thinking about communication can be successfully applied to these applications and what kind of research will be marshaled to test the theories used to explain the practical.
The Focus of the Field

As noted by Miller, over the 25 year period that he observed, the field shifted its attention from arguing about what the field should be to doing to focusing on actually doing research and developing theories. This is evidenced by markedly decreased amount of time spent trying to define communication. By 1984, in Arnold and Bower’s *Handbook of Rhetorical and Communication Theory*, Arnold and Frandsen were able to trace the evolution of definitional similarities and Bowers and Bradac were able to show a degree of definitional agreement and identify what questions remained. As a result, subsequent definitional examination became more focused as illustrated in Peters’ (1999) book on the history of views about communication as well as a 1995 conference where more than 100 scholars agreed to define the field as focusing “on how people use messages to generate meanings within and across various contexts, cultures, channels, and media” (Korn, Morreale & Boileau, 2000, p. 40). Over this period of time, two conclusions resulted: 1) no one definition was likely to emerge, and 2) there was a degree of commonality between definitions.

In subsequent years, in an effort to broaden the field, some scholars, unfortunately, argued that defining communication was a fruitless activity. For a while, this position led to the paradoxical situation where some introductory communication textbooks omitted definitions of communication or failed to discuss it (Griffin, 2000). However, recently, this trend has dissipated some (some authors have returned definitions of communication to the latest editions of their textbooks). While endless discussions about defining communication are not a good use of a field’s time and energy, it is detrimental to remain silent about the field’s central concerns because as Zarefsky argued; “By stressing our diversity and ignoring our unity, we invite several damaging judgments about our discipline by outsiders” (1995, p. 105).

**Conclusion**

Has communication matured to the place where it is now accepted as a discipline? In a 1993 article, Everett Rogers and Steven Chaffee discussed the issue with Rogers arguing that emerging field of communication was a discipline, citing the growth in the number of students and scholarly output as evidence. However, Chaffee was not ready to make such a claim, citing the lack of coherence in the field, even though in the end, Rogers succeeds in getting Chaffee to admit that the field was more unified than in the past.

Craig, in his highly influential 1999 article, took a position closer to Chaffee’s when he argued that communication is not yet an identifiable field of study because it lacks coherence and its goal should be a type of dialogical-dialectical coherence based on complementariness and tensions. However, if we go back to Bochner and Eisenberg’s contention that no field has that kind of coherence, then Craig’s recommendation may be a
realistic way to define the field of communication and may also be closer to the norm in other fields than previously thought.

Whether communication is a field, a discipline, multi-disciplinary or something else continues to be debated, but an increasing number of scholars have defined it as a discipline (e.g. Sproule, 2008; Eadie, 2004). In the U.S., the speech, journalism, and social scientific streams have, to a great degree, coalesced in the last half of the twentieth century to form what we now call “communication.” Whether similar coalescence will occur in Russia remains to be seen.

ENDNOTES

1. The author wishes to express appreciation to: a) Maureen Minielli for her many useful comments and suggestions on all versions of the paper, b) Gordon Mitchell for his critique of the original paper, and c) Olga Matyash, Sergei Samoilenko, Olga Leontovich and Irina Rozina for their comments on the original paper.

2. It should be noted that while Ries is an anthropologist who studies Russia and her approach is compatible with Carbaugh’s (2005) work from the point of view of a communication scholar.

3. While some have argued that the field is interdisciplinary by nature, I would argue that its appearance of interdisciplinary is merely a legacy of its earlier interdisciplinary inputs.

4. The evidence for such a process is beyond the limits of this paper but it can be found in the conclusions of scholars such as Pearce & Foss (1990) and Bryant and Miron (2006). In addition, there is evidence from the continual merging of departments in the U.S. and the direction of study in professional organizations such as the International Communication Association and the National Communication Association. This is not meant to imply that the process is complete or uniform.

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BOOK REVIEWS


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This book is dedicated to further development of the idea of integral unity of cognition and communication and is a conceptual extension of the series of the books set up, edited and published in Russian by B. F. Lomov in the 1980s. An outstanding psychologist and organizer of scientific research, B. F. Lomov (1927-1989) was among the founders of engineering psychology in the Soviet Union. He conducted numerous experimental studies of visual and tactile perception, memory, anticipation, spatial concepts and imagination.

Psychological studies of communication (Russian: obschenie) played a major role in the scientific work of B.F. Lomov. In the mid-1970s, B. F. Lomov and his co-workers launched studies of psychological phenomena in the context of joint activity and communication (interaction). The purpose of those studies was to reveal a unique stratum of human existence signaling a specific set of qualities, functions and regularities of the human mind. The Russian word obschenie, considered by B.F. Lomov as a socio-historical category, represents a specific aspect of human social existence, namely a form of human interaction with other humans, in the course of which they exchange actions, information and states. The immediate effect of this process is the establishment and/or implementation of specific new relations between people rather than transformation of objects.

Studies of perception, memory, thinking and representations in face-to-face and mediated communication/interaction and joint activities conducted within the framework of this paradigm show that interaction appears to be the most important foundation and determinant of psychological processes and personality. The effect of interaction may be pinpointed in the ways of organization, selection, estimation and correction of information processed by subjects, in selection of reference points and transformation of images, in widening the background for generalization and abstraction in concept formation, in changes of strategies of solving a variety of problems, etc. (Lomov, 1984). The results of the studies on these topics were reflected in three volumes of collected papers, all initiated and edited by B. F. Lomov.

The first book Problema Obscheniya v Psikhologii [The Problem of Communication in Psychology] (1981) was concentrated on the main directions of psychological studies of
communication, i.e., (1) peculiarities of psychological processes (perception, memory, concept formation, creative thinking) in communication, (2) verbal and non-verbal means of communication, (3) interrelation of communication and joint activity, and (4) communication and personality.

The second collective volume Psikhologicheskie Issledovaniya Obscheniya [Psychological Studies of Communication] (1985) was dedicated to the origins and development of studies of communication in Russian/Soviet psychology. The contributors to that book discussed the approaches developed by B. G. Ananiev, V. M. Bekhterev, V. N. Myasischev and L. S. Vygotsky and also the conceptions of communication by M.M. Bakhtin and A.A. Potebnya. The book also included studies of cognitive processes in communicative situations, analysis of personality determinants of interaction and peculiarities of human joint activities.

Poznanie i Obschenie [Cognition and Communication] (1988) was the third book of the series. That volume was concentrated on the studies of the nature of dialogue and its role in the processes of cognition and human interaction. In part, this new direction of studies was a reflection of the processes rapidly developing in the Soviet society of the 1980s, when dialogue became a most important means of political thinking. The advent of new communication technologies also required attention to their psychological components. It is in that book that the concepts of “cognitive-communicative situation” and “cognitive-communicative process” were first introduced and substantiated. As it happened, that was the last book of the series to which the contributors were both Soviet (e.g., B. F. Lomov, K.A. Abulkhanova, A.A. Bodalev, A.V. Brushlinsky, Ya.A. Ponomarev) and foreign (e.g., M. Cole, M. Griffin, J. Nutten, L. Strickland, G. d’Ydewalle, J. Wertsch) researchers.

Since 1988 communication has become a major category in psychological studies. The level of empirical studies in this area is approaching the exemplary experimental studies of perception, memory and thinking. The integrity of communication and cognition is now widely accepted. Communication is considered as a process of multi-qualitative, multi-level and multi-dimensional subject-subject interaction, continuously developing and subordinate to a very complex system of determinants. This process provides a matrix for generation, functioning and transformations of different psychological phenomena that reflect different sides of a dynamic whole, initiating, directing and controlling communication. It is not a mere coincidence that many researchers discover features of communication in interpersonal perception or collective thinking, and describe the acts of communication in terms of reciprocal cognitive processes.

Following the sudden and untimely death of B. F. Lomov in 1989 and the collapse of financial support of the Russian science, a part of the overall crisis in Russia of the 1990s, publication of books in this series stopped. The studies of cognition and communication, however, continued, intensifying during the last decade. So the primary objective of the new volume under the title Obschenie i Poznanie [Communication and Cognition] that is reviewed here was present recent studies that cast new light on psychological aspects of
communication. Published in 2007, it was also aimed at commemoration of B. F. Lomov on the occasion of his would-be 80-th birthday.

Several contributors to this new book, including V.A. Barabanschikov, V.N. Nosulenko and E.S. Samoylenko participated in one or more of the previous volumes, the other participants made their first contribution to this series. The volume consists of two parts subdivided into six sections and includes 18 chapters.

The first Part (Sections I-III) is dedicated to the origins and nature of cognitive-communicative psychological structures, the emergence of cognitive-communicative phenomena in human and non-human interaction, and cognitive-communicative components of social competence. V.A. Barabanschikov develops the concept of vicar interaction/communication (obschenie) to provide a framework for studies of human face perception that were conducted in cooperation with his co-workers (A.O.Boldyrev, L.A.Khrisanfova, A.V.Zhegallo). The subject matter of their studies reflected in Section I ranges from problems of interpersonal perception to perception of emotion expressed in human face and macro- and microgenesis of perception of facial expression, most of their research being based on empirical materials and experimental studies in visual perception. Cognitive processes as determined by the psychological type of a person are discussed in the contribution by N.G.Artemtseva and N.L.Nagibina, the study being based on a typology developed by the latter author. T.V.Galkina and E.N.Vasina consider self-awareness as a cognitive-communicative process in the chapter dedicated to means and methods of development of self-awareness.

Section II is dedicated to cognitive-communicative phenomenology in human interaction. Cognition in the processes of group decision making is discussed in the chapter by A.V.Karpov on the basis of analysis of transformations of main cognitive phenomena across different levels of organization. A.I.Voronin discusses models and modern approaches to research in joint intellectual activities and formulates requirements to the design of empirical studies of intelligence and creativity in interpersonal interaction. An empirical study of communication in educational environment is the subject matter of the chapter authored by D.D.Denisova, Yu.Yu.Guseva and E.S.Samoylenko. The researchers identify psychological meaning of several types of estimation judgments verbally expressed by a teacher, and analyze their effect on schoolchildren. The contribution by E.V.Koneva is dedicated to problematic situations emerging in the professional activities of school psychologists and criminal investigators (detectives). V.A.Tseptsov discusses results of observations and empirical studies of processes of negotiations revealing the dynamicity of participants’ goals as a function of situations, types of interaction and personal properties of negotiators.

Section III is dedicated to cognitive-communicative components of social competence. Theoretical problems of research in social intelligence and creativity, as well as methodology of psycho-diagnostics involved are discussed in the chapter authored by D.V.Ushakov. O.A.Kostygova and E.S.Samoylenko analyze sociometric procedures as applied to the
studies of school classes, specifically, attractiveness of members of a class as a social group, within the framework of the broader concept of cognitive-communicative components of a child’s social status.

The Second Part (Sections IV-VI) of the book is dedicated to some applications of fundamental research in psychology of communication/interaction.

Section IV is dedicated to studies of discourse within the framework of socio-psychological relations. Methodology of intent analysis as applied to studies of intentions of politicians in pre-electoral discourse is discussed in the paper by A.A.Grigorieva, N.D.Pavlova and E.A.Peskova based on the empirical study of materials collected during 2003 elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation. A.K.Alekseev pinpoints several metaphorical models of discourse used in Russian electoral campaigns and describes dynamic changes in three selected models during the 2003 campaign as compared with the first post-Soviet decade. Peculiar features of understanding in family discourse, specifically mutual understanding interpreted as understanding of a partner’s intentions, are described in the contribution by I.A.Zachesova based on materials of dialogues registered in one family.

Studies in communication mediated by modern technology are represented in Section V. S.Lahlou, V.N.Nosulenko and E.S.Samoylenko describe experimental use of a specific device, “the indicator of moods” displaying colorful patterns that allegedly “reflect” the moods of subjects engaged in individual and joint activities. They also discuss prospects for further development of experimental procedures of assessment of new technological devices within the paradigm elaborated in their earlier studies. Modern tendencies in the studies of e-mail mediated communication are reviewed in the contribution by E.S.Samoylenko.

In Section VI N.L.Karpova’s contribution is dedicated to cognitive-communicative studies in psychotherapy, specifically, to correction of disruptions in verbal communication (logoneuroses). Proceeding from her analysis of modifications in logoneurotics in the course of family group psychotherapy, the author proposes a modified version of B.F.Lomov model of interaction/communication.

The editors of the book sought to balance contributions dedicated to theory, experiment and psychological practice in order to demonstrate their interrelation and interdependence. As in the 1970s and 1980s, the examples of research presented in the book are complex studies; many of them are inspired by results from neighboring disciplines, such as sociology, political studies, pedagogy, linguistics, informatics, biology and even paleontology. However, their authors shed new light on the problems of generation, organization and functioning of psychological processes in communication, interrelation of verbal and non-verbal means, interrelation and reciprocal transfer of communication and joint activity, and the role of personality structure and transformations of personality in communication.

The volume under review is a rich collection of empirical and experimental data, new empirical methods and theoretical approaches to the cognitive-communicative
interrelationships. At the same time, such interrelationships still need a more systematic elaboration, for a lot of “white spots” still remain on its map. Thus the problems raised by B.F. Lomov in the 1970-1980s still remain very relevant today and call for further research.

REFERENCES


Reviewed by Boris Gubman, professor and head of the Department of Theory and History of Culture, Tver State University, Russia (bgubman@tversu.ru)

Culture was born due to human efforts to create a new reality rising above the limits of nature. Its material dimension serves as the outer expression of the ideal world existing at a certain time period within human minds. Thus, the world is given to us not in the form of a mirror image, but rather as a representation based on the faculty of our imagination using a variety of sign systems. This approach motivates M. Yampolsky’s study of the history of basic representation patterns in European culture.

The two symbolic personae — those of a weaver and a clairvoyant - should guide us, Yampolsky believes, in our tour in the history of representation in European culture. While the weaver should be understood as a symbol of a certain mimetic kind of representation associated with the material action of a craftsman, the clairvoyant is a figure inspired by the imaginary vision of the ideal dimension of human life (p.7). The author is convinced that, in the course of the European cultural history, the clairvoyant gradually wins his battle against the weaver thus giving us a chance to comprehend the creative nature of any cultural representation. Tracing back the history of this continuous struggle, Yampolsky invites the reader to undertake a kind of genealogical analysis based primarily on Foucault’s and Derrida’s approaches to cultural phenomena (pp. 323-324).

The first part of the book reveals the main stages of the transition from the mimetic kind of understanding of the nature of representation to its interpretation in the creative key. The Greek and the mediaeval readings of the representation phenomenon were inconceivable without the reference to the transcendental signified. For instance, Plato’s vision of a distinguishing and unifying representation procedure is based on the comparison with the weaver’s fiber production and constitutes a kind of techné-like activity. In this respect, a craftsman’s skills leading to the idea of reproduction are higher in order than the mimetic painter’s art of giving the portrayal of the superficial phenomena (pp. 59-60). This understanding of representation survives throughout the Antiquity and the Middle Ages until the Renaissance when Raphael proposed another interpretation of its nature. He looked at art as a creative imaginative and sensually given representation of a pure idea thus opening the horizon for a triumph of the clairvoyant over the weaver. Changing radically the previously existing paradigm of thought, the Renaissance makes an artist a sovereign creator resembling God (p.72). This idea was inherited and further developed by the Romanticism theorists and those of life philosophy. Since the Renaissance, in Yampolsky’s opinion, painting has become the meta-pattern for modernity culture (p. 140). Following this line of
argument, he comes to the conclusion that the Renaissance thought makes a discovery of the symbolical power of the political representation (p. 83). However, the creative nature of representation was not simultaneously discovered in all the areas of Renaissance culture. In philosophy, this idea became fully justified in I. Kant’s epistemological doctrine and further developed on the basis of his thought. The example of science history clearly reveals that here the creative power of representation was understood much later together with the rise of the post-classical paradigm of thought at the end of the 19th century.

In the second part of the book, Yampolsky explores the specific functions of the modernity period of political representation. Moving along this path, he provides a deep analysis of the empire city project of St.-Petersburg, comparing it with that of Rome. Any historically significant city, the author rightly believes, has its own mythology. While the Greek polis was understood as related to a certain genealogy, the Roman, mediaeval and early modernity cities possessed unbreakable ties with the transcendental signified (p. 230). Since Petrarca, Rome has been for many thinkers a kind of mnemonic theatre, allowing them to create ideal images of the city, a certain point of reference for the understanding of other places. St. Petersburg should be interpreted as an empire capital created ex-nihilo in accordance with the will of the sovereign ruler, Peter the Great, whose dream was to find a place for the Antiquity heritage on the Russian soil (p. 250). Comparing it with Rome, N. Gogol, Yampolsky argues, revealed the illusionary and eschatological nature of St. Petersburg as material illustration of a royal vision of an ideal city, bridging the gap between Russia and the West.

The Renaissance idea of representation, Yampolsky believes, was ruined by the end of the 18th - beginning of the 19th centuries due to the loss of the transcendental signified that became apparent with the birth of aestheticism. In the third part of the book, the author is trying to analyze the consequences of the triumph of the endless “representation of the representation,” the inner game of using reference to another set of signs for Russian and European cultures (p. 324). In the West, the romantic play, with the imaginary reality devoid of the transcendental signified, was a prelude to the age of modernist art. Facing the same challenge, Russian culture reacted in a different way. The author contends that N. Gogol and N. Leskov responded to this situation with the criticism of European pattern of cultural representation of Russian life and the appeal to religious language. They criticized representation as a search for truth in reality given in prayer and simple non-subjective storytelling (skaz). F. Dostoyevsky rightly remarked that, what Leskov took for truth was the fictitious representation masking reality. In their revolt against the Western strategy of representation, Gogol and Leskov produced the literary strategy that was later accepted by the Russian modernist art also criticizing the illusory nature of representation but no longer looking for truth. This new chapter in the story of cultural representation is given by the author in an outline form and looks quite promising.

M. Yampolsky’s book is a good invitation for a tour along the path of different stages of representation development in European and Russian cultures. The book allows the reader
to understand better the epistemological and semiotic nature of the representation phenomenon and its cultural functions. The story of the weaver and the clairvoyant continues and is open for new significant adventures.

Reviewed by Alexander M. Martin, associate professor of European History, University of Notre Dame (a.m.martin@nd.edu)

Except when dealing with religious or administrative matters, Muscovite elites were a rather uncommunicative lot compared with contemporaries elsewhere in Europe. How to reconstruct, then, the thought processes of a society that produced so few works of fiction, philosophy, autobiography, secular history, or portraiture? This “silence of Muscovy” (p. 1) impedes comparisons with other early modern Christian polities, makes it difficult to assess the balance of innovation and continuity in the subsequent Petrine reforms, and allows for no end of myth-making—whether of the Slavophile or Westernizer variety—about life in early modern Russia.

As in other fields where sources are in short supply, scholars of Muscovy have to be creative if they wish to pierce the veil of silence. Valerie Kivelson’s book on Muscovite maps offers an admirable demonstration of what can be achieved through the ingenious reading of unlikely source material. After an introductory discussion of the history of Muscovite mapmaking, she divides the remainder of her book into two sections—one on maps that illustrate local property disputes in Russia’s European heartland, the other on maps of Russia’s vast Siberian empire and its exotic inhabitants. Her book is impressive both for its skillful use of sources and for the light these sources shed on major issues in Russian history.

First, the sources themselves. We are often told not to judge a book by its cover, but in this case the cover—which shows a map of the town of Uglich and a nearby monastery—can serve to illustrate what there is to be learned by studying early modern Russian maps. The local rivers near Uglich are represented only in the most schematic form, for Muscovite mapmakers, Kivelson tells us, were typically men from the local service classes without specialized training as geographers. By contrast, much effort went into a lovely drawing of the town of Uglich, with a church towering over the scene, for the omnipresence of onion domes marked Russia symbolically as a Christian land. Mostly the map shows forests, which the artist indicated with dozens of elaborately drawn and colored trees. Why such painstaking detail? Because, we learn, Russian Orthodox icons—the key source of artistic inspiration for the amateur mapmakers—used trees to symbolize the Garden of Eden, which is how Muscovite mapmakers imagined their own country. Scattered among the trees are neatly outlined villages and *pustoshi* (the abandoned plowland whose ownership the map was supposed to document), reflecting the desire to carve out a human-scale sense of “place” amidst the vast “space” of the Russian plain. The map documents the local monastery’s claims on these lands in an ongoing legal dispute: proof, Kivelson tells us,
that maps in early modern Russia were not mere instruments of domination but rather allowed local groups to assert their own interests. The map’s bottom edge is filled with the names of local peasants whose expert testimony about local boundaries and landmarks was needed to corroborate the monastery’s account: thus, “through their locatedness in space,” even enserfed peasant villagers “derived a subordinate but stable civic identity and with it a certain degree of economic security and local authority” (p. 78).

Maps thus provide a remarkable window onto the worldview of the middling state servitors who typically drew them. Through a close examination of maps documenting real-estate disputes and imperial expansion—many of them reproduced in this beautifully illustrated book—Kivelson is able to address a host of important questions about Muscovite society, ranging from the relationship between tsar and subject to attitudes toward property and imperial conquest to the balance of optimism and pessimism in Muscovite religious thought. As she notes, the seventeenth century was an era when the increasing use of maps, the immobility implicit in serfdom, and the simultaneous expansion into Siberia all combined to transform Russians’ sense of space. All this is sometimes interpreted as a process by which bureaucrats, landlords, and conquistadors imposed an increasingly centralized and authoritarian order on a previously fluid society. However, Kivelson discerns a different pattern.

The maps from European Russia, as in the example from Uglich described above, were intended as evidence in property disputes among landlords. There is little sign that officials from Moscow simply imposed their will; instead, local landowners bombarded the center with self-interested claims and counterclaims that officials were left to sort out as best they could. Moreover, far from being mere objects of all this litigiousness, the enserfed peasants were themselves active participants in the proceedings. Lawsuits typically required their testimony to confirm the accuracy of the property claims recorded on the maps, a power that the peasants commonly used to back their own particular lord (because his ownership interest in the land coincided with theirs). Spatial location was ultimately a source not only of bondage but also of rights—e.g., the presence of a certain landlord’s peasants on a piece of land bolstered that landlord’s as well as his peasants’ claim of ownership. The evolving sense of spatiality associated with serfdom and state-building thus contributed, Kivelson notes, “to shaping a far more interactive, inclusive polity than has generally been imagined in discussions of Muscovy under the Romanov autocrats” (p. 11).

The maps of Siberia open up questions that seem different at first glance but then prove remarkably similar. The central issue here involves the portrayal of indigenous peoples. Kivelson’s discussion hinges on a fascinating comparison with contemporaneous maps of European colonies in the Americas. For example, the book reproduces two seventeenth-century maps of Virginia: one is enlivened by small drawings of local plants and animals but no natives (p. 180), while the other includes drawings of Indians only in the margins (p. 182). What neither map contains is any indication that particular Indian communities were associated with particular areas in a land subject to European
colonization. Contrast this with a map of the Upper Tobol River (plate 25) that is dotted with little Orthodox onion domes, mosques, yurts, and more, all intended to show precisely which nationality lived where, or a map (plate 28) that shows Siberia, from China all the way to the Arctic Ocean, divided into neatly delineated territories of specific native peoples.

What to make of this? As with the local maps from European Russia, Kivelson finds in the Siberian case that the Muscovite autocracy was intensely concerned to connect particular populations with specific territories. At one level, this policy reflected the same pragmatic imperative of facilitating the exploitation of native peoples that drove early modern imperialism everywhere. However, she also identifies a cultural component reflecting the traditions of the imperial metropole. One of the ideological underpinnings of English society was the notion of the rights of Englishmen, while Spain and France drew essential parts of their identity from Catholicism; this helps to explain why the French and the Spaniards sought to incorporate their colonial subjects into a homogenized Catholic society, while the English expelled or exterminated them. In Russia, by contrast, the maps from the European provinces depicted a social order built on a hierarchy of distinct, locally rooted, reciprocally dependent communities whose very diversity was tribute to the greatness of the tsar who ruled over them all. Kivelson argues that the Russians transferred this model to their Siberian possessions as well, where the sheer variety of tributary nationalities provided evidence of Muscovite imperial glory. Moreover, the implantation of Orthodox Russian people, settlements, and shrines was sufficient to render the Siberian land symbolically Christian, thereby obviating any perceived need to eliminate native religions. While no less single-minded in the service of God, gold, and glory than conquistadors elsewhere—and, Kivelson emphasizes, just as cruel and rapacious as their West European counterparts—the Russians created an empire that ultimately made greater allowance for the interests of the indigenous peoples than did the Spaniards or the French, let alone the English.

What can we take away from reading this marvelous book? First, in my view, that the time-honored image of Muscovite Russia as a harshly hierarchical society, one where power flowed only from the top down, needs to be treated with caution; there is much evidence of dialogue and compromise, and we should not accept at face value, unexamined, the rhetorical self-image of the autocratic regime. Second, it is a mistake, albeit a common one, to exclude Muscovy from the study of the early modern Atlantic empires, for there is much to be learned from their similarities as well as their divergences. Finally, even the vaunted “silence of Muscovy” can be broken if historians deploy sufficient imagination and creativity in their use of the sources.
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